In the next place we must speak of accusation and defence, from how many and from what kind of places it is necessary syllogisms should be made. It is necessary, therefore, to assume three things; one, indeed, what the particulars are, and how many in number, for the sake of which men injure others. The second is, how they are affected. And the third is, what kind of persons, and in what condition they are whom they attack. When we have therefore defined what it is to do an injury, we shall speak of what is next in order. Let then to do an injury be, to hurt another person contrary to law. But law is either peculiar or common. And I call that peculiar, indeed, according to which when committed to writing, men act politically. But common law is such institutes, as though not committed to writing appear to be acknowledged by all men. Men also act willingly when they act knowingly, and without compulsion. With respect to such things, therefore, as they do willingly, all these are not performed by them with deliberate choice; but all such things as they perform with deliberate choice, they do knowingly. For no one is ignorant of that which be deliberately chooses to do. The causes, however, through which men deliberately choose to injure others, and to do evil contrary to law, are vice and intemperance. For if certain persons have depravity either in one, or in many things, with respect to that in which they are depraved they are also unjust. Thus for instance, the illiberal man is unjust in money; the intemperate man in the pleasures of the body; the effeminate man in sloth; but the timid man in dangers. For timid men through fear desert those that are in the same danger with themselves. But the ambitious man is unjust on account of honour; the hasty man from anger; he who aspires after conquest, from victory; the severe man through revenge; the imprudent man, because he is deceived about the just and the unjust; and the impudent man, through a contempt of renown. In a similar manner with respect to the rest, each is unjust in that which is the subject of his passion. These things, however, are evident partly from what has been said about the virtues, and partly from what will be said about the passions. It now remains to show for what reason, and in what condition men injure others, and whom they injure. In the first place, therefore, let us explain what we desire, and what we avoid, when we endeavour to do an injury. For it is evident that the accuser must consider how many and which of those things, which all men coveting injure their neighbours, are present with his adversary; and how many and which of these things are not present with the defendant. All men, therefore, do all things partly on account of themselves, and partly not. And of those things which they do on account of themselves, some are performed by them from fortune, but others from necessity. And of those which are performed by them from necessity, some are violently, and others naturally effected; so that all such things as men do, not on account of themselves, are partly from fortune, partly from nature, and partly from violence. But such things as they perform on account of themselves, and of which they themselves are the causes, are partly from custom, and partly from appetite; and some indeed are from a rational, but others from an irrational appetite. But the will, indeed, is an appetite of good in conjunction with reason; for no one wishes any thing else than that which he conceives to be good. But the irrational appetites are anger and desire; so that all such things as men do, are necessarily performed by them from seven causes, viz. from fortune, force, nature, custom, reason, anger and desire. The division, however, of actions according to ages, or habits, or certain other things, is superfluous. For if it happens that young men are choleric, or prone to indulge desire, they do not perform things of this kind on account of their juvenile age, but on account of anger and desire. Nor yet on account of riches and poverty: but it happens to the poor indeed, to covet riches on account of their indigence; and to the rich to desire pleasures that are not necessary, through the power which they have of gratifying their desires. These, however, do not act on account of riches and poverty, but on account of desire. In a similar manner, also, the just and the unjust, and others who are said to act according to habits, do all things from these causes. For they act, either from reason, or from passion. But some, indeed, act from manners and worthy affections; and others from the contraries to these. It happens, however, that things of this kind are consequent to such like habits, and such and such to others. For immediately, perhaps, worthy opinions and desires concerning pleasures, are consequent to the temperate man, on account of his temperance; but the contraries to these are consequent to the intemperate man. Hence, divisions of this kind must be omitted; but it must be considered what desires or opinions are usually consequent to certain conditions. For whether a man be white or black, or great or little, nothing follows of things of this kind. But it is of consequence, whether he is young or old, just or unjust. And in short, such accidents as cause a difference in the manners of men, are of consequence as to the difference of their desires. Thus for instance, it makes a distinction, whether a man be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate. We shall, however, speak of these things hereafter. But now let us speak of the rest. Those things then proceed from fortune of which the cause is indefinite, and which are not produced for the sake of any thing; and which have neither a perpetual, nor a frequent, nor an orderly subsistence. This, however, is evident from the definition of fortune. But those things are produced by nature, of which the cause is in themselves and is orderly. For they happen after the same manner, either always, or for the most part. For with respect to preternatural things, it is not necessary to consider accurately whether they are produced from a certain nature, or from some other cause. Fortune, also, may seem to be the cause of such like things. But those things are effected by force, which are done by the agents themselves contrary to their desire or reason. Those things are effected by custom, which are done in consequence of having been frequently done. And those things are effected through reasoning, which are done with a view to advantage, as ranking among the above-mentioned goods, or as being an end, or as referring to the end, when they are performed on account of utility. For the intemperate, also, perform some things that are advantageous, yet not because they are advantageous, but for the sake of pleasure. And some men through anger and rage perform things which pertain to revenge. Revenge, however, and punishment differ. For punishment is inflicted for the sake of him that suffers; but revenge is for the sake of the agent, that he may satisfy his desire of vengeance. In what we shall hereafter say, therefore, about the passions, it will be evident what the objects are with which anger is conversant. Such things, however, as appear to be pleasant are performed on account of desire. But both that which is done from use, and that which is done from custom are delightful. For many things which are not naturally pleasant, when rendered familiar through custom are done with delight. Hence, in short, all such things as men do on account of themselves, are either good, or apparently good, are either pleasing, or apparently pleasing. Since, however, such things as men perform on account of themselves, they perform willingly, but such things as they do not perform on account of themselves, are done by them not willingly;—hence, all such things as they perform willingly, will either be good or apparently good, will either be pleasant, or apparently pleasant. For I consider the liberation from evils, or from apparent evils, or the assumption of a less instead of a greater evil, in the number of good things. For in a certain respect these are eligible. And in a similar manner the liberation from things painful, or apparently painful, or the assumption of less instead of more painful things, rank among things which are pleasant.
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