With respect to interrogation, it is then especially seasonable to employ it, when something is said by the opponent of such a nature, that by the addition of one interrogation, an absurdity will ensue. Thus Pericles asked Lampo concerning the mysteries of Ceres who was called the saviour goddess; but Lampo replied, “That it was unlawful for one who was uninitiated to hear them related.” Pericles, however, again asked him, “If he knew these mysteries.” And Lampo replying that he did, “And how is this possible, said Pericles, since you are uninitiated?” In the second place, it is seasonable to employ interrogation, when one of the premises from which something follows favourable to our cause is perspicuous, but the other will be evidently granted by the opponent; for then it is requisite to interrogate concerning such premise, and immediately conclude, without interrogating concerning the other premise, which is perspicuous. Thus Socrates when Melitus accused him of not believing there were Gods, asked him whether he thought there was any such thing as a dæmoniacal nature; and when Melitus acknowledged that he did, Socrates also asked him, whether dæmons were not either the sons of the Gods, or something divine. But Melitus granting that they were, Is it possible, therefore, said Socrates, that any one can believe that there are sons of the Gods, and yet that there are no Gods? Farther still, interrogation may likewise be seasonably employed, when we wish to show that the opponent contradicts himself, or asserts something paradoxical. In the fourth place, it may be opportunely employed, when the opponent can only answer to what is said sophistically, by asserting that a certain thing is and is not, or partly is, and partly is not, or in a certain respect is, and in a certain respect is not; for the auditors are disturbed by such answers, and are dubious as to their meaning. When, however, none of the above-mentioned opportunities occur, interrogation must not be employed; for if it should happen that the opponent answers properly, and eludes the interrogation, he who interrogates will appear to be vanquished. For many questions must not be asked on account of the imbecility of the mind of the auditor. Hence, it is especially necessary that enthymemes should be contracted.
It is likewise requisite to reply to ambiguous questions, by logically dividing, and not speaking concisely. But to things apparently true, a solution must immediately be given with the answer, before the opponent can add a second interrogation, or syllogize. For it is not difficult to foresee what he wishes to infer. This, however, and the solutions, i.e. the mode of avoiding and solving captious interrogations, will be manifest to us from the Topics. If the question, also, of the opponent produces a conclusion against us, it will be opportune in the answer to assign the cause why it does so. Thus, Sophocles being asked by Pisander, whether he was of the opinion of the other senators that a dominion of forty persons should be established? He replied that he was. And when he was again asked, “Does not this appear to you to be a base thing? He said, It does.” “Have you therefore, Pisander replied, given your assent to this base deed?” “I have, said Sophocles, for no better measure could be adopted,” Thus, too, that Lacon who had been an Ephorus, or senator, when he was desired to give an account of his conduct while he was in adminstration, was asked by some one, “Whether his colleagues appeared to him to have been justly condemned. He replied they did.” But the other, then said “Did not you also decree the same things together with them.” He acknowledged that he did. “Is it not therefore just, the other replied, that you also should be put to death.” “By no means said Lacon. For they did these things, having received money for doing them; but I did not; since my conduct was the result of my own judgement.” Hence, neither is it proper to interrogate after the conclusion, nor to interrogate concerning the conclusion itself, unless much truth is contained in it. With respect to ridicule, however, since it appears to possess a certain use in contests, and it is necessary, as Gorgias rightly said, that the serious arguments of the opponent should he dissolved by laughter, and his laughter by serious arguments, we have shown in the Poetic, how many species of ridicule there are. But of these species, one indeed is adapted to a liberal man, and another is not. The orator, therefore, must assume that species of ridicule, which is adapted to the occasion. Irony, however, is more liberal than scurrility. For he who employs irony, produces the ridiculous for his own sake; but he who employs scurrility, for the sake of another person.
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