It now follows that we should speak concerning the solutions of enthymemes. But it is possible to dissolve them by contrary reasoning, or by introducing an objection. With respect to contrary reasoning, therefore, it is evident that it may be effected from the same places. For syllogisms are composed from things that are probable; but many probable things appear to be contrary to each other. But objections are introduced, in the same manner as in the Topics, in four ways; for they are introduced either from the same, or from the similar, or from the contrary, or from the judgement and authority of others. By an objection however being introduced from the same, I mean as if for instance the enthymeme should be concerning love, that it is a worthy thing, an objection may be made to it in a twofold respect. For either it may be said universally, that all indigence is evil; or partially that it would not be proverbially said Caunias love, unless there was also base love. But an objection is introduced from the contrary; when if the enthymeme should be, “That a good man benefits all his friends;” it may be objected, “That neither does a bad man act ill towards all his friends.” An objection also is introduced from similars, when the enthymeme is, “That those who receive an injury always hate the authors of it. For it may be objected, “That neither do those who are benefited always love their benefactor. And objections which are introduced from the judgements of illustrious men, are as if the enthymeme were, “That it is requisite to pardon those who are intoxicated; for they err ignorantly.” The objection is, “That Pittacus, therefore, does not deserve to be praised; for he should not have legally established greater punishments for intoxication, if he who is intoxicated errs through ignorance.” Enthymemes however, are derived from four things; and these four are, the probable, example, tecmerion i.e. a necessary sign, and a sign not necessary. But those enthymemes which are collected from things that exist for the most part, or appear to exist, are derived from probabilities. Those which are derived from the similar, either from one, or many similar things, (when the orator assuming what is universal, syllogistically collects what is particular) exist through example. But those which exist through what is necessary and real, are through tecmerion. And those that exist through what is universal or particular, whether it really is, or not, are through signs which are not necessary. But a probable thing is that which does not exist always, but for the most part. Hence, it is manifest, that enthymemes of this kind may always be dissolved, if an objection is introduced. The solution, however, is sometimes apparent, and not always true; for he who objects does not dissolve the enthymeme by shewing that the thing is not probable, but by showing that it is not necessary. Hence, the defendant has always the advantage of the plaintiff; through this paralogism. For since the plaintiff demonstrates through probabilities; but the solution is not the same which shews either that the thing is not probable, or that it is not necessary; and that which exists for the most part, is always liable to objection; (for otherwise it would not be a probability, but would be always necessary)—hence the judge, if this mode of solution is adopted, will think either that the thing is not probable, or that it must not be judged by him, in consequence, as we have said, of being deceived by false reasoning. For it is requisite that he should not only judge from things which are necessary, but also from probabilities. For this is to judge most judiciously. The solution, therefore, of an enthymeme is not sufficient, which shows that a thing is not necessary, but it is requisite that the solution should also show, that it is not probable. But this will happen, if the objection rather shows that the thing for the most part subsists. It is possible, however, that a thing may happen for the most part, or frequently, in a twofold respect, viz. either from time, or from circumstances; but principally if from both. For if things which frequently happen thus subsist, this is more probable. But signs which are not necessary, and enthymemes derived through a sign, are solved in the way we mentioned in the first book. For that every such sign is unsyllogistic is evident to us from the analytics. Enthymemes, however, derived from examples are solved after the same manner as enthymemes derived from probabilities. For if we can adduce a contrary example in which the thing is not so, the enthymeme is solved, because the thing is not necessary, or because many things have happened frequently, and in a different manner. But if many things have happened frequently, and in this manner, then it must be contended either that the present circumstance is not similar, or is not similarly disposed, or has a certain difference. Tecmeria, however, i.e. necessary signs, and enthymemes which are of the nature of tecmeria, cannot be solved in consequence of being unsyllogistic. But this is evident to us from the analytics. It remains, therefore, to show that what is said, viz. that certain premises do not exist. But if it is evident that the premises do exist, and that the enthymeme is derived from tecmerion, then the enthymeme becomes insoluble. For all things now become apparent from demonstration.
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