Another place which is adapted to confutation is derived from considering things which are not assented to; viz. from considering, if any thing is not admitted, from all times, actions, and speeches. And this indeed, may be done separately in the person of the opponent; as, “He says that he loves you Athenians, and yet he has conspired with the thirty tyrants against his country.” And separately, as to the person himself, as, “He says indeed, that I am litigious, but he cannot show that I ever sued any man.” It may also be done separately, both as to the person himself, and his opponent as, “And this man indeed never lent any money, but I have ransomed many of you.” Another place is useful with respect to men and things that have been calumniated, but which do not appear to have deserved it; and this consists in assigning the cause of the paradox. For there is something which gave rise to the appearance. Thus for instance, a certain woman was calumniated with reference to her son; for in consequence of embracing him, it seemed as if she had connexion with the lad. But the cause of her embracing him being assigned, the calumny was dissolved. Thus too, in the Ajax of Theodectes, Ulysses says against Ajax, that though he is braver than Ajax, yet he does not seem to be so. Another place is derived from cause, which if it exists, the effect also exists; but if it is not, neither does the effect exist. For cause, and that of which it is the cause subsist together, and nothing is without a cause. Thus Leodamas in defending himself when Thrasybulus, accusing him said, “That his name had been branded with infamy on a pillar in the Acropolis, but the inscription had been erased by the thirty tyrants,” replied,”That this was not possible; for if it had taken place, the thirty tyrants would have placed more confidence in him, in consequence of his hatred to the people having been inscribed on a pillar.” Another place is from considering whether it was or is possible to advise, or do, or have done a thing better than it was advised to be, or is, or was done. For it is evident, that if it does not thus subsist, it was not done; since no one willingly and knowingly deliberately chooses what is bad. This place, however, is false; for frequently, it becomes afterwards evident how it was possible to have acted better, though this was before immanifest. Another place is derived from considering when something is intended to be done, contrary to what has been done. Thus Xenophanes when the Eleans asked him,”whether they should sacrifice to Leucothea, and lament her, or not,” advised them,”If they thought her a goddess, not to lament her; but if a mortal, not to sacrifice to her.” Another place is derived from accusing or defending errors. Thus for instance, in the Medœa of the poet Carcinus, some persons accuse her of having slain her children, because they no longer appear; (for Medœa erred in sending away her sons) but she defends herself by saying, “That if she had intended to commit murder she would not have slain her children, but Jason; for in not slaying Jason, she would have acted wrong, even if she had done the other thing i.e. slain her children. This place, however, and species of enthymeme, formed the whole prior rhetorical art of Theodorus. Another place is derived from name; as Sophocles of a certain woman named Sidero ‘Tis clear thou iron art, and bear’st the name. Thus also it is usual to celebrate the gods from the signification of their names. Conon likewise called Thrasybulus, audacious. And Herodicus said of Thrasymachus, “Thou art always Thrasymachus i.e. bold in fight. He also said of Polus, “You are always Polus i.e. a colt. Herodicus likewise said of Draco the legislator, “That his laws were not the laws of a man, but of a dragon; for they were severe.” Another example is derived from what Hecuba says in the Troades of Euripides, when speaking of Venus, “And the name of the goddess i.e. Aphrodite is rightly derived from aphrosune i.e. folly. And as Chœremon the comic poet says, “Pentheus was so denominated from future calamity.” Those enthymemes, however, which are adapted to confutation, are more approved than those that are ostensive; because the former are short collections of contraries; but parallels are more obvious to the hearer. Of all syllogisms, however, as well those that are adapted to confutation, as those that are ostensive, those especially excite perturbation in the auditors which manifest themselves as soon as they begin to be enunciated, yet not because their meaning is superficial. For the auditors are at the same time delighted that they foresaw from the beginning what would follow. This likewise is the case with those syllogisms which are understood as soon as they are completely enunciated.
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