CAPUT III. De Diffinitione vel Descriptione Generis Physici.
Literal Translation:
Chapter III. Concerning definition or description of physical genus.
Translation:
Chapter III. On the Definition or Description of Physical Genus
Explanation:
This is another chapter heading marking a shift in the argument. After discussing genus in its broader and philosophical senses, St. Albert now turns to the definition or description of physical genus, that is, genus as considered in natural philosophy. The pairing of diffinitio and descriptio suggests attention both to a strict account of what physical genus is and to a broader way of characterizing it for understanding. For students, the key point is that Albert is continuing his ordered method: after clarifying the term logically and philosophically, he now prepares to consider it as it functions in the study of nature.
1. Genus ergo cum tripliciter dicatur apud Philosophos, secundum tertiam sumitur suae significationis intentionem.
Literal Translation:
“Genus therefore, since three-times it-is-said among Philosophers, according-to the third is-taken of-its signification intention.”
Translation:
Therefore, since genus is spoken of in three ways among philosophers, it is taken according to the third intention of its signification.
Explanation:
St. Albert is here recalling the distinctions already made and fixing the precise sense in which the present inquiry will proceed. Although the word genus can be used in several ways, the relevant philosophical use is the third one, namely the strict technical sense proper to logic and philosophy. The phrase intentio significationis points to the exact meaning or conceptual intention under which the term is taken. For students, the main point is that Albert is narrowing the discussion: after surveying broader and analogous uses of genus, he now states that the argument will use the properly philosophical sense alone.
2. Et secundum hanc generis intentionem describunt genus dicentes: Genus est quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quid est praedicatur.
Literal Translation:
“And according-to this of-genus intention they-describe genus saying: Genus is that which of many and differing in-species in that which what it is is-predicated.”
Translation:
And according to this understanding of genus, they describe genus by saying: “Genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species, in answer to the question what a thing is.”
Explanation:
Here St. Albert gives the classic logical description of genus. A genus is not said of just one thing, but of many things, and those many must differ from one another specifically. Yet the genus is predicated of them not as an accident or a mere feature, but in regard to what they are, that is, as part of their essence. For example, “animal” is predicated of man and horse, which differ in species, and it is said of each in answer to the question “what is it?” For students, the key point is that genus names a common essential nature shared by many specifically different things, and this is what makes it a true genus in the logical sense.
3. Quae descriptio est generis prout genus dicit ordinem unius ad alterum, sicut superioris ad inferius, non simpliciter, sed in ipsa re quae sic ordinatur: sicut animal est genus, et corpus animatum, et substantia: substantia enim et vivum et animal sunt ea quibus accidit genera esse.
Literal Translation:
“Which description is of-genus insofar-as genus says order of-one to another, just-as of-superior to inferior, not simply, but in the thing itself which thus is-ordered: just-as animal is genus, and animated body, and substance: for substance and living-(thing) and animal are those to-which it-accides genera to-be.”
Translation:
This description is of genus insofar as genus signifies an order of one thing to another, as of a superior to an inferior, not absolutely, but in the very thing that is thus ordered. Thus animal is a genus, and animated body, and substance; for substance, living thing, and animal are things to which it happens to be genera.
Explanation:
St. Albert is clarifying that the definition just given describes genus not merely as an abstract word, but as something expressing a real ordered relation within the intelligible structure of things. Genus signifies a higher nature standing over a lower one, as superior to inferior, and this ordering belongs to the thing as understood, not merely to language by itself. So terms like substance, living thing, and animal are not genera in every respect simply considered; rather, they are realities that become genera when they are taken in relation to lower things contained under them. For students, the key point is that “being a genus” is not just the whole substance of a thing considered absolutely, but that same thing viewed according to its essential order to what falls beneath it.
4. Sed generalitas quae est ipsis rationem dicit huius ordinis sive habitudinis, quibus ordinantur ad sua inferiora: propter quod in ante habitis dictum est, quod genus est cui supponuntur species sive specierum multitudo.
Literal Translation:
“But generality which is in them account speaks of-this order or relation, by-which they-are-ordered to their inferiors: on-account-of which in the things had-before it-has-been-said, that genus is that to-which are-subposed species or multitude of-species.”
Translation:
But the generality that belongs to them expresses the account of this order or relation by which they are ordered to their inferiors. For this reason it was said earlier that genus is that under which species, or a multitude of species, are subordinated.
Explanation:
St. Albert is distinguishing between the thing itself and its status as a genus. Terms like substance, living thing, and animal are not genera simply by being what they are considered absolutely; rather, their “generality” consists in the ordered relation by which they stand above lower things. So generalitas names the aspect under which such a nature is related to species beneath it. That is why Albert can summarize genus as that to which species are subordinated: genus is not just a common word, but a common nature considered precisely as standing in an essential order to lower species.
5. In omnibus communibus substantialibus sic est, quod ex ipsa communitate qua unum substantialiter est in alio, aliae plures resultant analogiae, sive proportionis communitates.
Literal Translation:
“In all common substantial (things) thus it-is, that from the very community by-which one substantially is in another, other many analogies result, or commonnesses of proportion.”
Translation:
In all things that are substantial and common, it is so that from that very commonness by which one is substantially in another, many other analogies, or communities of proportion, arise.
Explanation:
St. Albert is saying that whenever one substantial nature is truly common to many lower realities, more than one kind of ordered likeness follows from that fact. The basic relation is that one common nature is really present in another more determinate nature, as genus is present in species. But from this essential commonness there also arise further proportional relations, that is, different ways in which the higher and lower terms correspond to one another. For students, the key point is that a common substantial nature does not produce only one logical relation. Once something is shared essentially, several related orders and analogies can be drawn from that shared foundation.
6. Ex hoc enim, quod animal est in homine et de homine, et est in asino et de asino, et sic de aliis speciebus, ex simili quodam respectu animalis ad species suppositas resultat, quod est commune et universale ut genus: quia generis nomen est animali impositum a tali respectu: et sic de specie, et de simili respectu hominis et asini et aliorum ad animal: quae omnes species quia participant animalis nomine et ratione, surgit communitas alia, quia unumquodque inferiorum sic superius respicientium dicitur species: ad talis enim respectus similitudinem impositum nomen speciei.
Literal Translation:
“For from this, that animal is in man and of man, and is in ass and of ass, and thus concerning the other species, from a certain similar respect of animal to the species subposed there results that which is common and universal as genus: because the name of genus is imposed on animal from such a respect: and thus concerning species, and from the similar respect of man and ass and the others to animal: which all species because they participate in the name and account of animal, there arises another commonness, because each one of the inferiors thus looking-back to the superior is called species: for to the likeness of such a respect the name of species is imposed.”
Translation:
For from the fact that animal is in man and is predicated of man, and is in the ass and predicated of the ass, and likewise in other species, there arises from this similar relation of animal to the species placed under it that common and universal character by which it is a genus. For the name of genus is given to animal from such a relation. And the same holds for species: from the similar relation of man, ass, and the others to animal, another commonness arises, because each of these inferiors, as looking to a superior in this way, is called a species. For the name of species too is given from the likeness of such a relation.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining that genus and species are not just isolated words, but names that arise from relations within an ordered structure of predication. “Animal” is called a genus because it stands in the same kind of essential relation to man, ass, and the other lower kinds: it is present in them and said of them as part of what they are. In turn, man, ass, and the others are called species because they all stand in a similar relation to a higher term, namely animal. So the names genus and species come from patterns of ordered commonness: genus names the common superior nature shared by many lower things, while species names the lower realities insofar as they participate in and are referred to that superior common nature.
7. Et sic est in respectu individuorum ad speciem: ex simili enim respectu huius ad hominem et illius et alterius, et sic de aliis, efficitur quod hic est suppositum hominis et illi et omnes alii.
Literal Translation:
“And thus it-is in (the) respect of-individuals to species: from similar indeed respect of-this-one to man and of-that-one and of-another, and thus of the others, it-is- effected that this-one is supposit of-man and those and all others.”
Translation:
And the same is true in the relation of individuals to the species: for from the similar relation of this individual, and that one, and another, to man, and so also in the case of the others, it follows that this one is a supposit of man, and so are those others and all the rest.
Explanation:
St. Albert is extending the same pattern from genus and species down to species and individuals. Just as a genus is called genus because of its common relation to many species, and a species is called species because of its relation to a higher genus, so too individuals stand in a similar ordered relation to the species under which they fall. “This man,” “that man,” and other individual men are all called supposits of man because each is a concrete subject in which the species man exists. For students, the key point is that logical names such as genus, species, and supposit arise from ordered relations within the structure of predication: higher terms are common to lower ones, while lower ones instantiate or bear the higher nature in distinct ways.
8. Ex hoc autem, quod una similitudine in qualibet natura commune determinatur, quilibet dicitur particularis homo: et ex hoc quod similiter omnes accidente discernente particulariter naturam communem determinantur, quilibet dicitur individuum.
Literal Translation:
“But from this, that by one similitude in each (thing) (the) common (nature) is determined, each is-called particular man: and from this that similarly all by-an accident discerning particularly (the) common nature are determined, each is-called individual.”
Translation:
But because the common nature is determined in each case by one likeness, each is called a particular man; and because all are likewise determined in a particular way by an accident that distinguishes the common nature, each is called an individual.
Explanation:
St. Albert is moving from species to the level of singulars. The common nature, such as humanity, is present in many, but in each case it is determined so as to exist in this particular subject. In that respect one can speak of “a particular man.” Then Albert adds a further precision: each is called an individual insofar as the common nature is marked off by individuating conditions, here described in the scholastic way as a distinguishing accident. The point for students is that the species remains one and common in account, but in actual existing things it is received in a determinate and singular way, so that this man and that man are not merely instances of humanity in general, but irreducibly distinct individuals.
9. Et sic ex respectibus naturae communis ad inferiora, et respectibus inferioris ad superius, multae causantur communitates: et secundum quodlibet nomen fit universalis praedicatio.
Literal Translation:
“And thus from relations of-(the) common nature to inferiors, and relations of-(the) inferior to (the) superior, many are-caused commonalities: and according-to each name is-made universal predication.”
Translation:
And thus, from the relations of a common nature to lower things, and from the relations of the lower to the higher, many kinds of commonality arise; and according to each of these names there is universal predication.
Explanation:
St. Albert is summing up the logical structure he has been tracing. When a common nature is considered in relation to what is beneath it, and when lower things are considered in relation to what is above them, different kinds of logical community appear, such as genus, species, and supposit. Each of these relations gives rise to a distinct name, and with each name there is a corresponding kind of universal predication. In other words, the ordered relations within a hierarchy of natures are what ground the different logical ways in which something can be said universally of many.
10. Quia tamen unum solum est, quod nomine et natura et ratione generis praedicatur, unum solum est id quod est genus, et aliae sunt praedicationes per modum generis praedicatae per accidens, quod accidit praedicato vel subjecto ex tali respectu ad invicem, vel tali ad superius.
Literal Translation:
“Because however one alone is, which by-name and by-nature and by-account of-genus is-predicated, one alone is that which is genus, and the others are predications through mode of-genus predicated through accident, which happens to-the-predicated or to-the-subject from such relation to each-other, or such (relation) to the superior.”
Translation:
Because, however, only one thing is predicated according to the name, nature, and account of genus, only one thing is truly genus; and the other predications made in the manner of genus are predicated only accidentally, because this belongs to the predicate or the subject on account of such a relation to one another, or of such a relation to what is higher.
Explanation:
St. Albert is distinguishing between what is truly and properly predicated as a genus and what is only said in a genus-like way because of some accompanying relation. Only that which is predicated with the full name, nature, and intelligible account of genus is genuinely a genus. Other things may seem to be predicated similarly, but this happens only accidentally, because of the way predicate and subject are related to one another or to a higher term. For students, the key point is that not every broad or common predication is a true case of genus. A true genus must belong essentially and formally, while other apparent cases arise only from a secondary relation and therefore do not have the full character of genus.
11. Et ex tali est, quod non sequitur cum dicitur: homo est animal, et homo est species, ergo animal est species: vel homo est animal, animal est genus, ergo homo est genus: vel Socrates est homo, Socrates est individuum, ergo homo est individuum.
Literal Translation:
“And from such it-is, that not it-follows when it-is-said: man is animal, and man is species, therefore animal is species: or man is animal, animal is genus, therefore man is genus: or Socrates is man, Socrates is individual, therefore man is individual.”
Translation:
And from this it follows that the inference does not hold when one says: “Man is an animal, and man is a species, therefore animal is a species”; or, “Man is an animal, animal is a genus, therefore man is a genus”; or, “Socrates is a man, Socrates is an individual, therefore man is an individual.”
Explanation:
St. Albert is warning against a false inference based on treating different kinds of predication as though they worked in exactly the same way. A thing can be related upward and downward in different logical respects: man is called an animal essentially, man is called a species by its relation to a higher term, and Socrates is called an individual by his mode of singular existence. But these relations are not interchangeable. So one cannot simply transfer what is said of one term in one logical respect onto another term in a different respect. For students, the key point is that genus, species, and individual are not merely names stacked in a chain; they express different logical statuses, and confusing those statuses leads to invalid arguments.
12. In talibus enim omnibus est fallacia accidentis: talis enim communitas ab accidente causatur, quod fundatur in modo respectus superioris ad inferius, vel inferioris ad superius, vel etiam respectu particularis ad naturam communem: qui omnes respectus ex hoc causantur, quod natura communis intelligitur in natura minus communi, quae species est vel individuum.
Literal Translation:
“For in all such (cases) there-is fallacy of-accident: for such commonness from accident is-caused, which is-founded in mode of-relation of-superior to inferior, or of-inferior to superior, or also in-relation of-particular to common nature: which all relations from this are-caused, that common nature is-understood in nature less common, which is species or individual.”
Translation:
For in all such cases there is the fallacy of accident. Such commonness is caused by an accident, founded on the mode of relation of the higher to the lower, or of the lower to the higher, or even of the particular to the common nature. All these relations arise from the fact that a common nature is understood in a less common nature, which is either a species or an individual.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining why the earlier inferences fail: they confuse what belongs to a thing essentially with what belongs to it only because of a certain logical relation. The labels genus, species, and individual do not all signify the same kind of thing in the same way. Rather, they arise from different respects: a higher nature to a lower, a lower to a higher, or a singular to a common nature. Because these are relational and not simply essential in the same way, one cannot transfer a predicate from one level to another as though it were univocal. The mistake is therefore a fallacy of accident: something true only under a certain respect is treated as though it were simply and absolutely true.
13. Et ideo patet quod non sequitur, genus praedicatur de pluribus differentibus speciebus: ergo genus est genus: et sic iretur in infinitum.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore it-is-clear that not it-follows, genus is-predicated of many differing species: therefore genus is genus: and thus it-would-be-gone into infinity.”
Translation:
And therefore it is clear that this does not follow: “A genus is predicated of many species differing from one another; therefore genus is itself a genus”; for in that way one would proceed to infinity.
Explanation:
St. Albert is rejecting a bad inference that would collapse logical levels into one another. A true genus is predicated of many things differing in species, but from that one cannot conclude that the term genus itself must also be a genus in the same way. If that were allowed, then one could keep asking for the genus of genus, and then the genus of that genus, and so on without end. For students, the key point is that logical terms such as genus describe how things are ordered and predicated; they do not automatically fall under themselves as though they were just more members of the same series. Albert is guarding against an infinite regress caused by confusing a logical notion with the things to which that notion applies.
14. Soli enim quod est genus per naturam quae est in pluribus differentibus specie convenit esse genus: ita ut genus dicat rationem ordinis, et praedicationis: animal autem in quod est sic praedicatum, praedicatur ut genus.
Literal Translation:
“For to-that-alone indeed which is genus through (the) nature which is in many differing in-species it belongs to-be genus: so-that genus may-say (the) account of-order, and of-predication: animal however, inasmuch as it is thus predicated, is-predicated as genus.”
Translation:
For only that which is a genus through a nature present in many things differing in species properly belongs to be a genus, so that genus signifies the notion of order and of predication; and thus animal, insofar as it is predicated in this way, is predicated as a genus.
Explanation:
St. Albert is clarifying that not everything said of many things is therefore a genus in the strict logical sense. To be a true genus, something must be a common nature really present in many things that differ specifically, and it must be predicated of them according to an ordered logical relation. Thus genus names not merely a word, but a mode of predication and order between superior and inferior. “Animal” is a genus because it is said of man, horse, and other species in precisely that way. For students, the main point is that genus is defined not just by breadth of predication, but by essential predication of a common nature across specifically diverse inferiors.
15. Attende autem, quod praedicari idem est quod attribuere per notam compositionis: quando enim unum alteri attribuitur mediante compositione, quam significat hoc verbum “est”, tunc praedicatur: et quando unum ab altero dividitur mediante negatione talis compositionis, sicut cum dicitur, homo non est lapis: tunc lapis dividitur ab eo.
Literal Translation:
“But attend, that to-be-predicated (is) the same (thing) as to-attribute through the mark of composition: when indeed one (thing) to-another is-attributed by-means-of composition, which signifies this word ‘is,’ then it-is-predicated: and when one (thing) from another is-divided by-means-of negation of-such composition, just as when it is-said, man not is stone: then stone is-divided from him.”
Translation:
But note that to be predicated is the same as to be attributed by means of a mark of composition. For when one thing is attributed to another through the composition signified by the word “is,” then it is predicated. And when one thing is separated from another through the negation of such a composition, as when one says, “man is not a stone,” then stone is divided from him.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert explains what predication is at the level of logical form. To predicate something is to attribute it to a subject by joining the two in a proposition, and the sign of that joining is the verb “is.” Thus in a statement like “man is animal,” the predicate is composed with the subject and truly said of it. By contrast, when that composition is denied, as in “man is not stone,” the predicate is not attributed but instead separated from the subject. For students, the key point is that Albert is grounding logic in the structure of affirmation and negation: predication happens through composition, while division happens through the denial of composition.
16. Et hoc fit in intellectu componente vel dividente: in re enim ipsa sine nota compositionis vel divisionis, unum in altero est, vel non est.
Literal Translation:
“And this happens in intellect composing or dividing: in thing indeed itself without mark of-composition or division, one in another is, or is not.”
Translation:
And this takes place in the intellect composing or dividing; for in the thing itself, apart from any mark of composition or division, one thing is in another, or is not.
Explanation:
St. Albert is clarifying that predication and division, as such, belong properly to the activity of the intellect. The mind composes subject and predicate in an affirmation or divides them in a negation. In reality itself, however, there is no verbal or logical “mark” of composition or division; there is simply the fact that one thing either is in another or is not. For students, the important point is that logic expresses how the intellect understands and states reality. The forms of affirmation and negation belong to thought and language, while the underlying being or non-being of one thing in another belongs to reality itself.
17. Sed intellectus componens vel dividens hic sine nota compositionis vel divisionis, hoc significare non potest: et, ut hoc significet, invenit modum compositionis unius cum alio: et hoc est praedicare unum de alio, vel negare unum ab alio.
Literal Translation:
“But (the) intellect composing or dividing here without mark of-composition or of-division, this to-signify cannot: and, that this it-may-signify, it-finds (a) mode of-composition of-one with another: and this is to-predicate one of another, or to-deny one from another.”
Translation:
But the intellect, when it composes or divides, cannot signify this without a mark of composition or division. And so, in order to signify it, it finds a way of composing one thing with another. This is what it means to predicate one thing of another, or to deny one thing of another.
Explanation:
St. Albert is continuing his account of predication as an act of the intellect. In reality, one thing may be in another or not in another without any spoken sign, but the intellect cannot express that relation unless it uses some sign of composition or division. That is why language needs forms like affirmation and negation. To predicate is to join one thing to another in thought and speech; to deny is to separate them. For students, the key point is that logic is not inventing reality, but providing the mind with a way to signify what is already the case in things.
18. Fit autem hoc quandoque essentialiter, quandoque autem accidentaliter.
Literal Translation:
“It-happens however this sometimes essentially, sometimes however accidentally.”
Translation:
Now this happens sometimes essentially, and sometimes accidentally.
Explanation:
St. Albert is introducing a basic distinction about predication. When one thing is predicated of another, this can happen in two different ways: essentially, when the predicate belongs to what the thing is, or accidentally, when the predicate belongs to it only in a secondary, non-essential way. This distinction is crucial for logic and metaphysics, because it separates predicates that express the nature of a thing from those that merely happen to belong to it. For students, the key point is that not every true statement tells us what a thing is; some truths tell us only what happens to belong to it.
19. Essentialiter autem quando unum accipitur in alio per naturam et substantiam.
Literal Translation:
“Essentially however when one (thing) is-taken in another through nature and substance.”
Translation:
Predication is essential, however, when one thing is taken in another through nature and substance.
Explanation:
St. Albert is now defining essential predication more precisely. A predicate belongs essentially when it is present in the subject according to the subject’s very nature and substance, that is, when it says something about what the thing is. For example, “animal” is predicated essentially of man because it belongs to man’s nature. For students, the key point is that essential predication reveals the inner constitution of a thing, not just an added feature that might come and go.
20. Et hoc tripliciter contingit: aut enim accipit ut priorem naturam in posteriori, aut naturam communem in materia determinatam, aut convertibilem, et idem in convertibili.
Literal Translation:
“And this threefold happens: for either it takes as prior nature in posterior, or common nature in matter determined, or convertible, and the same in convertible.”
Translation:
And this happens in three ways: for one may take a prior nature in a posterior one, or a common nature as determined in matter, or something convertible, that is, the same thing in what is convertible with it.
Explanation:
St. Albert is dividing essential predication into three kinds. One kind occurs when a higher or prior nature is found in a lower or posterior one, as genus is found in species. Another occurs when a common nature is received in determinate matter, which points toward the way a universal nature exists in a concrete subject. The third concerns what is convertible with a thing, that is, what is coextensive with it and thus said of the same subject as belonging inseparably with it. For students, the main point is that essential predication is not all of one sort: a predicate can belong to a thing as a higher nature, as a common nature determined in a subject, or as something convertible with it.
21. Primo quidem modo praedicatur ut genus, secundo autem ut species, tertio vero modo ut diffinitio de diffinito.
Literal Translation:
“In the first indeed mode it-is-predicated as genus, in the second however as species, in the third truly mode as definition of defined-(thing).”
Translation:
In the first mode, it is predicated as a genus; in the second, as a species; and in the third mode, as a definition of the thing defined.
Explanation:
St. Albert is completing the threefold division of essential predication mentioned just before. When a prior nature is found in a posterior one, the predicate is said as a genus; when a common nature is taken as determined, it is predicated as a species; and when what is said is fully convertible with the thing and expresses what it is, it is predicated as a definition of the thing defined. For students, the key point is that essential predication can express different levels of intelligibility: sometimes a more common nature, sometimes a determinate nature, and sometimes the full account that states exactly what the thing is.
22. De differentia vero inferius tractabitur.
Literal Translation:
“But concerning difference below it-will-be-treated.”
Translation:
Difference, however, will be treated below.
Explanation:
This is a brief signpost sentence. St. Albert has mentioned several kinds of essential predication, but he postpones fuller treatment of difference to a later part of the work. For students, the key point is that scholastic texts often move in an ordered way, touching on a topic where needed but delaying its full explanation until the proper place in the sequence of the argument.
23. Genus igitur est id quod dicto modo praedicatur.
Literal Translation:
“Genus therefore is that which in-the-said mode is-predicated.”
Translation:
Genus, therefore, is that which is predicated in the manner just described.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing together the definition he has been developing. After explaining what predication is and distinguishing the ways in which something can be predicated essentially, he now states that genus is precisely that which is predicated in the first of those essential ways, namely as a prior and more common nature said of what is lower. For students, the key point is that genus is not just any common term, but a predicate said essentially of many specifically different things in the way already laid out.
24. Non enim aliquod commune substantiale per quod diffiniatur genus potest poni: quia si omni generi supponeretur substantiale commune quod non est verum: quando enim dico “animal”, est quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie.
Literal Translation:
“For not any common substantial (thing) through which genus may-be-defined can be posited: because if to-every genus a common substantial (thing) were-subposed, which not is true: for when I say ‘animal,’ it is what is-predicated of many differing in-species.”
Translation:
For no common substantial thing can be posited through which genus might be defined. For if some common substantial thing were presupposed to every genus, that would not be true. When I say “animal,” for example, it is something that is predicated of many things differing in species.
Explanation:
St. Albert is saying that genus cannot be defined by appealing to some still more common substantial nature above every genus. If one tried to define genus that way, one would be assuming that every genus stands under some higher common substance, and Albert says that is not true. Instead, genus must be understood by its logical function: it is what is predicated of many things that differ specifically. The example of “animal” shows this well, since “animal” is said of man, horse, and other species. For students, the key point is that genus is not being defined here by a higher substance above it, but by the way it is predicated essentially of many specifically different things.
25. Et si quaeras quid est animal, dico quod animal est vivum sensibile quod de pluribus differentibus specie praedicatur.
Literal Translation:
“And if you may-ask what is animal, I say that animal is living sensible which of many differing in-species is-predicated.”
Translation:
And if you ask what an animal is, I say that an animal is a living, sentient thing that is predicated of many things differing in species.
Explanation:
St. Albert is applying the logical description of genus to a concrete example. “Animal” is called a genus because it is said of many specifically different things, such as man, horse, and dog, and it is said of them essentially, in answer to the question what they are. At the same time, he gives the content of the term itself as “living” and “sentient,” showing that genus is not an empty logical label but a real common nature. For students, the key point is that a genus both has its own intelligible content and serves a logical role: it expresses a common essential nature shared by several species.
26. Sed cum dico, genus, est quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie.
Literal Translation:
“But when I say, genus, is that which is-predicated of many differing in-species.”
Translation:
But when I say, “genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species,”
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing a contrast between defining a particular genus, such as animal, and describing genus as a logical notion. When he says “animal is a living sentient thing predicated of many differing in species,” he is speaking about one definite genus with its own content. But when he says “genus is what is predicated of many things differing in species,” he is giving the general logical description of genus as genus. For students, the key point is that Albert is distinguishing between the content of a specific genus and the formal account of what it means for something to be a genus at all.
27. Si quaeritur, quid est genus? non possum assignare quid est genus per aliquid communius illo: quia sicut iam dictum est, genus est nomen impositum ab accidente quod est ratio ordinis, et respectus superioris naturae ad inferiorem, in qua est substantialiter et acceptum in intellectu ipsius.
Literal Translation:
“If it-is-asked, what is genus? I am-not-able to-assign what genus is through something more-common than it: because just-as already it-has-been-said, genus is (a) name imposed from an accident which is (the) account of order, and (the) relation of a superior nature to an inferior, in which it is substantially and taken in the intellect of-it.”
Translation:
If it is asked, “What is genus?” I cannot explain what genus is through something more common than it, because, as has already been said, genus is a name imposed from an accident, namely from the notion of order and of the relation of a superior nature to an inferior one, in which that superior nature exists substantially and is grasped by the intellect.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining why genus cannot be defined in the usual way by putting it under something still more general. A genus like animal can be placed under a higher common term, but genus as genus is a logical notion named from a certain relation, not from a still more universal substance above it. That relation is the ordered respect of a higher nature to a lower one, where the higher is really present in the lower and is understood as such by the mind. For students, the key point is that “genus” is not just another natural kind waiting for a higher class above it; it is a logical term that names a mode of essential predication and order.
28. Et id nomen transcendens est, nec potest notificari per aliud significationis certae nomen aliquod: sed oportet quod notificetur per infinitum, hoc est, per nomen significationis non diffinitae, dicendo: genus est quod praedicatur.
Literal Translation:
“And that name is transcending, and not it-can be made-known through another name of-signification certain any: but it-is-necessary that it may-be-made-known through infinite, this is, through name of-signification not defined, saying: genus is what is-predicated.”
Translation:
And that is a transcendent name, nor can it be made known through some other name of definite signification. Rather, it must be made known through something indeterminate, that is, through a term of non-defined signification, by saying: genus is that which is predicated.
Explanation:
St. Albert is saying that the word genus, taken as a logical notion, cannot be clarified by placing it under some still more general and clearly delimited term. Because it names a very high-level logical relation, it has to be explained in a looser descriptive way rather than by a strict genus-and-difference definition. That is why he says it must be made known through something “indeterminate”: not by a more precise higher class, but by describing its function, namely that genus is what is predicated. For students, the key point is that some foundational logical terms are not defined the same way ordinary things are; instead, they are introduced by describing how they operate in thought and predication.
29. Et est idem ac si diceretur: illud quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie vocatur genus: quamvis id in quantum infinitum, notae sit et incertae significationis.
Literal Translation:
“And it is the same as if it were said: that which is-predicated of many differing in-species is-called genus: although that, insofar as indefinite, of-known (thing) it may-be and of-uncertain signification.”
Translation:
And it is the same as if one were to say: that which is predicated of many things differing in species is called a genus, although this, insofar as it is indeterminate, is of a known but uncertain signification.
Explanation:
St. Albert is restating the descriptive account of genus in a slightly looser form. A genus is what is predicated of many things that differ specifically, but this account is not yet a strict definition through something higher and more precise. Instead, it uses a more indeterminate expression. His point is that the mind can still recognize what genus means from its logical function, even if the term used to explain it is not itself sharply defined in the way an ordinary essential definition would be. For students, the key idea is that some logical notions are clarified not by being placed under a higher class, but by describing the role they play in predication.
30. Et sic poni potest in notificatione descriptionis vel diffinitionis.
Literal Translation:
“And thus it can be placed in (the) making-known of-description or of-definition.”
Translation:
And thus it can be set down for the clarification of a description or a definition.
Explanation:
St. Albert is concluding the point he has been making about how genus can be explained. Since genus cannot be defined through some more common and more determinate higher term, it must instead be made known by a descriptive account of its logical function. So this formula can rightly be used in giving the clarification of a description or definition. For students, the key point is that Albert is distinguishing strict definition from explanatory description: in the case of a very high logical notion like genus, one often has to rely on a descriptive way of making the meaning known rather than a fully strict essential definition.
31. Quod autem additur de pluribus differentibus specie, est ideo, quia genus ad speciem non deducitur nisi divisum per differentias: quae enim oppositae sunt et divisivae respectu generis, constitutivae autem respectu speciei, oportet plures esse.
Literal Translation:
“But that which is added concerning many differing in-species, is for-this-reason, because genus to species is not led-down unless divided through differences: for those which are opposed and divisive with-respect-to genus, but constitutive with-respect-to species, it-is-necessary (them) more to-be.”
Translation:
But the phrase “of many things differing in species” is added for this reason: because a genus is not brought down to species unless it is divided by differences. For those differences, which are opposed and divisive with respect to the genus, but constitutive with respect to the species, must necessarily be multiple.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining why the standard description of genus says that it is predicated of “many things differing in species.” A genus does not remain a genus by being related to just one determinate species; rather, it is divided into species by specific differences. Those differences are opposed to one another when considered as dividing the genus, but each of them helps constitute a distinct species. So genus necessarily implies a plurality of species beneath it. For students, the key point is that genus is a common nature broad enough to be split by several specific differences, and that is why it is said of many specifically different things rather than of only one.
32. Differentia divisiva, ut dicit Damascenus, est causa materiei formarum, sicut divisio per materiam est causa numeri individuorum.
Literal Translation:
“Divisive difference, as says Damascene, is cause of-the matter of-forms, just-as division through matter is cause of-the number of-individuals.”
Translation:
A dividing difference, as Damascene says, is the cause of the matter of forms, just as division by matter is the cause of the number of individuals.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining the role of difference in the production of species. A divisive difference is what breaks up a genus into distinct formal determinations, so it is called the cause of the “matter of forms,” meaning the principle by which different forms are set apart within the common field of the genus. He then compares this to individuation: just as matter is what multiplies one species into many individual instances, so divisive difference is what multiplies one genus into many species. For students, the key point is that difference does at the level of species what matter does at the level of individuals: it is the principle of division and multiplication, but in the formal order rather than the material one.
33. Et ideo communitas generis ambit species constitutas oppositis differentiis.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore (the) community of-genus embraces species constituted by-opposed differences.”
Translation:
And therefore the commonness of genus embraces species constituted by opposed differences.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing the conclusion from the role of divisive differences. Since a genus is divided into species by opposed differences, the genus remains the one common nature that extends across all those distinct species. Its commonness is broad enough to include them all, even though they are formally set apart from one another by their specific differences. For students, the key point is that genus does not disappear when species are distinguished; rather, it remains the common essential nature shared by the various species that arise from its division.
34. Quod etiamsi poneretur, quod non esset nisi una species, ut diceremus non esse nisi hominem et nullam aliam speciem animalis, adhuc praedicaretur animal de homine ut genus: quia de potestate et ambitu naturali animalis est et de aptitudine generis, quod dividatur oppositis differentiis.
Literal Translation:
“Which even-if it-were-posed, that there were not except one species, so-that we-would-say there to-be not except man and no other species of-animal, still would-be-predicated animal of man as genus: because of the power and natural range of animal it is and of the aptitude of-genus, that it be-divided by opposed differences.”
Translation:
And even if one were to suppose that there were only a single species, so that we were to say that there is only man and no other species of animal, animal would still be predicated of man as a genus. For it belongs to the power and natural scope of animal, and to the aptitude of genus as such, that it be divisible by opposed differences.
Explanation:
St. Albert is making an important logical point: genus does not cease to be genus merely because, as a matter of fact, only one species happens to be found under it. What makes something a genus is not only the actual number of species presently observed, but its nature and aptitude to be divided by opposed specific differences. So even in a hypothetical case where only man existed as a species of animal, “animal” would still be a genus because its common nature is of itself fit to extend to several specifically distinct forms. For students, the key point is that genus is defined by its formal intelligible capacity for specific division, not merely by the accidental fact of how many species are currently instantiated.
35. Non enim solum universale est quod praedicatur, sed quod aptum natum est praedicari de multis, ut iam in ante habitis dictum est.
Literal Translation:
“For not only universal is that which is-predicated, but that which apt born is to-be-predicated of many, as already in the things had-before it has-been-said.”
Translation:
For a universal is not only that which is in fact predicated, but that which is by nature apt to be predicated of many, as has already been said above.
Explanation:
St. Albert is clarifying that universality is not defined merely by actual use in predication. Something is universal not only when it is in fact said of many things, but more fundamentally when its nature makes it fit to be said of many. This explains the previous point about genus: even if only one species were actually found, the genus would still be a genus because it remains naturally apt for predication of many. For students, the key point is that scholastic logic often grounds universality in natural aptitude or capacity, not just in the accidental fact of how many instances happen to exist.
36. Et si illa multa differunt formis (quam differentiam et numerum facit divisio differentiarum, quae potestatem naturae dividit primum et per se) tunc praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie: quia genus differentiis dividitur divisiva sua potestate.
Literal Translation:
“And if those many differ by-forms (which difference and number the division of-differences makes, which the power of-the nature divides first and through itself) then it-is-predicated of many differing in-species: because genus by-differences is-divided by-its divisive power.”
Translation:
And if those many differ by forms, a difference and multiplicity brought about by the division of differences, which divides the power of the nature primarily and in itself, then it is predicated of many things differing in species; for genus is divided by differences through its own divisive power.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining why genus is said to be predicated of many things differing in species. The many things under a genus are not merely numerically many; they differ formally, that is, they are distinct species. This formal diversity comes from differences, which divide the common power of the generic nature in a primary and essential way. So genus has within it a capacity to be unfolded into specifically distinct forms, and when that happens, it is rightly said of many things differing in species. For students, the key point is that genus is common not in a vague way, but as a nature with an intrinsic aptitude to be divided by differences into formally distinct species.
37. Alia enim potestate genus est in specie una, et alia in alia: et non talis divisio est speciei per materiam: eadem enim potestate species est in uno individuo et in alio, nec est divisa, sed secundum esse integrum manente sua naturali potestate est in quolibet individuorum.
Literal Translation:
“For by-another power genus is in one species, and by-another in another: and not such division is of-species through matter: for by-the-same power species is in one individual and in another, nor is it divided, but according to integral being, its natural power remaining, it is in any of-the individuals.”
Translation:
For the genus is present in one species by one power and in another species by another power; and the species is not divided through matter in this same way. For the species is present by the same power in one individual and in another, and it is not divided, but remains in each of the individuals according to its whole being, while its natural power remains intact.
Explanation:
St. Albert is distinguishing again between the way genus is related to species and the way species is related to individuals. Genus is diversified across species because different specific differences actualize the generic nature in different formal ways, so its power is present differently in one species than in another. But species does not divide into individuals in that same formal manner. The species remains one and the same in natural power and essential content, and is wholly present in each individual. Individuals differ through matter and individuation, not because the species itself is split into different specific powers. For students, the key point is that formal division belongs to genus in relation to species, while material multiplication belongs to species in relation to individuals.
38. Quod autem additur in eo quod quid est, ideo additum est, quia omne superius quod per essentiam et nomen et differentiam est in inferiori, est quid ipsius, secundum quod quid est quidditas.
Literal Translation:
“But that which is added in that which what it is, for-that-reason is added, because every superior which through essence and name and difference is in the inferior, is the what of-it, according to that which what it is is quiddity.”
Translation:
But the phrase “in answer to what it is” is added for this reason: because every higher term that is present in a lower one according to essence, name, and difference belongs to what that lower thing is, insofar as “what it is” signifies quiddity.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining why the standard description of genus includes the phrase “in answer to the question what a thing is.” A genus is not just any predicate said of a subject; it is a higher nature that belongs to the lower thing essentially, so that it expresses part of the thing’s quiddity, that is, what the thing is in its essence. When a genus is predicated of a species, it is said not accidentally but as part of the intelligible content of the species itself. For students, the key point is that genus belongs to the essential order: it answers the question “what is it?” because it expresses something truly constitutive of the thing’s nature.
39. Et si aliquis dicat, quod non est tota quidditas, dicimus quod est totum esse ipsius, sed non est perfectum esse ipsius speciei: totum enim esse est in potentia: et nihil est de esse quod in potentia non sit ante ultimum actum ad quem terminatur motus potentiae: esse autem in potentia est esse in genere, et haec est causa vera quod genus praedicatur.
Literal Translation:
“And if anyone may-say, that it is not the whole quiddity, we say that it is the whole being of-it, but it is not the perfected being of-that species itself: for the whole being is in potency: and nothing is of being which in potency is not before the ultimate act to which is-terminated the motion of potency: being moreover in potency is being in genus, and this is the true cause that genus is predicated.”
Translation:
And if someone says that it is not the whole quiddity, we reply that it is the whole being of the thing, though it is not the perfected being of the species itself. For the whole of being is first in potency, and nothing belongs to being that is not in potency before the final act at which the movement of potency comes to completion. Now being in potency is being in a genus, and this is the true reason why a genus is predicated.
Explanation:
St. Albert is answering an objection about genus and essence. Someone might say that genus cannot be predicated essentially, because it does not express the whole quiddity or full definitional content of the species. Albert replies by distinguishing between whole being in potency and perfected being in act. Genus does indeed contain the whole being of the species, but only in an indeterminate and potential way, not yet in the fully completed way that belongs to the species as specified by its difference. Since what is later completed in act is first present in potency, the genus can truly be predicated of the species: it contains the species’ whole essential content, though not yet under its final and perfected determination.
40. Non ideo tantum quia est forma, sed quia est forma et secundum aliquem modum totum esse dicit.
Literal Translation:
“Not for-that-reason only because it is form, but because it is form and according to some mode it says whole being.”
Translation:
Not only for that reason, because it is form, but because it is form and in some way expresses the whole being.
Explanation:
St. Albert is refining the reason why genus can be predicated essentially. It is not enough simply to say that genus is predicated because it is a form. Rather, genus is predicated because it is a form that, in a certain way, contains and expresses the whole being of the species, though still in an indeterminate or potential mode. The species adds the final determination, but the genus already includes the whole essential content in a general way. For students, the key point is that genus is not a mere fragment of essence standing beside the rest; it contains the whole essence virtually and potentially, which is why it can truly be said of the species in answer to what the thing is.
41. Et quod sic se habet ad subjectum, praedicatur de illo non per denominationem accidentalem, sed essentiali praedicatione.
Literal Translation:
“And that which thus has-itself to (the) subject, is-predicated of it not through accidental denomination, but through essential predication.”
Translation:
And whatever is related to a subject in this way is predicated of it not by accidental denomination, but by essential predication.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing the conclusion from the previous discussion of genus. If something is present in a subject as form and in some way expresses the whole being of that subject, then it is not said of the subject merely by an accidental label or external naming. Rather, it is predicated essentially, that is, as belonging to what the thing is. For students, the key point is that genus is not attached to species the way an accident is attached to a subject; it belongs to the inner intelligible structure of the thing and is therefore said of it essentially.
42. Et hoc est quod a multis dicitur, quod est forma partis quae non praedicatur, et est forma totius quae praedicatur.
Literal Translation:
“And this is what by many is-said, that it is form of-part which is not predicated, and it is form of-whole which is predicated.”
Translation:
And this is what many people say: that it is the form of the part which is not predicated, but the form of the whole which is predicated.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing a distinction between two ways form can be considered. A form taken as the form of a part, that is, as one constituent element within a thing, is not what is ordinarily predicated. But a form taken as the form of the whole, that is, as expressing the whole nature or essence of the thing, is what can be predicated. In context, this helps explain why genus is predicated essentially: genus is not being taken merely as some partial component of the species, but as something that expresses the whole being of the species in an indeterminate way. For students, the key point is that what is predicated in logic is not just any metaphysical component, but what can stand for the whole nature of the thing.
43. Sed oportet addere, quod forma quae praedicatur, totius sit, et totum esse significet, et non significet essentiam cujus est actus proprius: animalitas enim non praedicatur, nec etiam humanitas: quamvis animalitatis esse sit animal, et humanitatis esse sit homo.
Literal Translation:
“But it-is-necessary to-add, that (the) form which is-predicated, of-the-whole may-be, and whole being may-signify, and not may-signify (the) essence of-which it is (the) proper act: for animality indeed is-not predicated, nor also humanity: although of-animality (the) being is animal, and of-humanity (the) being is man.”
Translation:
But one must add that the form which is predicated must be the form of the whole and must signify the whole being, and must not signify the essence of which it is the proper act. For “animality” is not predicated, nor is “humanity,” although the being of animality is animal, and the being of humanity is man.
Explanation:
St. Albert is making a subtle but very important scholastic distinction between abstract essences and concrete predicates. A term is predicated when it signifies the whole thing as existing in a certain nature, not merely an abstract essence considered by itself. Thus we say “man is an animal,” but we do not say “man is humanity” or “animality,” because humanity and animality name the essence abstractly, as though stripped away from the whole subsisting thing. By contrast, man and animal signify the whole being that has that essence. For students, the key point is that logical predication ordinarily uses terms that name the whole nature as found in a subject, not abstract essence-terms. That is why genus is predicated through words like animal, but not through abstractions like animality.
44. Talis ergo forma designans formam totius et esse, praedicatur, et non aliter: et anima sensibilis loco animalis posita non praedicatur, quia animal non est anima sensibilis: et similiter anima hominis non praedicatur de homine: haec enim dicit formam partis, et non totius esse.
Literal Translation:
“Such therefore form designating form of-whole and being, is-predicated, and not otherwise: and sensitive soul in place of animal having-been-placed is-not-predicated, because animal not is sensitive soul: and similarly soul of-man is-not-predicated of-man: for this says form of-part, and not whole being.”
Translation:
Therefore, a form of this kind, signifying the form of the whole and the whole being, is predicated, and not otherwise. Thus “sensitive soul,” if put in place of “animal,” is not predicated, because an animal is not a sensitive soul. And similarly the soul of man is not predicated of man, for this signifies the form of a part, and not the whole being.
Explanation:
St. Albert is applying the distinction he has just made between the form of a part and the form of the whole. A term can be predicated only if it signifies the whole being of the thing, not merely one constituent principle within it. So “animal” can be predicated of man because it names the whole living sentient being, but “sensitive soul” cannot, because it names only one formal part of that whole. Likewise, the human soul is not predicated of man, since it does not signify the complete human being but only one of the principles that make him up. For students, the key point is that predication in logic concerns terms that stand for the whole subject, not merely for one of its metaphysical components.
45. Animalitas autem et humanitas non praedicatur de his quorum formae sunt: non enim designant formas ut esse subjecti, sed ut essentias.
Literal Translation:
“But animality and humanity are not predicated of those of which they are forms: for they do not designate forms as the being of the subject, but as essences.”
Translation:
But animality and humanity are not predicated of the things of which they are the forms, for they do not signify forms as the being of a subject, but as essences.
Explanation:
St. Albert is continuing the distinction between concrete terms that can be predicated and abstract terms that cannot. Words like “animal” and “man” signify the whole thing as existing in a certain nature, and so they can be predicated of a subject. But “animality” and “humanity” signify the essence in the abstract, not the whole subject as existing. That is why one says “man is an animal,” but not “man is humanity.” For students, the key point is that scholastic logic carefully distinguishes between a term that names what a thing is as a whole and a term that names the essence abstractly. Only the former is ordinarily predicated.
46. Animal autem et homo praedicantur, quia designant formas ut esse totum subjecti, vel in potentia vel actu: subjecti dico de quo praedicantur.
Literal Translation:
“But animal and man are-predicated, because they designate forms as to-be whole of-the subject, either in potency or in act: of-the-subject I-say of-which they-are-predicated.”
Translation:
Animal and man, however, are predicated because they signify forms as the whole being of the subject, whether in potency or in act; and by “subject” I mean that of which they are predicated.
Explanation:
St. Albert is completing the contrast with abstract terms like animality and humanity. Words such as animal and man can be predicated because they signify not merely an abstract essence, but the whole subject as existing in that nature. They name the whole being of what they are said of, whether under a more potential and common aspect, as genus does, or under a more determinate and actual aspect, as species does. For students, the key point is that predication belongs to terms that stand for the whole thing in its being, not merely for an abstract essence considered apart from the subject.
47. Et sic etiam in formis accidentalibus omnibus.
Literal Translation:
“And thus also in forms accidental all.”
Translation:
And the same holds true also for all accidental forms.
Explanation:
St. Albert is extending the principle just established beyond substantial forms to accidental ones as well. Just as one must distinguish between a term that signifies an essence abstractly and a term that signifies the whole subject as existing in a certain way, so too with accidents: the way a form is signified determines whether it can be predicated. For students, the key point is that this rule about predication is not limited to genus and species alone. It applies more broadly to the logic of how forms are said of subjects: what is predicated must signify the subject as qualified or constituted in some whole way, not merely name an abstract form by itself.
48. Et ideo homo est risibilis, et non risibilitas; et homo est albus, et non albedo.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore man is laugh-able, and not laugh-ability; and man is white, and not whiteness.”
Translation:
And therefore a man is laughable, not laughability; and a man is white, not whiteness.
Explanation:
St. Albert is applying the same logical rule to accidental predicates. A concrete term such as risibilis or albus can be predicated of a subject because it signifies the subject as possessing a certain quality or disposition. But abstract terms like risibilitas and albedo signify the quality itself taken by itself, not the whole subject as qualified by it. So we properly say “man is laughable” and “man is white,” but not “man is laughability” or “whiteness.” For students, the key point is that predication normally requires a term that names the subject as being something, not merely the abstract form or quality considered in itself.
49. Hoc est igitur quod dicitur, quod genus est quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid est: quod enim quid est et esse ipsius est de quo praedicatur.
Literal Translation:
“This is therefore what is-said, that genus is what is-predicated of many differing in-species in that which what it is: for that which what it is and the being of-it is of-that of-which it-is-predicated.”
Translation:
This, then, is what is meant when it is said that genus is what is predicated of many things differing in species in answer to the question what a thing is. For what is predicated in this way is the whatness and being of that of which it is predicated.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert is summing up the definition of genus he has been unfolding. A genus is not just any common predicate said of many things; it is said of things that differ specifically, and it is said of them in answer to the question what they are. That is why genus belongs to the order of essence, not merely to accidental attribution. When a genus is predicated, it expresses something belonging to the very whatness and being of the subject. For students, the key point is that genus is a common essential nature, present in many specifically distinct things and truly said of them as part of what they are.
50. Et ideo genus est universale quod immediata et substantiali praedicatione est in multis speciebus et de multis.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore genus is universal which by-immediate and substantial predication is in many species and of many.”
Translation:
And therefore genus is a universal which, by immediate and substantial predication, is in many species and predicated of many things.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing the final consequence of his account of genus. Genus is a universal because it belongs not to one thing alone, but to many. Yet it is not universal in a loose or accidental way. It is present in many species and predicated of them immediately and substantially, that is, as part of what they are. For students, the key point is that genus is a universal of the strongest logical kind: it is directly and essentially said of many specifically different things, not merely attached to them from outside.
51. Sic ergo demonstratum est, quod genus est universale et inter universalia primum; et qualiter communitas generis differt ab aliis communitatibus posterioribus ab accidentibus denominatis.
Literal Translation:
“Thus therefore it-has-been-demonstrated, that genus is universal and among universals first; and in-what-way (the) commonness of-genus differs from other commonnesses posterior denominated from accidents.”
Translation:
Thus, therefore, it has been shown that genus is a universal, and the first among universals; and it has also been shown how the commonness of genus differs from other, posterior kinds of commonness that are named from accidents.
Explanation:
St. Albert is concluding the argument of the chapter. He has established that genus is a true universal and, among universals, the primary one, because it is immediately and essentially predicated of many specifically different things. He also distinguishes this commonness of genus from later and lesser kinds of commonness, which arise only from accidental features or denominative relations rather than from the substance of a thing. For students, the key point is that genus belongs to the deepest level of intelligible structure: it expresses what things are in their essence, whereas accidental commonness names only what happens to belong to things afterward.
The sources, goals, method, outline, and direction of this lesson are the work of Mr. William C. Michael, O.P., Headmaster of the Classical Liberal Arts Academy. The written copy has been composed from his materials and instructions with the assistance of artificial intelligence tools, and reviewed and approved by him before publication.
