Return to St. Albert the Great, Logic
Prelection
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Caput V. De divisione logicae, et quae sint partes ipsius, et de voce significante ad placitum, quid et qualiter significet.
1. Divisio autem logicae, ut quidam partium ipsius, ut dicunt Avicenna et Alfarabius, accipienda sunt ex intentione ipsius.
Literal Translation:
“Division however of-logic, as certain-(men) of-parts of-itself, as say Avicenna and Alfarabi, to-be-received are out-of intention of-itself.”
Translation:
The division of logic, however, and likewise the division of its parts, as Avicenna and Alfarabi say, must be taken from its intention.
Explanation:
Albert is here saying that the proper way to divide logic is not arbitrarily or merely by outward features, but by considering its intentio, that is, its aim or purpose. The same principle applies to the parts of logic as well: they should be distinguished according to the end they serve within the overall work of reasoning. By citing Avicenna and Alfarabi, he places this method within the broader philosophical tradition. For students, the key point is that logic is to be organized by what it is trying to accomplish, namely the guidance of the mind toward knowledge, and its parts are understood best when seen in light of that purpose.
2. Sicut vero iam ante dictum est, logica intendit docere principia per quae per id quod notum est, devenire potest in cognitionem ignoti.
Literal Translation:
“Just-as indeed already before it-has-been-said, logic intends to-teach principles through which through that which known is, to-come it-is-able into cognition of-(the) unknown.”
Translation:
But as has already been said before, logic intends to teach the principles through which one can come, by means of what is known, to knowledge of the unknown.
Explanation:
Albert is restating the fundamental purpose of logic before going on to divide it. Logic exists to teach the principles by which the mind moves from what it already knows to what it does not yet know. This is the controlling idea behind the whole science, and it is why its parts must be distinguished according to their role in that movement of reason. For students, this sentence is important because it reminds us that logic is not primarily about words or forms taken in isolation, but about the ordered process by which the intellect is led to new knowledge.
3. Est autem incomplexum, de quo quaeritur quid sit: aut complexum, de quo quaeritur an verum vel falsum sit.
Literal Translation:
“There-is however incomplex, about which it-is-asked what it may-be: or complex, about which it-is-asked whether true or false it may-be.”
Translation:
Now there is the incomplex, about which one asks what it is, and the complex, about which one asks whether it is true or false.
Explanation:
Albert is beginning the division of logic by distinguishing two fundamental kinds of object before the mind. One is the incomplex, that is, something simple like a term or concept, about which the question is what it is. The other is the complex, that is, something composed such as a proposition, about which the question is whether it is true or false. This distinction is basic for logic because the mind first grasps simple things and then combines or separates them in judgments. For students, the key point is that logic must account both for simple understanding and for composed statements, since these are two different ways in which the intellect relates to what it knows.
4. Sciri autem non potest incomplexum de quo quaeritur quid sit, nisi per diffinitionem.
Literal Translation:
“To-be-known however not it-is-able (the) incomplex about which it-is-asked what it may-be, unless through definition.”
Translation:
Now the incomplex, about which one asks what it is, cannot be known except through definition.
Explanation:
Albert is explaining how simple or incomplex things are brought to knowledge. When the question is quid sit, what something is, the proper way to know it is by definition, because definition expresses the essence of the thing. This fits the basic structure of logic he is laying out: simple things are known through definition, whereas complex things will be treated in relation to truth and falsity. For students, the important point is that definition belongs to logic because it is the means by which the mind comes to grasp clearly what a thing is.
5. Complexum autem, de quo quaeritur an verum vel falsum sit, non potest sciri nisi per argumentationem.
Literal Translation:
“Complex however, about which it-is-asked whether true or false it may-be, not it-is-able to-be-known unless through argumentation.”
Translation:
The complex, however, about which one asks whether it is true or false, cannot be known except through argumentation.
Explanation:
Albert is pairing the second basic object of logic with its proper means of knowledge. A complex expression, such as a proposition, raises the question whether it is true or false. That question cannot be settled merely by definition, but requires argumentation, because the mind must be led by reasoning to assent or denial. For students, this completes the basic parallel Albert is drawing: simple things are known through definition, while complex things are known through argumentation. This distinction helps explain the principal divisions of logic.
6. Istae ergo sunt duae partes logicae.
Literal Translation:
“These therefore are two parts of-logic.”
Translation:
These, therefore, are the two parts of logic.
Explanation:
Albert is now drawing the immediate conclusion from the distinction he has just made. Since the incomplex is known through definition and the complex is known through argumentation, logic is divided into these two corresponding parts. One part concerns definition and the grasp of what a thing is; the other concerns argumentation and the judgment of truth and falsity in complex statements. For students, this sentence marks the formal division of logic according to its two basic tasks in guiding the mind to knowledge.
7. Una quidem ut doceantur principia per quae sciatur diffinitio rei et quidditas: ita quod per principia illa doceatur quae sit vera rei diffinitio, et quae non, et quae videatur esse et non sit.
Literal Translation:
“One indeed that there-may-be-taught principles through which may-be-known definition of-(the) thing and quiddity: so-that through principles those there-may-be-taught which may-be true of-(the) thing definition, and which not, and which may-seem to-be and not may-be.”
Translation:
One part, indeed, is so that the principles may be taught through which the definition and quiddity of a thing may be known, so that through those principles it may be taught which is the true definition of a thing, which is not, and which seems to be one and is not.
Explanation:
Albert is explaining the first of the two parts of logic, the part concerned with definition. Its task is to teach the principles by which the mind can know a thing’s definition and quiddity, that is, what the thing truly is in its essence. But this part of logic does more than simply offer definitions; it also teaches how to judge whether a proposed definition is genuinely true, whether it fails to define the thing, or whether it only appears to be a definition without really being one. For students, the point is that logic helps protect the mind from false or merely apparent definitions and guides it toward a true grasp of essence.
8. Alia vero ut doceantur principia qualiter per argumentationem probetur enuntiationis veritas vel falsitas.
Literal Translation:
“Other indeed that there-may-be-taught principles how through argumentation may-be-proved of-enunciation truth or falsity.”
Translation:
The other part, however, is so that the principles may be taught by which, through argumentation, the truth or falsity of an enunciation is proved.
Explanation:
Albert is now describing the second part of logic, the part that concerns argumentation. Its task is to teach the principles by which the truth or falsity of a statement can be established through reasoning. While the first part of logic deals with definition and the question of what a thing is, this second part deals with enunciations or propositions and the question whether what is said is true or false. For students, this shows that logic is not only about grasping essences, but also about proving judgments through ordered argument.
9. Et ut doceatur illius argumentationis forma, quantum ad figuram et modum, et quietationem seu complexionem: et ut doceatur eiusdem argumentationis materia.
Literal Translation:
“And that there-may-be-taught of-that argumentation (the) form, as-much-as to figure and mode, and quietation or complexion: and that there-may-be-taught of-the-same argumentation (the) matter.”
Translation:
And so that the form of that argumentation may be taught, as regards its figure and mode, and its ordering or composition; and so that the matter of that same argumentation may be taught.
Explanation:
Albert is expanding the second part of logic, the part concerned with argumentation. Logic must teach not only whether an argument proves truth or falsity, but also the structure of the argument itself. That includes its form, such as figure and mode, and also its composition or arrangement, as well as its matter, that is, the sort of content or premises from which it is made. The word quietationem in this sentence is unusual and may reflect a textual problem; the sense seems to point to the arrangement or composure of the argument, especially since Albert immediately pairs it with complexionem. For students, the main point is clear: logic studies both the form and the matter of arguments so that reasoning can be judged rightly.
10. Et ut doceatur quae videtur esse argumentatio, et non sit: eo quod apparentiam aliquam quidem habet, sed veram existentiam non habet.
Literal Translation:
“And that there-may-be-taught which seems to-be argumentation, and not may-be: by-this that appearance some indeed it-has, but true existence not it-has.”
Translation:
And so that that may be taught which seems to be argumentation and is not, because it does indeed have some appearance, but does not have true reality.
Explanation:
Albert is adding that logic must also teach how to recognize false or merely apparent arguments. Some things look like genuine argumentation because they have an outward resemblance to it, but they do not truly possess the reality of sound reasoning. This is an important part of logic’s work, since the mind must be able not only to construct and judge true arguments, but also to expose those that imitate argument without actually proving anything. For students, this points toward the study of sophistical reasoning: logic guards the intellect against being deceived by what only seems rational.
11. Et ut doceantur cautelae quibus opponens vel respondens per aliquam occasionem impediatur vel commoveatur a conjectu veritatis, vel ad hoc quod perfecte videat veritatem et non divertat ab ipsa.
Literal Translation:
“And that there-may-be-taught cautions by-which (the) opposing-(person) or responding-(person) through some occasion may-be-impeded or may-be-moved from (the) conjecture of-truth, or to this that perfectly he-may-see truth and not may-turn-aside from it.”
Translation:
And so that the precautions may be taught by which an opponent or respondent may, on some occasion, be hindered or moved away from a conjecture of the truth, or by which he may instead see the truth perfectly and not turn aside from it.
Explanation:
Albert is here including in logic the study of dialectical strategy and caution. In disputation, a person arguing or answering may be led off course by some occasion, so that he is hindered or drawn away from a true judgment. Logic therefore teaches the safeguards needed in debate, both to detect these dangers and to keep the mind fixed on the truth. The sentence also suggests the positive aim of such cautions: not merely avoiding error, but helping a person see the truth clearly and remain with it. For students, the point is that logic is not only about abstract forms of argument, but also about the disciplined conduct of reasoning in actual disputation, where one must guard against confusion and stay directed toward truth.
12. Sed prima harum partium vel ab Antiquis tradita non est, vel ad nos non pervenit.
Literal Translation:
“But first of-these parts either by (the) Ancients handed-down not is, or to us not it-has-come.”
Translation:
But the first of these parts either was not handed down by the ancients, or it has not come down to us.
Explanation:
Albert is now making an important historical remark about the first part of logic, the part concerned with definition and quiddity. He says that either the ancients did not transmit this part, or else, if they did, it has not survived to his own time. This does not mean that the subject itself is unimportant, but rather that its treatment was not available in the tradition as he received it. For students, the point is that Albert is aware of a gap in the inherited logical corpus: the logic of definition should belong to the science in principle, yet its full classical treatment seems to be missing.
13. Hanc etiam partem dicunt Avicenna et Alfarabius ad Arabes non pervenisse.
Literal Translation:
“This also part say Avicenna and Alfarabi to (the) Arabs not to-have-come.”
Translation:
Avicenna and Alfarabi also say that this part did not come down to the Arabs.
Explanation:
Albert is strengthening the previous historical point by appealing to Avicenna and Alfarabi. They too say that this first part of logic, the part concerning definition and quiddity, did not reach the Arabs. So the absence of a developed treatment is not merely Albert’s own impression, but something acknowledged within the Arabic philosophical tradition as well. For students, this helps explain why the surviving logical tradition focuses so heavily on argumentation and syllogism: an important complementary part of logic was thought not to have been preserved in the transmitted texts.
14. Dicit tamen Aristoteles in plerisque locis hanc causam erroris fuisse Antiquis: quia artem diffiniendi non habebant.
Literal Translation:
“Says however Aristotle in many places this cause of-error to-have-been to-(the) Ancients: because art of-defining they had-not.”
Translation:
Aristotle nevertheless says in many places that this was the cause of the error of the ancients: because they did not have the art of defining.
Explanation:
Albert now explains why the missing first part of logic matters so much. Aristotle, he says, often attributes the mistakes of earlier thinkers to the fact that they lacked the art of definition. Without knowing how to define things properly, one cannot grasp their essences clearly, and this leads to confusion and error in further reasoning. For students, the lesson is that definition is not a minor preliminary exercise. It is foundational for truth, because unless one knows what a thing is, one will reason badly about it.
15. Quod autem quidam dicunt hanc tradidisse Aristotelem in sexto Topicorum, frivolum est: ibi enim partem diffiniendi non tradidit, sed docet terminare problema illud quae quaeritur quid insit ut diffinitio.
Literal Translation:
“But that certain-(men) say this to-have-been-handed-down by Aristotle in (the) sixth of-the Topics, frivolous is: there for part of-defining he handed-down not, but he teaches to-determine that problem which is-asked what may-inhere as definition.”
Translation:
But what some say, namely that Aristotle handed this down in the sixth book of the Topics, is frivolous. For there he did not hand down the part of logic concerned with defining, but rather teaches how to settle that problem in which one asks what belongs as a definition.
Explanation:
Albert rejects the claim that Aristotle already provided the missing art of definition in Book VI of the Topics. His point is that Aristotle does not there give a full treatment of the logical part concerned with defining as such. Instead, he teaches how to handle a particular kind of dialectical problem, namely the question whether something belongs as a definition. In other words, Aristotle discusses how to test or dispute about a proposed definition, not how to hand on the complete art of definition itself. For students, this matters because Albert is distinguishing between a dialectical examination of definitions and a full logical doctrine of how definition itself should be formed and known.
16. Adhuc autem quidam alii dicunt haec pertinere ad metaphysicam, et Aristotelem hanc tradidisse in septimo et octavo primae philosophiae: sed hoc absurdum est.
Literal Translation:
“Further however certain others say these-(things) to-pertain to metaphysics, and Aristotle this to-have-handed-down in (the) seventh and eighth of-first philosophy: but this absurd is.”
Translation:
Further, some others say that these things pertain to metaphysics, and that Aristotle handed this down in the seventh and eighth books of the First Philosophy; but this is absurd.
Explanation:
Albert now rejects a second mistaken opinion about the missing art of definition. Some had claimed that it belongs not to logic but to metaphysics, and that Aristotle treated it in Books VII and VIII of the Metaphysics. Albert says this is absurd because, although metaphysics certainly deals with essence and definition in its own way, that is not the same as providing the logical art by which one learns how to define correctly. For students, the important point is that Albert is carefully distinguishing sciences by their proper role: metaphysics studies being and essence as realities, while logic would study the rational principles by which definitions are formed and judged.
17. Aristoteles enim ibi docet quae sint diffinientia tam substantiam quam accidens, et quae sit diffinitio physica, et qualiter diffinitio est unum et non multa, et talia huiusmodi.
Literal Translation:
“For Aristotle there teaches which may-be defining-(things) both substance and accident, and which may-be definition physical, and how definition is one and not many, and such things of-this-kind.”
Translation:
For Aristotle there teaches what things define both substance and accident, what a physical definition is, how a definition is one and not many, and other things of this sort.
Explanation:
Albert explains why the discussion in the Metaphysics does not amount to the missing logical art of definition. Aristotle is indeed treating important questions about definition there: what can define substance or accident, what a physical definition is, and how a definition has unity. But these are metaphysical and philosophical questions about the nature of definitions and the realities they express, not a logical doctrine teaching the method by which the mind forms and tests definitions. For students, the point is that talking about definition within metaphysics is not the same thing as handing down the logical science of defining.
18. Sed qualiter diffiniendo respondetur ad quaestionem qua quaeritur quid est res per essentiam et quidditatem, non docet: quia hoc ad logicam pertinet, et non ad primam philosophiam.
Literal Translation:
“But how by-defining it-is-answered to (the) question by-which it-is-asked what is (the) thing through essence and quiddity, he teaches-not: because this to logic pertains, and not to first philosophy.”
Translation:
But he does not teach how, by defining, one answers the question by which it is asked what a thing is through its essence and quiddity, because this pertains to logic and not to first philosophy.
Explanation:
Albert is making the distinction fully explicit. Aristotle may discuss definitions in metaphysics, but he does not there teach the logical method by which a definition answers the question “What is the thing?” in terms of essence and quiddity. That practical and methodological task belongs to logic, not to first philosophy. For students, this is an important clarification: metaphysics investigates what things are at the level of reality, but logic would teach the intellectual procedure by which the mind frames and recognizes a true definition of that reality.
19. Patet igitur, quod haec pars nondum ad nos pervenit.
Literal Translation:
“Clear is therefore, that this part not-yet to us has-come.”
Translation:
It is clear, therefore, that this part has not yet come down to us.
Explanation:
Albert now concludes the whole historical discussion. The logical part concerned with definition and quiddity has not been transmitted to his own time. Neither the Topics nor the Metaphysics provides it in the proper way, and even Avicenna and Alfarabi say it did not reach the Arabs. For students, this means that the logical tradition as Albert received it is incomplete: an important part of logic belongs to the science in principle, but is absent from the inherited corpus.
20. Sunt et harum partium subdivisiones quae exequitur logica: de quibus in sequentibus erit tractatus.
Literal Translation:
“There-are also of-these parts subdivisions which carries-out logic: about which in following-(things) will-be treatment.”
Translation:
There are also subdivisions of these parts which logic works out, and these will be treated in what follows.
Explanation:
Albert is closing this section by indicating the next step in the exposition. Logic is divided into the two principal parts he has just described, but those parts themselves have further subdivisions. He does not yet explain them here, but announces that they will be discussed later. For students, this is a transition sentence: Albert has established the main structure of logic and is now preparing to unfold its more detailed internal organization in the chapters to come.
21. Quia autem logica omnia considerat prout sunt in anima sive intellectu eius, qui quaerit per notum sibi venire in notitiam ignoti: gratia horum considerat de voce significante ad placitum, et quid et qualiter significet: quod antiquiores Peripatetici (ut dicunt Alfarabius et Algazel) in quinque modis distinxerunt.
Literal Translation:
“Because however logic all-things considers according-as they are in (the) soul or intellect of-him, who seeks through known-(thing) to-him to-come into knowledge of-(the) unknown: for-the-sake of-these-(things) it-considers about voice signifying by convention, and what and how it-may-signify: which more-ancient Peripatetics (as say Alfarabi and Algazel) in five modes distinguished.”
Translation:
Because, however, logic considers all things insofar as they are in the soul or intellect of the one who seeks to come, through what is known to him, to knowledge of the unknown, for this reason it also considers the spoken sign that signifies by convention, and what it signifies and how it signifies. And this the earlier Peripatetics, as Alfarabi and Algazel say, distinguished in five modes.
Explanation:
Albert is now connecting logic’s study of the mind with its study of language. Since logic considers things as they are present in the intellect of the person reasoning from the known to the unknown, it must also consider spoken signs, because human reasoning ordinarily uses words to express what is in the mind. But these words signify not by nature, rather by convention, so logic must ask both what they signify and how they do so. The final clause introduces a further division: the older Peripatetics distinguished this signifying function in five ways. For students, the key point is that logic studies language only because language serves thought, and it does so precisely as a conventional sign of what the intellect conceives.
22. Primo quidem per principaliter dictio significat id ad quod prima institutione significare est instituta, ut homo hominem, et domus domum, et sic de aliis.
Literal Translation:
“First indeed through principally (a) word signifies that to which by first institution to-signify it has-been instituted, as man man, and house house, and thus of others.”
Translation:
First, indeed, a word signifies primarily that for which it was established to signify by its first institution, as homo signifies man, and domus signifies house, and so with the others.
Explanation:
Albert is beginning the fivefold account of signification by describing the most basic kind. A word first signifies the thing for which it was originally imposed by convention. So the word homo directly signifies man, and domus directly signifies house. This is the primary and most straightforward level of signification, before one considers anything more complex about how words function in thought and reasoning. For students, the key point is that logic starts from ordinary conventional signification: a word first means the thing it was instituted to mean.
23. Secundo modi significare dicitur quod ex consequenti supponitur in ipsa, sicut domus significat fundamentum et parietem, et quodlibet totum integrale sic significat suas partes integrales et principales.
Literal Translation:
“Second mode of-signifying is-said that which by consequence is-supposed in it itself, just-as house signifies foundation and wall, and any whole integral thus signifies its parts integral and principal.”
Translation:
Second, that is called a mode of signifying which is implicitly included in it by consequence; thus a house signifies foundation and wall, and any integral whole in this way signifies its integral and principal parts.
Explanation:
Albert is now describing a second mode of signification, one that follows consequentially from the first. A word can signify not only the thing directly named, but also what is presupposed in that thing as one of its constituent parts. So when one says “house,” one also brings along the implication of foundation and wall, because these belong to the house as integral parts. The same is true of any whole made up of principal parts. For students, the point is that signification can extend beyond the immediate object named to what is included in it as part of its constitution.
24. Tertio modo quando res comitatur significationem ipsius: sicut si paries est, fundamentum esse significat, et si tectum est, fundamentum et parietem esse significat.
Literal Translation:
“Third mode when (the) thing accompanies (the) signification of-itself: just-as if wall is, foundation to-be it-signifies, and if roof is, foundation and wall to-be it-signifies.”
Translation:
In the third mode, when a thing accompanies its signification, thus if there is a wall, it signifies that there is a foundation, and if there is a roof, it signifies that there is a foundation and a wall.
Explanation:
Albert is describing a third mode of signification in which one thing points to another because it ordinarily accompanies it. Here the relation is not simply that of whole and part taken directly, but of implication through connection. If there is a wall, one can take that as signifying the existence of a foundation; if there is a roof, that signifies the presence of both foundation and wall. For students, the important point is that words and things can signify beyond their immediate object by the ordered connection of realities, so that one feature can indicate others that go along with it.
25. Quarto quando unum est in intellectu alterius, sicut homo significat animal, et significat rationale.
Literal Translation:
“Fourth when one is in (the) understanding of-another, just-as man signifies animal, and signifies rational.”
Translation:
In the fourth mode, when one is in the understanding of another, as man signifies animal and signifies rational.
Explanation:
Albert is now speaking of signification according to what is contained in the intelligible content of a thing. The concept man includes within its understanding both animal and rational, because these belong to what man is. So one term can signify what is intellectually contained within it, not merely what is externally connected to it. For students, this is an important step toward definition, because it shows how concepts are structured internally: to understand man is already to understand it as an animal and as rational.
26. Et ad hunc modum reducitur, quod accidens et passio significant subjectum, sicut simus significat nasum, et sicut album significat corpus terminatum, et cetera huiusmodi.
Literal Translation:
“And to this mode it-is-reduced, that accident and passion signify subject, just-as snub signifies nose, and just-as white signifies body bounded, and other things of-this-kind.”
Translation:
And to this mode is reduced the fact that an accident or property signifies its subject, as simus signifies a nose, and as white signifies a bounded body, and other things of this sort.
Explanation:
Albert explains that this fourth mode also includes the way an accident or property points to the subject in which it exists. The term simus means “snub-nosed,” and so it implicitly signifies a nose; similarly, “white” signifies a body of some definite kind, since whiteness must exist in a subject. The point is that some terms carry within their meaning a reference to the subject they presuppose. For students, this shows how signification can involve not just genus and difference, but also the relation of accident or property to the thing in which it inheres.
27. Quinto sicut oppositio significat oppositionem, et oppositum significat oppositum: sicut disgregatio albi significat aggregationem nigri, et motus ad centrum frigidi significat motum a centro calidi, et cetera huiusmodi.
Literal Translation:
“Fifth just-as opposition signifies opposition, and opposite signifies opposite: just-as disgregation of-(the) white signifies aggregation of-(the) black, and motion to (the) center of-(the) cold signifies motion from (the) center of-(the) hot, and other things of-this-kind.”
Translation:
In the fifth way, opposition signifies opposition, and one opposite signifies the other opposite. Thus the dispersal of the white signifies the gathering of the black, and the motion of the cold toward the center signifies the motion of the hot away from the center, and so forth in similar cases.
Explanation:
Albert’s fifth mode of signification is based on contrariety or opposition. Sometimes a thing signifies another thing not because it is part of it, contained in its definition, or accompanying it, but because it stands over against it as an opposite. One opposite brings the other to mind precisely through their contrast. So if whiteness is dispersed, blackness is correspondingly gathered; if what is cold moves toward the center, what is hot is understood as moving away from the center. For students, the point is that signification can arise through relations of opposition just as much as through relations of inclusion or accompaniment. Logic therefore pays attention not only to what things are directly, but also to how they point beyond themselves through structured relations in thought.
28. Et hoc ad logicam pertinet per hoc, quod logica est disserendi scientia: disseri autem non potest, nisi dicit Aristoteles, nisi detur quod nomina aliquid significant, eo quod non significant infinita.
Literal Translation:
“And this to logic pertains through this, that logic is of-disputing science: to-dispute however not it-is-able, unless says Aristotle, unless it-be-granted that names something signify, by-this that not they-signify infinite-(things).”
Translation:
And this pertains to logic for this reason: because logic is the science of reasoning or disputation. But disputation is not possible, as Aristotle says, unless it is granted that names signify something, since they do not signify infinitely many things.
Explanation:
Albert is explaining why these modes of signification belong within logic. Logic is the science of rational discourse, and discourse cannot even begin unless words have determinate meaning. If names signified an unlimited number of things, no reasoning could proceed, because the mind would have no fixed point from which to argue. So logic must consider how words signify, since meaningful disputation depends on the fact that names signify something definite rather than an endless indeterminate range. For students, the central point is that logic requires stable signification: reason can move from the known to the unknown only if the terms it uses have bounded and intelligible meaning.
29. Gratia huius etiam considerat de communibus et vocibus incomplexis.
Literal Translation:
“For-the-sake of this also it-considers about common-(things) and voices incomplex.”
Translation:
For this reason, it also considers universals and incomplex expressions.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing a practical consequence from the previous point about signification. Because logic must secure meaningful discourse, it also has to consider universals and simple or incomplex expressions. These are the elements out of which more complex reasoning is built. Logic does not study them as its highest subject, but it must examine them for the sake of argumentation, since rational discourse depends on clearly understood terms and common notions. For students, the point is that logic includes the study of terms and universals because they are necessary building blocks for reasoning.
30. Complexio autem et incomplexio non accidunt rei secundum quod res est, nec etiam voci secundum quod est vox: sed accidunt voci secundum quod refertur ad intellectum simplicem vel compositum.
Literal Translation:
“Complexion however and incomplexion not happen-to (the) thing according-to that which (the) thing is, nor even to-(the) voice according-to that which it is voice: but they happen-to (the) voice according-to that which it is-referred to intellect simple or composite.”
Translation:
Composition and incomposition, however, do not belong to a thing insofar as it is a thing, nor even to a spoken sound insofar as it is a spoken sound; rather, they belong to a spoken sound insofar as it is referred to a simple or a composite intellect.
Explanation:
Albert is explaining that complexity and simplicity, in the logical sense, do not belong first to things in themselves, nor merely to sounds as physical sounds. They belong to speech only insofar as speech expresses the activity of the mind. A word or utterance is called incomplex or complex because it corresponds to a simple act of understanding or to a composed act of understanding, that is, one in which the intellect combines or divides. For students, the key point is that logical structure comes from the relation of language to thought. Logic studies terms and propositions not as bare sounds, but as expressions of the intellect’s acts.
31. Simplicem autem dico intellectum, qui simplex unius rei est intuitivus.
Literal Translation:
“Simple however I-call intellect, which simple of-one thing is intuitive.”
Translation:
Now by a simple intellect I mean one that has a simple intuition of a single thing.
Explanation:
Albert is now clarifying what he means by “simple intellect.” It is the act of understanding by which the mind directly grasps one thing in a simple way, without yet composing or dividing, affirming or denying. This is the level at which terms and simple concepts belong. For students, the point is that before the mind judges whether something is true or false, it first simply apprehends what a thing is. That simple apprehension is what Albert here calls the simple intellect.
32. Talis enim intellectus non significatur ad alium, nisi voce sive dictione incomplexa.
Literal Translation:
“Such for intellect not is-signified to another, unless by-voice or by-word incomplex.”
Translation:
For such an intellect is not signified to another except by a spoken sound or an incomplex word.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing the linguistic consequence of the distinction he has just made. A simple act of understanding, by which the mind grasps one thing without composition or division, is communicated to another person through an incomplex expression, that is, a simple word or term. Since the thought itself is simple, the sign that expresses it is likewise simple. For students, this helps connect thought and language: simple concepts are ordinarily expressed by simple terms, while more complex acts of judgment require more complex forms of speech.
33. Compositum autem dico intellectum, qui accipit rem unam in alia vel ut divisam ab alia: qui intellectus voce incomplexa designari non potest, sed potius complexa: sicut homo est animal, vel homo ambulat, vel homo non est lapis, et huiusmodi.
Literal Translation:
“Composite however I-call intellect, which takes one thing in another or as divided from another: which intellect by-voice incomplex cannot be-signified, but rather by-(voice) complex: just-as man is animal, or man walks, or man not is stone, and things of-this-kind.”
Translation:
By composite intellect, however, I mean one that takes one thing in another or as divided from another. Such an intellect cannot be signified by an incomplex expression, but rather by a complex one, as “man is an animal,” or “man walks,” or “man is not a stone,” and other things of this sort.
Explanation:
Albert is now defining the composite intellect as the act by which the mind combines or separates one thing in relation to another. This is the level of judgment, where the mind affirms or denies. Because this mental act is composite, it cannot be expressed by a simple word alone, but requires a complex expression, such as a proposition. His examples show both affirmation and negation: “man is an animal,” “man walks,” and “man is not a stone.” For students, the key point is that propositions correspond to composed acts of thought. Logic must therefore study complex speech because truth and falsity arise where the intellect combines or divides.
34. Propter quod diffinientes incomplexum veteres Peripatetici dixerunt, quod dictio significativa ad placitum incomplexa est, cuius partes nihil significant de intentione totius: sicut cum dicitur homo, pars ita quae est ho, et pars alia quae est mo, nihil significant de hominis intentione.
Literal Translation:
“On-account-of which defining (the) incomplex older Peripatetics said, that word significative by convention incomplex is, of-which parts nothing signify of (the) intention of-the whole: just-as when it-is-said man, part thus which is ho, and part other which is mo, nothing signify of man’s intention.”
Translation:
For this reason, in defining the incomplex, the older Peripatetics said that an incomplex expression is a word signifying by convention whose parts signify nothing of the intention of the whole. Thus, when “homo” is spoken, the part “ho” and the other part “mo” signify nothing of the intention of man.
Explanation:
Albert is giving the Peripatetic definition of an incomplex expression. A simple word signifies by convention as a whole, but its separate syllables or parts do not themselves signify the meaning intended by the whole word. In the example homo, neither ho nor mo means “man” on its own. This shows that the signification belongs to the undivided word as one conventional sign. For students, the key point is that an incomplex term is not called simple because it lacks physical parts, but because its parts do not carry the meaning of the whole. That helps clarify how logic distinguishes simple expressions from complex ones.
35. Quod si etiam nomen aliquod rei unius simplics sit compositum, sicut Adeodatus, tamen, secundum quod unius simplicis rei nome est, incomplexa dictio est.
Literal Translation:
“But if also (the) name some of-(a) thing one simple may-be composite, just-as Adeodatus, nevertheless, according-to that which of-one simple thing (a) name it is, incomplex expression it-is.”
Translation:
But even if some name of one simple thing is composite, as “Adeodatus,” nevertheless, insofar as it is the name of one simple thing, it is an incomplex expression.
Explanation:
Albert is clarifying that an expression can be materially composite and still count as logically incomplex. The point is not whether a word can be broken into parts as a sound, but whether it signifies one simple thing as a single name. So a name like Adeodatus, even though it is made up of parts, is still incomplex in the logical sense if it functions as one name for one thing. For students, this helps refine the earlier definition: logical simplicity is determined by signification, not merely by outward grammatical or phonetic composition.
36. Et hoc quod dico Adeo, et hoc quod dico datus, nihil significant de institutione totius nominati per hoc nomen Adeodatus.
Literal Translation:
“And this which I-say Adeo, and this which I-say datus, nothing signify of (the) institution of-the whole named through this name Adeodatus.”
Translation:
And this part that I say, “Adeo,” and this part that I say, “datus,” signify nothing of the institution of the whole named by this name “Adeodatus.”
Explanation:
Albert is reinforcing the previous point by applying it directly to the example Adeodatus. Even though the name can be materially divided into parts, those parts do not signify the whole person named by that word according to the original institution of the name. The signification belongs to the entire name as one conventional unit. For students, the point is that a logically incomplex term remains incomplex even if it is outwardly composite, provided its parts do not carry the meaning of the whole as the whole name does.
37. Complexa autem dictio est, cuius partes aliquid significant de intentione totius, sicut cum dicimus, homo ambulat: et haec dictio homo, et haec dictio ambulat, aliquid significant de intentione huius complexi, homo ambulat.
Literal Translation:
“Complex expression however is, of-which parts something signify of (the) intention of-the whole, just-as when we-say, man walks: and this expression man, and this expression walks, something signify of (the) intention of-this complex, man walks.”
Translation:
A complex expression, however, is one whose parts signify something of the intention of the whole, as when we say, “man walks.” And this expression “man,” and this expression “walks,” signify something of the intention of this complex, “man walks.”
Explanation:
Albert now defines the complex expression by contrast with the incomplex one. A complex expression is one whose parts each contribute something to the meaning of the whole. In the proposition “man walks,” both “man” and “walks” signify something that belongs to the total judgment being expressed. Because the parts retain meaningful contribution within the whole, the expression is complex. For students, this is important because it shows how propositions differ from simple terms: in a proposition, the parts are meaningful elements that together express a judgment of the composite intellect.
38. Adhuc autem vox secundum quod refertur ad intellectum eius qui quaerit invenire ignotum per notum, habet quod dividitur in commune, seu universale, et proprium, sive singulare: talium enim nihil accidit ei secundum quod ad rem designatam refertur.
Literal Translation:
“Further however voice according-to that which it-is-referred to intellect of-him who seeks to-find (the) unknown through (the) known, has that it-is-divided into common, or universal, and proper, or singular: of-such-things for nothing happens to-it according-to that which to (the) thing designated it-is-referred.”
Translation:
Further, a spoken sign, insofar as it is referred to the intellect of the one who seeks to discover the unknown through the known, is divided into common, or universal, and proper, or singular. For none of these belongs to it insofar as it is referred to the thing designated.
Explanation:
Albert is now adding another distinction that belongs to words as they function in thought. A word, considered in relation to the intellect reasoning from the known to the unknown, can be taken either as common or universal, or as proper or singular. That distinction does not arise from the physical sound itself, nor simply from the external thing named, but from the way the word stands in relation to intellectual apprehension. In other words, logic considers universality and singularity at the level of signification as it serves thought. For students, the main point is that “universal” and “singular” are logical features of a term as used by the mind, not merely properties of the spoken sound or of the thing outside the mind.
39. Res enim omnes sunt singulares quae eadunt sub sensu et secundum quod constituuntur a natura: et commune quod est in eis, accipitur ab intellectu.
Literal Translation:
“For things all are singular which fall under sense and according-to that which they-are-constituted by nature: and common-(thing) which is in them, is-received by intellect.”
Translation:
For all things that fall under sense, and as they are constituted by nature, are singular; and the common element that is in them is received by the intellect.
Explanation:
Albert is explaining why the distinction between universal and singular belongs especially to logic and to the work of the intellect. Things as they exist in the world and as they are encountered by the senses are always singular, that is, particular individual realities. What is common in them is not separately given in sense as such, but is grasped by the intellect through abstraction. For students, the point is that universality does not belong to things outside the mind in the same way singularity does. Rather, the intellect receives and understands the common nature present in many singular things, and this is what makes universal knowledge and logical reasoning possible.
40. Et ideo dicunt Aristoteles et Boetius, quod universale est dum intelligitur, singulare vero dum sentitur.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore say Aristotle and Boethius, that universal is when it-is-understood, singular however when it-is-sensed.”
Translation:
And therefore Aristotle and Boethius say that a thing is universal when it is understood, but singular when it is sensed.
Explanation:
Albert is summing up the previous point with an authoritative formula. The same reality is considered as singular when it is encountered by the senses, because sense deals with particular things; but it is universal when it is grasped by the intellect, because intellect apprehends the common nature that can belong to many. For students, this is a classic scholastic distinction: universality belongs to the mode in which a thing is known by the mind, while singularity belongs to the mode in which it is encountered in the world through sensation.
41. Commune tamen quod est in eis, est tribus modis, scilicet id quod est actu in pluribus, ut homo quod actu divisibile est in plures, ita quod totum est in singulis per naturam et rationem: et id quod actu est in uno, aptitudine vero naturae potest esse in pluribus, sicut hoc commune quod est sol: et id quod nec actu est in pluribus, nec in aliquo vel uno solo, sed aptitudine non repugnat et ratione quin possit esse in multis, sicut eptangulum si ponimus, nihil esse eptangulum secundum actum, tamen secundum aptitudinem est et potest esse in multis.
Literal Translation:
“Common however which is in them, is in three modes, namely that which is actually in many, as man which actually divisible is into many, so that whole it-is in singles by nature and notion: and that which actually is in one, by-aptitude however of-nature it-can-be in many, as this common-(thing) which is sun: and that which neither actually is in many, nor in any or one alone, but by-aptitude not it-repugns and by-notion that it-can-be in many, as eptangulum if we-posit, nothing to-be eptangulum according-to act, nevertheless according-to aptitude it is and can-be in many.”
Translation:
The common element that is in them, however, is in three modes. First, there is what is actually in many, as man, which is actually divisible into many, so that the whole nature is in each individual according to nature and intelligible account. Second, there is what is actually in one, but by the aptitude of its nature can be in many, as this common nature which is the sun. Third, there is what is neither actually in many, nor even in any one thing alone, but whose aptitude and intelligible character do not prevent it from being able to exist in many, as if we posit an eptangulum; although nothing is actually an eptangulum, nevertheless according to aptitude it is such and can be in many.
Explanation:
Albert is distinguishing three ways in which something common or universal may be considered. Sometimes a common nature is actually found in many individuals, as human nature is in many men. Sometimes it is actually found in only one instance, yet its nature does not prevent it from being multiplied, as with the sun, which is one in fact though not necessarily one by intelligible character alone. Finally, something may not actually exist at all, yet still be universally thinkable because its notion does not involve contradiction if it were instantiated in many things. The last example, eptangulum, is textually unusual, but the point is clear: the intellect can form a common notion even where no actual instance exists. For students, this shows that universality concerns not only what is presently multiplied in reality, but also what the intellect grasps as communicable to many according to its nature.
42. Et ulterius consideratur dictum omne vel dicto, quod imponitur a forma communi cadit in multis, sive illa forma sit accidentalis, sive substantialis, commune est et universale, sive secundum actum sive secundum aptitudinem, sive non.
44. Proprium autem sive singulare est, quod imponitur a forma accidentali significanti accidentium collectionem quam impossibile est inveniri nisi in uno solo, ut Socrates, vel Platonis: quae ex proprietatibus subjectis et loco individuatis, et aliis hujusmodi, non nisi uni convenire possunt, et impossibile est ut in alio reperiantur.
45. Et hoc intelligere est, et omne id hominis proprium, cui nulla demonstratio nisi ad hoc singulare, et una dictione hoc signum, vel hoc album.
46. Haec enim sic est hoc, quod non potest esse aliud.
47. Adhuc dictio sive vox significativa est articulata, et ex hoc quod refertur ad rem designatam, sed ex hoc quod est in intellectu quaerentis sive ignotum per notum: licet etiam quaedam ipsius sit notio, quaedam autem verbum.
48. Pronomen autem secundum quod nomen sunt sive nominis in supponendo accipiunt, et participium cum suppletione verbi substantivi in apponendo vel praedicando supplet verbum verbi: sicut cum dicitur, homo est amans, vel homo amat, vel homo fuit amans, vel homo amavit, vel homo erit amans, vel homo amabit.
49. Caetera autem partes indeclinabiles sive adjunctionis nullum habent intellectum: et si dicatur, homo est in, non intelligitur nisi alterum ex eis sit, ut in domo.
50. Et similiter cum dicitur, homo est super, vel non ambulat super equum, et si dicatur, homo autem, et non addatur cui adverso conjungitur: vel si dicatur, homo ergo, nisi addatur quid inferatur.
51. Nomen autem, ut in sequentibus habebitur, significativum est ad placitum sive temporis; verbum autem cum tempore quod ei subjicitur idem praedicative, vel ficitive, vel negativè, vel affirmative uni.
52. Alias autem vox significativa ad placitum secundum quod est in intellectu et quaeritur scientiam ignoti per notum, accidunt quinque, scilicet quod sit univoca, et quaedam aequivoca, quaedam autem multivoca, etiam quaedam equivocata, quaedam vero analoga sive proportionata, quae apud Arabes vocantur convenientia.
53. Univoca autem sunt, quae a tali forma imposita sunt, ad quam omnium participantium eam est respectus unus secundum rem et rationem sive magis et minus: sicut animal participatur a speciebus animalium, et homo participatur ab individuis quae sunt sub ipso.
54. Diversorum autem sunt diversa nomina unius et ejusdem rei secundum substantialem: et quod institutum nominis ad instituendo diversis rei proprietatibus fuit affectus, ut ens, moveri, spatium, glaciem, vestis, tunica, et hujusmodi.
55. Æquivoca sunt diversarum rerum diversa nomina: eo quod institutionis diversis diversorum rerum proprietatibus instituendo fuit affectus, ut equus, et aequus.
56. Æquivocum sunt quando unum nomen diversis secundum diversas rationes impositum est: eo quod una aliqua proprietas invenita in diversis affect institutionem: quae tamen proprietas non per unum rationem est in illis, ut canis, quod nomen est impositum latrabili, et stellae caelesti, et nautae piscis propter unam proprietatem inventam in illis, quae est omnia habere esse mordacia, cum tamen non una ratione mordacia sint.
57. Analoga autem sunt proportionaliter dicta, ut Arabes dicunt, convenientia: et sunt media inter univoca et aequivoca, quae sunt imposita diversis secundum esse et substantiam per respectum ad unum cui appropriatur, sicut ens, quod dicitur de substantia primo et principaliter, et de accidente secundario, quia est aliquid entis: et quantitas dicitur ens, quia est mensura entis: et qualitas dicitur ens, quia est dispositio entis.
58. Et hoc, ut dicit Johannes Damascenus in logica sua, fit tribus modis, scilicet per priorem ad unum subjectum, ut ens: et proportionem ad unum efficies actum, ut medicus dicitur vere medicus quia secundum eam quae in ipso est medicinam operatur: et medicus dicitur idiota, medicus per expertam vel experimenta initiatus in opere medicandi, et non secundum eam quae in ipso est artem medicinam: et medicus dicitur instrumentum medicinae per quod fit medicatio, ut venter, et phlebotoma, vel alia hujusmodi: tertio proportionem quidem, sicut sanum quod principaliter consistit in aequalitate complexionis animalium, et est in cibo sicut in conservante eandem sanitatem, et in urina sicut in indicante, et in aëre vel in loco sicut in fovente, et similiter est in aliis.
59. Hae autem omnes de logicis actenus sunt: eo quod haec convenientia voce significativa est articulata, secundum quod per institutionem dicti intellectum cujus qui per notum certificari quaerit de ignoto.
60. Vocamus etiam secundum consecutionem quam in aliis habemus, omnia quantum possumus more, quae ad illuminationem pertinent doctrinae.
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