Since, however, it is possible that one thing may be a syllogism, and another not, but only appear to be so; it is likewise necessary with respect to an enthymeme, that this should be, and that should not be, but should only appear to be an enthymeme; since an enthymeme also is a certain syllogism. But there are places of apparent enthymemes; one indeed in the diction; and of this, one part, as in dialectics is, when though nothing is syllogistically concluded, yet at the last it is inferred, It is not therefore this, or that; or it necessarily is this or that. What also is said in enthymemes contortly and oppositely, appears to be an enthymeme, though it is not so in reality; for such a diction is the receptacle of enthymeme. And a thing of this kind appears to be from the figure of the diction. For the purpose however of speaking syllogistically in the diction, it is useful to produce the heads of many syllogisms, as, “These he saved, others he avenged, but he liberated the Greeks.” For each of these is demonstrated from others. But from the conjunction of these something appears to be effected. Another place of apparent enthymemes is derived from equivocation; as, if some one should say “that μυς mus a mouse is a worthy animal; for the mysteries are the most honourable of all initiatory rites.” Or, if some one making an encomium on a dog, should also comprehend in his encomium the celestial dog, or the god Pan, because Pindar says, “O blessed, whom the Olympian gods call the all-various dog of the great goddess.” Or if it should be said, “That it is most dishonourable there should be no dog; so that it is evident that a dog is honourable.” And to say, “That Hermes is the most communicative of all the gods; for he alone is called common Hermes.” Likewise to say “That logos speech is most worthy; because good men are worthy not of riches, but of logos speech;” for to be worthy of logos is not simply predicated. Another place consists in speaking things which are separated, conjunctively, or things which are conjoined, disjunctively. For since each of these modes of speaking appears to be the same, though frequently it is not the same, it is requisite to adopt whichever of these is more useful. The first example of this place is that of Euthydemus, “To know being in Sicily that there is a three-ranked galley in the Piræus.” Another example is “That he who knows the elements of a verse, knows the verse; for a verse is the same thing as the elements from which it is composed. Another example of this place is, “That since twice so much of a thing is noxious, neither can the half of that quantity be said to be salubrious; for it is absurd, if two things are good, that one of them should be bad.” Thus, therefore, this place is useful for the purpose of confutation. But it is ostensive as follows; “For one good is not two evils.” In short, this place is paralogistic. Again, another example is that of Polycrates respecting Thrasybulus, “That he deposed the thirty tyrants.” For this is conjunctive. Or what is said in the Orestes of Theodectes; for it is from division, or is disjunctive, viz. “It is just that she who killed her husband should die;. and it is also just that a son should revenge his father. It is just, therefore, that the mother Clytemnestra should be slain by the son Orestes.” For if these sentences are conjoined, the conclusion, perhaps will no longer be just. In this sophism likewise, there is a fallacy of defect; for it is not expressed by whom it is just that the mother should be slain. Another place consists in confirming or confuting by exaggeration. And this is when a man not showing that he has done a certain deed, amplifies the thing. For thus he causes it to appear either that he has not done the deed, when he who defends the cause amplifies, or that he did it when the accuser was enraged. Hence, it is not an enthymeme. For the hearer falsely collects that he has or has not done the deed, the thing not being demonstrated. Another place is derived from a sign; for this also is unsyllogistic. As if some one should say, “Lovers are advantageous to cities; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton deposed the tyrant Hipparchus.” And, likewise, if some one should say, “That Dionysius was a thief; for he was a depraved character.” For this is unsyllogistic; since not every depraved character is a thief, but every thief is a depraved character. Another place is derived from that which is accidental; as in what Polycrates said of the mice, “That they aided the city by gnawing the bowstrings of the enemy.” Or if some one should say, that to be invited to supper is a most honourable thing; for Achilles, in consequence of not being invited was enraged against the Greeks in Tenedos. But he, as being despised was angry; and this happened because he was not invited. Another place is derived from that which is consequent; as for instance, in what is said of Paris, “That he was magnanimous; for despising an association with the multitude, he dwelt in mount Ida by himself.” For because magnanimous men are lovers of solitude, Paris also may appear to be magnanimous. And, “Since a certain person decorates himself, and wanders by night, he is an adulterer;” because adulterers also are men of this kind. In a similar manner it may be proved that mendicants and exiles are happy. “Because mendicants sing and dance in temples; and because it is permitted exiles to dwell where they please.” For because, these things are present with those that appear to be happy, those also to whom these things are present, may seem to be happy. There is here however a difference in the mode; on which account this example falls into defect, i.e. it is a fallacy of defect. Another place is derived from that which is causeless as if it were a cause; as when that which is done together with another thing, or after it, is assumed as if it had been done for the sake of it. And this place is especially used by politicians, as by Demades, who said, “That the administration of Demosthenes, was the cause of all evils; since war happened after it.” Another place is derived from a deficiency in the time when, and the manner in which a thing is done; such for instance as this, “That Paris justly ravished Helen; for the choice was given to Helen by her father of marrying whom she pleased.” For perhaps this choice, was not given to her always, but at first; and the authority of her father over her extended so far as to this. Or as if some one should say, “That to strike free men is insolence.” For it is not entirely so, but when he who strikes was not provoked. Farther still, another place is when in litigious disputes, an apparent syllogism is produced from that which is simply, and that which is not simply; as in dialectics, it is shown that non-being is being. For non-being is non-being. And it is also shown that what is unknown is the object of science. For the unknown is the object of science, because it is unknown, i.e. because it is known that it is unknown. Thus also in orations there is an apparent enthymeme, from that which is not simply probable, but is a certain probable thing. This probability, however, does not take place universally, as Agatho also says, “Perhaps some one may say that this is probable, that many things which are not probable happen to mortals.” For that which is unlikely happens. Hence, what is unlikely is likely. But if this be the case, that which is not probable is probable. This, however, is not simply true; but as in contentious arguments a fallacy is produced, when a limitation restraining to a part, to a place, to time, or signifying relation, is not added; so here that which is improbable is not simply probable, but is a certain probability. But the art of Corax is composed from this place. For whether the person be not obnoxious to the crime; as he who is weak escapes an action for an assault; for it is not likely that he committed an assault; or whether he be obnoxious, as being a strong man, he has the same defence, unless a certain probability is apparent. And the like takes place in other things. For a man must necessarily be obnoxious to the crime or not. Both, therefore, appear to be probable; and the one is indeed probable in reality; but the other, not simply, but in the way we have shown. And this it is, to make the inferior argument to be the superior. Hence men were justly indignant with what Protagoras professed to accomplish. For what he announced is false, and not true, but is apparently probable, and exists in no art, but in the rhetorical and contentious. And thus much concerning enthymemes, both the true, and the apparent.
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