Let us now speak concerning enthymemes universally, after what manner they are to be investigated; and in the next place, let us show what are the places of enthymemes; for there is a different species of each of these. That an enthymeme, therefore, is a certain syllogism, and how it is a syllogism, we have before shown; and also in what it differs from dialectic syllogisms. For neither ought things remote to be collected, nor are all things to be collectively assumed; since the former will be obscure from their length; and the latter will be nugatory, through speaking of things which are obvious. For this is the reason why the unlearned are more capable of producing persuasion among the crowd, than the learned, since as the poets say, “The unlearned speak more elegantly to a mob.” For the unlearned speak of things common and universal, which are adapted to the comprehension of the multitude; but the learned speak of things which they know, and which are near. Hence, rhetorical enthymemes must not be composed from every thing which is probable, but from things of a definite nature; such as are those things which appear probable to the judges, or which the judges admit. Nor is it requisite that these things should be approved by all the auditors, but it is sufficient if they are approved by the greater part of them. It is likewise requisite not only to collect from things which are necessary, but also from things which have a frequency of subsistence. In the first place, therefore, it is necessary to assume, that concerning the thing of which it is requisite to speak and syllogize, whether by employing a political, or any other syllogism; concerning this it is necessary to possess all or some of the things which are inherent in it; for if we possess none of them, no conclusion can be made from nothing. I say for instance, how can we advise the Athenians to engage in war or not, unless we know what their power is, whether naval or land, or both; how great it is; what their revenue is; who are their friends and enemies; and farther still, what wars they have waged, and how they were carried on, and other things of the like kind. How likewise could we praise them, if we were not acquainted with the naval battle at Salamis, or the battle at Marathon, or the deeds which they performed for the Heraclidæ, or any thing else of the like kind? For all men praise others from beautiful transactions which exist, or appear to exist. In a similar manner, also, in blaming the Athenians, we must direct our attention to the contraries to these things, considering what particular of a contrary kind pertains to them, or appears to pertain to them; such as that they enslaved the Greeks, and subdued those who fought with them against the Barbarian, and behaved most intrepidly, viz. the Aeginetæ and Potidœatæe; and other things of the like kind, and whatever other crime may be laid to their charge. Thus too, both those who accuse, and those who defend, accuse and defend by directing their attention to inherent particulars; but it makes no difference whether we speak of the Athenians or Lacedæmonians; of God, or man. For he who advises Achilles, who praises or blames, accuses or defends bim, must assume things which are inherent, or appear to be inherent, that from these he may in praising or blaming show whether any thing beautiful in conduct or base is inherent; in accusing or defending may show whether any thing just or unjust is inherent; and in advising, whether any thing advantageous or detrimental is present. The like method must also be adopted in every other thing. Thus for instance, in investigating whether justice is good or not, our attention must be directed to what is inherent in justice or in good. Hence, since it appears that this method is adopted by all men, whether they syllogize more accurately, or more remissly; for their assumptions are not derived from all things, but from such as are inherent in each particular, and through reasoning; since it is evident that it is otherwise impossible to prove what they wish to prove;—this being the case, it is obvious, as we have shown in the Topics, that about each question in things contingent, and the time best adapted to them, it is necessary to have in the first place, things of a more select nature. The investigation, likewise, must be made after the same manner in things of an unexpected nature, so that our attention must not be directed to the indefinite, but to things inherent, which are the subject of the oration. Of the things inherent, likewise, the greater part and those which are nearest the subject, must be included in the oration; for by how much the greater the number of things inherent is which the orator possesses, by so much more easily will he prove that which he wishes to prove; and by how much more proximate the particulars are which he details, by so much the more appropriate will they be, and less common. But I call common things, indeed, such as to praise Achilles, because he is a man, and because he is among the number of demigods, and because he fought against Troy. For these particulars belong also to many others; so that praise of this kind no less pertains to Achilles than to Diomed. Things peculiar, however, are such as happen to no other person, than Achilles; such as to have slain Hector the bravest of the Trojans; and Cygnus, who being invulnerable prevented the Greeks from descending from their ships to the land; and that being very young he entered into the army, though he was not bound by an oath to fight against the Trojans. These, and other things of the like kind, are peculiar to Achilles. This, therefore, is one place of selection, and is the first topical place.
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