CONCERNING the Lacedæmonian and Cretan polity, and nearly concerning other polities, there are two things to be considered; one indeed is, whether their legislation is calculated to promote the best order; but the other, whether there is any thing in it adverse to the hypothesis and the mode of the polity proposed by them. That in every well-established polity, therefore, there should be a freedom from the labour of procuring necessaries, is a thing acknowledged; but after what manner this is to be effected, it is not easy to determine. For the slaves of Thessaly, called the Penestia, have frequently rebelled against the Thessalians; and in a similar manner the Helots against the Lacedæmonians; for they, as it were, watch for an opportunity for some misfortune befalling them. No such thing, however, has yet happened to the Cretans. But the cause of this perhaps is, that though the neighbouring cities are at war with each other, yet no one of them enters into an alliance with revolters, because this would be attended with no advantage, as they also have their villains. All the neighbouring states, however, were enemies to the Lacedæmonians, viz. the Argives, the Messenians, and the Arcadians. Their slaves, also, first revolted from the Thessalians, because they were yet engaged in war with their neighbours the Acheans, the Perrabeans, and the Magnesians. It seems, however, to be very troublesome, if nothing else, to keep upon proper terms with them. For if you are remiss, they are insolent, and think themselves equal to their masters; and if they are treated with severity, they form stratagems against you, and hate you. It is evident, therefore, that those have not discovered the best mode of government, to whom this happens respecting the Helots. Again, the liberty permitted to women is injurious both to the design of the polity, and to the felicity of the city. For as a man and his wife are the parts of a family, it is evident that a city, also, ought to be considered as nearly divided into two parts, viz. into the number of the men, and of the women; so that in those polities in which the women are not under good regulations, it is necessary to think that one half of the city is without legislation; as it there happened to be the case. For the legislator being desirous that the whole city might be capable of enduring labour, has evidently accomplished his purpose with respect to the men, but not with respect to the women, who are permitted to live intemperately and luxuriously in all licentiousness. Hence, wealth is necessarily honoured in such a polity, especially when the men are in subjection to the women, as is the case with many warlike and military nations, except the Celts, or some other nations, if there are such, who openly approve of connexion with males. For he who first mythologized, seems not absurdly to have conjoined Mars with Venus; since all such nations appear to be addicted either to a connexion with males or women. Hence, this was the case with the Lacedæmonians, and many things in their government were performed by the authority of women. For what is the difference, whether women govern, or those who are governed by women? For the same thing will happen. Since, however, boldness is not at all useful for ordinary purposes, but if it is ever useful, it must be in war, even here, the Lacedæmonian women were of the greatest disservice, as was evident at the time of the Theban invasion. For they were of no use at all, indeed, as they are in other cities; but they occasioned more disturbance than the enemies themselves. This liberty, however, seems to have been permitted to the Lacedæmonian women at first, not without a reasonable cause. For the men were for a long time absent from home, on account of the wars in which they were engaged with the Argives, and again with the Arcadians and Messenians; so that when these wars were at an end, they were prepared by their military life to obey the precepts of their legislator; for a military life possesses many parts of virtue. But it is said that Lycurgus, having endeavoured to bring the women to an obedience to his laws, on their refusal desisted from the attempt. Women, therefore, were the causes of these transactions; so that it is evident that they were also the causes of this error. We, however, are not considering this, who ought to be pardoned, or who ought not, but what is right, and what is not right. Those things, however, respecting women which are not right, appear, as we have before observed, not only to produce a certain indecorum in the polity itself, but likewise to contribute something to the love of money. For after what has been now said, some one may also blame his unequal division of property. For it will happen, that some will have far too much, and others far too little; by which means the land will come into the possession of a few; and this because it is arranged badly by the laws. For he made it indecorous for any one either to buy or sell his possessions, in which he acted rightly. But he permitted any one that was willing to give them away, or bequeath them; though the same thing will necessarily happen from one practice as from the other. It is likewise supposed that nearly two parts in five of the whole country, are the property of the women, in consequence of the great inheritances which fall to the lot of some, and the great dowries which are bestowed upon others; though it would be better to allow them no land, or a little, or a moderate proportion. Now, however, a man may make any woman his heir if he pleases; and if he dies intestate, he who succeeds as heir at law gives it to whom he pleases. Hence, though the country is able to support fifteen hundred horse, and thirty thousand foot, the number does not amount to one thousand. From these facts, therefore, it is evident that the particulars respecting this arrangement are badly conducted. For the city could not sustain one shock, but was ruined through the paucity of men. They say, however, that during the reigns of their former kings, they used to present foreigners with the freedom of their city, to prevent their being in want of men while they waged war for a long time; and it is said, that the number of Spartans was formerly ten thousand. Nevertheless, whether this is true or not, it is better for the city to increase the number of people through an equality of property. The law too, which was made to encourage population, was adverse to the correction of this inequality. For the legislator being willing that the Spartans should be as numerous as possible, in order to make them desirous of having large families, ordered that he who had three children should be exempt from keeping watch, and he who had four, from all public charges; though it is evident that the people becoming numerous, while the land was thus divided, many of them must necessarily be poor. Moreover, those things which regard the Ephori, are badly instituted. For the authority of these magistrates pertains to things of the greatest importance; yet all of them are chosen out of the people. Hence, it frequently happens that men very poor are elected to that office, and who on account of their poverty are to be bought. But formerly this was frequently apparent, and even now is to be seen in their public tables called Andries. For the Ephori being corrupted by bribes, subverted the whole city as far as they were able. And because their power was very great, and equal to a tyranny, their kings also were compelled to solicit their favour; so that this contributed likewise to injure the polity. For from an aristocracy, it became a democracy. This magistracy, therefore, connects the polity together; for the people acquiesce, because they partake of the greatest authority in it. Hence, whether this happened to take place through the legislator, or through fortune, it is advantageous to their affairs. For it is necessary to the preservation of a polity, that all the parts of the city should wish to be, and to remain the same. Their kings, therefore, on account of the honour which is paid to them, are thus disposed; but worthy and good men, on account of the senatorial dignity; for this rank is the reward of virtue. The common people, however, are thus disposed, on account of the Ephori, who are constituted from all of them. But it is necessary that these magistrates should be chosen out of the whole community, and not after the manner in which they are now chosen; for it is very puerile. Again, the Ephori are the supreme judges in causes of the greatest importance, though it is accidental what kind of persons they may be. Hence it would be better that they should not judge according to their own opinion, but according to written decrees and the laws. The manner of living also of the Ephori, is not consistent with the intention of the city; for this is very dissolute; but in other things they are too severe, so that they are intolerable, and yet secretly transgressing the laws, they give themselves to the enjoyment of corporeal delights. The particulars, also, respecting the authority of the senators, are not well instituted. For if they were worthy men, and sufficiently instructed in what pertains to probity, perhaps some one might say that they would be useful to the city, though it would still be dubious whether they should be judges for life, so as to have the power of determining things of the greatest importance. For as there is old age of the body, so likewise of the reasoning power. But as they are educated after such a manner, that even the legislator himself cannot confide in them as good men, there is no security in them. For it appears that the members of that community have been guilty both of bribery and partiality in many public affairs. Hence it would have been better, if they had been made answerable for their conduct; but now they are not. It may however seem that the authority of the Ephori has the power of correcting all the magistrates. In this respect, indeed, they have very great power; but we say it is not proper they should after this manner have a corrective power. Farther still, the choice which they make of their senators, is, with respect to the election of them, childish; nor is it right that he who is thought worthy of the magistracy should demand it. For he who deserves to be a magistrate ought to be one, whether he is willing or unwilling. Now, however, the legislator appears to have acted in this particular, as he has in the other parts of his polity. For causing the citizens to be ambitious, he employs them in the election of the senators; since no one could solicit to be a senator who was not ambitious; though most voluntary acts of injustice, nearly happen to men through ambition and avarice. With respect, however, to a kingly government, whether it is better that it should exist in cities or not, must be discussed at another time. It is indeed better that kings should be chosen, not as they are now, but according to their conduct in life. But that the legislator himself, did not think that he should be able to make kings to be men of probity, is evident; for he distributed them as not being sufficiently good men. Hence, he sent ambassadors with the king, that were enemies to each other; and thought that the safety of the city consisted in the discord of the kings. Neither were their common tables, called phiditia, at first well established. For the synod ought rather to have been at the public expense, as in Crete. But among the Lacedæmonians, it is necessary that every man should bring his portion to the feast, though some of them are very poor, and not able to bear this expense. Hence, the very contrary happened to what the legislator intended. For he wished that the institution of common tables should be democratic; but as it is thus ordained by law, it becomes in the smallest degree democratic. For it is not easy for those who are very poor to partake of these tables. And the boundary of their polity assigned by their ancestors is this, that he who is not able to contribute to this end, viz. to the common tables, shall not partake of them. Certain other persons, also, have blamed his law concerning admirals, and they have blamed it rightly; for it was the cause of sedition. For the government of the fleet is nearly the establishment of another kingdom, in opposition to the kings who are generals of the army for life. And some one, also, may on another account blame the hypothesis of the legislator, as Plato does in his Laws. For the whole arrangement of the laws is with a view to a part of virtue, viz. the business of war; for this is useful for the purposes of victory. Hence, their safety consisted in waging war; but after they had conquered, and obtained empire, they were ruined, because they knew not how to be idle, nor to engage in any other employment more important than war. The following, also, was an error of no less consequence; for they thought that those goods which are the objects of contention among mankind, are produced through virtue rather than through vice; and in this respect they thought well. But they did not think well in supposing that these things are better than virtue. The public revenue also at Sparta was badly managed. For being compelled to carry on extensive wars, the common property of the city was of no value; and the subsidies were badly raised. For in consequence of the Spartans possessing a great quantity of land, they did not examine each other as to the amount of what was paid in. Hence, an event contrary to the intention of the legislator took place; for the city was made poor, but the individuals avaricious. And thus much concerning the polity of the Lacedæmonians. For these are the things which may by some one be especially blamed.
The lessons published on this site are freely available to read. If you wish to move from reading to formal study — with graded assessments, academic records, and the support of the Academy — you may enroll at any time. Enrollment is open year round, to students of all ages.
