Aristotle, Rhetoric. Book I, Chapter 8


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The greatest, however, and most powerful of all things, in order to the ability of persuading and counselling well is to assume all polities, and the manners and legal institutes of each, and to distinguish what is advantageous to them. For all men are persuaded by that which is advantageous; and that is advantageous which preserves the polity. Farther still, the enunciation of him who possesses the supreme power, possesses the principal authority. But dominion is divided according to polities. For as many polities as there are, so many forms also are there of dominion. There are, however, four polities, a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy; so that the supreme power and that which judges, will be either a part or the whole of these. But a democracy, indeed, is a polity in which the magistrates are distributed by lot. An oligarchy is a polity in which the magistracy is distributed to the rich alone, and therefore is distributed according to estates. An aristocracy is a polity in which magistrates are chosen according to their erudition; but by erudition I mean that discipline which is appointed by the law. For those who persevere in legal institutes, govern in an aristocracy. Hence, it is necessary that these should appear to be the best of men. But a monarchy is, as the name indicates, a polity in which one person has the supreme authority. And of this polity, that which is conducted according to a certain order is a kingdom; but that which is indefinite is a tyranny. It is also requisite not to be ignorant of the end of each polity; for those things are chosen in each which pertain to the end. And the end, indeed, of a democracy is liberty; of an oligarchy wealth; of an aristocracy, whatever pertains to erudition and legal institutes; and of a tyranny safe-guard. It is evident, therefore, that those customs, legal institutes, and things advantageous which pertain to the end, must be distinguished, if the choice of the several polities is directed to this. Since, however, credibility is not only produced through a demonstrative oration, but also through that which is ethical; (for we believe the speaker because he appears to be a person of a certain description, viz. if he appears to be worthy, or benevolent, or both these)—this being the case, it is requisite that we should possess a knowledge of the manners of each of the polities. For it is necessary that the manners of each should be most persuasive with reference to each. But these manners may be obtained through the same things. For manners become apparent from deliberate choice; but deliberate choice is referred to the end. What the particulars therefore are, to which the attention of those who exhort should be directed, as future or present; and from what forms credibility about that which is advantageous must be derived; and farther still, concerning the manners and legal institutes of polities; and through what things and how we may abound with arguments,—all these have been unfolded by us as much as is sufficient to the present purpose. For these particulars will be accurately discussed in the Politics.


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