Since, however, the profitable is the scope proposed by him who counsels; but men counsel not concerning the end, but those things which refer to the end; and these are such as are advantageous to action; but that which is advantageous is good;—this being the case, the elements must be assumed of the good and the advantageous simply considered. Let good, therefore, be that which is itself eligible for its own sake; and for the sake of which we choose something else. Let it, also, be that which all things desire, or which all things desire that have sense or intellect, or would desire if they had. Let it, likewise, be such things as intellect dictates to every one; and whatever the intellect of each person dictates to each, this is the good of each. It is, also, that which when present causes its possessor to be well disposed, and sufficient to himself; and is self-sufficiency. It is, likewise, that which produces or preserves things of this kind; to which things of this kind are consequent; and which prevents the contraries, and such things as are corruptive of these. But things of this kind are consequent to food in a twofold respect; either at once, or afterwards. Thus for instance, scientific knowledge is posterior to discipline; but life subsists at one and the same time with health. And the efficient causes have a threefold subsistence, some, indeed, in the genus of the formal cause as to be well is effective of health; others in the genus of the efficient cause as food is productive of health; and others in the genus of the disposing cause as exercise, because this for the most part produces health. These things, therefore, being admitted, it is necessary that the assumptions of things good and the rejections of things evil should be good; for the non-possession of evil is at once consequent to the former; and the possession of good to the latter. The assumption, likewise, of a greater instead of a less good, is consequent to these, and of a less instead of a greater evil. For that by which the greater surpasses the less, becomes the assumption of the one, and the rejection of the other. It is, likewise, necessary that the virtues should be good. For those who possess them are from these well disposed, and become effective of and practically good. With respect to each virtue, however, what it is, and what quality it possesses, we must speak separately. It must also be admitted that pleasure is good; for all animals naturally aspire after it; so that things which are pleasant and beautiful are necessarily good; since these are productive of pleasure. But of things which are beautiful, some indeed are pleasant; but others are themselves eligible by themselves. That we may, however, speak of them severally, it is necessary that the following things should be good: felicity; for it is eligible for its own sake, is sufficient to itself, and we choose many things for the sake of it. Justice, likewise, fortitude, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and other habits of this kind; are necessarily good; for they are the virtues of the soul. This is also the case with health, beauty, and the like; for they are the virtues of the body, and are effective of many things. Thus for instance, health, is effective of pleasure and life; on which account, also, it appears to be most excellent, because it is the cause of two things which are most honoured by the multitude, viz. pleasure and life. Wealth, also, is good; for it is the virtue of possession, and is effective of many things. A friend, also, and friendship are good; for a friend is a thing eligible of itself, and is effective of many things. This is also the case with honour and glory; for they are delightful, produce many things, and those things for which men are honoured, are for the most part attendant upon them. The power, likewise, of speaking and acting is good; for all such things are effective of good: and besides these, a good disposition, memory, an aptness to learn, sagacity, and every thing of this kind; for these powers are productive of good. In a similar manner this is the case with all sciences and arts. Life itself, also, is good; for though it were effective of no other good, yet it is eligible of itself. The just likewise is good; for it is in common something profitable. And these things are in general acknowledged to be good. With respect, however, to those things which are dubious, syllogisms are thus framed to prove that they are good. That is good, the contrary to which is evil. This is likewise the case with that, the contrary to which is advantageous to enemies. Thus, if to be timid is especially advantageous, to enemies, it is evident that fortitude is especially beneficial to citizens. And in short, the contrary to that which enemies wish, or with which they are delighted, appears to be beneficial. Hence, it was well said, Sure Priam will rejoice. This, however, is not always, but for the most part true. For nothing hinders but that sometimes the same things, may be beneficial as well to our adversaries as to us. Hence, it is said that evils conciliate men, when the same thing is pernicious to both. That, also, of which there is no excess is good; but that which is greater than it ought to be is evil. That, likewise, is good, for the sake of which many labours have been endured, and much wealth consumed; for this is now an apparent good; and a thing of this kind is considered as an end, and as the end of many things. But the end is good. Hence it is said by Juno, And fame, indeed, to Priam will redound. And by Ulysses, Longer to stay is shameful. Whence, also, the proverb, ” A water pot at the door.” That, likewise, is good which is the object of desire to many persons, and which appears to be worthy of contention. For that which all men desire is good; and the many appear to be as it were all. That, also, is good which is laudable; for no one praises that which is not good. In a similar manner that is good which both enemies and bad men praise. For it is just as if all men acknowledged it to be good, if it is acknowledged to be so by those that are badly affected. For because it is apparent, it is acknowledged to be good; just as those are bad men whom our friends blame; and those are good men whom our enemies do not blame. Hence the Corinthians conceived themselves to be reviled by Simonides, for saying, “Ilion, however, does not Corinth blame.” That likewise is good which is preferred by some wise person, or some good man or woman. Thus Minerva preferred Ulysses, Theseus Helen, the goddesses Paris, and Homer Achilles. And in short, things which are the objects of deliberate choice are good; but men deliberately choose to perform the things we have mentioned, and such as are evil to enemies, and good to friends. Things that are possible, also, are good; but these are twofold, viz. such as may be done, and such as may be easily done; and those things may be easily done, which are unattended with pain, or which may be effected in a short time. For that which is difficult is defined either by pain, or by length of time. Things, likewise, are good which are done according to our wish; but we wish either no evil, or less evil than good. But this will take place, if either punishment is latent, or small. Men, also, wish to possess good which is their own property, and which no other person possesses. They, likewise, wish to possess superfluities; for thus they obtain more honour. And, also, things adapted to themselves; but things of this kind are such as are fit, both according to genus and power. Things, likewise, which they fancy they are defective in, are the objects of their wish, though they should be little things. For they no less deliberately choose to perform these. Also, things which may be easily effected; for these are possible, as being easy. But those things are most easily effected which all men, or those that are similar, or those that are inferior have performed rightly and well. Likewise, those things with which friends are gratified, or which are odious to enemies. And such things as those who admire them deliberately choose to do. Likewise, those things in which men are ingenious and expert; for they think they shall easily accomplish them with rectitude. Also, those things which no bad man will undertake; for these are more laudable. And such things as are the objects of desire to men; for these are not only delightful, but they also appear to be more excellent. Men, also, especially choose to do those things to which they are most propense. Thus, for instance, victory is the object of choice to the warrior; honour to the ambitious; riches to the covetous; and other characters after the same manner. Concerning the good, therefore, and the advantageous, credibility may from these things be derived.
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