It now remains that we should speak concerning the order of diction. But there are two parts of an oration; for it is necessary to speak of the thing which is the subject of discussion, and then to demonstrate. Hence, it is impossible for him who narrates a thing not to demonstrate, or that he should demonstrate, without previous narration. For he who demonstrates, demonstrates something, and he who propounds, propounds for the sake of demonstrating. Of these necessary parts of an oration, however, the one is the proposition, but the other the confirmation; in the same manner as in the sciences, one thing is a problem, but another a demonstration. But the division which rhetoricians now make is ridiculous. For narration belongs to a forensic oration. But in the demonstrative and deliberate genus, how can there be a narration such as they say there is, or those things which are urged against the opponent? Or how can there be a peroration of things demonstrative? The proem, however, the comparison, and the repetition, then take place in orations to the people, when there is altercation; (for in these there is frequently accusation and defence;) but not so far as there is consultation in these. But neither does peroration belong to every forensic oration; for it is not requisite, when the oration is short, or the thing can easily be remembered; since this peroration it would happen that something would be taken away from the length of such an oration. The necessary parts of an oration, therefore, are proposition and proof. And these, indeed, are proper or peculiar parts. But the most numerous parts of an oration are, the proem, the proposition, proof, and peroration. For what is said against the opponent, pertains to proof; and the comparison is an amplification of our arguments, so that it is a certain part of the proof; for he demonstrates something who does this. Neither the proem, however, nor the peroration is a part of the proof, but each is subservient to recollection. If, therefore, any one makes a division of things of this kind, like the followers of Theodorus, narration, pre-narration, supernarration, confutation and superconfutation, will be different from each other. It is necessary, however, that he who speaks of a certain species and difference of a thing, should give a name to it; for, if not, it will become vain and nugatory. And this fault of needlessly introducing new names was committed by Lycimnius in his Art of Rhetoric, when he speaks of irruption, aberration, and ramification.
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