CAPUT II. De Genere Philosophico, et Quomodo Assimilatur Aliis?
Literal Translation:
“Chapter II. Concerning philosophical genus, and how is-it made-similar to others?”
Translation:
Chapter II. On Philosophical Genus, and How It Is Compared to Other Things
Explanation:
This is a chapter title announcing the next stage of the discussion. After treating broader and analogical senses of genus, St. Albert now turns to genus in the philosophical sense and to the question of how it can be likened to other things. The title signals a more technical inquiry: not just what genus means in ordinary or extended usage, but how the philosophical notion relates by similarity or analogy to other kinds of wholes, principles, or classifications. The word ey appears to be a textual error for et, “and,” but the sense is still clear from the context.
1. Sic ergo (ut in civilibus accipitur genus) non utuntur genere philosophii: sed utuntur genere in illa significationis intentione, qua dicitur, genus est cui supponitur species directa et immediata suppositione.
Literal Translation:
“Thus therefore (as in civil matters genus is received) not use genus philosophers: but they use genus in that signification’s intention, in which it is said, genus is that to-which species is-subposed by-direct and immediate supposition.”
Translation:
Thus, then, philosophers do not use genus in the way it is understood in civil matters; rather, they use genus in that intended sense of signification according to which it is said that genus is that under which a species is placed by direct and immediate subordination.
Explanation:
St. Albert is now formally leaving behind the broader social or genealogical uses of the word genus and moving into its philosophical sense. Philosophers do not mean by genus a family line, a civic stock, or a people descending from one ancestor. Instead, they mean a logical or metaphysical universal under which a species falls directly and immediately. The key point for students is that philosophical genus is defined by predicable order: a species stands under a genus as its next higher common nature. So Albert is shifting from looser, historical uses of the term to its strict technical use in classification and essential predication.
2. Genus enim consequitur differentiam, et differentia in genere est potestate, et ideo aliquo modo est sub ambitu communitatis generis: sed tamen non ponitur ut substans sub genere, sed adjungitur lateraliter ad generis determinationem et contractionem.
Literal Translation:
“For genus indeed follows difference, and difference in genus is in potency, and therefore in some mode is under the range of the commonness of-genus: but nevertheless it is not placed as standing-under under genus, but it is added laterally to the determination and contraction of-genus.”
Translation:
For genus is followed by difference, and difference exists in the genus potentially; and therefore in some way it falls within the scope of the genus’s commonness. Yet it is not placed under the genus as something standing beneath it; rather, it is added alongside for the determination and contraction of the genus.
Explanation:
St. Albert is distinguishing species from difference. A species is directly subordinated under a genus, but a difference is not related to genus in that same vertical way. Difference is already contained in genus potentially, because genus is something common that can be further specified into distinct species. Still, difference is not itself a lower subject placed under genus as species is. Instead, it comes in, as it were, from the side, adding the determination that narrows or contracts the common nature of the genus into a definite species. For students, the key point is that genus gives the common essential content, while difference makes that content definite and specific.
3. Erit autem de genere ad potestatis ipsius divisionem.
Literal Translation:
“It-will-be however concerning genus unto division of-the power of-itself.”
Translation:
But this will concern the genus with respect to the division of its power.
Explanation:
This sentence is brief and somewhat compressed, but the sense is that the discussion is now turning to genus insofar as its internal potentiality or scope is divided out. In the scholastic framework, genus contains differences and species potentially, and those are brought out through division. So St. Albert is signaling that what follows will treat genus in relation to the way its power extends to various determinations. For students, the key point is that genus is not a dead universal; it has a certain range or potency that is unfolded when it is divided into its subordinate species.
4. Et ideo nec differentia divisiva, nec etiam differentia constitutiva directe supponitur generi, ut substantia stans sub genere.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore neither dividing difference, nor also constitutive difference, directly is-subposed to-genus, as substance standing under genus.”
Translation:
And therefore neither the dividing difference nor even the constitutive difference is directly subordinated to the genus as a substance standing under the genus.
Explanation:
St. Albert is continuing to distinguish difference from species. A species stands directly under a genus, but a difference does not. Whether the difference is taken as dividing the genus into branches or as constituting a species, it is not itself something that falls under the genus in the same way a species does, as though it were a complete substance beneath it. Rather, difference functions to determine and contract the genus so that a species may be constituted. For students, the key point is that genus and species are related vertically by subordination, while difference works differently: it specifies the genus rather than standing under it as an independent lower term.
5. Nec etiam species sic supponitur differentiae.
Literal Translation:
“Nor also species thus is-subposed to-difference.”
Translation:
Nor is the species subordinated to the difference in that way.
Explanation:
St. Albert is making the structure of these logical relations more precise. Just as difference is not directly subordinated to genus as though it were a substance standing beneath it, so too species is not subordinated to difference in the same way. Difference does help constitute the species by determining the genus, but it is not a higher term under which the species simply falls as under a genus. For students, the key point is that genus, difference, and species are related in different ways: genus is predicated of species, while difference determines genus so that the species may be constituted.
6. Sed differentia constitutiva est in genere ad determinandam generis potestatum et contrahendum ad speciem constitutam, et quasi lateraliter venit ad speciem: propter quod non supponitur generi, ut quid generis, vel ut quale quid sicut species: et ideo differentia non est cui supponitur in ordine naturae species, sed totius est speciei et generis.
Literal Translation:
“But constitutive difference is in genus for determining (the) power of-genus and for contracting (it) to constituted species, and as-if laterally it comes to species: on-account-of which not it-is-subposed to-genus, as what of-genus, or as what-sort of-what like species: and therefore difference not is that to-which in order of nature species is-subposed, but of-the-whole it is of-species and of-genus.”
Translation:
But constitutive difference is present in the genus in order to determine the power of the genus and to contract it to the constituted species, and it comes to the species, as it were, from the side. For that reason it is not subordinated to the genus as a “what” belonging to the genus, or as a “qualified what” in the way species is. And therefore difference is not that under which the species is subordinated in the order of nature; rather, it belongs to the whole of the species and the genus together.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining more exactly how constitutive difference relates to genus and species. Difference does not stand under genus the way species does, as if it were another lower thing contained beneath it. Instead, difference works within the genus by determining and narrowing its common content so that a definite species can result. That is why he says it comes “laterally”: it is not a lower term in the same line of subordination, but a determining principle added to genus to make the species. For students, the key point is that genus gives the common essential content, while constitutive difference specifies and contracts that content into one definite species; so difference is not something under which species is placed, but something that helps make the species to be what it is.
7. Quamvis autem individuum generi supponatur, non tamen immediate substat positione.
Literal Translation:
“But although individual to-genus is-subposed, not however immediately it-stands-under by-position.”
Translation:
But although the individual is subordinated to the genus, it does not stand under it immediately in the order of placement.
Explanation:
St. Albert is making another distinction in the logical order of predication. An individual does fall under a genus, but not directly or immediately. It stands under a species first, and only through the species does it fall under the genus. So the genus is not predicated of the individual in the same immediate structural way that it is predicated of the species. For students, the key point is that logical order moves step by step: genus is immediately above species, and the individual is beneath the species, not directly beneath the genus.
8. Adhuc nec subsistit: genus enim non contrahitur in ipso pro se, sed species: nec in eo contrahitur species, sed potius secundum esse dividitur divisione materiae et divisione accidentis, et individuantis: quod non proprie est substare in ordine substantiae et superstantis: sed est diffusio substantis et superstantis ad multiplicationem materialem.
Literal Translation:
“Further neither does-it-subsist: for genus not is-contracted in it for itself, but species: nor in it is species contracted, but rather according to being it-is-divided by division of matter and by division of accident, and of-that-which-individuates: which not properly is to-stand-under in order of substance and of-that-which-stands-over: but is diffusion of-that-which-stands-under and of-that-which-stands-over unto material multiplication.”
Translation:
Further, it does not subsist under the genus in that way either. For the genus is not contracted in the individual as such, but in the species; nor is the species contracted in the individual in the same formal way, but rather it is divided according to being by the division of matter and by the division of accident and of what individuates. This is not properly to stand under in the order of substance and of what stands above it; rather, it is the diffusion of what stands under and what stands above into material multiplication.
Explanation:
St. Albert is clarifying why the individual is not immediately under the genus in the same way that the species is. Genus is formally contracted into species, and that is the proper logical step. The individual, however, does not arise by a further logical contraction of genus in the same manner; instead, the species is multiplied into individuals through matter, accidents, and individuating conditions. So the move from genus to species belongs to the essential and logical order, while the move from species to individuals belongs to the order of concrete material multiplication. For students, the key point is that species is the proper immediate subject of genus, whereas individuals are the materially diversified instances of a species, not a further formal level directly parallel to species under genus.
9. Proprium etiam post speciem est secundum ordinem naturae.
Literal Translation:
“Property also after species is according to order of nature.”
Translation:
A property also comes after the species in the order of nature.
Explanation:
St. Albert is placing proprium in its proper logical order. A property does not come before the species or constitute it; rather, it follows upon the species once the species is already established in its nature. In scholastic logic, a property belongs necessarily to a species and flows from its essence, but it is not part of the essence itself. For students, the key point is that the species must first be what it is, and only then can its proper attributes be understood as following from that nature.
10. Nec etiam proprium secundum quod proprium substare habet, sed potius in esse, et post illud accidens.
Literal Translation:
“Nor also does property, according to that which (it is) property, have to-stand-under, but rather to-be in being, and after that accident.”
Translation:
Nor does a property, precisely as property, have the role of standing underneath something; rather, it has the role of being present in a thing, and after it comes accident.
Explanation:
St. Albert is continuing to distinguish the logical order of predicables. A property is not something that stands under a higher term in the way a species stands under a genus. Instead, a property belongs to a thing as something present in it and following from its nature. After property comes accident, which belongs even less essentially. For students, the key point is that genus and species belong to the essential structure of what a thing is, while property and accident belong in a different order: they are present in the thing, but they do not stand beneath higher terms as essential constituents in the same way.
11. Et ideo solum genus est per se et proprie, cui supponitur species.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore only genus is through itself and properly, to-which species is-subposed.”
Translation:
And therefore genus alone is, in itself and properly speaking, that under which species is subordinated.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing the conclusion from the distinctions he has just made. Neither difference, nor individual, nor property, nor accident stands in relation to lower terms in quite the same way that genus does to species. Species is directly and properly subordinated to genus alone. For students, the key point is that genus has a unique role among the predicables: it is the proper higher term under which species immediately falls, and this is what makes genus genus in the strict philosophical sense.
12. Genus enim cum dicat ordinem superioris ad inferius apud Philosophos, optime notificatur sua significatio, quando determinatur per id ad quod dicit ordinem.
Literal Translation:
“For genus indeed since it says (the) order of-superior to inferior among Philosophers, best is-made-known its signification, when it is determined through that to which it says order.”
Translation:
For since genus, among philosophers, expresses the relation of a higher term to a lower one, its meaning is best made known when it is defined through that to which it stands in relation.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining why philosophers identify genus by reference to species. In the philosophical sense, genus is not understood in isolation, but as a higher universal standing over a lower term. Because its very notion includes this ordered relation, genus is best clarified by specifying the inferior to which it is related, namely the species placed under it. For students, the key point is that genus is a relative logical notion: to understand what genus is, one must understand its place in the ordered structure of predication, where it stands above species as the more common essential term.
13. Et cum determinetur significatio generis apud Philosophos, fortasse haec intentio dicta est sic: quia in hac intentione habet similitudinem quamdam ad genus dictum in civilibus secundum utramque praecedentium intentionum.
“And when is-determined (the) signification of-genus among Philosophers, perhaps this intention is-said thus: because in this intention it has a certain similitude to genus said among civil-(matters) according to each of the preceding intentions.”
Translation:
And when the meaning of genus is determined among philosophers, perhaps this notion is expressed in this way because, in this sense, it bears a certain likeness to genus as spoken of in civil matters according to each of the two preceding meanings.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining why philosophers can use the same word genus even though they mean something more technical than the civic or genealogical uses discussed earlier. The philosophical notion is not identical with those earlier meanings, but it does resemble them in important ways. It is like them because in each case there is some relation of one to many, some higher principle under which others are gathered, and some commonality binding the many together. For students, the key point is that Albert is justifying the transfer of the term from ordinary usage to philosophy: the word is appropriate because the philosophical genus preserves a real likeness to those earlier senses, even though it is now used in a stricter and more exact way.
14. Genus enim sic dictum, principium quoddam est specierum quae sunt sub ipso, non quidem materiale, sed etiam effectivum, ut pater.
Literal Translation:
“For genus thus said, (a) certain principle is of-(the)-species which are under itself, not indeed material, but also effective, as father.”
Translation:
For genus, understood in this way, is a certain principle of the species that are under it, not a material principle, but an effective one, like a father.
Explanation:
St. Albert is continuing the comparison between philosophical genus and the earlier civil or genealogical senses of the word. Philosophical genus is called a principle of the species beneath it because it stands to them as a source from which they are understood, not as matter out of which they are made. That is why he says it is not a material principle but an effective one, like a father. The point is analogical: genus is not literally generating species the way a father generates children, but it does stand above them as a principle from which their ordered intelligibility proceeds. For students, the key idea is that genus is being presented as active and prior in the order of thought and definition, helping to account for the species under it.
15. Pater enim est, ut dicit Aristoteles, qui aliquid sui habet in filio.
Literal Translation:
“For father is, as says Aristotle, who something of-himself has in (the) son.”
Translation:
For a father is, as Aristotle says, one who has something of himself in his son.
Explanation:
St. Albert is strengthening the analogy between fatherhood and philosophical genus. A father is called father because something of him is truly present in the son, and this makes him a genuine principle of the son’s generation. In the same way, genus is being compared to a principle that is really present in the species under it, not merely named from outside. For students, the important point is that Albert is using this Aristotelian idea to explain why genus can be treated as a true principle of species: what is higher is not wholly alien to what is lower, but is present in it in a real and formative way.
16. Id enim quod aliquid sui habet in filio formali effectivo, est totus pater: pater enim totius secundum principium formativum est in semine, ut artifex in artificiato.
Literal Translation:
“For that which has something of-itself in the son formally effecting, is the whole father: for the father of-the-whole according to the formative principle is in the seed, as the artisan in the artifact.”
Translation:
For that which has something of itself in the son as a formal and effective principle is the whole father; for the father, with respect to the formative principle of the whole, is in the seed, just as the artisan is in the thing made.
Explanation:
St. Albert is deepening the analogy between fatherhood and genus. The father is said to be present in the son, not by being physically identical with him, but because the formative and productive principle by which the son is generated comes from the father. In that sense, the whole father is present in the seed as the source of formation, just as an artisan is present in his artifact through the form and skill by which he made it. For students, the key point is that Albert is using this example to clarify how a principle can be truly present in what comes from it without being present as a material part. That helps explain how genus can be present in species as a formal principle.
17. Propter quod etiam Plato opinatur semen esse parvum animal, quod egreditur a generante, et quod est ut parvus pater quantitate, sed totus et integer pater virtute.
Literal Translation:
“On-account-of which also Plato thinks seed to-be a small animal, which goes-out from the generator, and which is as a small father in quantity, but a whole and entire father in power.”
Translation:
Because of this, Plato also thinks that seed is a small living thing which proceeds from the generator, and that it is like a small father in size, but the whole and complete father in power.
Explanation:
St. Albert is continuing the analogy between fatherhood and principle. The point is not chiefly to settle a biological question, but to show how the generating principle can be truly present in what proceeds from it. By reporting Plato’s view, Albert emphasizes that the seed can be thought of as carrying the father’s formative power in a concentrated way: not the father in bodily bulk, but the father’s causal and shaping force. For students, the key idea is that this helps explain the philosophical notion of genus. A higher principle can be present in what comes from it, not as a separate body or material part, but as the power or form through which the lower reality is constituted.
18. Et similiter genus est totum in specie secundum substantiam: a quo etiam producitur differentia formans speciem et constituens in esse formato.
Literal Translation:
“And similarly genus is whole in species according to substance: from which also is-produced difference forming species and constituting (it) in formed being.”
Translation:
And similarly the genus is wholly present in the species according to substance; and from it there also proceeds the difference that forms the species and establishes it in determinate being.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing the philosophical parallel from the earlier example of father and offspring back to logical genus and species. Just as a formative principle can be wholly present in what comes from it, so genus is wholly present in the species according to its essential substance. Yet the species is not merely genus left indeterminate; it becomes a definite species through difference, which shapes and determines the generic nature into a specific mode of being. For students, the key point is that genus contains the essential content in a common way, while difference brings that content to determinate form, so that the species is constituted as this definite kind of thing.
19. Et sic genus est sicut generationis principium, quod in ante habitis principalem dicimus esse generis significationem in civilibus.
Literal Translation:
“And thus genus is as (the) principle of-generation, which in the things had-before principal we-say to-be of-genus signification in civil-(matters).”
Translation:
And thus genus is like a principle of generation, which in the preceding discussion we said is the principal meaning of genus in civil usage.
Explanation:
St. Albert is now explicitly tying the philosophical sense of genus back to the earlier civic or genealogical sense that he had judged most important among those preliminary meanings. In philosophy, genus is not literally a biological source, but it resembles a principle of generation because it stands as the higher source from which the species under it are understood and determined. The comparison helps students see why the same word genus can be used in both settings: in each case there is a principle that is prior, common, and productive of what comes under it.
20. Est autem etiam principium ut locus speciei, in quo fundatur species secundum substantiam: et ex eo determinatur species ad quid et substantiam per se substanlem, et in alio quodam fundatam: sicut res fundatur in loco suae generationis et salvatur.
Literal Translation:
“But it-is also principle as place of-species, in which is-founded species according-to substance: and from it is-determined species to what and substance through itself subsisting, and in another certain (thing) founded: just-as a thing is-founded in (the) place of-its generation and is-preserved.”
Translation:
It is also a principle as the place of the species, in which the species is grounded according to substance. From it the species is determined to what-it-is and to a substance subsisting through itself, yet founded in another in a certain way, just as a thing is grounded and preserved in the place of its generation.
Explanation:
St. Albert is adding another likeness between philosophical genus and the earlier civic sense of genus taken from place. Genus is not only like a generative principle; it is also like a “place” in which the species is founded. The point is not physical location, but intelligible grounding: the species rests in the genus as in that within which its substantial content is first contained and from which it is further determined into its own definite essence. The comparison to a thing being founded and preserved in the place of its generation helps students see that genus functions as a kind of stable ground for species in the order of understanding. The phrase about substance “subsisting through itself, yet founded in another” is somewhat compressed, but the sense is that the species has its own proper substantial determination while still depending on genus as the higher principle in which its essential content is rooted.
21. Propterea differentia non habet loci similitudinem: quia ipsa constitutiva existens fundatur in alio quodam, et magis proprium, et accidens.
Literal Translation:
“On-that-account difference not has of-place similitude: because itself constitutive existing is-founded in another certain (thing), and more proper, and accidental.”
Translation:
For that reason, difference does not have the likeness of a place, because, as constitutive, it is itself founded in something else, something more proper and accidental.
Explanation:
St. Albert is distinguishing genus from difference by returning to the analogy of place. Genus can be compared to a kind of ground or place in which the species is founded, because genus contains the common substantial content on which the species rests. Difference, however, cannot be compared in the same way, because it does not function as that broad ground. Instead, it is a more determinate factor that is added to contract and specify the genus. In that sense it is founded in something else rather than serving as the place in which other things are founded. For students, the main point is that genus is the common underlying principle, while difference is the more precise determination that brings the species to its distinct form.
22. Species autem quid locatum in genere, et non locus solum.
Literal Translation:
“Species however (is) something placed in genus, and not place alone.”
Translation:
Species, however, is something situated in the genus, and not itself merely a place.
Explanation:
St. Albert is continuing the comparison between genus and place. If genus can be likened to a kind of “place” or ground in which the species is founded, then the species is like that which is placed within this ground. But the species is not merely a passive location or empty container; it is a determinate reality established within the genus. For students, the point is that genus provides the common substantial basis, while species is the more definite nature resting within that basis and specifying it further.
23. Genus igitur est ad ipsam se habens ut pater, et ut locus, prout pater et locus generationis sunt principia.
Literal Translation:
“Genus therefore is having-itself to it as father, and as place, insofar-as father and place of-generation are principles.”
Translation:
Genus, therefore, stands in relation to the species as a father and as a place, insofar as father and place of generation are principles.
Explanation:
St. Albert is summing up the two main analogies he has been using to explain philosophical genus. Genus relates to species like a father, because it is a kind of originating principle from which the species is determined; and it relates like a place, because the species is grounded in it as in an underlying intelligible basis. He does not mean that genus is literally a parent or a location, but that it functions analogously to both, insofar as both father and place are principles in generation. For students, the key point is that genus is being presented as both source and ground of the species: it gives the common essential content from which the species proceeds and within which it is established.
24. Habet autem etiam similitudinem ad genus quod in civilibus secundario dicitur quadammodo habentium se ad aliquid, et ad se invicem, in hoc quod genus in eo quod genus est, necessario continet multitudinem quamdam specierum quae sunt sub eo.
Literal Translation:
“But it-has also similitude to genus which in civil-(matters) secondarily is-said of-things having-themselves in-a-certain-way to something, and to themselves mutually, in this that genus in that which genus it-is, necessarily contains a certain multitude of-species which are under it.”
Translation:
It also bears a likeness to genus as that is secondarily spoken of in civil matters, namely of things related in some way to one thing and to one another, inasmuch as genus, precisely as genus, necessarily contains a certain multitude of species that are under it.
Explanation:
St. Albert is now connecting philosophical genus to the secondary civic sense of genus as a collection ordered both to one source and to one another. The comparison works because a logical genus is not directed to just one species, but necessarily embraces a plurality of species beneath it. Those species are related to the one genus above them, and they are also related to one another by sharing that same generic nature. For students, the key point is that genus is not merely a higher label placed over disconnected things; it is a common principle that gathers many species into one ordered whole.
25. Nec potest esse genus unius solius speciei contentivum: eo quod species non exit a genere, nisi per oppositas differentias divisivas: quae (cum eductae fuerint a genere) plures et oppositas constituent species de necessitate.
Literal Translation:
“Nor can there be genus containing of-one sole species: by-this that species not goes-out from genus, unless through opposite differences divisive: which (when they shall-have-been drawn-out from genus) more and opposite will-constitute species of necessity.”
Translation:
Nor can there be a genus that contains only a single species, because a species does not proceed from a genus except through opposed dividing differences; and these, once drawn out from the genus, necessarily constitute several opposed species.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining why genus, in the strict logical sense, must extend to more than one species. A genus is something common and indeterminate, and it becomes specified only through dividing differences. But such differences are opposed to one another, and once they are brought out, they do not yield just one species, but several distinct species. So genus is by nature not the container of only one species, but of a plurality. For students, the key point is that genus implies a real capacity for division into specifically different kinds, which is why it functions as a common principle over many species rather than as a label for only one.
26. Non sic autem se habet species ad individuum.
Literal Translation:
“Not thus however itself has species to individual.”
Translation:
Species, however, does not stand in this way to the individual.
Explanation:
St. Albert is marking an important difference between the relation of genus to species and the relation of species to individual. A genus necessarily extends to several species because it is divided by opposed differences, but a species is not related to individuals in exactly the same formal way. Individuals do fall under a species, yet they arise not by a further specifically divisive contraction like species from genus, but through material and individuating conditions. For students, the key point is that genus-to-species and species-to-individual are not parallel in every respect: the first is a logical division by formal differences, while the second concerns the multiplication of one nature in distinct singulars.
27. Non enim species sui divisione constituit individuum, sed tota est in individuo per substantiam et potestatem: unde materiae determinatione ex accidente individuante individuatur.
Literal Translation:
“For not species by-its division constitutes individual, but whole it-is in individual through substance and power: whence by-determination of-matter from accident individuating it-is-individuated.”
Translation:
For the species does not constitute the individual by dividing itself; rather, it is wholly present in the individual according to substance and power. Hence the individual is individuated by the determination of matter through an individuating accident.
Explanation:
St. Albert is distinguishing the way species relates to individuals from the way genus relates to species. A genus is divided by differences into multiple species, but a species is not divided in that same formal way in order to produce individuals. Instead, the whole species is present in each individual as that individual’s essential nature. What makes this individual to be this individual is not a new specific difference, but the determination of matter together with individuating conditions or accidents. For students, the key point is that species belongs to the essential order, while individuation belongs to the concrete order of singular existence: the same specific nature remains whole in each individual, but it is received in materially distinct subjects.
28. Solum ergo genus ambiens species et multitudinem, continetur in una generis natura.
Literal Translation:
“Only therefore genus embracing species and multitude, is-contained in one nature of-genus.”
Translation:
Therefore only genus, embracing species and a multitude, is contained under one generic nature.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing a conclusion from the distinction he has just made between genus, species, and individual. Species does not divide itself into individuals in the same formal way that genus divides into species; rather, the whole species remains present in each individual. Because of this, genus alone has the character of something that comprehends both a plurality of species and, through them, a multiplicity beneath them, all within one common generic nature. For students, the key point is that genus is uniquely expansive in the logical order: it contains many species under one common nature, and this is why it serves as the broad unifying principle in philosophical classification.
29. Differentia enim cum se habeat ad genus ut divisiva, non est continens, sed separans et in multitudinem agens.
Literal Translation:
“For difference indeed since itself has to genus as divisive, not is containing, but separating and into multitude acting.”
Translation:
For difference, since it is related to genus as something divisive, is not that which contains, but rather that which separates and brings into multiplicity.
Explanation:
St. Albert is distinguishing the role of difference from the role of genus. Genus is what contains many species under one common nature, but difference does the opposite sort of work: it divides that common nature and marks off one species from another. So difference is not a containing principle but a distinguishing one. For students, the key point is that genus gathers many under one, while difference introduces the formal distinctions by which the one common genus is unfolded into a plurality of species.
30. Proprium autem cuius sit consequens speciem, et accidens commune consequens individuum, continentis non potest habere rationem, sed potius sunt contenta in aliis secundum suum esse et rationem.
Literal Translation:
“But property indeed, since it is consequent upon species, and common accident consequent upon individual, of-containing cannot have (the) account, but rather they are contained in others according to their being and account.”
Translation:
A property, however, since it follows upon the species, and a common accident, since it follows upon the individual, cannot have the character of something containing; rather, they are themselves contained in other things according to their being and intelligible account.
Explanation:
St. Albert is concluding the contrast among the predicables. Genus contains; difference divides; but property and common accident do neither. A property follows from the nature of a species, and a common accident belongs at the level of individuals, so neither of them serves as a higher principle under which other things are gathered. Instead, they depend on what is prior to them and are found within those more fundamental realities. For students, the key point is that property and accident do not organize the logical order the way genus does. They come after the essence and presuppose it, rather than containing lower terms under themselves.
31. Cum autem tripliciter in usu loquentium dicatur genus, de tertio est sermo apud Philosophos et in philosophia: quod ut dictum est, fortasse dictum est ad similitudinem aliorum.
“But since threefold in (the) usage of-speakers genus is-said, concerning the third there-is discourse among Philosophers and in philosophy: which as it has-been-said, perhaps it has-been-said to (the) likeness of-the others.”
Translation:
But since genus is spoken of in three ways in ordinary usage, it is the third of these that is under discussion among philosophers and in philosophy; and, as has been said, perhaps it is so called by likeness to the others.
Explanation:
St. Albert is now gathering the earlier distinctions into a clear conclusion. He has shown that the word genus can be used in three ways, and he now says that philosophy is concerned with the third sense, namely the properly logical or philosophical one. At the same time, he reminds the reader that this technical use of the word was probably named by analogy with the earlier civic or genealogical senses. For students, the important point is that philosophical language often takes an ordinary word and refines it for a stricter purpose. The philosophical genus is not simply the same as a family line or a source of descent, but it bears enough likeness to those earlier meanings that the same term can fittingly be transferred to it.
32. Dico autem fortasse, ne videatur aliter dissimile propter duas dissimilitudines in praecedenti capitulo determinatas.
Literal Translation:
“But I-say perhaps, lest it may-seem otherwise dissimilar on-account-of two dissimilarities in the preceding chapter determined.”
Translation:
But I say “perhaps,” lest it seem otherwise dissimilar because of the two dissimilarities established in the preceding chapter.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining why he speaks cautiously when he says that the philosophical sense of genus is named by likeness to the earlier senses. He adds fortasse (“perhaps”) so that he does not seem to ignore the two important differences already pointed out in the previous chapter. In other words, the resemblance is real, but it is not perfect. For students, the key point is that Albert is carefully balancing analogy and distinction: philosophical genus can be compared to the earlier meanings, but only with caution, because there are also definite ways in which it differs from them.
33. Et hoc quidem summatim perstringere possumus, dicendo quod aliter quam in civilibus rursum genus dicitur esse, cui supponitur species, ad horum generum (quae in civilibus dicta sunt) fortasse similitudinem quamdam sic dictum.
Literal Translation:
“And this indeed summarily we-can-touch-upon, by-saying that otherwise than in civil-(matters) again genus is-said to-be, to-which species is-subposed, to these genera (which in civil-(matters) have-been-said) perhaps by a certain similitude thus said.”
Translation:
And we can sum this up briefly by saying that genus is spoken of again in a different way from its use in civil matters, namely as that under which species is subordinated, and that it is perhaps so called because of a certain likeness to those genera spoken of in civil matters.
Explanation:
St. Albert is here giving a compact summary of the whole transition from ordinary to philosophical usage. In civil or common usage, genus referred to lineage, source, or a collected stock descending from one principle. In philosophy, however, genus means the higher universal under which species is directly placed. He still says that this philosophical use is perhaps named by likeness to the civil uses, because in both cases there is a relation of one to many and a kind of common principle uniting what falls under it. For students, the key point is that the philosophical meaning is distinct and stricter, but not unrelated: it grows out of earlier senses by analogy, while still being carefully distinguished from them.
34. Hoc enim genus a civilibus ad philosophiam translatum est.
Literal Translation:
“For this genus from civil-(matters) to philosophy has-been-transferred.”
Translation:
For this term genus has been transferred from civil usage into philosophy.
Explanation:
St. Albert is stating directly that the philosophical use of the word genus is not wholly unrelated to its earlier ordinary or civic use. Rather, the term was carried over from that common sphere into philosophical discourse because the earlier meanings provided a helpful likeness: in both cases there is some one principle or commonality under which many are gathered. For students, the key point is that philosophy often takes a familiar word and gives it a stricter technical sense. The word remains the same, but its meaning is refined so that it can serve precise logical and metaphysical analysis.
35. Est ergo genus principium quoddam specierum huiusmodi, quale Priamus est communis pater, et quale est communis locus, ut explanatum est: et sic habet similitudinem cum intentione principali.
Literal Translation:
“Is therefore genus a certain principle of-species of-this-kind, such-as Priam is common father, and such-as is common place, as it-has-been-explained: and thus it has similitude with the principal intention.”
Translation:
Genus, therefore, is a certain principle of species of this kind, just as Priam is a common father, and just as there is a common place, as has been explained; and thus it has a likeness to the principal intention.
Explanation:
St. Albert is summing up the analogy he has been building between philosophical genus and the earlier civic meanings of the word. Genus in philosophy is a principle of the species under it, and it resembles those earlier cases in which many are unified under one source, such as a common father like Priam or a common place of origin. The point is not that philosophical genus is literally an ancestor or a location, but that it functions analogously as a common principle grounding and containing many inferiors. For students, the key point is that this is why the term genus can be transferred into philosophy: it preserves the core idea of one principle under which many are gathered.
36. Videtur enim genus in una natura communi omnem multitudinem specierum quae sub ipso est continere: et in hoc habet similitudinem cum secundaria generis significatione.
Literal Translation:
“For genus seems in one common nature all multitude of-species which under itself is to-contain: and in this it has similitude with secondary of-genus signification.”
Translation:
For genus seems to contain within one common nature the whole multitude of species that are under it; and in this respect it bears a likeness to the secondary signification of genus.
Explanation:
St. Albert is here drawing together the analogy between philosophical genus and the earlier, broader senses of the word genus. A logical genus gathers many species under one common nature, so that the many are held together in a single higher principle. In that respect, it resembles the secondary civil meaning of genus, where many persons are unified under one source or one common bond. For students, the key point is that philosophical genus is not merely a label placed over many species; it is a real common nature that contains them intelligibly and unites them under one account.
37. Tripliciter ergo cum sic dicatur genus, de tertio modo suae significationis apud Philosophos de genere sermo est.
Literal Translation:
“Threefold therefore since thus genus is-said, concerning the third mode of-its signification among Philosophers about genus discourse is.”
Translation:
Therefore, since genus is spoken of in these three ways, among philosophers the discussion of genus concerns the third mode of its signification.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing the discussion to a clear conclusion. After distinguishing the several ways in which the word genus can be used, he says that philosophy is concerned specifically with the third sense, the properly philosophical or logical one. The earlier senses were useful as preparations and analogies, but the real subject of philosophical inquiry is genus as a higher universal under which species are placed. For students, the key point is that Albert has now finished clearing away the broader meanings of the term and is fixing attention on the strict technical sense that matters for logic and metaphysics.
The sources, goals, method, outline, and direction of this lesson are the work of Mr. William C. Michael, O.P., Headmaster of the Classical Liberal Arts Academy. The written copy has been composed from his materials and instructions with the assistance of artificial intelligence tools, and reviewed and approved by him before publication.
