It is necessary, however, that credibility should be demonstrative. But it is requisite to demonstrate (since controversy is respecting four things) by adducing a demonstration of the controverted subject. Thus for instance, if it is controverted whether a thing has been done, it is especially necessary in a judicial process to give a demonstration of this; or if it is controverted whether this man has been injured, or whether he has been injured to the extent alledged, or whether justly or not. And in a similar manner of the existence of the thing controverted. Nor must we be ignorant that in this controversy alone, one of the persons must necessarily be depraved; for here ignorance is not the cause, as if certain persons were disputing about justice; so that this controversy but not others must be diligently discussed. But in demonstrative orations the amplification will for the most part consist in showing that actions have been beautiful and beneficial; for it is necessary to believe in facts. For demonstrations are seldom given of these things unless they are incredible, or another person is supposed to be the cause of them. In popular orations, however, it may be contended that a thing will not be; or that what is advised will take place, but that it is not just; or that it is not beneficial, or that it is not of such great consequence. It is likewise necessary to see whether the opponent has asserted any thing false, which does not pertain to the cause; since from this as from a sign it may be inferred that he has also spoken falsely in other things. Examples, however, are indeed most adapted to popular orations; but enthymemes to judicial orations. For the former are conversant with the future; so that examples must necessarily be derived from past events. But judicial orations are conversant with things which exist, or do not exist, in which there is in a greater degree demonstration and necessity. For that which has been done is attended with necessity. Enthymemes, however, must not be adduced in a continued series, but must be mingled with other things more pleasant and easy; since if this is not done, they will be detrimental to each other; for there is a boundary of quantity. Hence, in Homer in Odyss. 4. Menelaus praises Pisistratus the son of Nestor, for the mediocrity of his speech. “Dear youth, you have said just as much as a wise man would have said.” For he does not praise him that he said such things, but so much and no more. Nor must enthymemes be investigated in every subject; for if this precept is not observed, you will do that which some of those who philosophise do, who syllogistically collect things more known and credible, than the propositions from which they are deduced. When, likewise, you wish to excite the passions, do not introduce an enthymeme i.e. abstain from argument; for the enthymeme will either expel the passion, or will be introduced in vain. For motions which exist at one and the same time expel each other, and either destroy themselves, or become imbecil. Nor when the oration is ethical is it proper at the same time to search for any enthymeme; for demonstration has neither the power of expressing manners, nor deliberate choice. Sentences, however, must be used both in narration and confirmation; for they are ethical; as, “And I indeed entrusted him with this, though I knew that it was not proper to believe in any man.” But if you wish to speak pathetically, you may say, “And I do not repent though I have been injured; for gain is with him, but justice with me.” It is not without reason, however, that popular orations are more difficult than such as are judicial; because they are conversant with the future; but the judicial are conversant with the past, which is scientifically known to diviners, as Epimenides the Cretan said. For he did not predict about future events, but about such past events as were immanifest. And the law is an hypothesis in judicial orations; but he who possesses the principle, can more easily discover the demonstration. Popular orations, likewise, have not many digressions; such for instance as, a digression to the opponent, either respecting himself, or which may produce the pathetic; but such orations admit these, the least of all things, unless they depart from their proper employment. It is requisite, therefore, that he should digress, who is in want of arguments; and this method is adopted by the Athenian rhetoricians, and also by Isocrates. For giving counsel he accuses the Lacedæmonians, in his Panegyric; but in his oration concerning Peace, he accuses Chares. In demonstrative orations, however, it is requisite to insert praise as an episode, as Isocrates does; for he always introduces something which he may praise. And Gorgias employed the same art, who said, “That he should never be in want of an oration.” For if he speaks of Achilles, he praises Peleus, afterwards Aeacus, and afterwards the God i.e. Jupiter, the great grandfather of Achilles. In a similar manner he praises the fortitude of Achilles. He, therefore, who has demonstrations, may speak both ethically and demonstratively. But if you have not enthymemes, you may speak ethically. And it is more adapted to a worthy man that he should appear to be a good man, than that he should deliver an accurate oration. Of enthymemes, however, those which are adapted to confutation are more approved, than those which are demonstrative; because such things as produce confutation are evidently more syllogistic; for contraries when placed by each other become more known.
Arguments, however, which are employed against the opponent are not specifically different from those which we employ in our own defence; but it pertains to credibility, to dissolve some things by objection, and others by syllogism. It is also necessary both in consultation and in a judicial process, that he who first pleads his cause, should in the first place confirm his cause, but afterwards should dissolve or extenuate the arguments contrary to his own. But if the opposing arguments are many, these must be first confuted, as Callistratus did in the Messeniac assembly; for he first refuted what his adversaries could say, and then said what conduced to his own cause. He, however, who speaks in the second place, ought first to encounter the reasoning of his adversary, dissolving it, and syllogizing in opposition to it, and especially if the arguments of his opponent have been approved. For as the soul is not favourably disposed towards those who have been already accused of crimes, after the same manner neither does it willingly attend to an oration, if the opponent appears to have spoken well. In order to prepare the mind of the auditor, therefore, to hear an oration, it is necessary first to show that what the opponent has said is false. Hence, the orator must fight against either all the arguments of his opponent, or the greatest of them, or those which are most approved, or those which may be easily confuted, and thus render his own arguments credible. Thus Hecuba in Euripides, “But first the goddesses I will assist; For Juno,” &c. For here Hecuba first confutes what was most infirm. And thus much concerning confirmation. But with respect to manners, since for a man to say certain things about himself, is either invidious, or is attended with circumlocution or contradiction; and to speak of another person is attended either with slander or rusticity;—hence, it is necessary to introduce another person speaking, as Isocrates does in his oration against Phillip, and in his Antidosis; and as Archilochus blames. For he makes the father Lycambes say concerning his daughter, in an Iambic verse, “There is nothing which may not be expected to be done, and nothing which will not be sworn to, through money.” And in another Iambic, the beginning of which is, “I care not for the riches of Gyges,” he introduces Charon the artist speaking. Thus, also, Aemon the son of Creon, and the husband of Antigone, in Sophocles, while he supplicates his father Creon for the life of Antigone, commemorates the praises of Antigone not from his own proper, but from another person. It is necessary also to change enthymemes, and sometimes to change them into sentences; as,”It is requisite that those who are intelligent should form compacts with enemies, when they are in prosperity; for thus they will be attended with the greatest advantage.” But this is done enthymematically as follows: “For if it is then requisite to form compacts, when they are most useful, and replete with the most advantageous conditions, it is also necessary that they should be made in prosperity.”
The lessons published on this site are freely available to read. If you wish to move from reading to formal study — with graded assessments, academic records, and the support of the Academy — you may enroll at any time. Enrollment is open year round, to students of all ages.
