Because, however, those who counsel and who acknowledge the subjects of their deliberation to be profitable, are frequently dubious with respect to that which is more profitable, it follows that we should in the next place speak concerning the greater good, and the more profitable. Let, therefore, that which exceeds be so much and something more; but let that which is exceeded be that which is inherent in the thing which exceeds. And that which is greater, indeed, and more is always referred to that which is less; but the great and the small, and the much and the few, are referred to the magnitude of many things. And that which exceeds, indeed, is the great; but that which is deficient is the small; and in a similar manner with respect to the much and the few. We call good, therefore, that which is itself eligible for its own sake, and not for the sake of another; that which all things desire; that which he who has received intellect and prudence would choose; and that which is effective and preservative, or to which things of this kind are consequent. But that for the sake of which other things subsist is the end; and the end is that for the sake of which other things subsist; but that is good to any individual which with reference to him possesses these definitions of universal good. Hence, it is necessary that more goods should be a greater good than one or a few goods, when the one good or the few are co-enumerated; for they transcend; but that which is inherent is exceeded. If, also, that which is greatest in one genus exceeds that which is greatest in another, the one genus will also exceed the other; and when one genus exceeds the other, that which is greatest in the one, will also exceed that which is greatest in the other. Thus, for instance, if the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman, then in short men are greater than women; and if men are in short greater than women, the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman. For the excesses of the genera, and of the greatest things in the genera subsist analogously. When, also, this thing is consequent to that, but that is not consequent to this the latter is a greater good. But one thing is consequent to another either simultaneously, or successively, or potentially. For the use of the consequent is inherent in the use of the antecedent; and to live is, indeed, simultaneously consequent to the being well, but the latter is not simultaneously consequent to the former. And scientific knowledge is posterior to discipline. But it follows potentially that if a man be a sacrilegious person he may commit a private theft; for he who robs a temple would also steal private property. Of two things, also, which exceed the same third, that which more exceeds is the greater; for it is necessary that it should exceed the other by that greater excess by which it exceeds the third. Those things, likewise, are greater which are effective of a greater good; for by this the efficient cause is greater. And in a similar manner that of which the efficient is greater, is also itself greater. For if that which is salubrious is more eligible than that which is pleasant, and is a greater good, health is also a greater good than pleasure. That, likewise, which is more eligible of itself, is a greater good than that which is not eligible of itself. Thus, for instance, strength is a greater good than the salubrious; for the latter is not desirable for its own sake, but the former is, which is the characteristic of good. If, also, one thing is the end, but the other is not, the former is the greater good. For the latter subsists for the sake of another, but the former for the sake of itself; as, for instance, to be exercised is for the sake of the good condition of the body. That, likewise, which is in a less degree indigent of another, or of other things is a greater good; for it is more sufficient to itself. But that is in a less degree indigent which requires fewer things, or such as are more easily procured. When, likewise, this thing cannot subsist without that, or it is not possible it can be generated without it, but that can subsist without this, then the latter is a greater good than the former; for it is more sufficient to itself; because that which is not indigent of another is more self-sufficient; so that it is evidently a greater good. This is also the case, for the same reason, if one thing is a principle, but another is not; and if one thing is a cause, but another is not. For without cause and principle it is impossible for a thing to be, or to be generated. When, likewise, two things are principles, that which proceeds from the greater principle is greater; and also when there are two causes, that is the greater which proceeds from the greater cause. And vice versa, when there are two principles, the principle of the greater thing is greater; and when there are two causes, the cause of the greater thing is greater. From what has been said, therefore, it is evident that in both ways a thing may appear to be greater. For if this thing is a principle, but that is not, this thing will appear to be greater than that. And, also, if this thing is not a principle, i.e. if it is the end, but that is a principle; for the end is greater, and is not a principle; as Leodames when he accused Callistratus, said, that he who advised did a greater injury than he who performed the deed; for it would not have been done had it not been advised. But, again accusing Chabrias, he said that he who did the deed acted more unjustly than he who advised it; for it would not have been done, unless there had been one who did it. For men give advice to others for the sake of this, viz. that they may act. That which is more rare, also, appears to be a greater good than that which is found in abundance; as for instance, gold than iron, though it is less useful. For the possession of it is greater because it is obtained with more difficulty. After another manner, however, the plentiful is a greater good than the rare, because the use of it surpasses the use of the rare. For that which is frequently, surpasses that which is rarely found; whence it is said by Pindar, “Water is the best of things.” And, in short, that which is procured with more difficulty is a greater good than that which is procured with facility; for it is more rare. After another manner, however, that which is procured with facility is a greater good than that which is procured with more difficulty; for it subsists as we wish it should. That, also, is greater, the contrary to which is greater. And, likewise, that of which the privation is greater. Virtue, likewise, is greater than what is not virtue, and vice than what is not vice; for the former are ends, but the latter are not. Those things also are greater, the works of which are more beautiful, or more base; and of those things of which the virtues and the vices are greater, the works also are greater; since such as is the subsistence of causes and principles, such also is the subsistence of events; and such as is the subsistence of events, such also is the subsistence of causes and principles. Those things, likewise, are greater, the excess of which is more eligible or more beautiful. Thus, for instance, to see accurately is more eligible than to smell accurately; for the sight is more eligible than the smell. To be a lover of friendship, also, is better than to be a lover of riches; so that to be a lover of friends is more beautiful than to be a lover of wealth. And on the contrary, the excesses of better things are better; and of more beautiful things more beautiful. This is also the case with those things of which the desires are more beautiful or better. For of greater things there are greater appetitions; and the desires of more beautiful and better things, are for the same reason better and more beautiful. Those things, likewise, of which the sciences are more beautiful or more worthy, are themselves more beautiful and more worthy. For such as is the subsistence of science, such also is the subsistence of that which is true. But each science is employed about its proper subject; and for the same reasons the sciences of more worthy and more beautiful things have an analogous subsistence. That, likewise, which either all, or many, or most prudent persons, or the most excellent characters have judged or do judge to be good or greater, necessarily thus subsists, or simply, or so far as they judge according to prudence. This, also, is common to other things. For every thing is such according to substance, quantity and quality, as science and prudence assert it to be. This principle, however, we apply to good; for good is defined to be that, which every thing that possesses prudence would choose. It is evident, therefore, that that thing is a greater good which prudence says is more good. That, likewise, which is inherent in better things either simply, or so far as they are better is a greater good; as, for instance, fortitude than strength. This is also the case with that which a better man would choose, either simply, or so far as he is better; such for instance, as to be injured rather than to injure; for this a more just man would choose. That which is more delightful, likewise, is a greater good than that which is less delightful. For all beings pursue pleasure, and for the sake of it desire to be delighted. For these are the things by which good and the end are defined. But the more difficult is both that which is less painful, and that which is for a longer time pleasant. That which is more beautiful, also, is a greater good than that which is less beautiful. For the beautiful is either the delightful, or that which is of itself eligible. Such things, also, as men wish to be in a greater degree causes to themselves or their friends, are greater goods. This is likewise the case with things that endure for a longer, than with those that endure for a shorter time; and with things that are more than with those that are less stable. For the use of the former exceeds in time; but of the latter in the will. For we in a greater degree use that which is stable according to our will. Such things, also, as follow from co-ordinate and similar cases are greater goods. Thus, if an action which is accomplished with fortitude, is better and more eligible than that which is effected by temperance, fortitude also is more eligible than temperance, and to be brave than to be temperate. That, likewise, which all men choose is a greater good than that which all men do not choose. And that which is chosen by many than that which is chosen by a few. For good was defined to be that which all beings desire; so that what is more the object of desire will be a greater good. That, likewise, is a greater good, which is admitted to be so by those who controvert what good is, or which enemies, or judges, or the skilful acknowledge to be so. For that which enemies admit, is just as if all men admitted, and that which the latter admit, is equivalent to what is granted by men excelling in power and knowledge. And at one time, indeed, that is a greater good of which all participate; for it is disgraceful not to participate it; but at another time, that of which no one, or of which a few participate; for it is more rare. Things, likewise, which are more laudable are greater goods; for they are better. And in a similar manner those things of which the honours are greater; for honour is as it were a certain dignity. This is also the case with those things of which the punishments are greater. And likewise with those things which are greater, than such as are acknowledged or appear to be great. The same things, also, when divided into parts appear to be greater; for the transcendency of many things becomes apparent. Hence, the poet says, that Meleager was persuaded by his wife to rise to battle by enumerating the evils which happen from a captured city. She paints the horrors of a conquer’d town, The heroes slain, the palaces o’erthrown, The matrons ravish’d, the whole race enslav’d. This is also the case with composition and exaggeration, as may be seen in Epicharmus; and for the same reason as in division. For composition shows an abundant excess, and appears to be the principle and cause of great things. Because, however, that which is more difficult and rare is greater, occasions, also, and ages, and places, and times, and powers produce great things. For if any one performs a deed beyond his power, and beyond his age, and those that resemble him, or if in this way, or in this place, or at that time, it will have the magnitude of things beautiful, good and just, and of the contraries to these. Whence, also, the epigram on him who conquered in the Olympic games. Some time ago so vulgar was my trade, With a rough sack on both my shoulders laid, From Argos to Tegea still I trudg’d, To sell my fish, till victor here adjudg’d. And Iphicrates passes an encomium on himself by saying, From whence came these? That, likewise, which is spontaneous, or springs from itself, is greater than that which is adscititious; for it is more difficult, whence also the poet says, Self-taught am I. And also the greatest part of a great thing. Thus, for instance, Pericles in a funeral oration says, “That youth being taken away from a city, is just as if spring were taken away from the year.” Those things, likewise, are greater which are useful in a greater necessity; such as things in old age and disease. This is also the case with that of two things which is nearer to the end. That, likewise, which is good to a certain thing, is a greater good than that which being good simply is not good to it. And also the possible than the impossible. For the former is good to a thing itself, but the latter is not. The goods, also, which are in the end of life are greater than others; for those things are in a greater degree ends which are near to the end. Things, likewise, which pertain to truth are a greater good than things which pertain to opinion. But the definition of that which pertains to opinion is that which if it were latent no one would choose. Whence, also, it would seem that it is more eligible to be benefitted than to benefit; for the former would be chosen though it should be latent; but to benefit latently does not seem to be a thing that would be chosen. Those things, likewise, are greater goods which we rather wish to be than to seem to be; for they pertain more to truth. Hence, also, the sophists say that justice is a small thing, because it is more eligible to seem to be than to be just; but it is not so with health. That, also, is a greater good which is more useful for many purposes; as, for instance, that which is more useful to life, to living well, to pleasure, and to the performance of beautiful actions. Hence, riches and health appear to the vulgar to be the greatest of things; for these contain all the abovementioned particulars. That also is a greater good which is more free from molestation, and is attended with pleasure; for in this case there are more goods than one; so that the good is both pleasure and a privation of pain. That, likewise, of two things is the greater good, which being added to the same thing renders the whole a greater good. And those things which when present are not latent, are greater goods than those which are latent; for the former tend to truth. Hence, to be rich will be considered as a greater good than to seem to be rich. That also which is lovely is a greater good; and which to some things, indeed, is lovely when possessed alone; but to others when possessed in conjunction with other things. Hence, the punishment is not equal to deprive him of an eye who has but one eye, and him that has two eyes; for the former is deprived of that which is dear to him. And thus we have nearly shown from what forms it is necessary to derive credibility in exhorting and dissuading.
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