But Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a Milesian, invented the art of dividing cities, and separated the Piræus, being, as to the rest of his life, exuberant through ambition, so as to appear to some persons to live more superfluously than he ought, with his flowing hair, and the expensive ornaments of his dress. And besides this, he wore a coarse warm garment, not only in the winter, but also during the hot weather. Wishing likewise to be learned in the whole of physiology, he was the first who, not being engaged in the management of public affairs, endeavoured to say something about the most excellent polity. He planned therefore a city, consisting of ten thousand persons, divided into three parts. For he made one part to be artificers, another husbandmen, and the third warriors, and those that bear arms. He likewise divided the region into three parts, one being allotted to sacred purposes, another to the public, and the third to individuals. The first of these was to supply what is necessary for the established worship of the gods; the second was to be allotted to the support of the soldiery; and the third was to be the property of the husbandman. He likewise thought that there should be only three species of laws. For the things against which actions are brought are these three, assault, damage, and death. He also established by law that there should be one proper court of justice, into which all causes might be removed which appeared not to have been well determined elsewhere; and this court he composed of certain chosen old men. He thought, however, that sentence should not be passed in courts of justice by vote, but that every one should bring with him a tablet in which he should write the sentence, if he absolutely condemned the person accused, but if he entirely acquitted him, that he should leave it blank. And if he partly acquitted him, and partly not, that he should also signify this in the tablet. For he was of opinion that the custom now established by law is not proper; since it compels the judges to be guilty of perjury, on one side or the other. He also made a law that those should be honoured who discovered any thing advantageous to the city, and that the children of those that fell in battle, should be supported and educated at the public expense; this law not having yet been established by other legislators. This law, however, exists at present in Athens, and in other cities. He would likewise have all the magistrates chosen by the people; and he made the people to be the three parts of the city. But those that were elected were to be the guardians of the public affairs, and of those of strangers and orphans. These, therefore, are the principal parts, and the most worthy of notice, in the political arrangement of Hippodamus. Some one, however, may doubt in the first place concerning his division of the multitude of the citizens. For the artificers, the husbandmen, and the soldiers, partake all of them in common of the polity; the husbandmen indeed having no arms; and the artificers neither land nor arms, so that they will nearly become the slaves of those that possess arms. It is impossible, therefore, that they should partake of all the honours. For from those that have arms, the generals and guardians of the city, and the principal magistrates, as I may say, must be appointed; but the two other parts not partaking of the polity, how can they be disposed in a friendly manner towards it? But it is necessary that those that have arms should be superior to the other two parts; and this superiority will not be easily obtained, unless they are very numerous. But if they are so, why is it necessary that others should partake of the polity, and have the power of establishing the magistrates? Again, in what respect are the husbandmen useful to the city? For it is necessary, indeed, that there should be artificers, since every city is in want of these; and they are able to live from their art, in the same manner as in other cities. The husbandmen, however, if they furnish indeed those that have arms with provisions, will reasonably be a certain part of the city; but now they are supposed to have land of their own, and to cultivate it for their own use. Farther still, with respect to that common land from which the soldiers derive their support, if the soldiers themselves cultivate it, the warlike will not differ from the agricultural tribe. But it is the intention of the legislator that it should. And if there should be any other who are to cultivate the private property of the husbandman, and the common land of the military, this will be a fourth part of the city, which will have no share in it, but will always be foreign from the polity. Moreover, if any one should propose that the same persons should cultivate private and common land, then there would be a deficiency of provisions to supply two families, as the lands would not immediately yield enough for themselves, and the soldiers also. All these things, therefore, would be attended with great confusion. Nor is his law respecting judicial processes well framed, which ordains, that on the simple prosecution of a cause, the judge shall divide the sentence; and of a judge become an arbitrator. For when any affair is brought to arbitration, it is usual for many persons to confer together on the business that is before them; but this is not the case in courts of justice, since, on the contrary, many legislators take care that the judges shall not have it in their power to communicate with each other. In the next place, how is it possible the sentence should not be attended with confusion, when the judge thinks that something is due to the plaintiff, and yet not so much as the plaintiff says is owing to him? For the plaintiff demands twenty minæ, but the judge only awards ten. Or when one judge awards more, but another less; one five minæ, but another four? And in thus dividing their sentences, some of the judges give sentence wholly against the plaintiff, but others not at all. After what manner, therefore, can their decisions be reconciled? Again, no one compels a judge to perjure himself, who simply acquits or condemns, if the action is simply and justly brought. For he who acquits the defendant, does not say that he ought not to pay any fine at all, but that he ought not to pay a fine of twenty minæ. But the judge that condemns him is guilty of perjury, if he sentences him to pay twenty minæ, while he does not think that the damages ought to be so much. With respect, however, to the honours which he proposes to bestow on those who discover any thing advantageous to the city, it is not safe to establish this by law, but it is alone plausible to the hearer. For it is attended with calumny, and commotions perhaps of the polity. It also falls into another problem, and another speculation. For it is doubted by some persons, whether it is hurtful or advantageous to cities to alter their ancient and established laws, even if any better law should be proposed. On which account it is not easy to assent immediately to what he here says, if it is not advantageous to alter the established law. It is, however, possible to introduce a certain dissolution of laws or a polity, as a common good. But since we have mentioned the subject, it will be better to discuss a few particulars concerning it. For it is, as we have said, attended with a doubt; and it may appear to be better to alter the ancient laws. In other sciences, therefore, this has been found to be useful. Thus, the medical and gymnastic sciences, and in short all arts and powers have been changed from the modes in which they were anciently exercised. Hence, since the art of government must be considered as one of the sciences, it is evident that a similar thing must also take place with respect to this science. Some one also may say, that this is indicated by things themselves; for the ancient laws are very simple and barbaric. For the Greeks then were allowed to wear swords in common, and to buy their wives of each other. And, indeed, all the remains of ancient laws that we have, are very rude. Thus, in Cuma there is a law relative to murder, that if any person who prosecutes another for murder, can produce a certain number of witnesses to it of his own relations, the accused person shall be held guilty. In short, all men investigate, not what has been instituted by their ancestors, but what is good. And it is likely, that the first men, whether they were earth-born, or were saved from a certain destruction of the human race, were similar to the vulgar and the stupid, as those are said to be that were earth-born; so that it is absurd to remain in the dogmas of these persons. And in addition to these things, neither is it better to permit the written laws to remain without alteration. For, as in other arts, so likewise in political arrangement, it is impossible to express every thing in writing accurately. For whatever is written must be written as that which will necessarily take place; but actions are conversant with particulars, which have not a necessary subsistence. From these things, therefore, it is evident that certain laws may at certain times be altered. And yet if this affair is considered after another manner, it will appear to require great caution. For when the advantage proposed is trifling, as it is a bad thing for the people to be accustomed to dissolve their laws easily, it is evident that some errors must be passed over both of legislators and magistrates. For he who alters them will not be the cause of so much benefit, as the habit of disobeying the magistrates will be of detriment. The example, also, adduced from the arts is false. For it is not a similar thing to alter art and law. For the law has no strength to enforce obedience except from custom; and this is not effected, but in a long time; so that to change easily from the existing laws to other new laws, is to make the power of law imbecile. Again, if the laws are to be altered, are all of them to be altered, and in every polity, or not? And whether are they to be altered by any casual person, or by certain persons? For these things have a great difference. On which account we shall at present omit the consideration of this; for it pertains to another opportunity.
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