After these things let us speak concerning virtue and vice, and the beautiful in conduct and the base; for to these the intention of those who praise and blame is directed. For it will happen that at the same time we speak about these, those things also will become manifest from which our moral character is formed, which is the second thing that produces credibility. For we may be able to gain the credit of being virtuous ourselves, and cause another person to do the same, from the same things. Since, however, it frequently happens that without being serious, and also seriously, we praise not only man or God, but also inanimate things, and any animal that may occur;—this being the case, propositions also respecting these must be assumed after the same manner; so that we must also speak concerning these, so far as is requisite for the sake of example. The beautiful in conduct, therefore, is that which being eligible of itself is laudable; or which being good is delightful because it is good. But if the beautiful in conduct is this, it is necessary that virtue should be beautiful; for being good it is laudable. Virtue, however, is indeed a power, as it appears of imparting and preserving good: and a power of procuring many and great benefits, and of imparting all things about all. But the parts of virtue are, justice, fortitude, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, mildness, prudence, wisdom. It is however necessary, that those virtues should be the greatest which are most useful to others, since virtue is a beneficent power. Hence, just and brave men are especially honoured; for fortitude is useful in war, and justice in peace. The next to these is liberality. For the liberal freely bestow their property, and do not contend about money, of which others are so eminently desirous. But justice, indeed, is a virtue through which every one legally possesses what is his own; and injustice is that through which a man possesses the property of others, contrary to law. Fortitude is that virtue through which men perform beautiful deeds in dangerous circumstances, in such a manner as the law commands, and those who possess this virtue are subservient to the law; but timidity is the contrary to this. Temperance is a virtue through which men are disposed towards pleasures in such a way as the law commands; but intemperance is the contrary. Liberality is the beneficent use of money; but illiberality is the contrary. Magnanimity is a virtue which is effective of great benefits; but pusillanimity is the contrary. Magnificence is a virtue effective of magnitude in expense; but pusillanimity and indecorous parsimony are the contrary. Prudence is the virtue of the reasoning power, according to which it is possible to give good counsel respecting the above-mentioned good and evil pertaining to felicity. And thus we have spoken sufficiently at present of virtue and vice, and the parts of them. With respect to other things, however, it is not difficult to see which among them are beautiful or base. For it is evident that such things as are effective of virtue must necessarily be beautiful; since they pertain to virtue; and also those things which proceed from virtue. But things of this kind are the indications and works of virtue. Since, however, the indications, and such things as are the works or passions of virtue, are beautiful, it is necessary that such things as are the works of fortitude, or are indications of it, or are bravely accomplished should be beautiful. This must also be the case with just things, and with works which are justly performed; but not with the passions of them. For in this alone of the virtues, that which is justly done is not always beautiful; but in being punished, it is more base to be punished justly, than to be punished unjustly. And in a similar manner with respect to the other virtues. Those things, also of which the reward is honour are beautiful; and likewise those things of which honour more than riches is the reward. And such eligible things as a man performs not for his own sake. Likewise such things as are simply good, such as what a man performs for his country, neglecting his own interest. Also things which are naturally good; and such things as are good, but not to their possessor. For things which are good to their possessor, are performed for his sake alone. This is likewise the case with such things as are more present with the dead than with the living. For those things which are present with a man when living, have in a greater degree a subsistence for his sake. And also with such works as are performed for the sake of other things; for they have less of a subsistence for the sake of him who performs them. This likewise, is the case with such deeds as are well performed with respect to others, and not with respect to him who performs them, and also with respect to benefactors; for this is just. The like may be said of benefits conferred on others; for they are not attended with private advantage. This is also the case with the contraries to those things of which we are ashamed. For those who say or do, or are about to commit base actions are ashamed, as in the verses of Sappho when Alcœus said to her, Something I wish to say, but shame prevents. Sappho replied, If good and upright actions you desire, And your tongue meditates no ill to speak, Your eyes will never be suffus’d with shame, But freely you will what is just reveal. This is likewise the case with things about which men fearlessly contend; for men are affected in this manner about things which tend to glory. The virtues, also, and the works of things which are naturally more worthy, are beautiful; as, for instance, the virtues and works of man than those of woman. This is likewise the case with those things which procure more pleasure to others than to their possessor; on which account the just and justice are beautiful. It is also beautiful to take vengeance on enemies rather than to be reconciled to them. For retribution is just; but the just is beautiful; and it is the province of a brave man not to be vanquished. Victory, likewise, and honour are among the number of things beautiful; for they are eligible though they should be unattended with advantage, and they evince the transcendency of virtue. Public celebrations, also, of the memory of any one are beautiful; and the greater they are the more beautiful. This is likewise the case with commemorations of the dead; and also with those things which are attended with honour. Things too which possess a certain excellence, and belong to one person alone are more beautiful; for they are more worthy of being remembered. This is likewise the case with possessions that are unfruitful; for they are more liberal. Things, also, which are the peculiar property of individuals are more beautiful; and likewise such things as are indications of what is laudable among those with whom we inhabit. Thus for instance, in Lacedæmon it is beautiful to wear long hair; for it is a sign of liberty. For it is not easy for him who wears long hair to do any servile work. It is also beautiful not to exercise any illiberal art; for it is the province of a freeman not to live subservient to another person. Things also which are allied to the beautiful are to be assumed, as being the same with them, both with respect to praise and blame; as if for instance, we should call a cautious and animated person, timid and insidious; a stupid, a good man; and one who is insensible in the endurance of injuries, a mild man. And after this manner we should always proceed from things which are consequent to that which is best; so as to call him who is wrathful and furious, simple; and him who is arrogant, magnificent and venerable. We may also praise those who err through excess, as if they were virtuous. Thus, for instance, we may call an audacious, a brave man; and a prodigal, a liberal man. For they will appear to be so to the multitude; and at the same time a paralogism will be made from cause. For if any one is prepared to encounter danger when there is no necessity for it, he will much more seem to be so prepared where it is beautiful to encounter it. And he who is profuse to any casual persons, will appear to be much more so to his friends; for to benefit all men is the excess of virtue. It is likewise requisite to consider by whom any one is praised; for as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise the Athenians among the Athenians. It is necessary, however, to speak of that which is honourable among the several nations, as of a thing which actually exists; as for instance, among the Scythians or Lacedæmonians, or the philosophers. And in short it is requisite to refer that which is honourable to the beautiful in conduct; since it appears to approximate to it. This is also the case with such things as subsist according to fitness; as if the deeds of a man are worthy of his ancestors, and of the deeds which he has already performed. For to make an addition to the honour already acquired, contributes to felicity, and is beautiful. This likewise will be the case, if besides what is becoming, a man conducts himself with a view to what is better and more beautiful; as if being prosperous he is indeed moderate; but in adversity, he is magnanimous; or is better and more affable, the more dignified his situation in life becomes. And a thing of this kind is that saying of Iphicrates, Some time ago so vulgar was my trade, With a rough sack on both my shoulders laid. And also that inscription of Simonides, “A woman whose father and husband were the brothers of tyrants.” But since praise is derived from actions; and the peculiarity of a worthy man is to act from deliberate choice, we must endeavour to show that he who acts, acts from deliberate choice. And for this purpose it is useful to render it apparent that a man has frequently thus acted. Hence, also, casualties, and events which result from fortune, must be assumed as pertaining to deliberate choice. For if many and similar things are adduced, it appears to be an indication of virtue and deliberate choice. But praise is an oration exhibiting the magnitude of virtue. It is necessary, therefore, to evince that actions are things of this kind viz. that they proceed from great virtue. An encomium, however, pertains to deeds; but those things which surround him who is praised, pertain to credibility; such as nobility and education. For it is likely that a good man will be the offspring of good parents, and that he who is thus educated will be a man of this kind. Hence, we celebrate those who act well; but deeds are the indications of habit; since we also praise him that has not acted, if we believe him to be a man of this kind. The predication, however, of beatitude and felicity, do not differ from each other, but they are not the same with praise and encomium; but as felicity comprehends virtue, so the predication of felicity comprehends these. Praise, however, and counsel have a common form. For those things which you may propound in giving counsel, these by transposing the diction will become encomiums. When therefore we know what we have to do, and what kind of a person a man ought to be, then it is necessary adducing these as precepts to transpose and convert the diction; such for instance, as that it is not proper a man should conceive magnificently of himself on account of the gifts of fortune, but on account of those things which he possesses from himself. And thus indeed what is said, will have the force of a precept. But the following will have the force of praise. He conceived magnificently of himself, not on account of the gifts of fortune, but of those procured by himself. Hence, when you praise see what it is that you propound, and when you propound, see what it is you praise. The diction, however, will necessarily be opposite, when that which impedes, and that which does not impede are transposed. Frequently, also, many of those things may be used, which have an amplifying power; as whether a man acted alone, or first, or with a few, or whether he were the principal person in the action. For all these are beautiful. Praise likewise is increased from the consideration of times and seasons. For these have nothing in addition to what is fit. This is also the case with the consideration if a man has done a thing rightly; for this will be considered as a great thing, and not originating from fortune, but from himself. It likewise pertains to praise, if those things which excite men to virtue and cause them to be honoured, were invented and prepared by him whom we praise; and upon whom the first encomium was made. Thus for instance, it happened to Hippolochus to have the first encomium, and to Harmodius, and to Aristogiton to have their statues placed in the forum. The like method also must be observed in amplifying the contrary to praise. When, likewise, you do not find in him whom you praise an abundance of things worthy of applause, compare him with others, which Isocrates did from his custom of writing delamatory orations. But it is requisite to compare him whom you praise with renowned men; for the oration has an amplifying power and is beautiful, if he is found to be better than worthy men. Amplification, however, deservedly falls upon praise; for it consists in transcendency; and transcendency is among the number of things beautiful. Hence, if you cannot compare him with renowned persons, yet it is requisite to compare him with others, that are not renowned, since transcendency seems to indicate virtue. In short, of those forms which are common to all orations, amplification, indeed, is most adapted to the demonstrative genus. For it assumes actions which are acknowledged, so that it only remains to add to them magnitude and beauty. But examples are most adapted to the deliberative genus, or that which consists in giving counsel. For we form a judgement by predicting future from past events. And enthymemes are most adapted to the judicial genus. For the fact which is the subject of judicial discussion, especially receives cause and demonstration, on account of its obscurity. And thus we have shown from what forms nearly all praise and blame are derived, to what we ought to look in praising and blaming, and from what particulars encomiums and opprobriums are produced. For these things being known, the contraries to these are apparent; since blame consists from the contraries to praise and encomium.
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