Return to St. Albert the Great, Logic
Prelection
In this chapter, St. Albert the Great asks whether logic is truly a part of philosophy or only a method used by the other philosophical sciences. Some argued that philosophy has only three speculative parts—natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics—and that logic, being the common instrument of all reasoning, stands outside philosophy. St. Albert answers that this dispute often arises from using the word “philosophy” in different senses: if philosophy means only the contemplation of realities outside the mind, logic is not counted among its parts; but if philosophy means the ordered pursuit of truth in every way man can attain it, then logic certainly belongs to philosophy. Logic studies the work of reason itself, especially the mind’s movement from what is known to what is unknown through comparison, affirmation, denial, and proof. Students of the Classical Liberal Arts Academy should see here why logic is not a mere accessory to learning, but a necessary part of wisdom’s discipline, for without it the mind cannot proceed securely toward truth in any science.
Chapter 02. Utrum logica sit pars philosophiae?
1. Hanc autem scientiam qui modus est omnis philosophiae, quidam nullam partem esse philosophiae contendunt, dicentes non nisi tres esse partes philosophiae, scilicet physicam, mathematicam sive disciplinabilem, et metaphysicam sive divinam.
Literal Translation:
“This however science which mode is of-all philosophy, certain (men) no part to-be of-philosophy contend, saying not except three to-be parts of-philosophy, namely physics, mathematics or disciplinable, and metaphysics or divine.”
Translation:
Now some maintain that this science, which is the method of all philosophy, is not any part of philosophy, saying that there are only three parts of philosophy: namely physics, mathematics or the disciplinary science, and metaphysics or divine science.
Explanation:
This sentence opens a new stage in the argument by applying the earlier discussion of logic directly to philosophy as a whole. Some thinkers say that logic cannot be a part of philosophy because it is the method used by all philosophy, not one branch alongside the others. They therefore reduce philosophy to the three traditional speculative divisions: natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics. For students, the key issue is the same one we have already seen: if logic is universal in use, does that prevent it from being a genuine part of philosophy? This is the objection the author is now preparing to answer.
2. Cum enim diffinitio dicens quid et propter quid medium sit in scientia, et diffinitio non possit variari nisi tripliciter, scilicet quod aut concipiat materiam sensibilem, quae cum motu est et mutatione: aut concipiat materiam intelligibilem, cuius essentia non est cum motu et mutatione secundum rationem quamvis secundum esse: sit in materia quae est cum mutatione et motu, sicut est magnitudo et numerus: aut nec secundum essentiam, nec secundum esse concipiat materiam sensibilem: videtur quod philosophia non habeat nisi tres partes essentiales, sicut et Aristoteles dicere videtur.
Literal Translation:
“For since definition saying what and on-account-of-what (the) middle is in science, and definition is-not able to-be varied except threefold, namely that either it may-conceive sensible matter, which with motion is and change: or it may-conceive intelligible matter, whose essence is-not with motion and change according-to reason although according-to being it may-be in matter which is with change and motion, just-as is magnitude and number: or neither according-to essence, nor according-to being it may-conceive sensible matter: it-seems that philosophy may-have not except three essential parts, just-as also Aristotle to-say seems.”
Translation:
For since definition, stating what a thing is and why it is, holds the middle place in science, and since definition can vary only in three ways, namely: either it conceives sensible matter, which exists with motion and change; or it conceives intelligible matter, whose essence is not bound up with motion and change in its formal account, although in its being it exists in matter subject to motion and change, as magnitude and number do; or it conceives sensible matter neither in essence nor in being, it seems that philosophy has only three essential parts, just as Aristotle also seems to say.
Explanation:
This sentence gives the philosophical reason for dividing philosophy into only three principal parts. The argument depends on the different ways a thing can be defined according to its relation to matter and motion. One kind of object is considered with sensible matter and motion, which belongs to natural philosophy. Another is considered apart from motion in its intelligible account, though not apart from matter in actual existence, which belongs to mathematics. A third is considered apart from sensible matter both in essence and in being, which belongs to metaphysics or divine science. On that basis, it seems that philosophy can have only these three essential divisions. For students, the important point is that this is a classification by subject matter: the sciences are being distinguished according to the kind of reality each considers and how that reality stands in relation to matter and motion.
3. Propter quod nonnulli logicam scientiam sive rationalem, nullam partem dicunt esse philosophiae.
Literal Translation:
“On-account-of which not-none logic science or rational, no part they-say to-be of-philosophy.”
Translation:
For this reason, some say that logical science, or rational science, is no part of philosophy.
Explanation:
This sentence states the conclusion drawn by some from the threefold division of philosophy just mentioned. If philosophy has only the three essential parts distinguished by their relation to matter and motion, then logic, or rational science, would not count as one part among them. The thought is that logic does not study a special class of beings the way physics, mathematics, and metaphysics do, but instead concerns the mode of reasoning used in all of them. For students, this line is important because it sharpens the debate: is logic excluded from philosophy because it is methodological rather than material, or can it still belong to philosophy in a distinct way?
4. Addunt etiam ad suae assertionis confirmationem, quod nullis rei modus, cum re cuius modus est, venit in generis sui divisionem.
Literal Translation:
“They-add also to confirmation of-their assertion, that of-no thing (the) mode, with the thing of-which (it is the) mode, comes into division of-its genus.”
Translation:
They add also in support of their claim that the mode of a thing does not fall, together with the thing of which it is the mode, within the division of its genus.
Explanation:
This sentence adds another argument for excluding logic from the parts of philosophy. The claim is that a mode or method does not belong to the same division of a genus as the thing whose mode it is. So if logic is the mode of philosophy, it should not be counted as one member of philosophy alongside the other parts. In other words, method and subject are not being placed on the same level of classification. For students, this is an important scholastic objection: if logic is the way philosophy proceeds, then perhaps it should not be listed as one philosophical science among others. The author is building the strongest case for that view before answering it.
5. Constat autem, quod logica generaliter dicta modus philosophiae est.
Literal Translation:
“But it-is-established, that logic generally called (the) mode of-philosophy is.”
Translation:
Now it is established that logic, taken generally, is the method of philosophy.
Explanation:
This sentence states as an accepted premise the point that has been argued earlier: logic, understood in a general way, is the mode or method by which philosophy proceeds. That means logic is being considered here not yet as one distinct science with its own subject, but as the common rational way in which philosophical inquiry, teaching, and demonstration are carried out. For students, this line is important because it tightens the objection being presented: if logic is granted to be the method of philosophy, then the question becomes whether a method can also be counted as a part of the whole whose method it is.
6. Non ergo venire videtur ad philosophiae divisionem, nec videtur in aliqua parte huius generis quod est philosophia contineri.
Literal Translation:
“Not therefore to-come it-seems into division of-philosophy, nor it-seems in any part of-this genus which is philosophy to-be contained.”
Translation:
Therefore, it seems not to fall within the division of philosophy, nor does it seem to be contained in any part of this genus which is philosophy.
Explanation:
This sentence states the conclusion of the objection now being developed. If logic is the general method by which philosophy proceeds, then it seems not to belong within the division of philosophy as one part among others. In scholastic terms, the argument is that what serves as the mode of a whole genus is not itself counted as one species inside that genus. For students, this is the sharpened form of the difficulty: if philosophy is divided into its proper parts, and logic is only the common method of them all, then logic would appear to stand outside that division rather than within it.
7. Hanc autem opinionem alii quidam impugnantes dicunt philosophiae generalis esse intentionem omnem, omnium quocumque modo entium comprehendere veritatem, quantum homini possibile est comprehendere eam secundum rationem et intellectum.
Literal Translation:
“But this opinion certain others attacking say of-philosophy general to-be (the) intention every, of-all things in-whatever way existing to-comprehend (the) truth, as-much-as to-man possible is to-comprehend it according-to reason and intellect.”
Translation:
But some others, attacking this opinion, say that the aim of philosophy in general is to comprehend the whole truth about all things that in any way exist, as far as it is possible for man to comprehend it according to reason and intellect.
Explanation:
This sentence begins the reply to the view that logic is not part of philosophy. These thinkers define philosophy in the broadest possible way: philosophy aims at grasping the truth about all beings, in whatever manner they exist, so far as the human mind can attain that truth through reason and intellect. That broader definition matters because it opens room for logic within philosophy. If philosophy is ordered not only to certain subject matters but to the full rational grasp of truth, then the science that studies the very act and method of rational knowing may also belong within philosophy. For students, this is an important shift: the argument is moving from a narrow division based only on kinds of objects to a wider account based on the human pursuit of truth itself.
8. Ea autem quae sunt, dicuntur esse aut ab opere nostro, sive a voluntate, sive etiam ab intellectu scientiam quaerente: aut a natura generaliter dicta, quae ab opere nostro causari non potest.
Literal Translation:
“But those things which are, are-said to-be either from our work, whether from will, or also from intellect seeking knowledge: or from nature generally called, which by our work cannot be caused.”
Translation:
Now the things that exist are said to be either from our own activity, whether from the will or even from the intellect seeking knowledge, or from nature, taken in a general sense, which cannot be caused by our activity.
Explanation:
This sentence introduces a broad division of beings according to their source. Some things come from human activity: either from the will, as in things we choose and make, or from the intellect, as in the ordered products of thought and inquiry. Other things come from nature in the broad sense, that is, from what exists independently of our making. In the argument about philosophy, this matters because it expands the field of what philosophy may consider. Philosophy is not restricted only to naturally existing things; it may also include what arises from rational activity itself. For students, this is an important step toward making room for logic within philosophy, since logic concerns something that belongs in a special way to the work of intellect.
9. Et cum ea quae a natura sunt, nostrae sint causae scientiae, et non nos sumus causa ipsorum, non potest de illis esse scientia practica.
Literal Translation:
“And since those things which from nature are, of-our knowledge are causes, and not we are cause of-them, not can concerning them there-be practical science.”
Translation:
And since the things that come from nature are causes of our knowledge, while we are not the cause of them, there cannot be a practical science about them.
Explanation:
This sentence draws an important scholastic distinction between speculative and practical knowledge. Things that exist by nature are not produced by us; rather, they are what our minds come to know. Because they are the source or object of our knowledge and do not depend on our action for their being, they cannot belong to practical science, which is concerned with what can be done or made by us. For students, the point is that practical science deals with things ordered to human action, while the study of natural things belongs instead to the contemplative or speculative order, since nature is something we discover, not something we produce.
10. Relinquitur ergo, quod de talibus apud nos non est nisi scientia contemplativa, quae lumine intelligentiae perficitur.
Literal Translation:
“It-remains therefore, that concerning such (things) among us there is not except contemplative science, which by-(the) light of-intelligence is perfected.”
Translation:
It remains, therefore, that with respect to such things there is for us only contemplative science, which is brought to perfection by the light of intelligence.
Explanation:
This sentence draws the conclusion from the previous distinction. Since things that come from nature are not made by us and therefore do not belong to practical science, our knowledge of them must be contemplative rather than practical. That is, they are known not in order to be produced or altered by us, but in order to be understood. The final phrase adds that this contemplative science is perfected by the light of intelligence, meaning by the intellect’s power to grasp truth. For students, this marks a classic scholastic division: where the object is not something we make, the proper science is one of contemplation, ordered to understanding rather than action.
11. Eorum autem quorum nos sumus causa per voluntatem, non potest esse apud nos scientia speculativa, sed tantum practica.
Literal Translation:
“But of-those (things) of-which we are cause through will, not can there-be among us science speculative, but only practical.”
Translation:
But of those things of which we are the cause through the will, there cannot be for us speculative science, but only practical science.
Explanation:
This sentence states the other side of the distinction just made. When the things in question are brought about by us through the will, they do not belong to speculative science, which is ordered to knowing what is, but to practical science, which is ordered to action and production. In scholastic thought, speculative science considers realities that exist independently of our choosing, whereas practical science concerns things we can do, make, or direct. For students, the point is simple and important: where human willing is the cause, the proper kind of knowledge is practical, because the purpose of that knowledge is not merely to understand but to guide action.
12. Eadem enim sunt in quolibet scibili principia et causae et elementa cognoscendi, quae sunt principia essendi: quia aliter sequeretur, quod id quod scitur a nobis, non scitur secundum id quod est, sed potius sciretur id quod non est.
Literal Translation:
“For the same indeed are in each knowable (thing) principles and causes and elements of-knowing, which are principles of-being: because otherwise it-would-follow, that that which is-known by us, is-not known according to that which it is, but rather that would-be-known which is not.”
Translation:
For in every knowable thing, the principles, causes, and elements of knowing are the same as the principles of being. Otherwise it would follow that what is known by us is not known according to what it truly is, but rather that what is not would be known.
Explanation:
This sentence states a fundamental scholastic principle: true knowledge must correspond to reality. The same principles that make a thing be what it is must also ground our knowledge of it; otherwise our knowledge would not really be knowledge of the thing itself. If what we know were disconnected from the thing’s actual being, then we would not be knowing reality, but something false or nonexistent. For students, this is an important foundation for the whole discussion of science: science is trustworthy only because the mind, when it knows rightly, is ordered to being as it really is, not to mere appearances or inventions of its own.
13. Et sic falso modo sciretur omne quod scitur, quod absurdum est.
Literal Translation:
“And thus in-a-false mode would-be-known every (thing) that is-known, which absurd is.”
Translation:
And thus everything that is known would be known in a false way, which is absurd.
Explanation:
This sentence draws out the consequence of denying that knowledge corresponds to the being of the thing known. If the principles of knowing were not rooted in the principles of being, then all knowledge would be false in its very mode of knowing, because it would fail to grasp things as they truly are. The author rejects this as absurd, since it would destroy the possibility of real science altogether. For students, this line reinforces a basic scholastic conviction: truth in the mind depends upon conformity to reality, and without that conformity there could be no genuine knowledge.
14. Relinquitur igitur quod de entibus a natura causatis, non potest esse scientia per ea quae sunt a nobis, sed potius scientia eorum habetur ex principiis causantibus essentiam et esse eorum esse in natura, quae nos nisi per contemplationem sunt in omnibus.
Literal Translation:
“It-remains therefore that concerning beings caused by nature, there cannot be science through those things which are from us, but rather science of-them is-had from principles causing the essence and being of-their being in nature, which to us except through contemplation are in all (things).”
Translation:
It follows, therefore, that there cannot be science of beings caused by nature through things that come from us; rather, our knowledge of them is obtained from the principles that cause their essence and their being in nature, principles that are available to us only through contemplation in all such things.
Explanation:
This sentence continues the distinction between what is known speculatively and what is known practically. Things caused by nature cannot be understood through principles that arise from our own making or willing, because we are not their cause. Instead, they must be known through the principles that account for what they are and for their existence in nature. That is why the proper science of natural beings is contemplative rather than practical: we do not produce these things, but study them by attending to the causes and principles present in them. The final part of the sentence is somewhat difficult in the text as given, but the overall sense is clear: such principles are accessible to us not by making, but by intellectual contemplation.
15. Eorum autem quae sunt a nobis, non potest esse scientia vera apud nos nisi per ea principia quae sunt in nobis, per quae nos sumus causa eorum, quae a nobis sunt: cuius finis non est verum, sed bonum quod nobis bonum est.
Literal Translation:
“But of-those things which are from us, not can there-be science true among us except through those principles which are in us, through which we are cause of-those things, which from us are: of-which (the) end is not the true, but the good which to-us good is.”
Translation:
But of the things that come from us, there can be true science among us only through those principles that are within us, by which we are the cause of the things that come from us. And the end of such a science is not truth, but the good that is good for us.
Explanation:
This sentence completes the contrast between speculative and practical science. In the case of things that arise from us, that is, from human choice and action, true knowledge must proceed from the principles within us by which we produce or direct those things. Because we are their cause, the science concerning them is not ordered simply to contemplating what is true, but to achieving what is good in action. For students, the key point is that practical sciences differ from contemplative sciences in their end: contemplative science aims at truth, but practical science aims at the good, especially the good as it is to be realized in human life and conduct.
16. Similiter igitur alicuius philosophiae erit intentio comprehendere veritatem eius quod in nobis est, secundum rationem qua nititur comprehendere veritatemeius quod rationis ductu via est in omnem cognitionem omnium eorum quorum cognitio fit in nobis per ea quae cognita sunt apud nos, ex quibus nos profiscimur ad scientiam incognitorum.
Literal Translation:
“Similarly therefore of-some philosophy there-will-be (the) intention to-comprehend the truth of-that which in us is, according to the reason by-which it strives to-comprehend the truth-of-it which by-guidance of-reason (the) way is into all cognition of-all those (things) of-which cognition is-made in us through those (things) which known are among us, from which we proceed unto science of-the-unknown.”
Translation:
Similarly, then, it will belong to some branch of philosophy to comprehend the truth of that which is in us, according to the rational account by which it strives to comprehend the truth of that which, under the guidance of reason, is the path to all knowledge of all those things whose cognition comes to be in us through what is already known to us, from which we proceed to knowledge of what is unknown.
Explanation:
This sentence argues that there must be some part of philosophy concerned not with things outside us in nature, nor with things produced by our will, but with something within us that serves as the way to knowledge itself. That “something” is the rational process by which, starting from what is already known, we move toward knowledge of what was previously unknown. In context, this is another step toward identifying logic as a genuine part of philosophy: logic studies the truth about this inner rational path, the very movement of thought by which human knowing advances. For students, the key point is that if philosophy seeks truth wherever it can be grasped by reason, then it must also include the study of reason’s own road to truth.
17. Erit igitur de intentione philosophiae etiam logica scientia quae est rationalis.
Literal Translation:
“(It) will be therefore of the intention of philosophy also logic science which is rational.”
Translation:
Therefore logic also, since it is a rational science, will belong to the scope of philosophy.
Explanation:
Albert’s point is that logic is not outside philosophy, but part of its proper concern. The word intentio here means the aim, scope, or object of consideration of philosophy. Since logic is a rational science, that is, a discipline concerned with the operations of reason itself, it belongs within philosophy’s domain. This reflects the scholastic understanding that philosophy does not study only external things, but also the acts and order of human reasoning by which truth is sought.
18. Adhuc autem huius signum dicunt, quod apud Peripateticos philosophia in tres partes prima divisione est, in physicam scilicet generaliter dictam, et ethicam generaliter dictam, et rationalem similiter acceptam.
Literal Translation:
“Still further however of this sign they say, that among (the) Peripatetics philosophy into three parts in (the) first division is, into physics namely generally said, and ethics generally said, and rational (science) similarly accepted.”
Translation:
Moreover, they say that a sign of this is that among the Peripatetics philosophy is divided first into three parts: physics in the general sense, ethics in the general sense, and rational science understood in the same general way.
Explanation:
Albert here strengthens the previous claim by appealing to the traditional Aristotelian division of philosophy. The “sign” or evidence is that the Peripatetics, that is, the followers of Aristotle, classically divide philosophy into three broad branches: natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and rational philosophy, which includes logic. His point is that logic is not an alien tool standing outside philosophy, but one of its recognized principal parts when philosophy is taken in a broad sense. This reflects the scholastic habit of organizing knowledge into major domains according to the kinds of things reason studies: nature, human action, and reason itself.
19. Dico autem physicam generaliter dictam, quae comprehendit et naturalem et disciplinalem et divinam.
Literal Translation:
“(I) say however physics generally said, which comprehends both natural and disciplinal and divine.”
Translation:
Now by “physics” taken in a general sense, I mean that which includes natural science, mathematical science, and divine science.
Explanation:
Here Albert clarifies that he is using the word physica in a broader-than-usual way. He does not mean only the study of mobile natural things, but a general division that embraces three kinds of speculative inquiry: natural science, which studies things in matter and motion; disciplinal science, meaning the mathematical sciences; and divine science, which concerns the highest immaterial realities. This is important because it shows that the division of philosophy he is describing is very wide in scope, and not limited to what we would call “physics” in the narrow modern sense.
20. Ethicam autem generalem, quae in se continet et monasticam et oeconomicam et civilem.
Literal Translation:
“Ethics however general, which in itself contains both monastic and economic and civil.”
Translation:
Now by ethics in the general sense, I mean that which contains within itself monastic, economic, and civil ethics.
Explanation:
Albert is again clarifying a broad division of philosophy. Just as he used physica in a wide sense in the previous sentence, here he uses ethica generalis to mean the whole field of moral philosophy. This includes monastica, which concerns the conduct of the individual person, oeconomica, which concerns the ordering of the household, and civilis, which concerns the life of the community or political society. The point is that ethics is not just about private moral choices, but about right order at several levels of human life: the person, the family, and the city.
21. Rationalem autem generalem quae comprehendit omnem modum deveniendi de noto ad ignotum quocumque modo: quod per multa genera probationum fit, ut in sequenti ostendtur.
Literal Translation:
“Rational (science) however general, which comprehends every mode of coming from known to unknown in-whatever way: which through many kinds of proofs is done, as in the following is shown.”
Translation:
Now by rational science in the general sense, I mean that which includes every way of proceeding from what is known to what is unknown, in whatever manner this may be done; and this happens through many kinds of proof, as will be shown in what follows.
Explanation:
Albert is defining rational philosophy very broadly. Its task is to guide the mind in moving from things already known to things not yet known, and this is exactly what logic does. Logic studies the various ways reasoning can proceed, whether by demonstration, argument, or other forms of proof. So the point of the sentence is that rational science is not a narrow subject, but the whole ordered study of how the intellect advances in knowledge. The final word appears to be a defective spelling of ostenditur, but the meaning is still clear from the context: Albert is saying that he will explain these many kinds of proof later in the text.
22. Manifestum est igitur, quod logica aliqua pars est philosophiae.
Literal Translation:
“Manifest is therefore, that logic some part is of-philosophy.”
Translation:
Therefore it is clear that logic is some part of philosophy.
Explanation:
This sentence states the conclusion of the preceding argument. After showing that the Peripatetics divide philosophy into broad parts that include rational science, and after explaining that logic belongs to rational science because it directs the mind from what is known to what is unknown, Albert now draws the result plainly: logic is a part of philosophy. The word aliqua is important, because it does not necessarily mean that logic is the whole of philosophy or its highest part, but that it truly belongs within philosophy’s ordered structure.
23. Adhuc autem si aliquid est de intentione philosophiae: tunc hoc maxime de intentione philosophiae erit, sine quo nullus in philosophia in aliquam devenire potest cognitionem.
Literal Translation:
“Still further however if something is of the intention of philosophy: then this most of the intention of philosophy will-be, without which no-one in philosophy into any cognition to-come is-able.”
Translation:
Moreover, if anything belongs to the scope of philosophy, then that above all will belong to the scope of philosophy without which no one can arrive at any knowledge in philosophy.
Explanation:
Albert is sharpening his argument by appealing to necessity. He is saying that if some discipline truly belongs to philosophy, then most of all that discipline belongs to philosophy which is required for attaining any philosophical knowledge at all. The implied subject is logic: since no one can advance to knowledge in philosophy without the proper use of reasoning, logic must belong to philosophy in a special and especially important way. So the sentence does not merely say that logic is included within philosophy; it argues that logic is indispensable to the whole philosophical enterprise.
24. Ignorans autem logicam nullus ignoti perfectam potest acquirere cognitionem, eo quod ignorat modum per quem devenire oportet de noto ad ignoti notitiam.
Literal Translation:
“Ignoring however logic no-one of-(the) unknown perfect is-able to-acquire cognition, by-this that (he) is-ignorant of-(the) mode through which to-come it-is-necessary from known to of-(the) unknown knowledge.”
Translation:
However, no one who is ignorant of logic can acquire a perfect knowledge of what is unknown, because he does not know the method by which one must proceed from what is known to knowledge of the unknown.
Explanation:
Albert here makes explicit why logic is necessary for philosophy. The problem is not simply that logic is one subject among others, but that without it a person lacks the method for moving from truths already known to truths not yet understood. Since learning depends on this ordered advance of the mind, ignorance of logic prevents the attainment of full or perfect knowledge. The sentence therefore supports the larger argument that logic belongs essentially to philosophy because it governs the way the intellect reaches truth.
25. Videtur ergo logicam praecipue esse de intentione philosophiae.
Literal Translation:
“It-seems therefore logic especially to-be of the intention of philosophy.”
Translation:
Therefore logic seems to belong especially to the scope of philosophy.
Explanation:
Albert is now drawing a stronger conclusion from the previous steps of the argument. He has already said that logic is a part of philosophy and that no one can reach philosophical knowledge properly without it. From that, he now concludes that logic belongs especially to the intention or scope of philosophy. The point is not that logic is the whole of philosophy, but that it has a special importance within philosophy because it provides the method by which the mind advances from what it already knows to what it does not yet know.
26. Hanc autem contentionem Avicenna et Alfarabius dicunt esse frivolam et infructuosam.
Literal Translation:
“This however contention Avicenna and Alfarabius say to be frivolous and unfruitful.”
Translation:
However, Avicenna and Alfarabi say that this dispute is frivolous and unproductive.
Explanation:
Here Albert reports the judgment of Avicenna and Alfarabi on the debate just described about whether logic belongs to philosophy. They consider the quarrel frivolous and without fruit, meaning that it does not lead to useful understanding. The implication is that the dispute may be overly verbal or misplaced, since what matters more is the actual role logic plays in helping the mind reach truth. In context, this line prepares the way for a more refined treatment of logic’s place: instead of arguing in a merely contentious way about classification, one should ask how logic functions in relation to the other sciences.
27. Frivolam quidem, quia in contradicendo sibi intentionem ad idem eodem modo dictum non referrunt.
Literal Translation:
“Frivolous indeed, because in contradicting to-themselves intention to the same (thing) in-the same mode said they do-not refer.”
Translation:
It is indeed frivolous, because in contradicting one another they do not refer the term “intention” to the same thing said in the same way.
Explanation:
Albert here explains why Avicenna and Alfarabi judge the dispute to be frivolous. The problem is that the disputants are using the key term intentio in different senses while arguing as though they were speaking about the same thing in the same way. In scholastic reasoning, this is a serious defect, because a contradiction is only real when both sides are referring to the same subject under the same aspect. If the word changes meaning from one side of the debate to the other, then the disagreement is partly verbal rather than substantive. Albert’s point, then, is that the controversy about logic and philosophy is confused because the participants have not fixed the meaning of their central term carefully enough.
28. Dicentes enim logicam philosophiae partem non esse, realem et contemplativam philosophiam vocant.
Literal Translation:
“Saying for logic of-philosophy part not to be, real and contemplative philosophy they call.”
Translation:
For those who say that logic is not a part of philosophy are calling philosophy “real” and “contemplative” philosophy.
Explanation:
Albert is now explaining the difference in meaning that lies behind the dispute. Those who deny that logic is part of philosophy are using the word philosophia in a narrower sense. They mean by it “real” or “contemplative” philosophy, that is, philosophy concerned with things and realities to be known, rather than with the instruments of reasoning by which we come to know them. So the disagreement is not simply about logic itself, but about what one means by the word philosophia. This helps show why Albert, following Avicenna and Alfarabi, thinks the controversy can become merely verbal if the terms are not carefully distinguished.
29. Contradicentes autem his, et dicentes logicam partem philosophiae esse, omnem comprehensionem veritatis qualitercumque existentis, sive in se, sive in nobis cognoscentibus vel operantibus, vocant philosophiam.
Literal Translation:
“Contradicting however these, and saying logic part of-philosophy to be, every comprehension of-truth in-whatever-way existing, whether in itself, or in us knowing or operating, they call philosophy.”
Translation:
Those, however, who oppose them and say that logic is a part of philosophy call philosophy every grasp of truth in whatever way it exists, whether in itself or in us as knowing or acting beings.
Explanation:
Albert is showing that the two sides of the dispute define philosophy differently. Those who include logic within philosophy are using the word philosophia in a very broad sense: for them, philosophy includes every apprehension of truth, whether truth is considered in things themselves or in the human mind as it knows and acts. On this broader definition, logic belongs within philosophy because it concerns the mind’s way of attaining truth. The sentence therefore helps explain why the disagreement may be verbal rather than substantial: the disputants are not always using the word philosophia in the same sense.
30. Et sic frivole contendunt non ad idem suam referentes intentionem.
Literal Translation:
“And thus frivolously they contend not to the same (thing) their intention referring.”
Translation:
And thus they argue frivolously, because they are not directing their meaning to the same thing.
Explanation:
Albert here gives the conclusion of the point he has been making about the dispute over logic and philosophy. The argument is frivolous because the disputants are not speaking about the same object under the same meaning. One side uses philosophia in a narrower sense, while the other uses it more broadly, so their disagreement is partly verbal rather than truly substantive. This is an important scholastic lesson: before a dispute can be fruitful, the terms must be defined carefully so that both sides are actually addressing the same question.
31. Infructuosa etiam huius contentio, quia de proposita nihil declarat intentione.
Literal Translation:
“Unfruitful also of-this contention, because concerning (the) proposed nothing it-declares of-intention.”
Translation:
This dispute is also unfruitful, because it makes nothing clear about the intention that has been proposed.
Explanation:
Albert now adds a second criticism of the debate. It is not only frivolous because the disputants use their terms differently, but also unfruitful because it does not actually clarify the question at hand. The phrase proposita intentio refers to the matter or meaning under discussion, and Albert’s point is that this kind of argument does not help us understand it better. In other words, a dispute that turns on confused usage of terms produces no real intellectual gain. For students, this is a good reminder that scholastic argument is valuable only when it truly illuminates the subject, not when it circles around verbal disagreement.
32. Et sic nihil prodest ad propositum.
Literal Translation:
“And thus nothing it-benefits toward (the) proposed.”
Translation:
And thus it is of no use for the matter at hand.
Explanation:
Albert brings the point to a sharp conclusion. Since the dispute has failed to clarify the meaning of the question and has instead turned on different uses of the same terms, it does not help with the actual subject under discussion. Propositum here means the issue that has been set forth for consideration. So Albert is teaching an important scholastic principle: an argument is worthwhile only if it advances understanding of the real question, not if it remains stuck in verbal confusion.
33. Est igitur logica una partium philosophiae generaliter dictae, quae omnis admirabilis intendit comprehendere veritatem secundum modum, secundum quem possibile est comprehendere eam ex propriis principiis eius quod admiratur.
Literal Translation:
“Is therefore logic one of-(the) parts of-philosophy generally said, which every admirable (thing/person) intends to-comprehend truth according to (the) mode, according to which possible it-is to-comprehend it from (the) proper principles of-it which it admires.”
Translation:
Therefore logic is one of the parts of philosophy taken in a general sense, which aims to comprehend truth according to the manner in which it is possible to grasp it from the proper principles of the thing under consideration. The phrase quae omnis admirabilis is textually difficult as it stands, but the main sense of the sentence is still clear.
Explanation:
Albert is now giving a more settled conclusion. Logic belongs to philosophy when philosophy is taken broadly, because philosophy in this general sense seeks to understand truth in an ordered way, starting from the proper principles of the thing being studied. That fits the argument of the previous sentences: logic is included within philosophy because it helps the mind proceed rightly from what is already known to what is not yet known. The unusual phrase quae omnis admirabilis seems awkward in the text as given, so some textual difficulty may be present there, but it does not obscure the central point that philosophy aims at truth through disciplined rational understanding, and logic serves that aim as one of its parts.
34. Hoc enim variatur secundum uniuscuiusquae scientiae proprietatem.
Literal Translation:
“This for is-varied according-to of-each science property.”
Translation:
For this varies according to the proper character of each science.
Explanation:
Albert is explaining that the way truth is to be grasped is not identical in every field of knowledge. Each science has its own proper subject matter, principles, and method, and so the mode of understanding must be fitted to that science’s particular nature. This supports the previous sentence: philosophy seeks truth from proper principles, but the exact way that happens differs from one science to another. The form uniuscuiusquae appears textually irregular, and it is most naturally understood as meaning “of each.”
35. Sicut enim in philosophia reali secundum diversitatem diffusionis (quae medium in demonstratione est) variatur philosophia, sic in logicis sive rationalibus secundum variationes ratiocinationis variatur scientia, hoc est, sciendi modus.
Literal Translation:
“Just-as for in philosophy real according-to diversity of-diffusion (which (the) middle in demonstration is) is-varied philosophy, so in (the things) logical or rational according-to variations of-reasoning is-varied science, this is, of-knowing mode.”
Translation:
For just as in real philosophy philosophy is diversified according to the diversity of diffusion, which is the middle term in demonstration, so in logic, or the rational sciences, science is diversified according to the different kinds of reasoning, that is, according to the mode of knowing.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing a parallel between two ways of dividing the sciences. In real philosophy, the divisions arise from differences in the way a subject is demonstrated through its middle term, that is, through the explanatory principle by which something is proved. In the logical or rational sciences, the divisions arise from differences in reasoning itself, and therefore from different modes of knowing. His point is that sciences are not distinguished randomly: they are distinguished by the kind of intellectual process proper to them. So just as different kinds of demonstration produce different branches of real philosophy, different kinds of reasoning produce different branches of logic.
36. Si enim ratio procedit ex signis facientibus praesumptionem, erit logicae generalis pars una quae rhetorica vocatur.
Literal Translation:
“If for reason proceeds out-of signs making presumption, will-be of-logic general’s part one which rhetoric is-called.”
Translation:
For if reasoning proceeds from signs that produce presumption, there will be one part of general logic that is called rhetoric.
Explanation:
Albert is here identifying rhetoric as one branch of general logic by the kind of reasoning it uses. The key idea is that rhetoric does not usually proceed from strict demonstration or necessary proof, but from signs that lead the hearer to a likely judgment or presumption. In Scholastic terms, this places rhetoric within the rational arts because it still belongs to ordered reasoning, yet it works at a lower level of certainty than demonstration. The passage helps students see why medieval thinkers often grouped rhetoric with logic: it is a mode of reasoning directed toward persuasion through probable indications rather than through conclusive proof.
37. Si autem procedit ex fictis facientibus delectationem vel abominationem, erit alia pars logicae quae vocatur poesis vel poetica.
Literal Translation:
“If however proceeds out-of fictive-things making delight or abhorrence, will-be another part of-logic which is-called poetry or poetic.”
Translation:
If, however, it proceeds from fictions that produce delight or aversion, there will be another part of logic which is called poetry or poetics.
Explanation:
Here Albert adds another branch of logic or the rational arts by considering a different kind of reasoning. Whereas rhetoric works through signs that produce a probable judgment, poetics works through imaginative or fictive representations that stir the affections, either by delighting the hearer or by causing dislike or repulsion. The point is not that poetry gives strict demonstration, but that it still moves the mind in an ordered way and so belongs within the broader study of rational discourse. For students, this is an important reminder that medieval thinkers often treated poetry not simply as ornament or entertainment, but as a distinct mode of verbal reasoning that shapes judgment through the imagination and the passions.
38. Si autem procedit ex probabilibus communibus, quae in pluribus inveniuntur, erit pars alia quae vocatur dialectica.
Literal Translation:
“If however proceeds out-of probable-(things) common, which in more-(cases) are-found, will-be part other which is-called dialectic.”
Translation:
If, however, it proceeds from common probabilities, which are found in most cases, there will be another part which is called dialectic.
Explanation:
Albert is now identifying dialectic by the kind of premises from which it reasons. Dialectic does not begin from necessary and demonstrative principles, but from propositions that are commonly probable, that is, things generally found to be true in most cases and widely accepted. This gives dialectic more strength than rhetoric or poetics in precision, but it still falls short of strict scientific demonstration. For students, the important point is that Albert is classifying the rational arts by the level and kind of certainty their reasoning uses: poetics works through imaginative fictions, rhetoric through persuasive signs, and dialectic through commonly probable premises.
39. Si autem procedit ex causis essentialibus et propriis, erit alia pars quae vocatur demonstrativa.
Literal Translation:
“If however proceeds out-of causes essential and proper, will-be another part which is-called demonstrative.”
Translation:
If, however, it proceeds from essential and proper causes, there will be another part which is called demonstrative.
Explanation:
Albert now reaches the highest kind of reasoning in this sequence: demonstration. Demonstrative reasoning proceeds from causes that are essential and proper to the thing being studied, meaning causes that truly belong to its nature and explain why it is what it is. Because of that, demonstration gives genuine scientific knowledge rather than mere persuasion or probability. In the larger argument, Albert is distinguishing the parts of logic by the kind of principles from which they reason. Poetics uses fictions, rhetoric uses persuasive signs, dialectic uses common probabilities, and demonstration uses true causes that belong to the essence of the thing. This shows students the hierarchy of the rational arts, culminating in the mode of reasoning that yields the fullest certainty.
40. Si autem ex his quae videntur et non sunt, erit pars alia quae vocatur sophistica.
Literal Translation:
“If however out-of these things which seem and not are, will-be part other which is-called sophistic.”
Translation:
If, however, it proceeds from things that appear to be and are not, there will be another part which is called sophistic.
Explanation:
Albert here identifies sophistic as the kind of reasoning that proceeds from what only seems true but is not actually true. Unlike demonstration, which reasons from real and proper causes, or dialectic, which reasons from genuine probabilities, sophistic works from appearances that deceive the mind. Its arguments have the form of reasoning, but not the truth that should ground sound reasoning. For students, this completes Albert’s classification of the rational arts by the kind of principles they use: poetics from fictions, rhetoric from persuasive signs, dialectic from probabilities, demonstration from essential causes, and sophistic from mere appearances. The point is that not every orderly argument leads to truth; some only imitate wisdom and must therefore be recognized and distinguished from true reasoning.
41. Si autem ex cautelis provocantibus respondentem doceat procedere, erit alia pars logicae generalis quae vocatur tentativa: et sic facile est de omnibus aliis intelligere.
Literal Translation:
“If however out-of cautions provoking (the) respondent it-may-teach to-proceed, will-be another part of-logic general which is-called tentative: and thus easy is concerning all others to-understand.”
Translation:
If, however, it teaches one to proceed by cautions that provoke the respondent, there will be another part of general logic which is called tentative; and thus it is easy to understand the same about all the others.
Explanation:
Albert here adds yet another division of general logic by describing a mode of reasoning that proceeds through careful probing of an opponent or respondent. The word cautelis suggests strategic precautions or devices in argument, and provocantibus respondentem points to drawing out the person answering so that his position may be tested. For that reason, this part of logic, called tentativa, is concerned with trying, examining, or sounding out another’s claim rather than simply demonstrating truth directly. The final clause shows that Albert thinks the pattern of division is now clear: once one sees that each branch of logic is distinguished by its mode of reasoning, one can easily understand how the other branches are likewise classified.
42. Horum autem quae dicta sunt, rationem ponit Avicenna dicens res omnes tripliciter esse accipiendas, scilicet quod primo accipiantur in essentiae suae principiis: secundo in esse quod habent in singularibus propriis: tertio autem secundum quod acceptae sunt in intellectu.
Literal Translation:
“Of-these however which have-been-said, (the) account sets-forth Avicenna saying things all threefold to-be to-be-received, namely that first they-may-be-received in principles of-essence their: second in being which they-have in singulars proper: third however according-to which received they-are in intellect.”
Translation:
Avicenna, however, gives the reason for these things that have been said, saying that all things must be understood in a threefold way: first, as taken in the principles of their essence; second, in the being they have in their proper singulars; and third, according as they are received in the intellect.
Explanation:
Albert now appeals to Avicenna to provide the underlying reason for the distinctions he has been making. The threefold division is metaphysical and epistemological at once. A thing can be considered first in its essential principles, that is, in what belongs to its nature as such; second in the concrete existence it has in individual things; and third as it exists in the intellect, where it is known and understood. This helps students see that the different sciences and modes of reasoning depend on different ways of considering the same reality. A thing can be studied as it is in itself, as it exists in particular beings, or as it is received by the mind, and these different standpoints help explain how the sciences are distinguished.
43. Multa enim secundum essentiae suae principia separata sunt a motu et a materia quae tamen secundum esse sunt vel possunt esse in motu et materia, sicut substantia, unitas, identitas, multitude, et diversitas, et alia huiusmodi, quae quidem in essentiae suae principiis ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia sunt: et hoc modo secundum Platonem sunt rerum principia formalia, propter quod ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia talia Plato esse dicit.
Literal Translation:
“Many for according-to (the) principles of-essence their separated are from motion and from matter which nevertheless according-to being are or can be in motion and matter, as substance, unity, identity, multitude, and diversity, and other things of-this-kind, which indeed in (the) principles of-essence their ungenerable and incorruptible are: and in-this way according-to Plato are of-things principles formal, on-account-of which ungenerable and incorruptible such-things Plato to-be says.”
Translation:
For many things, according to the principles of their essence, are separate from motion and matter, though according to their being they are, or can be, in motion and matter, such as substance, unity, identity, multitude, diversity, and other things of this sort. These, indeed, in the principles of their essence are ungenerated and incorruptible. In this way, according to Plato, they are the formal principles of things, which is why Plato says that such things are ungenerated and incorruptible.
Explanation:
Albert is explaining Avicenna’s distinction by showing that some things can be considered in two different ways. If we consider them according to their essence, they are separate from motion and matter, because notions like substance, unity, identity, and diversity do not, in themselves, depend on physical change or material conditions. But if we consider how they exist in actual things, they are found in material and changing realities. This allows Albert to explain why Plato could speak of such principles as ungenerated and incorruptible: Plato is speaking of them as formal principles, that is, as realities considered at the level of essence rather than as embodied in particular material things. The passage helps students see how scholastic authors distinguish between what a thing is in itself and how it exists in the world.
44. Et si talia dicantur generari vel corrumpi, hoc non erit nisi secundum accidens, hoc est, secundum esse quod habent in generatis et corruptis.
Literal Translation:
“And if such-things may-be-said to-be-generated or to-be-corrupted, this not will-be unless according-to accident, this is, according-to being which they have in generated and corrupted-(things).”
Translation:
And if such things are said to be generated or corrupted, this will only be accidentally, that is, according to the being they have in generated and corrupted things.
Explanation:
Albert is clarifying that realities such as unity, substance, identity, and the like are not in themselves subject to coming-to-be or passing-away. If they are ever said to be generated or corrupted, that can only mean this in an accidental sense: not that their essential nature begins or ceases, but that they exist in things which themselves are generated and corrupted. So the change belongs properly to the material subjects in which these forms or intelligible principles are found, not to the principles considered in themselves. This continues the distinction between essence and concrete existence, and it helps students see why Albert can say that such principles are incorruptible in themselves while still being present in corruptible things.
45. Acceptio autem rei secundum esse quod habet in suppositis, erit secundum existentiam illorum suppositorum, et secundum diffinitionem quam habere possunt secundum esse quod habent in illis.
Literal Translation:
“Reception however of-(the) thing according-to being which it has in supposits, will-be according-to (the) existence of-those supposits, and according-to definition which to-have they-can according-to being which they have in them.”
Translation:
The consideration of a thing, however, according to the being that it has in its subjects, will be according to the existence of those subjects, and according to the definition that the thing can have according to the being it has in them.
Explanation:
Albert is now treating the second way in which a thing may be considered: not according to its essence in itself, but according to the being it has in concrete subjects or instances. In that respect, the thing is understood in relation to the actual existence of the subjects in which it inheres, and also in relation to the kind of definition it can receive from that mode of being. The point is that when something is considered as existing in particular things, its intelligibility is tied to those things as they exist concretely. This continues the distinction between essence considered in itself and essence as instantiated in real individuals, helping students see how the same reality can be studied under different aspects depending on whether one looks at it abstractly or as existing in particular subjects.
46. Acceptio autem rerum secundum quod sunt in intellectu est secundum cognitionem quam habent, non secundum quod in se sunt, sed secundum quod acceptae sunt per intellectum.
Literal Translation:
“Reception however of-things according-to that they are in intellect is according-to cognition which they have, not according-to that in themselves they are, but according-to that received they-are through intellect.”
Translation:
The consideration of things, however, insofar as they are in the intellect, is according to the knowledge they have, not according to what they are in themselves, but according to the way they are received by the intellect.
Explanation:
Albert is now stating the third way in which things may be considered: not as they are in their own essence, and not as they exist in particular subjects, but as they exist in the mind as known. In this mode, the thing is treated according to its status as an object of cognition. That means the intellect does not consider the thing simply as it is outside the mind, but as it has been intellectually received and formed within thought. This is important for understanding logic, because logic studies things precisely under this aspect, namely as they are known, predicated, divided, and reasoned about by the intellect. So the passage helps students see why logic is distinct from metaphysics and natural philosophy: it concerns not things directly in themselves, but things as grasped and handled by the mind.
47. Et secundum omnes istos tres modos sunt etiam consequentia accidentia quae vocantur propriae passiones ipsius.
Literal Translation:
“And according-to all these three modes are also consequent accidents which are-called proper passions of-itself.”
Translation:
And according to all three of these modes, there are also consequent accidents which are called its proper passions.
Explanation:
Albert adds that in each of the three ways of considering a thing, there are also properties that follow from it. These are not the essence itself, but attributes that flow from the thing in a proper and necessary way, and so they are called its proper passions. In scholastic thought, a “passion” here does not mean an emotion, but a property that belongs to a subject because of what it is. The point is that whether a thing is considered in its essential principles, in its existence in singulars, or as received in the intellect, there are corresponding attributes that follow upon it. This helps students see that scientific study does not consider only essences themselves, but also the properties that arise from those essences under different modes of consideration.
48. Et sic quolibet istorum modorum trium philosophia de ipsis intendit acquirere veritatem.
Literal Translation:
“And thus in-any-of these modes three philosophy concerning them intends to-acquire truth.”
Translation:
And thus, in each of these three modes, philosophy intends to acquire truth about them.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing the conclusion from the threefold distinction he has just laid out. Things can be considered according to their essence, according to their existence in particular subjects, and according to the way they are received in the intellect; and in each of these respects philosophy seeks truth about them. The point is that philosophy is not confined to only one level of consideration. It can investigate things as they are in themselves, as they exist in the world, and as they are known by the mind. For students, this helps explain how different branches of philosophy arise: they are united by the search for truth, but they differ according to the mode under which the same realities are considered.
49. Et hoc est per ductum rationis aliquem qui ad logicam pertinet.
Literal Translation:
“And this is through guidance of-reason some which to logic pertains.”
Translation:
And this is through some guidance of reason that pertains to logic.
Explanation:
Albert is concluding that philosophy reaches truth in these different modes by means of a certain direction or guidance supplied by reason, and that this belongs to logic. In other words, logic is not merely one subject among others, but the rational discipline that guides the mind in its pursuit of truth. After distinguishing things as considered in themselves, in singulars, and in the intellect, he now shows that moving rightly through those considerations requires an ordered method of reasoning. For students, this is an important summary point: logic serves philosophy by directing the mind so that it can proceed rightly in the search for truth.
50. Res enim prout habent esse in anima, accidentia habent propria, sicut aliquid esse notum apud hominem, et aliquid esse ignotum: et cum comparata ad invicem in aliquo se coniungant, erit via rationis, procedendo de noto ad ignotum, per comparationem noti ad ignotum secundum convenientiam vel differentiam noti ad ignotum.
Literal Translation:
“For things according-as they have being in (the) soul, accidents they-have proper, as something to-be known among man, and something to-be unknown: and when compared to each-other in something themselves they-join, will-be way of-reason, proceeding from known to unknown, through comparison of-known to unknown according-to agreement or difference of-known to unknown.”
Translation:
For things, insofar as they have being in the soul, have their own proper accidents, such as one thing being known to a man and another being unknown. And since, when compared to one another, they are joined in some respect, there will be a way of reasoning by proceeding from the known to the unknown through the comparison of the known to the unknown according to their agreement or difference.
Explanation:
Albert is now explaining more precisely how logic guides the mind. When things exist in the soul, that is, as objects known by the intellect, they take on certain properties relative to our knowledge, such as being known or unknown. Reasoning becomes possible because known and unknown things are not utterly disconnected; they share some likeness or some contrast that allows the mind to compare them. By means of that comparison, the intellect can move from what it already knows to what it does not yet know. This is a very important scholastic account of learning and demonstration: logic directs the mind by using relations of similarity and difference so that truth can be reached step by step from what is already evident.
51. Ex quo comprehenditur, quod unum componitur cum alio, et praedicatur de illo: vel unum dividitur ab alio, et removetur ab ipso: secundum enim hunc modum devenitur de uno in alterum.
Literal Translation:
“From which it-is-comprehended, that one (thing) is-composed with another, and is-predicated of that: or one (thing) is-divided from another, and is-removed from it: according-to for this mode it-is-come from one into another.”
Translation:
From this it is understood that one thing is joined with another and predicated of it, or that one thing is divided from another and removed from it; for according to this mode one comes from one thing to another.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing out one of the basic operations of logic from the mind’s movement from the known to the unknown. Because reason advances by comparing things, it can either unite one thing with another in a judgment and predicate one of the other, or it can separate one from another and deny it. These are the two basic directions of intellectual judgment, affirmation and negation. His point is that the mind reaches new knowledge by making these acts of composition and division, moving from one thing to another through ordered comparison. This helps students see why predication and separation are so central to logic: they are the very means by which reason advances in knowledge.
52. Hoc igitur modo logica est de intentione philosophiae generalis.
Literal Translation:
“This therefore mode logic is of intention of-philosophy general.”
Translation:
Therefore, in this way, logic belongs to the intention of general philosophy.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing a conclusion from the argument he has been developing. Since philosophy seeks truth in different ways, and since reason must be guided in moving from the known to the unknown through comparison, composition, and division, logic falls within the scope or concern of general philosophy. In other words, logic is not something alien to philosophy, but belongs to philosophy’s own work because it directs the mind in the pursuit of truth. For students, this is an important summary statement: logic is part of general philosophy because it provides the rational guidance by which philosophical inquiry proceeds.
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