Aristotle, Rhetoric. Book II, Chapter 22


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With respect to gnomology, or the doctrine of a sentence, when we have shown what a sentence is, it will then especially become evident, about what kind of things, and when, and to what persons, it is fit to employ sentences in orations. But a sentence is an enunciation, yet not about particulars, such as what kind of person Iphicrates was, but about that which is universal; yet it is not about all universals, such for instance as that a right is contrary to a curved line; but it is about those universals with which actions are conversant, and those things which in acting are eligible or to be avoided. Hence, because enthymemes are nearly syllogisms about things of this kind, if the syllogism is taken away, the conclusions and the principles of the enthymemes, are sentences. Thus for instance what Medea in Euripides says is a sentence, viz. “It does not become a man of a sound mind to educate his children so as to render them transcendently wise.” This, therefore, is a sentence. But the cause being added, and the why, the whole is an enthymeme; as for instance, in the words of Medea; “For besides the indolence which they thus acquire, they excite the baneful envy of their fellow citizens.” And also, “There is no man who is in all respects happy.” And, “There is not any man who is free;” is a sentence; but the following words being added, it becomes an enthymeme, viz. “For he is either the slave of wealth, or of fortune.” If, therefore, a sentence is what we have said it is, there are necessarily four species of a sentence. For it will either subsist in conjunction with an epilogue, or without an epilogue. Those sentences, therefore, require demonstration, which assert any thing paradoxical, or dubious; but those that assert nothing paradoxical, are without an epilogue. But of these, it is necessary that some indeed, in consequence of being previously known, should require no epilogue, such as for instance, ” Health, as it appears to us, is the best of things to man.” For thus it appears to the many. But other sentences as soon as they are spoken become manifest to those that consider them; such as, “There is no lover who does not always love.” Of sentences, however, which are with an epilogue, some indeed are the parts of an enthymeme; as, “It does not become a man of a sound mind.” But others are enthymematic, yet are not a part of an enthymeme; which also are especially approved. These are sentences in which the cause of what is said is apparent; as in the following, “Being a mortal do not retain an immortal anger.” For to say, “It is not proper to retain anger always,” is a sentence; but the addition, “Being a mortal,” asserts the why or the cause. Similar to this also is the sentence, “It is fit that mortals should be wise in mortal, and not in immortal concerns.” From what has been said, therefore, it is manifest how many species there are of a sentence, and to what kind of things each is adapted. For in things of a dubious, or paradoxical nature, a sentence is not to be used without an epilogue, but either, an epilogue being added, the sentence must be used as a conclusion; as if any one should say, “I indeed, since it is neither proper to be envious, nor to be indolent, assert that erudition is not requisite;” or this being previously said, the former assertions must be subjoined. But in things which are not paradoxical indeed, yet are immanifest, the why or cause must be most concisely added. And to things of this kind Laconic apothegms and enigmas are adapted; as if some one should say what Stesichorus said. among the Locrians, “That it is not proper to behave insolently, lest the grasshoppers should sing on the ground.” A sententious mode of speaking, however, is adapted to him who is more advanced in age; but what he sententiously says, must be about things in which he is skilled. Hence, it is unbecoming for one who is not so advanced in age to speak sententiously, in the same manner as it is for him to mythologize. But for a man to speak sententiously about things in which he is unskilled is foolish and inerudite; of which this is a sufficient indication, that rustics are especially sententious, and easily show that they are so. To assert, however, universally, that which is not universally true, is especially adapted to lamentation and amplification; and in this case, such sentences must be adduced either at the beginning, or when you demonstrate. But it is requisite to employ sentences which are generally known and common, if they are useful for the purpose; for in consequence of being common, as being acknowledged by all men they appear to be true. Thus he who exhorts soldiers to encounter danger, though they have not sacrificed, may employ what Hector says to Polydamas, “Without a sign his sword the brave man draws, And asks no omen but his country’s cause.” And when those are exhorted to fight who are inferior to their opponents in force, it may be said, “In battle Mars to either side inclines.” When any one likewise is exhorted to destroy the children of enemies, though they have done no injury, he may say, “He is a fool, who having destroyed the father spares the children.” Farther still, some proverbs are also sentences; such as the proverb, “An Attick stranger.” Sentences likewise are to be sometimes adduced, contrary to those which are generally received. But I mean by those that are generally received, such as “Know thyself,” and “Nothing too much.” And sentences contrary to these are to be adduced, when either the manners will from thence seem to be better, or when the thing is spoken pathetically. But a thing is spoken pathetically, if some one being enraged should say, “It is false that a man ought to know himself; for this man, if he had known himself would never have sollicited the command of the army.” And the manners will appear to be better, if it is said, “That it is not proper, according to the assertion of Bias to love, as if intending hereafter to hate, but rather to hate, as if intending hereafter to love.” It is necessary, however, to render the choice manifest by the diction; but if not, to subjoin the cause. Thus for instance, we may either thus speak, “That it is necessary to love, not as they say, but as if always intending to love; for the other i.e. he who loves as if intending hereafter to hate loves like a treacherous person.” Or thus, “What is generally asserted does not please me; for a true friend ought to love as one who will love always. Nor does that saying please me, Nothing too much; for it is necessary to hate vehemently bad men.” But these sentences afford great assistance to orations, one cause of which arises from the arrogance of the hearers; for they are delighted if any one speaking universally, happens to adduce opinions which they have formed about some particular things. My meaning, however, will be manifest from what follows; and at the same time it will be evident how these sentences are to be investigated. For a sentence is, as we have said, a universal enunciation; but the auditors are delighted when that is universally asserted, which they have pre-conceived partially. Thus for instance, if any one happens to have had bad neighbours or children, he will adopt the sentence. “That nothing is more troublesome than vicinity,” and “That nothing is more stupid than the procreation of children.” Hence, it is necessary to conjecture what the opinion of the audience will be about particulars, and afterwards to adduce universal sentences conformable to their opinion. And this is one use which speaking sententiously ought to possess. But there is another use of it which is superior to this; for it causes orations to become ethical. And those orations are ethical in which the deliberate intention of the speaker is manifest. All sentences, however, effect this, because he who employs the sentence, speaks universally about things which are the objects of deliberate choice. Hence, if the sentences are good, they cause the speaker to appear to be one who possesses worthy manners. And thus much concerning a sentence, what it is, how many species there are of it, how sentences are to be employed, and what advantage they possess.


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