The use, however, of persuasive orations pertains to judgement; for we no longer require arguments about things which we know, and of which we have formed a judgement. And though it be but one person alone whom the orator endeavours to exhort or dissuade, as is the case with those who admonish or persuade, yet that one person is a judge; for he whom it is necessary to persuade, is, in short, a judge. And the like takes place, whether the oration is directed against the litigant, or against the hypothesis; for it is necessary that an oration should be employed, and that the contrary arguments should be subverted, against which as against a litigant, the oration is made. A similar method must also be adopted in demonstrative orations; for in these the speech is directed to the spectators as to judges. In short, he alone is, simply speaking, a judge, who in political contests judges the subjects of investigation. For in such contests the manner in which things of a dubious nature subsist is investigated, and also those which are the subjects of consultation. Concerning the manners of politics, however, we have already spoken in what we have said about deliberative affairs; so that it is there explained in what manner, and through what particulars we may produce ethical orations. But since about every kind of orations there is a certain different end, and about all of them opinions and propositions are assumed, from which those who consult, demonstrate, and dispute, derive credibility; and farther still, since we have also discussed those particulars, from which it is possible to compose ethical orations;—it remains that we should discuss such things as are common. For it is necessary that all rhetoricians in orations of every kind should employ what pertains to the possible and impossible, and should endeavour to show that some things will be, and that others have been. The consideration, likewise, of magnitude is common to all orations; for all orations whether they persuade or dissuade, whether they praise or blame, accuse or defend, employ diminution and amplification. But these things being determined, let us endeavour to discuss in common what pertains to enthymemes and examples, in order that by adding what remains we may bring to an end what we proposed from the first. Of things however which are common, amplification is most adapted to demonstrative orations, as we have before observed; but that which has been done is most adapted to judicial orations; (for judgement is employed about these) and the possible, and what will be done are most adapted to deliberative orations. In the first place, therefore, let us speak concerning things possible and impossible. If then it is possible for one contrary to be or to be effected, it would seem to be possible that the other contrary also may be. Thus for instance, if it is possible that a man may be restored to health, it is also possible that he may be diseased; for there is the same power of contraries so far as they are contraries. And if one similar is possible, another similar likewise is possible. And if that which is more difficult is possible, that also which is more easy is possible. If, likewise, it is possible for a thing to be rendered good or beautiful, it is possible, in short, for that thing to be produced; for it is more difficult for a beautiful house, than for a house simply to exist. That also of which the beginning is possible the end is possible; for nothing is effected, nor begins to be effected of things which are impossible. Thus for instance, it will never begin to be possible, nor will it ever be possible that the diagonal of a square should be commensurable with the side of the square. That of which the end, likewise, is possible, the beginning is possible; for all things are produced from the beginning or principle. If that, also, which is posterior in essence, or in generation, is possible to be effected, this is likewise the case with that which is prior; as if it is possible for a man, it is also possible for a child to be generated; for the latter is prior to the former. And if it is possible for a child to be generated, it is likewise possible for a man; for a child is the beginning, but man is the end of this generation. Those things, also, of which the love or desire is from nature, are possible; for no one for the most part loves or desires things impossible. And it is possible for those things to be and to be effected, of which there are sciences and arts. Those things likewise are possible, the principle of the generation of which is in those things which we can compel, or persuade; and these are things than which we are more powerful, or of which we are the masters or friends. And of those things of which the parts are possible, the whole is possible; and of those things of which the whole, the parts also are for the most part possible. For if it is possible for the ornaments of the head, and a garment to be made, it is also possible for apparel to be made; and if apparel, it is likewise possible for the ornaments of the head, and a garment to be made. If, likewise, the whole genus is among the number of things possible to be effected, this is also the case with the species; and if with the species, likewise, with the genus. Thus for instance, if it is possible for a ship, it is also possible for a three-banked galley to be constructed; and if a three-banked galley, a ship likewise may be constructed. And if one of those things which are naturally related to each other is possible, the other also is possible; as if the double is possible, this is also the case with the half; and if the half, the double also. If, likewise, it is possible for any thing to be effected without art or preparation, it is much more possible for it to be effected through art and diligent attention; whence, also, it is said by Agatho, Some things by fortune may effected be, And some by art we do, and from necessity.
And if a thing may be effected by worse, or inferior, or more imprudent persons, it may also be much more effected by persons of a contrary description; as likewise Isocrates said, that it would be a dreadful thing, if Euthynus should have learnt that, which he himself was unable to discover. But with respect to things impossible it is evident that they may be obtained from the contraries to the abovementioned particulars. Whether a thing, however, has been done, or has not been done, must be considered from what follows. For in the first place, if that has been done, which is less naturally adapted to have been done, that will have been effected which is more naturally adapted to have been done. And if that which was wont to be done afterwards has been done, that also has been done, which was usually done before; as if a man has forgotten any thing, he has once learnt that which he has forgotten. And if a man is able and willing to do a thing he has done it; for all men act, when they are willing and able; since there is then no impediment to their acting. Farther still, if a man is willing to do a thing, and nothing external impedes him, he does it. And if he is able to effect any thing, and is angry, he effects it; and this is likewise the case if he is able, and is under the influence of desire. For men for the most part do those things which they desire, and are able to effect; depraved men, indeed, from intemperance; but worthy men because they desire what is equitable. If, also, any one intended to do a thing, it is probable that he did it. And if such things are done as are naturally adapted to be done prior to a certain thing, or for the sake of it, that thing has been done. Thus, if it has lightened, it has also thundered. And if any one has endeavoured to do a certain thing, he has also done it. And if such things as are naturally adapted to have been done afterwards, or if that for the sake of which they are done has been effected, that also which is done prior to them, and for the sake of which they are done, has been effected. Thus, if it has thundered, it has lightened; and if a thing has been done, there has likewise been an endeavour to do it. With respect, however, to all these things, some of them are from necessity; but others for the most part subsist after this manner. And as to that which has not been done, it is evident that it may be shown not to have been done from places contrary to the before-mentioned. Evidence, likewise, with respect to what will be done may be derived from the same things; for that which it is in the power and will of any one to do, will be done. This is also the case with things which any one is impelled to do from desire and anger, and reasoning in conjunction with power. Hence, if any one is impelled, or meditates to do a thing, it will be done; since for the most part things which are intended to be done are effected, rather than those which are not. If, also, those things are done which ought to have been done first, that likewise will be done, which ought to have been done afterwards. Thus, because before it rains the clouds ought to be collected, if the clouds are collected, it is probable it will rain. And if a thing has been done which is for the sake of something else, it is probable that the thing will be done for the sake of which the other was done; as if the foundation is laid, it is probable the house will be built. With respect, however, to the magnitude and parvitude of things, the greater and the less, and in short things which are great and small, these will be evident to us from what has been before said; for in the discussion of the deliberative genus we have spoken concerning the magnitude of what is good, and in short, concerning the greater and the less. Hence, since in every oration the proposed end is good; as for instance, the useful, the beautiful, and the just, it is evident that through these, amplifications must be assumed in all orations. But besides these, to investigate any thing concerning magnitude simply and excess, is a vain discussion. For particulars are more useful in the composition of orations than universals. And thus much concerning the possible and impossible, and whether a thing has been done, or has not been done, and will be, or will not be; and further still, concerning the greatness and littleness of things.
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