It now remains to speak about the credibility which is common to all orations since we have already spoken, about the credibility which is peculiar. But there are two kinds of the credibility which is common; viz. example and enthymeme; for a sentence is a part of an enthymeme. In the first place, therefore, let us speak concerning example; for example is similar to induction; but induction is a principle. But of examples there are two species; for one species indeed of example, is to speak of things that are past, but the other is, when we ourselves feign something similar for the purpose of shewing that which we wish to show. And of this, one species is a parable, but the other fables like those of Esop and the Africans. Example, however, is indeed a thing of the following kind, as if some one should say, “That it is necessary to make preparations against the Persian king, and not suffer him to subjugate Egypt; for prior to him Darius could not pass over the Hellespont till he had captured Egypt; but when he had captured it, he passed into Greece.” And again, “Xerxes did not attack Greece till he had captured Egypt; but when he had captured it, he passed over into Greece; so that this king of Persia also, if he should take Egypt will pass into Greece. Hence, he must not be suffered to do this.” But a parable is a Socratic similitude; as if some one should say, “That it is not proper magistrates should be chosen by lot; for this is just as if some one should choose athletæ by lot, so as not to select those who are able to contend, but those on whom the lot falls; or as if some one should choose by lot from a number of sailors, him who ought to be the pilot of a ship, as if it were proper that he should be chosen on whom the lot falls, and not he who is skilled in steering a ship.” But a fable, is such as that of Stesichorus against Phalaris, and of Æsop for a certain demagogue. For, when the Himereans had chosen Phalaris for their general with absolute authority, and were about to give him a guard for his body, Stesichorus after other things which he had said, addressed this fable to them, “That a horse once had sole possession of a meadow, but that a stag coming into it, and destroying the pasture, the horse wishing to be revenged of the stag, asked a man, if he should be able in conjunction with him to punish the stag. But the man answered, that he should be able if he would suffer himself to be bridled, and let him get on his back, armed with darts. The horse, therefore, having consented, the man, having got on his back, instead of taking vengeance on the stag, made the horse his slave. In like manner said he, do you Himerians take care, lest wishing to be revenged of your enemies, you suffer the same things as the horse. For now you have received a bridle, in having chosen a general with absolute authority; but if you allow him a guard, and suffer him to get on your backs, you will immediately be enslaved by Phalaris.” But Æsop, when pleading in Samos for a demagogue who was in danger of losing his life, said, ” That a fox in passing over a river fell into a whirl-pool, and not being able to get out of it, was for a long time in a miserable condition, and many canine flies adhered to his skin. But a hedgehog wandering along, as soon as he saw him, commiserating his condition, asked him whether he should drive away the canine flies from him. The fox, however, would not give his permission; and being asked by the hedgehog why he would not, replied, because these indeed are now full of me, and draw but little blood; but if you drive these away, others will come who are hungry, and will drink up the rest of my blood. Thus Oh men of Samos said he, this man will no longer hurt you; for he is rich; but if you put him to death, other persons who are poor will succeed him, and by thieving the public property, will consume your wealth.” Fables, however, are adapted to popular harangues, and they have this good, that it is difficult to find things which have been similarly transacted; but it is easy to find fables. For it is necessary that he who is able to perceive similitude in things should compose fables in the same manner as parables, which it is easy to do from philosophy. It is easy, therefore, to introduce fables; but examples derived from history are more useful for the purposes of consultation; for future, for the most part resemble past events. But it is necessary that the orator should use examples as demonstrations when he has not enthymemes; for credibility is obtained through these. And when he has enthymemes, he should use them as testimonies, and should employ examples in the epilogues of the enthymemes. For examples when they are proposed by themselves ought to be similar to inductions; but induction is not adapted to rhetorical compositions except in a few instances. And examples when adduced in confirmation of conclusions are equivalent to testimonies. But a witness is every where adapted to persuade. Hence, he who introduces examples prior to enthymemes, must necessarily adduce many examples; but one example is sufficient for the purpose of confirming what has been proved by enthymemes. For a credible witness, though but one is useful. And thus we have shown how many species there are of examples, and how, and when they are to be used.
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