Let us now speak of the elements of enthymemes. But I call the same thing the element and place of an enthymeme. Let us however first speak of those things which it is necessary in the first place to discuss. For there are two species of enthymemes. And the first species contains ostensive enthymemes, which show that a thing is, or is not; but the other species is adapted to confutation. They differ also in the same manner as in dialectics an elenchus, and syllogism differ. But an ostensive enthymeme, is when the conclusion is collected from things acknowledged; and the enthymeme adapted to confutation is, when things not acknowledged are collected in the conclusion. Nearly, therefore, places have been delivered by us about each of the useful and necessary species; for propositions respecting each have been selected. Hence, we have shown from what places it is requisite to derive enthymemes about good or evil, the beautiful or the base, the just, or the unjust; and in a similar manner places have been assigned by us concerning manners, passions and habits. Again, therefore, it remains that after another manner we should assume universally concerning all the three genera of orations, indicating which of them are adapted to confutation, and are ostensive, and what are the places of apparent enthymemes, but which are not enthymemes in reality, since neither are they syllogisms. But these things being rendered manifest, we shall discuss solutions and objections, and show whence it is requisite to adduce these against enthymemes. One place, therefore, of ostensive enthymemes is from contraries; for it is necessary to consider whether one contrary is inherent in another; subverting, indeed, if it be not inherent; but confirming if it is inherent. For instance, we may thus show that to act temperately is good; for to act intemperately is noxious. Or as in the Messeniac oration of Alcidamas; for if war is the cause of the present evils, it is necessary to correct those evils with peace. For as a certain tragic poet argues in Greek senaries, “If it is not just to fall into anger with those who have done evil willingly; neither is it fit, if any one has acted beneficently from compulsion to be grateful to him. But if to speak falsely is, among mortals, calculated to persuade, it is requisite to think that on the contrary many things are true, which are considered by mortals as incredible. Another place is from similar cases; for it is necessary that they should be similarly inherent, or not inherent. Thus from this place it may be shown that not every thing which is just is good. For if every thing just were eligible and good, every thing which is justly done would be eligible and good; but now to die justly is not eligible. Another place is from relatives. For if some one has acted well or justly, another has suffered well or justly. And if to command is just, it is also just to obey the command; as the publican Diomedon said about the tributes. “For, said he to the people, if it is not disgraceful in you to sell the tributes, neither is it disgraceful in us to buy them.” And, if one man deservedly and justly suffers a loss, he who caused him to suffer it, acted well and justly. And if he who caused another to suffer a loss acted well and justly, he who sustained the loss, sustained it well and justly. In this place, however, it is possible to paralogize. For if a man died justly, he suffered justly; but perhaps not by you. Hence, it is necessary to consider separately, whether he who suffered deserved to suffer, and whether he who did the thing deserved to do it, and thus to infer what is adapted and appropriate. For sometimes a thing of this kind is dissonant, and nothing impedes; as in the Alcmæon of Theodectes. “Did never any mortal hate thy mother?” To which the answer is, “Distinctly this must be considered.” Alphesibœa, also, enquiring, ” How therefore have the judges condemned thee?” Alcmæon answered, “Of death deserving she was judg’d, but I ‘Twas said could not have slain my mother.” Thus, likewise, on the trial of Demosthenes, and those who slew Nicanor, because they were judged to have slain him justly, it appeared that he was justly put to death. In like manner, when a certain person was slain at Thebes, it was inquired in the court of justice whether he had been unjustly slain; as if it were not unjust to slay him who deserved to die. Another place is from the more and the less; such as, if even the gods do not know all things, much less do men. For the meaning of this is, if the more is not inherent in that in which it ought to be more inherent, it is evident that neither will it be inherent in that in which the less is inherent. But this place, that he will strike his neighbour who strikes his father, depends on this, that if the less is inherent, the more also will be inherent. And this place is useful for both purposes; viz. whether it be requisite to show that a thing is inherent, or is not. Farther still, if a thing is inherent neither more nor less; whence it is said, in a certain tragedy, ” Is thy father to be pitied, because he has lost a son, and is not Oeneus to be equally commiserated, who has lost his son Meleager one of the most illustrious of the Greeks?” And that if Theseus did not act unjustly in ravishing Helen, neither did Paris. And if the Tyndaridæ i.e. Castor and Pollux did not act unjustly in ravishing the daughters of Leucippus, neither did Paris. Likewise if Hector did not act unjustly in slaying Patroclus, neither did Paris in slaying Achilles. And if other artists are not vile men, neither are philosophers. And if generals are not vile, because they are frequently conquered, neither are sophists. And that if a private person, ought to be careful of your renown, you also ought to be careful of the renown of the Greeks. Another place consists in the consideration of time; as is exemplified in what Iphicrates says in his oration against Harmodius. For, said he, “If before I had done the thing, I had demanded a statue in case I did it, you would have granted it to me, and will you not grant it, now I have done the thing? You would not, therefore, when expecting a benefit promise a reward, and refuse it, when you have received the benefit.” And again, for the purpose of persuading that the Thebans ought to permit Philip to pass through their land into Attica, it may be said, “That if he had made this request before he sent you assistance against the Phocenses, you would have permitted him. It is absurd, therefore, that because he then neglected to ask permission, and trusted you would grant it, that you should now deny it to him.” Another place is taken from things said, and retorted on the speaker. And this mode is eminently useful, and was employed in the tragedy of Teucrus, by Iphicrates against Aristophon, when he enquired of him whether he would have betrayed the ships for money? And when Aristophon denied that he would, Iphicrates afterwards said, “You therefore being Aristophon would not have betrayed them, and should I being Iphicrates have betrayed them?” It is necessary, however, that he who is opposed should appear to have acted more unjustly than the opponent; for if not, it would seem to be ridiculous, if any one had said this against Aristides accusing who was in every respect worthy of belief, and which ought to have been said against an accuser, who did not deserve to be credited. For in short the plaintiff ought to be considered as better than the defendant. He therefore who opposes another, should always reprobate this. And universally, that which is said is absurd, when any one reproves others in things which he himself does, or would have done if he could; or who persuades others to do those things which he himself does not do, nor would have done. Another place is derived from definition; such for instance as, “That which is dæmoniacal is nothing else than either God, or the work of God; but whoever thinks that it is the work of God, must necessarily think that there are Gods.” And as Iphicrates said against a certain person named Harmodius. “He who is the best of men is most generous or noble; for there was nothing generous in Harmodius and Aristogiton, till they had accomplished some generous undertaking.” He added, that he was more allied to i.e. he more resembled the ancient Harmodius. “For my works, said he, are more allied to the works of Harmodius and Aristogiton than thine.” And as in the oration concerning Paris, “All men will confess that those who are intemperate are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one body.” Hence Socrates said that he would not go to Archelaus king of Macedonia. “For it is disgraceful, said he, for him who has received a benefit not to be able to recompense him from whom he received it; just as it is disgraceful in him who has been used ill, not to return the ill treatment.” For all these defining, and assuming what a thing is, syllogize about the things which are the subjects of their speech. Another place is derived from multiplicity of diction, as in the Topics, an argument is derived, from that which has a rectitude of subsistence being multifariously predicated. Another place is derived from division; as, if all men act unjustly for the sake of three things; for they act unjustly either for the sake of this, viz. utility, or for the sake of this, viz. pleasure, or for the sake of this, viz. because they are enraged; but for the sake of two of these they could not do the injury; and the opponents themselves confess they did not do it for the sake of the third. Another place is from induction; as from the oration inscribed Peparethia, in which it is said, “That women every where determine truly about the birth of children.” For this is evident from what happened at Athens; since when Mantias the rhetorician was dubious about his son, his doubts were dissolved by the mother of the child. This likewise happened at Thebes; for when Ismenes and Stilbo contended which of them was the father of Thessalicus, Dodonis demonstrated that he was the son of Ismenes; and on this account Thessalicus was considered as the offspring of Ismenes. And again, from the law of Theodectes, if no one would commit his horses to the care of those who do not pay a proper attention to the horses of others, nor his ships to those who destroy the ships of others, and if the like takes place in all things, we ought not to commit our safety to those who have badly attended to the safety of others. And as Alcidamas says, “That all men honour the wise.” For the Parians honour Archilochus, though he blasphemed them; the Chians honour Homer, though he was not their fellow-citizen; and the Mitylenans Sappho, though she was a woman. The Lacedæmonians, also, though they were in the smallest degree philologists, made Chilo one of their senators. The Italians likewise honoured Pythagoras; and the Lampsaceni buried Anaxagoras though he was a stranger, and honour him even now. Again, the Athenians by using the laws of Solon were happy; and the Lacedæmonians by using those of Lycurgus. The city of the Thebans, also, as soon as philosophers were their governors, became happy. Another place is derived from the judgement made about the same, or a similar, or a contrary thing. And this indeed is especially the case, if it is the judgement of all men, and always; but if not, if it is the judgement of most men, or of all, or the greater part of wise men, or of good men. Or if it is the decision of those who are judges, or of those whom the judges approve, or of those against whom there is no judgement to be given, as of princes; or of those whose judgement it is not becoming to oppose, such as the gods, a father, or preceptors. But of this place there are many examples, and one is, what Autocles said against Mixidemides, “If it were well indeed for the venerable goddesses the Furies to plead their cause in the Areopagus, can it be improper for Mixidemides to do so?” Another is what Sappho said, “That to die is an evil; for the gods have judged it to be so; since otherwise, they themselves would die.” Another is, what Aristippus said against Plato asserting something as he thought too positively, “But our associate, said he, meaning Socrates, affirms no such thing.” Another example is that of Agesipolis, who at Delphi enquired of the god Apollo, having prior to this consulted the oracle of Jupiter Olympus, “Whether the son was of the same opinion as the father?” As if it were shameful for a son to dissent from his father. Another is that of Isocrates concerning Helen, who shows that she was a worthy character, because Theseus judged her to be so; and who also says the same thing of Paris because the goddesses preferred his judgement to that of other men. He likewise asserts that Evagoras was a worthy character, “because Conon when his affairs were adverse, leaving every one else came to Evagoras. Another place is from the enumeration of parts, as in the Topics, where it is enquired, “What kind of motion the soul is;” for it is either this, or that, viz. it must either be the motion which is a change in quality, or lation, or augmentation, or generation. An example of this place is from Theodectes in his oration in defence of Socrates when he was accused by the judges; “What temple has Socrates violated? And what gods has he not reverenced among those whose honours are legally established by the city?” Another place is from consequent good or evil. For since in most things it happens that some good and evil are consequent to them, we may employ consequent good for the purpose of persuading, praising, and defending, but consequent evils for the purpose of dissuading, blaming, and accusing. Thus for instance, we may blame literary pursuits, because envy is consequent to erudition, which is an evil; and we may also praise them because they are attended with wisdom which is a good. Hence, in the former case we may say that it is not proper to acquire erudition, because it is not proper to be envied; and in the latter, that it is proper to acquire erudition, for it is requisite to be wise. In this place the art of the rhetorician Calippus consists, to which he added what pertains to the possible, and other things, of which we have already spoken. Another place is, when about two things, and those opposed to each other, it is requisite either to exhort, or dissuade, and to use the before-mentioned place in both ways. But it differs from that place in this, that there casual things are opposed; but here contraries only. Thus for instance, a certain priest would not suffer his son to speak in public. “For if said he, you speak what is just, men will hate you; but if what is unjust the gods.” It is necessary, however, on the other hand, to speak in public. For if you speak what is just, the gods will love you; but if what is unjust, men will love you. This however, is the same thing with the saying, of buying oil and salt. And this argument may be retorted, when to each of two contraries good and evil are consequent, each being contrary to each. Another place is, because the same things are not praised openly and secretly; but just and beautiful things are especially praised openly; and privately men are more inclined to praise what is advantageous. One of these, therefore, we must endeavour to collect. For this place is the most principal of paradoxes. Another place is derived from analogy, and was used by Iphicrates. For when the Athenians wished to compel his younger son, because he was large, to engage in public service, Iphicrates said, “That if great boys were to be considered as men, little men should be decreed to be boys.” And Theodectes in the law said, “You have made mercenaries, such as Strabaces and Charidemus, citizens, on account of their probity; but you have not made exiles of those among the mercenaries, who have acted nefariously.” Another place is, when in consequence of the same thing following from two things, it is shown that the things from which it happens to follow are the same. As when Xenophanes said, “That those were similarly impious, who assert that the gods were generated, and those who assert that they die; for in both ways it happens that at a certain time the gods do not exist.” And in short, that which happens from each, is always to be assumed as the same. This place, was also used by some one in the defence of Socrates; for he said, You are about to pass sentence, not on Socrates, but on his pursuit, whether it be requisite to philosophize.” And, it may be said, “That to give earth and water is to become slaves; and that to participate of common peace is to do what is commanded to be done.” But whichever of these is useful must be assumed. Another place is derived from this, that the same men do not always choose the same thing in a posterior or prior time, but conversely; as in this enthymeme. “If when we were exiles we fought, in order that we might return; shall we, having returned fly, in order that we may not fight?” For at one time the Athenians chose to fight, that they might return to their country, and at another time they were willing to leave their country lest they should be obliged to fight. Another place is, when we affirm any thing to have been done on account of some cause, through which it might have been done, though it was not in reality done through it; as if one man should give something to another, in order that by afterwards taking it away, he may give him pain. Hence, also it is said in a certain tragedy, “The dæmon gives great prosperity to many, yet not with a benevolent intention, but in order that they may receive more conspicuous calamities.” And in the Meleager of Antiphon who that he might praise Meleager says, “There was a concourse of people from all Greece, not for the purpose of killing the boar, but that they might be witnesses of the valour of Meleager.” Another example is from the Ajax of Theodectes, in which it is said, “That Diomed preferred Ulysses as his associate in the nocturnal adventure not for the purpose of honouring him, but that he might have one to attend him who was his inferior.” For it is possible he might have thus acted with this view. Another place is common both to litigants and counsellors, and consists in considering whatever pertains to exhortation and dissuasion, and for the sake of which things are done and avoided; for these are such as ought to be done when they are present. For instance, it must be considered whether a thing is possible, and easy to be effected, and whether it is beneficial either to a man himself, or to his friends; or whether it is noxious and pernicious to his enemies, or is at least attended with greater emolument than loss. And exhortations are to be derived from these places, and dehortations from the contraries. From the same places also accusations and defences may be derived; defence indeed, from those which pertain to dissuasion, but accusation from those which pertain to exhortation. And in this place the whole art of Pamphilus and Calippus consists. Another place is derived from things which appear indeed to be done, but are incredible, because they would not be credited, unless they were, or nearly were in existence; and this in an eminent degree. For whatever is done, is apprehended to be done, either because it has been truly done or is of itself credible, and probable. If, therefore, a thing is incredible, and not probable, it will be true that it has been done; for it does not appear to have been done, in consequence of being probable and credible. Thus Androcles Pitheus accusing the law said, (the multitude being tumultuous whilst he was speaking) “The laws require a law to correct them.” For fishes also require salt, though it may seem neither probable, nor credible, that animals nourished in salt, should require salt. And olives require oil; though it may seem incredible, that those things from which oil is produced, should be in want of oil.
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