But narration in demonstrative orations, is not continued, but distinguished into parts. For it is necessary in demonstrative orations to enumerate those actions, from which the oration is composed. For an oration of this kind is composed, so as to be partly inartificial (since the orator is not the cause of any of the actions,) and partly artificial. This, however, consists in showing, either that the thing is, if it is incredible, or what the quality, or quantity of it is, or in exhibiting all these. On this account, sometimes it is not requisite to narrate every thing, because thus to demonstrate is adverse to facility of remembrance. Thus for instance, it may be said, “That from these things it appears that he is a brave man; but from those, a wise, or just man.” And the one oration is more simple, i.e. the oration in which every thing is narrated in a continued series without any confirmation and amplification; but the other in which there is confirmation and amplification, is various and not elaborate. It is necessary, however, to call to mind things and persons known and celebrated; on which account the greater part of celebrated persons and things do not require narration; as if, for instance, you should be willing to praise Achilles; for all men are acquainted with his actions; but it is requisite to make use of these actions. But if you were willing to praise Critias, narration is necessary; for he is not known by many persons. At present, however, rhetoricians ridiculously say that narration should be rapid; though what a certain person said in reply to a baker asked, “whether he wished that he should make soft or hard bread,” may be applied to these. For his answer was, “Is it not possible to make good bread, so that it may be neither hard nor soft, but of a moderate condition?” For it is requisite neither to make a long narration, as neither is it necessary to make a long exordium, nor to dwell on the credibility of what is narrated; since here also propriety consists neither in rapidity, nor conciseness, but in mediocrity. But this is effected by narrating such things as render the affair manifest; or such things as induce the audience to believe that the thing has been done, or that the person has been hurt, or the injury has been committed, or that the transactions were of that magnitude which the orator wishes the hearers to believe they were. Things, however, of a nature contrary to these are to be adduced by the opponent. The orator, likewise; should insert in his narration such things as pertain to his own virtue; such as, “But I always admonished him to act justly, and not to desert his children.” Or he should insert in his narration such things as pertain to the depravity of another person; as in the above instance. “But he answered me, that wherever he was he should have other children,” which Herodotus in Euterpe says, was the answer of the Egyptians, when they revolted from their king. Or he should insert such things as are pleasing to the judges. To the defendant, however, narration is less necessary; but the subjects of controversies are, whether a thing has been done or not, whether it is detrimental or not, whether it is unjust or not, and whether it is a thing of so much consequence or not. Hence, the defendant must not dwell upon a thing that is acknowledged, unless something is said in opposition to his statement of the affair. For then he must show, that admitting the thing to have been done, yet it was not unjust. Farther still, it is necessary to narrate things which have not been done, as if they had been done, if they are calculated to produce commiseration or indignation. Examples of this are, the fabulous narration of Ulysses to Alcinous, and again to Penelope, which is effected in thirty verses. Another example is that of Phayllus, who contracted a very long poem which was called the circle, and also the prologue of Euripides in his Oeneus. But it is necessary that the narration should be ethical; and this will be effected, if we know what produces manners. One thing, therefore, which produces them is, a manifestation of deliberate choice; and manners are good or bad from the quality which they possess. But deliberate choice is such as it is from the end. On this account mathematical discussions are not ethical, because they do not contain in themselves deliberate choice; for they have not that for the sake of which a thing is done i.e. they do not consider the end; but this is the business of Socratic discussions; for these consider things of this kind. The oration also expresses manners, which exhibits such things as are consequent to manners; such as, “That at the same time he said these things, he went away;” for this manifests audacity, and rusticity of manners. The oration likewise is rendered ethical by not speaking as if from a syllogistic process, like rhetoricians of the present day, but as if from deliberate intention; as, “I have wished,” And, “For this was the object of my deliberate choice; since though I should desire no emolument from it, it is a better thing.” For the one i.e. to speak as if from a syllogistic process is the province of a prudent man; but the other, i.e. to speak from deliberate intention, is the province of a good man. For it belongs to a prudent man to pursue what is beneficial, but to a good man to pursue what is beautiful in conduct. If, however, what you narrate is incredible, then the cause is to be explained; an example of which is from the Antigone of Sophocles, “That she was more anxiously concerned for her brother, than for her husband or children; for she might repair the loss of her husband and children by marrying again; but her mother and father having descended to Hades, she could never have another brother.” But if you cannot assign the cause, you may say, “That you are not ignorant you relate what is incredible, but that you are naturally disposed not to admit any thing disgraceful.” For mankind do not believe that any action is performed willingly, except it is advantageous. Again, that the narration may be ethical, it is requisite that it should be pathetic; and this is effected by relating such things as are consequent to the passions, which are known to the audience, and which particularly relate either to the orator, or his opponent; as, “But he departed looking after me;” and as Aeschines says of Cratylus, “That he hissed, and clapped with his hands.” For these things are adapted to persuade; because these things which the audience know, are symbols of what they do not know.” Many things also of this kind may be assumed from Homer; as in Odyss. 19. “Then o’er her face the beldam spread her hands.” For those who begin to weep, cover their eyes with their hands. In the beginning of the oration, likewise, you should introduce yourself as a worthy, and your opponent as an unworthy man that the audience may survey you and your opponent as such. But this should be done latently. And that this may be easily accomplished may be seen from those who announce any thing to us; for concerning things of which we know nothing, we at the same time form a certain opinion of their truth or falsehood. In many places, however, it is necessary to narrate, and sometimes not in the beginning of the oration. But in a popular oration, there is no need of narration, because no one makes a narration of future events. If, however, there should happen to be narration in it, it will be of past events, in order that by recalling them into the memory, there may be a better consultation about such as are future, either employing on this occasion accusation or praise; but then he who does this, will not perform the office of a counsellor. If, however, that which is narrated is incredible, then you ought to promise the audience, that you will immediately assign the cause of it, and leave it to the audience to believe or not as they please. Thus Iocastra in the Oedipus of Carcinus, when she says something incredible in answer to him who asks her concerning his son, always promises that she would prove the truth of what she had said. And the Aemon of Sophocles employs the same art.
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