The proem, therefore, is the beginning of an oration; which in dramatic poetry is the prologue; and in playing on the pipe the prelude. For all these are principles or beginnings, and as it were preparatory to what follows. And the prelude, indeed, is similar to the proem of the demonstrative kind of orations. For as those that play on the pipe connect the prelude with the beginning of the song; thus, also, in demonstrative orations, immediately after the orator has mentioned what he wishes to say, it is necessary to collect aptly with it what is to follow; of which all rhetoricians adduce as an example, the proem of Isocrates in his oration in praise of Helen. For Isocrates begins his encomium with blaming the sophists, which has nothing in common with the praise of Helen; and yet because he has aptly conjoined it with the argument he has obtained praise. But the proems of demonstrative orations are derived from praise or blame; as in the proem of Gorgias to his Olympiac oration, “O Greeks, this is a thing worthy of general admiration.” For he praises those who instituted the public spectacles. Isocrates on the contrary blames them, “Because they honoured indeed with gifts the virtues of the body; but appointed no reward for wise men.” The proems also of demonstrative orations are derived from counsel and advice, such for instance as, “That it is requisite to honour good men; on which account he the orator has undertaken to praise Aristides.” Or as he who wrote an oration in praise of Paris; for he says “That it is neither requisite to praise those who are celebrated, nor those who are of no account, but those who are good, and at the same time obscure men, such as was Paris the son of Priam.” For he who thus begins his oration is one that gives counsel. Farther still, the proems of demonstrative orations are derived from forensic proems; but this is from things pertaining to the hearer, if the oration is concerning something paradoxical, or difficult, or much celebrated, so as to require pardon from the auditors; such for instance as the proem of Chœrilus, “But now since all things are divulged.” The proems, therefore, of demonstrative orations are derived from these things; viz. from praise and blame; from exhortation and dissuasion, and from those things which are referred to the hearer. It is necessary, however, that the proems should either be foreign, or appropriate to the oration.
With respect to proems of the forensic kind, it is necessary to assume, that they are able to effect the same thing as the prologues of dramatic, and the proems of epic poems. For dithyrambic proems are similar to those of the demonstrative kind; as, “On account of thee, and thy gifts or spoils.” But in dramatic and epic poems, the proems are a specimen of what is to follow, that the reader may foresee what the subject of them is, and that his mind may not be kept in suspense. For that which is indefinite causes the mind to wander. The poet, therefore, who delivers into the hands of the reader the beginning of his poem, makes him follow with attention the rest of it. Hence, Homer, “The wrath of Peleus’ son O goddess sing.” And, “The man for wisdom’s various arts renown’d, Long exercis’d in woes, O Muse resound.” And another poet, Again O Muse inspire my verse and sing How from the Asian land, a mighty war Spread over Europe. Tragic poets also indicate respecting the drama, though not immediately, as Euripides does, yet they indicate what it is in the prologue, as Sophocles in the Oedipus, “Polybius was my father.” And after the same manner Comic poets. The most necessary and proper office, therefore, of a proem is this, to unfold the end for the sake of which the oration was composed; on which account, if the end is manifest, and the subject matter is trifling, the proem must be omitted. Other species of proems, however, which are used by orators, are remedies, and things of a common nature. And these are derived from the speaker and the hearer, from the subject matter, and from the opponent. From the orator, therefore, and the opponent, those proems are derived which pertain to the dissolving or making an accusation. But these must not be similarly employed by the plaintiff and defendant. For by the defendant, what pertains to accusation must be introduced in the beginning, but by the plaintiff at the end of the oration. But for what reason, it is not immanifest. For it is necessary that the defendant when he is about to introduce himself should remove all impediments, so that he must dissolve the accusation at the beginning of his speech; but the opponent should be criminated by the plaintiff at the end, in order that the hearers may remember the better. What, however, pertains to the auditor consists in rendering him benevolent to the orator, and enraged with the opponent. Sometimes, also, it is advantageous to the cause, that the auditor should be attentive, and sometimes that he should not; for it is not always beneficial to render him attentive. Hence, many orators endeavour to excite laughter in their hearers. A summary account of a thing also contributes to celerity of apprehension; and this is likewise effected by the orator appearing to be a worthy man. For the audience are more attentive to men of this description. But they are attentive to great things, to things pertaining to themselves, to admirable, and to delightful things. Hence, it is necessary to inform the audience that the oration will be concerning things of this kind. On the contrary, if the the orator wishes the audience not to be attentive to the cause, he must say that the subject matter is a thing of small consequence, that it does not pertain to them, and that it is a troublesome affair. It is necessary, however, not to be ignorant that all such things are foreign to the oration; for they pertain to a depraved hearer, and to one who attends to what is foreign to the purpose. For if he were not a person of this description, there would be no occasion for a proem, except so far as it is requisite to give a summary account of the affair, in order that the oration as a body, may have a head. Farther still, to render the audience attentive if it should be requisite, is common to all the parts of an oration; because universally the audience are less attentive to what is said in the progress, than in the beginning of the oration. Hence it is ridiculous to endeavour to procure attention in the beginning of the oration, because then all the hearers are especially attentive. Hence, attention is to be procured, wherever occasion offers; by saying for instance “Give me your attention; for this business is not more mine than yours.” And, “I will relate to you a transaction of such a nature, that you have never heard of any thing so dreadful, or so admirable.” But this is, as Prodicus says, when the audience are drowsy, to promise to say something to them from his demonstration, estimated at fifty drachms. It is evident, however, that the proem is referred to the auditor, not so far as he is an auditor; for all orators in the proems either criminate, or dissolve fear; as from the Antigone of Sophocles, “I will tell O king, though it was not my intention to have come hither as a messenger.” And from the Iphigenia in Tauris of Euripides, “Why do you preface?” A proem also is necessary when the cause is bad, or appears to be bad; for in this case it is better to discuss any thing else, than to dwell upon the cause. Hence, servants do not directly reply to the question they are asked, but their answer is circuitous and prefatory. But we have shown whence it is requisite to render the audience benevolent, and have explained every thing else of this kind. Since, however, it is well said by Ulysses to Minerva, in Odyss. 14, “Give me as a friend, and a man to be pitied, to reach Phœacia’s land,” it is necessary to pay attention to these two things. But in proems of the demonstrative kind, it is necessary to make the auditor fancy, that either himself, or his race, or his pursuits, or something else belonging to him, is praised together with the person who is the subject of the oration. For what Socrates says in the Menexemus of Plato, is true, “That it is not difficult to praise the Athenians among the Athenians, but among the Lacedæmonians.” But the proems of popular orations are derived from those of the forensic kind; for these have not naturally any themselves; since the audience are well acquainted with the subject. And the thing itself is not in want of any proem, but a proem is here requisite either on account of the orator, or the opponents, or if the audience should not think the affair of just so much consequence as it is, but of greater or less consequence. Hence it is necessary either to criminate the opponent, or to dissolve the accusations against him, and either to amplify or diminish the affair. But for the sake of these things a proem is requisite. Or a proem is necessary for the sake of ornament; since without this the oration will appear to be carelessly composed. And such is the encomium of Gorgias on the Eleans; for without any previous extension and graceful movement of his arms like the Athletæ before they engage, he immediately begins, “Elis a happy city.”
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