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1. Sic ergo explicata quaestione, hi qui dicunt in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus posita esse septem pro se fortiores inducunt rationes.
Thus therefore (having) explicated (the) question, these who say in sole, nude, and pure intellects posited to-be seven for themselves stronger induce reasons.
Therefore, the question having been explained in this way, those who maintain that universals exist only in bare and pure intellects now bring forward seven stronger arguments in support of their position.
This sentence serves as a transition into the third chapter of the disputation. Having clarified the terms and structure of the question in the preceding discussion, St. Albert now turns to examine one side of the controversy more systematically—namely, the view that universals exist only in the intellect. The expression in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus emphasizes universals as abstract concepts stripped of all individuating and material conditions, existing formally only as objects of understanding. By saying that these thinkers “bring forward seven stronger arguments,” Albert is signaling the scholastic method of proceeding through the strongest objections and demonstrations before resolving the issue. Thus the chapter begins not with Albert’s own conclusion, but with the formal presentation of the intellectualist position at its strongest.
2. Dicunt enim, quod Boethius et Aristoteles et Avicenna dicunt, quod omne quod separatum in natura est, ideo est quia unum numero est.
They-say for, that Boethius and Aristotle and Avicenna say, that every (thing) which separated in nature is, therefore is because one in-number is.
For they say that Boethius, Aristotle, and Avicenna teach that whatever is separate in nature is separate because it is numerically one.
St. Albert here begins presenting the first argument for the view that universals exist only in the intellect. The argument appeals to authoritative philosophers—Boethius, Aristotle, and Avicenna—who hold that anything existing separately in reality must be numerically one and determinate. A thing that exists outside the mind as a real substance is always this one thing: this man, this horse, this tree. But a universal, precisely as universal, is common to many and predicable of many individuals. Therefore, if something is truly separate in nature—that is, independently existing in reality—it cannot be universal in the strict sense, because real extra-mental existence belongs only to singulars. The argument thus aims to show that universality does not belong to things as they exist outside the mind, but only to the intellect’s conception of them.
3. Universale autem quod est genus et species non unum numero est, eo quod universale est unum in multis, et de multis.
Universal however which is genus and species not one in-number is, by-this that universal is one in many, and of many.
But a universal, which is genus or species, is not numerically one, because a universal is one in many things and predicated of many things.
The argument continues by contrasting the mode of existence proper to singular things with that of universals. Anything existing separately in reality is numerically one—that is, one individual thing. But a genus or species, such as “animal” or “man,” is universal precisely because it is common to many individuals and can be predicated of many subjects. “Man” is said of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle alike. Therefore, a universal cannot be numerically one in the same way that an individual substance is one. The point is that universality involves communicability and commonness, whereas extra-mental existence belongs to singulars alone. Hence the argument aims to prove that universals, formally as universals, do not exist separately in reality but only in the intellect.
4. Quod autem est unum in multis et de multis, separatum non est a multis.
Which however is one in many and of many, separated not is from many.
But what is one in many things and predicated of many things is not separated from the many.
St. Albert is drawing out the implication of the previous argument. A universal is characterized by being “one in many and of many,” meaning that the same common nature is found in many individuals and can be predicated of them all. Because of this, a universal cannot be something existing separately apart from those many individuals, since its very intelligibility as a universal depends upon its relation to them. If it were entirely separate, it would exist as a single independent thing and would no longer function as something common to many. The argument therefore opposes the Platonic notion of separately existing universals and reinforces the Aristotelian view that universals have their foundation in particulars and exist formally as universals only in the intellect.
5. Ergo ipsum separatum non est: non ergo unum numero est.
Therefore itself separated not is: not therefore one in-number is.
Therefore it is not something separate; therefore it is not numerically one.
St. Albert concludes the syllogism by linking the two previous claims together. Whatever exists separately in reality must be numerically one, that is, one singular individual thing. But a universal is common to many and predicable of many, and therefore cannot exist as something separated from those many individuals. Hence the universal is not a separately existing thing, and consequently it does not possess numerical unity in the manner of an individual substance. The conclusion is aimed against the Platonic doctrine of separate Forms and supports the Aristotelian position that universals exist in particulars as common natures, while their universality as such belongs properly to the intellect.
6. Et si unum numero non est, sequitur ipsum non esse.
And if one in-number not it-is, it-follows itself not to-be.
And if it is not numerically one, it follows that it does not exist.
Here St. Albert presents the final and strongest step of the objection he is reporting. The argument assumes the metaphysical principle that whatever truly exists outside the mind must possess numerical unity, since being and unity are convertible: every being is one. Therefore, if a universal is not numerically one—as the previous reasoning claimed—then it would seem to follow that it has no real existence at all. The force of the objection is to push the opponent toward the conclusion that universals cannot exist outside the intellect. Albert is presenting this as an argument for the intellectualist position, not yet as his own final doctrine. The underlying issue is whether universals possess any real existence in things themselves, or whether only singulars truly exist outside the mind while universality belongs solely to intellectual abstraction.
7. Ergo universale separatum non est.
Therefore universal separated not is.
Therefore the universal is not something separate.
This is the conclusion of the entire argument. Since whatever exists separately in reality must be numerically one, and since a universal is common to many and therefore not numerically one in the manner of an individual substance, the universal cannot exist as a separate thing outside particulars. St. Albert is here presenting the Aristotelian critique of Platonic realism: there is no separately existing universal “Man itself” or “Animal itself” apart from individual men and animals. Rather, the common nature exists only in singular things in an individualized mode, while its universality belongs to the intellect, which abstracts the common nature from particular conditions and understands it as one nature shared by many.
8. Si ergo aliquo modo est, non nisi in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus est.
If therefore (in)-some mode it-is, not unless in sole, nude, and pure intellects it-is.
If, therefore, it exists in any way at all, it exists only in bare and pure intellects.
This is the final conclusion of the argument St. Albert is presenting on behalf of those who deny that universals exist separately in reality. Since universals cannot exist outside the mind as numerically one substances, yet still seem to possess some kind of being, their existence must belong only to the intellect. The phrase in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus emphasizes universals as existing in a wholly intellectual mode, stripped of all material and individuating conditions. In reality there are only singular things—this man, this horse, this tree—but the intellect abstracts from those singulars the common nature and conceives it universally. Thus universality belongs formally to thought rather than to extra-mental existence. Albert is still presenting the force of this intellectualist argument before later refining the doctrine into the moderate realism characteristic of the scholastic tradition.
9. In solis quidem, quia in re non est: nudis autem, quia universale denudatum est a phantasmatibus; puris autem, quia non nisi purum intelligentiae lumen est, nulli comparatum materiae sensibili.
In sole indeed, because in thing not it-is: nude however, because universal denudated is from phantasms; pure however, because not unless pure of-intelligence light it-is, to-no (thing) compared of-matter sensible.
Indeed, in intellects alone, because it does not exist in the thing itself; ‘bare,’ moreover, because the universal is stripped of phantasms; and ‘pure,’ because it is nothing other than the pure light of intelligence, related to no sensible matter.
St. Albert is now explaining the three expressions used in the previous sentence: “alone,” “bare,” and “pure.” Universals exist “in intellects alone” because, according to this argument, universality as such is not found in external things themselves, where only singulars exist. They are called “bare” because the intellect abstracts the universal nature from phantasms—that is, from the particular images and sensible conditions tied to individual material things. Finally, universals are called “pure” because, as understood intellectually, they belong to the immaterial activity of intelligence and are no longer connected to sensible matter. The argument therefore describes universality as the result of intellectual abstraction: the intellect removes individuating and material conditions from what is perceived in sense experience and apprehends the common nature in a purely intelligible mode.
10. Secundam adducunt rationem.
(The) second (they)-adduce (as) reason.
They bring forward a second argument.
This brief sentence marks the transition to the next stage of the disputation. St. Albert has finished presenting the first argument for the position that universals exist only in the intellect, and he now introduces the second argument in its proper scholastic order. The phrase reflects the methodical structure of medieval disputation, where multiple arguments are presented successively before objections are answered and the author’s own resolution is given.
11. Dicunt enim quod omne quod separatum a natura est, separatum habens esse extra intelligentiam, hoc aliquid est.
They-say for that every (thing) which separated from nature is, separated having to-be outside intelligence, this something is.
For they say that everything which is separate by nature, having a separate existence outside the intellect, is a particular thing.
St. Albert is presenting the principle underlying the second argument against separately existing universals. Anything that exists outside the intellect as a real and separate being must be hoc aliquid—literally “this something,” that is, a determinate individual substance. Real existence outside the mind always belongs to singular things: this man, this horse, this tree. But a universal is not a hoc aliquid, because it is common to many and predicable of many. Therefore, if something exists separately in reality, it cannot be universal precisely as universal. The argument again aims to show that universality belongs not to things as they exist outside the mind, but to the intellect’s abstract understanding of a common nature.
12. Et hoc quidem dictum est Aristotelis et Avicennae, et probatur per inductionem.
And this indeed said is of-Aristotle and of-Avicenna, and is-proved through induction.
And this, indeed, is a doctrine of Aristotle and Avicenna, and it is proved by induction.
St. Albert appeals again to the authority of Aristotle and Avicenna to support the principle that whatever exists separately in reality is an individual thing. He adds that this claim is confirmed “by induction,” meaning through observation of particular cases. Everything encountered in extra-mental reality appears as a determinate singular: this man, this animal, this stone. We never encounter a universal existing by itself apart from individuals. Thus both philosophical authority and empirical observation support the argument that separate existence belongs only to singular substances, while universality arises through the intellect’s abstraction from those singulars.
13. Sed universale non est hoc aliquid, sed quale quid.
But universal not is this something, but such a what.
But a universal is not a ‘this something,’ but a ‘such-like thing.’
St. Albert is drawing an important Aristotelian distinction between an individual substance and a universal nature. A hoc aliquid (“this something”) is a concrete, determinate individual existing in reality, such as Socrates or this particular horse. A universal, however, is not an individual thing but a quale quid—a “such-like thing,” that is, a nature or kind considered according to what it is, such as humanity or animality. The universal signifies a common form or essence that can belong to many individuals rather than one singular subject. Therefore, since whatever exists separately in reality must be an individual hoc aliquid, the universal cannot exist separately as universal. The argument again supports the conclusion that universality belongs formally to the intellect’s understanding of common natures rather than to extra-mental existence itself.
14. Ergo universale in natura existens non est.
Therefore universal in nature existing not is.
Therefore a universal existing in nature does not exist.
This is the conclusion of the second argument. Since whatever exists separately in reality must be a determinate individual thing (hoc aliquid), and since a universal is not an individual but a common nature predicable of many, it follows that no universal exists in nature as universal. In other words, there is no universal existing outside the mind in the way individual substances exist. St. Albert is still presenting the intellectualist objection according to which universality belongs only to the intellect’s abstract conception, while extra-mental reality contains only singular beings. The argument is directed chiefly against the Platonic notion of universals as separately existing entities.
15. Si ergo est, oportet quod in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus sit.
If therefore it-is, it-is-necessary that in sole, nude, and pure intellects it-be.
If, therefore, it exists, it must exist only in bare and pure intellects.
St. Albert now restates the conclusion reached from the second argument. Since universals cannot exist in nature as separate individual things, yet still possess some kind of intelligible being, their existence must belong to the intellect alone. They exist in “bare” intellects because the intellect abstracts the common nature from all particular sensible conditions and phantasms, and in “pure” intellects because universality belongs to the immaterial act of understanding rather than to material reality itself. Thus the universal exists not as a separate thing outside the mind, but as an intelligible object formed through abstraction from singular beings encountered in experience.
16. Tertiam adducunt rationem.
(The) third (they)-adduce (as) reason.
They bring forward a third argument.
This sentence simply marks the transition to the third argument in the disputation. St. Albert continues the scholastic method of systematically presenting the strongest arguments for the position that universals exist only in the intellect. Each argument develops a different philosophical line of reasoning intended to show that universality cannot belong to things as they exist outside the mind.
17. Si omne quod est secundum esse separatum in natura, particulare et individuum est, ut omnis forma quae est in individuo individua est, sive sit substantialis, sive accidentalis, individuatur enim per materiam quae omnis individuationis principium est et causa.
If every (thing) which is according-to to-be separated in nature, particular and individual is, as every form which is in individual individual is, whether it-be substantial, or accidental, is-individuated for through matter which every of-individuation principle is and cause.
If everything that exists with a separate act of being in nature is particular and individual—as every form existing in an individual is itself individual, whether substantial or accidental, for it is individuated through matter, which is the principle and cause of all individuation—
St. Albert begins the third argument by stating a fundamental Aristotelian principle: whatever exists in extra-mental reality exists as an individual. Every form that exists in a concrete subject becomes individualized by the matter in which it exists. This applies both to substantial forms, such as humanity in a man, and to accidental forms, such as whiteness or height in a subject. Matter is called the “principle and cause of individuation” because it is what makes a common nature exist as this particular instance rather than another. Humanity in Socrates is not universal humanity existing separately, but humanity individuated by Socrates’ designated matter. The argument therefore aims to show that anything existing in nature is necessarily singular and particular, so universality cannot belong to things in their extra-mental mode of existence but only to the intellect that abstracts the common nature from individuating conditions.
18. Universale autem ponitur esse in suo particulari, ut in subiecto et substantia in qua subsistit, et qua sibi substat, ut dicit Aristoteles in Praedicamentis.
Universal however is-posited to-be in its particular, as in subject and substance in which it-subsists, and which to-itself under-stands, as says Aristotle in Categories.
But the universal is posited as existing in its particular, as in a subject and substance in which it subsists and which underlies it, as Aristotle says in the Categories.
St. Albert continues the third argument by emphasizing that a universal does not exist apart from individuals, but only in particular subjects. The universal nature, such as humanity, exists in an individual substance like Socrates as in the subject in which it subsists. The individual substance “underlies” the universal nature because the concrete singular is what actually exists in reality and bears the common nature. Aristotle’s language in the Categories distinguishes between what exists in a subject and what is predicated of a subject, and Albert applies this framework to show that universals have no separate subsistence apart from individual substances. Since the universal exists only in particulars, and particulars individuate whatever exists in them through matter, the universal as existing in reality is always individualized. Its universality therefore belongs not to its extra-mental existence, but to the intellect’s abstraction from particular conditions.
19. Universale ergo si subsistet extra intellectum in suo particulari, particulare est: quod absurdum est, quia particulare nec est in multis, nec de multis est.
Universal therefore if it-will-subsist outside intellect in its particular, particular is: which absurd is, because particular neither is in many, nor of many is.
Therefore, if the universal were to subsist outside the intellect in its particular, it would be particular—which is absurd, because a particular is neither in many things nor predicated of many things.
St. Albert now draws the conclusion of the third argument. If a universal truly existed outside the intellect in a particular subject, then by existing in that individual it would itself become individualized and particularized. But this destroys the very nature of a universal, since a particular exists only as one singular thing and cannot be common to many or predicated of many subjects. Socrates, for example, is not “in many” nor said of many; he is only this one man. Therefore, if the universal subsisted outside the mind in the same way particulars subsist, it would cease to be universal altogether. The argument is intended to show that universality cannot belong to things in their extra-mental existence, but only to the intellect’s apprehension of a common nature abstracted from individuating conditions.
20. Universale autem est in multis et de multis.
Universal however is in many and of many.
But the universal is in many things and predicated of many things.
St. Albert here restates the defining characteristic of a universal. A universal is “in many” because the same common nature is found in many individual subjects, and it is “predicated of many” because it can be truly said of many individuals. Thus “man” is present in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and the term “man” may be predicated of each of them. This commonness and communicability distinguish the universal from a particular, which exists only as one singular thing. The point of the argument is that whatever exists outside the intellect as an individual substance cannot at the same time possess the universality required to be common to many. Therefore universality, formally considered, belongs to the intellect’s mode of understanding rather than to extra-mental existence itself.
21. Quarto ad idem inducunt, quod Aristoteles in prima probat philosophia multipliciter, quod in eodem idem est esse universalis et particularis: quia aliter homo esset duo et non unum.
Fourth to the same (they)-induce, that Aristotle in first philosophy proves manifoldly, that in the same same is to-be of-universal and of-particular: because otherwise man would-be two and not one.
As a fourth argument for the same conclusion, they bring forward the point that Aristotle proves in the First Philosophy in many ways: that in the same thing the being of the universal and the being of the particular are identical, because otherwise man would be two things and not one.
St. Albert now introduces a fourth argument concerning the relation between the universal and the individual in the same subject. The argument appeals to Aristotle’s Metaphysics (“First Philosophy”), where Aristotle insists that a thing must possess a unified act of being and cannot be divided into two separate realities. Thus, in Socrates, the humanity that is understood universally and the humanity existing particularly cannot have two distinct acts of existence, or else Socrates would somehow be composed of two men—one universal and one particular. The same reality that exists individually in Socrates is what the intellect understands universally. The argument therefore denies that there is a separately existing universal alongside the individual thing. Instead, the universal and the particular are the same reality considered under different modes: particular in existence outside the mind, universal in the intellect’s abstraction and predication.
22. Si ergo universale esse habet unum cum esse particularis, hoc esse secundum quod in particulari, est particulare: et particularis esse est non esse de multis et in multis: hic enim homo singularis est, et non in multis et de multis: a destructione consequentis arguitur.
If therefore universal to-be has one with to-be of-particular, this to-be according-to which in particular, is particular: and of-particular to-be is not to-be of many and in many: this for man singular is, and not in many and of many: from destruction of-consequent it-is-argued.
If, therefore, the universal shares one and the same act of being with the particular, then that act of being by which it exists in the particular is itself particular. But the being of a particular is not a being that belongs to many things or exists in many things—for this individual man is singular, and does not exist in many or belong to many. Therefore, the conclusion is disproved by denying the consequent.
St. Albert is arguing that a universal cannot exist in reality in exactly the same way that an individual thing exists. If the universal “man” possessed the very same act of existence as this particular man, then the universal itself would have to exist as singular and non-communicable, just as Socrates exists only as this one individual and not as something shared among many. But the very nature of a universal is that it is common to many and predicable of many individuals. Therefore, the universal cannot have the same mode of being as the particular. Rather, humanity exists in reality only in singular men, where it is individuated and particularized, while its universality arises in the intellect, which abstracts the common nature from individuating conditions and understands it as one nature shared by many. Thus Albert preserves the realist claim that universals are grounded in real natures while denying that universals exist outside the mind as separate common things.
23. Si universale secundum suum esse, in multis et de multis est, universalis esse, non est esse particularis.
If universal according-to its to-be, in many and of many is, of-universal to-be, not is to-be of-particular.
If the universal, according to its mode of being, exists in many things and is predicated of many things, then the being of the universal is not the being of the particular.
St. Albert is distinguishing the mode of existence proper to a universal from the mode of existence proper to an individual thing. A universal, such as “man,” is by nature something common that can exist in many subjects and be predicated of many individuals, whereas a particular exists only as this one singular thing. Therefore, if the universal truly has a mode of being that is communicable to many, its act of existence cannot be identical with the singular existence of a particular individual like Socrates. The point is not that universals are separate entities existing apart from particulars, but that the same nature considered universally by the intellect differs in mode from the individualized existence it has in concrete things. Humanity exists in Socrates only as this individual humanity, while the intellect grasps the same nature as universal and common to many.
24. Est autem esse particularis si extra est.
It-is however to-be of-particular if outside it-is.
But if it exists outside the mind, its existence is that of a particular.
St. Albert means that whatever exists in extra-mental reality exists only as an individual, singular thing. Outside the intellect there is no universal existing as universal; there are only particular beings—this man, this horse, this tree. Thus, if a nature exists “outside” the mind, that is, in the real world, it necessarily possesses particularized existence. Universality belongs not to things as they exist in themselves, but to the intellect’s way of understanding a common nature abstracted from singular individuals. Albert is therefore reinforcing the scholastic doctrine that universals have a foundation in reality but exist as universals formally only in the intellect.
25. Ergo non extra in natura est, sed in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus est: quia aliter universale nullo modo esset: quod valde inconveniens est.
Therefore not outside in nature is, but in sole, nude, and pure intellects is: because otherwise (the) universal in no mode would-be: which greatly inconvenient is.
Therefore it does not exist outside in nature, but exists only in bare and pure intellects; because otherwise the universal would in no way exist at all—which is highly absurd.
St. Albert here states the conclusion drawn from the fourth argument. Since the universal and the particular cannot possess two distinct acts of being in the same thing without destroying the unity of the individual, the universal cannot exist separately outside the mind in nature. Yet the universal cannot simply be denied altogether, since universals are necessary for knowledge, predication, and science. Therefore the universal must exist in another mode: namely, in the intellect, where the mind abstracts the common nature from individuating conditions and conceives it universally. The phrases “bare and pure intellects” again emphasize that universality belongs to the intellect insofar as it strips away material and singular conditions from what is known through sense experience. The alternative—that universals do not exist in any way at all—is rejected as philosophically untenable.
26. An vero universale sit nunquam aliquis dubitavit.
But whether (the) universal may-be never anyone doubted.
But no one has ever doubted that the universal exists.
St. Albert concludes the line of reasoning by affirming that the existence of universals themselves is undeniable. The real question is not whether universals exist at all, but how they exist. Human knowledge, language, definition, and science all depend upon universals, since we truly predicate common natures such as “man,” “animal,” or “triangle” of many individuals. Thus no philosopher seriously denies the existence of universals in some sense. The dispute concerns their mode of existence: whether they exist separately in reality, only in the intellect, or in some intermediate way. Albert has been presenting the arguments of those who maintain that universals exist formally only in the intellect, though grounded in the natures of individual things.
27. Et ideo Antiqui non quaerebant an universale sit, vel non sit, sed quaerebant an universale extra intellectum separatum in natura sit, an in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus positum sit et fundatum; eo quia extra intellectum sit in rerum natura.
And therefore (the) Ancients not were-seeking whether (the) universal may-be, or may-not-be, but were-seeking whether (the) universal outside intellect separated in nature may-be, whether in sole, nude, and pure intellects placed may-be and founded; by-this because outside intellect may-be in (the) nature of-things.
And therefore the ancients did not ask whether the universal exists or does not exist, but rather whether the universal exists outside the intellect as something separated in nature, or whether it is placed and founded only in bare and pure intellects, even though it exists outside the intellect in the nature of things.
St. Albert clarifies the true point at issue in the controversy over universals. The ancient philosophers did not dispute whether universals exist in some sense, since universals are necessary for knowledge, science, and predication. The real question was how universals exist. One possibility was that universals exist separately outside the mind as independent realities, as in the Platonic doctrine of Forms. The other was that universals exist formally only in the intellect, which abstracts common natures from sensible things. Yet Albert adds an important qualification: the universal has a foundation in reality because the common nature exists outside the intellect in individual things. Thus humanity exists really in Socrates and Plato, though not as a universal outside the mind. Universality itself belongs to the intellect, but it is grounded in the real natures of things. This points toward the moderate realism that Albert ultimately defends.
28. Quinto opponunt dicentes quae Avicenna dixit et Algazel, quod universale quod est genus vel species, si extra intellectum est, aut coepit esse, aut non coepit esse.
Fifthly they oppose saying which (things) Avicenna said and Algazel, that (the) universal which is genus or species, if outside intellect is, either began to-be, or not began to-be.
As a fifth objection, they bring forward what Avicenna and Algazel said: that a universal which is a genus or species, if it exists outside the intellect, either began to exist or did not begin to exist.
St. Albert now introduces a fifth argument against the extra-mental existence of universals. The argument, drawn from Avicenna and Algazel, proceeds by dividing the possibilities concerning a universal existing outside the mind. If such a universal exists in reality, then either it came into being at some point or it has always existed eternally. The subsequent argument will examine both alternatives and attempt to show that each leads to difficulties. The underlying aim is again to deny that universals, considered as universals, possess independent existence outside the intellect. Instead, the disputants intend to show that universality belongs properly to intellectual abstraction, even though the common nature itself is grounded in real things.
29. Si dicatur quod non coepit esse, sequitur quod aeternum sit: quod esse non potest, cum causam habeat intelligentiae lumen quod facit et dat omnes formas.
Si dicatur quod non coepit esse, sequitur quod aeternum sit: quod esse non potest, cum causam habeat intelligentiae lumen quod facit et dat omnes formas.
If it is said that it did not begin to exist, it follows that it is eternal—which cannot be, since it has as its cause the light of intelligence, which produces and gives all forms.
St. Albert presents the first horn of the dilemma introduced in the previous argument. If a universal existing outside the intellect did not begin to exist, then it would have to be eternal. But this is impossible, according to the argument, because universals depend upon the activity of intellect. The “light of intelligence” refers to the intellectual power by which forms are abstracted and made actually intelligible. Since universality arises through intellectual operation, it cannot exist eternally and independently outside the mind as a self-subsisting reality. The argument therefore denies that universals possess eternal separate existence in the Platonic sense and instead treats universality as dependent upon the intellect’s apprehension of forms derived from sensible things.
30. Si autem coepit esse, aut coepit esse a seipso, aut ab alio.
But if it-began to-be, either it-began to-be from itself, or from another.
But if it began to exist, then it either began to exist from itself or from another.
St. Albert now turns to the second possibility in the dilemma. If the universal is not eternal but began to exist, then there must be some cause of its existence. Either it caused itself to exist, or it was caused by something else. The argument proceeds according to classical metaphysical principles concerning causality: whatever begins to exist must have a sufficient cause. The next steps of the objection will examine these alternatives in order to show that neither can explain a separately existing universal. The overall aim remains to deny that universals possess independent extra-mental existence and to locate universality instead in the operation of intellect.
31. Non autem coepit esse a seipso: quia nihil incipit a se, cum Plato dicat quod nihil est cuius ortum legitima causa non praecesserit.
Not however it-began to-be from itself: because nothing begins from itself, since Plato may-say that nothing is whose arising legitimate cause not may-have-preceded.
But it did not begin to exist from itself, because nothing begins from itself, since Plato says that there is nothing whose coming-to-be is not preceded by a proper cause.
St. Albert rejects the possibility that a universal could bring itself into existence. Nothing can be the cause of its own coming-to-be, because a thing would have to exist before it exists in order to cause itself, which is impossible. To support this principle, he appeals to Plato’s teaching that everything which comes into being must be preceded by an appropriate or legitimate cause. Thus, if a universal began to exist, it cannot have originated from itself. The argument continues narrowing the possibilities in order to show that a universal cannot exist outside the intellect as an independently subsisting reality. The broader purpose remains to establish that universality depends upon intellectual activity rather than possessing separate extra-mental existence.
32. Si autem ab alio coepit, per actum agentis coepit.
But if from another it-began, through act of-agent it-began.
But if it began from another, it began through the act of an agent.
St. Albert continues the causal analysis of the universal’s supposed extra-mental existence. If the universal did not arise from itself, then it must have been brought into being by some external cause acting upon it. Whatever begins to exist through another does so by the operation or activity of an agent. The argument is preparing to ask what kind of agent could produce a universal outside the intellect. Since every agent acts according to some determinate mode and produces something proportioned to its operation, the subsequent reasoning will attempt to show that no agent could produce a universal as universal in extra-mental reality. The broader aim remains to deny separate existence to universals and to locate universality formally in intellectual abstraction.
33. Nihil autem fit per actum agentis, nisi particulare et individuum: quia omnis actus circa particularia est.
Nothing however becomes through act of-agent, unless particular and individual: because every act around particulars is.
But nothing comes to be through the act of an agent except something particular and individual, because every action is concerned with particulars.
St. Albert now states the crucial metaphysical principle driving the argument. Every real act of causation produces an individual effect, not a universal as such. An agent always acts upon and brings forth something determinate and singular: this man, this tree, this motion, this quality. Action occurs within the realm of concrete particulars, because existence outside the mind is always individuated. Therefore, if a universal supposedly came into being through the action of an agent, it would necessarily become a particular individual rather than remain universal. The argument is meant to show that universality cannot be produced or exist in extra-mental reality as universality, but belongs instead to the intellect’s abstraction from singular things.
34. Ergo universale particulare et individuum est.
Therefore (the) universal particular and individual is.
Therefore the universal is particular and individual.
This is the reductio conclusion of the argument. If every action produces only particular and individual effects, and if the universal were brought into existence through some agent, then the universal itself would necessarily become particular and individual. But this is contradictory, since a universal is defined precisely by being common to many and predicable of many. The conclusion is therefore absurd, and the argument is intended to show that the universal cannot exist outside the intellect as a separately produced thing. Rather, universality belongs formally to the intellect, which abstracts the common nature from the particular individuals produced in reality.
35. Destruamus ergo consequens, dicentes quod universale particulare et individuum non est, sicut iam superius probatum est: ergo universale non coepit esse, nec in aeternum est.
Let-us-destroy therefore (the) consequent, saying that (the) universal particular and individual not is, just-as already above proved is: therefore (the) universal not began to-be, nor in eternity is.
Let us therefore deny the consequent, by saying that the universal is not particular and individual, as has already been proved above; therefore the universal neither began to exist nor exists eternally.
St. Albert is here using a reductio argument. The previous reasoning had led to the absurd conclusion that the universal would have to be particular and individual if it existed outside the intellect. Since that conclusion contradicts the very nature of a universal, it must be rejected. By “destroying the consequent,” Albert means denying the unacceptable conclusion reached by the opposing argument. Once it is denied that the universal can be particular and individual, it follows that the universal cannot be treated as a thing existing in nature in the same way singular substances exist. Consequently, the earlier dilemma also collapses: the universal neither began to exist as an extra-mental thing nor exists eternally as a separate reality. Instead, the argument pushes toward the conclusion that universality belongs to the intellect’s mode of understanding rather than to a separately existing thing in nature.
36. Ergo universale non est in natura, sed in intellectu est.
Therefore (the) universal not is in nature, but in intellect is.
Therefore the universal does not exist in nature, but exists in the intellect.
This is the formal conclusion of the series of arguments St. Albert has been presenting on behalf of those who hold that universals exist only intellectually. Since whatever exists outside the mind exists as a singular individual, and since universals are common to many and predicable of many, universality cannot belong to things as they exist in nature. Rather, the universal exists in the intellect, which abstracts the common nature from individuating and material conditions found in singular things. Yet this does not mean that universals are mere fictions or empty names. The intellect forms universal concepts because real common natures exist in individual things, though outside the mind those natures exist only in a particularized mode. Thus the universal exists formally in the intellect but is founded upon reality.
37. Sextum quod in assertionem suae inducunt opinionis, est, quod in arte (quae naturam imitatur) duo esse videntur in forma artis.
Sixth which into assertion of-their opinion they-induce, is, that in art (which nature imitates) two to-be are-seen in form of-art.
The sixth argument which they bring forward in support of their opinion is that, in art—which imitates nature—there appear to be two modes of being in an artistic form.
St. Albert now introduces a sixth argument for the view that universals exist formally only in the intellect. The argument proceeds by analogy with art, since art imitates the operations of nature. In an artistic product there seem to be two modes of existence for the form: first, the form exists in the mind of the artist as an intelligible conception or plan; second, it exists in the produced object as realized in matter. For example, the form of a house exists first in the architect’s intellect and then in the constructed house. The argument will likely use this distinction to illuminate the status of universals: the universal exists intellectually as universal, while in external reality the corresponding nature exists only in particularized individuals. Thus the universality belongs to the intellectual mode of the form rather than to its material existence in singular things.
38. Si enim consideretur secundum quod in artifice est, communis est ad omnia quae sunt eiusdem generis et speciei, quia in artifice est per modum artificis.
For if it-may-be-considered according-to which in artificer it is, common it is to all (things) which are of-the-same genus and species, because in artificer it is through mode of-artificer.
For if it is considered according to the way it exists in the craftsman, it is common to all things that are of the same genus and species, because it exists in the craftsman according to the mode of the craftsman.
St. Albert is explaining the first of the two modes of being found in an artistic form. A form existing in the mind of the craftsman exists universally and commonly, because the artisan conceives one intelligible plan that can be applied to many individual products. For example, the architect possesses in his intellect one form of a house that can guide the construction of many houses of the same kind. The form is therefore common and universal insofar as it exists intellectually according to the mode of understanding. The argument uses this analogy to illuminate universals generally: universality belongs to the intellect, where one conception can apply to many individuals, whereas in external reality the form exists only in singular, particularized things.
39. Et sicut unus est artifex valens producere multa artificiata: ita forma in artifice commune exemplar est ad omnia in quibus illa forma potest exemplificari.
And just-as one is (an) artificer powerful to-produce many artificiates: so form in artificer common exemplar is to all (things) in which that form can to-be-exemplified.
And just as one craftsman is able to produce many artifacts, so the form in the craftsman is a common exemplar for all the things in which that form can be exemplified.
St. Albert continues the analogy between artistic production and universals. A single craftsman can produce many individual objects because he possesses within his intellect one common form or plan that serves as the model for all of them. The form existing in the artisan’s mind is therefore universal in the sense that it can be realized in many distinct products. For example, one architectural design may be instantiated in many houses. The form as intellectually conceived is one and common, while the actual products are many and individual. Albert uses this analogy to support the view that universality belongs properly to the intellect: the universal exists as a common exemplar in thought, whereas in external reality it appears only in particularized instances.
40. Quando autem extra artem artificis est in materia artificiata, particulata est, et nulla potest esse communis, nec aliquam habet aptitudinem ad hoc quod in alio et de alio sit.
But when outside (the) art of-artificer it is in artificiated matter, particularized it is, and none can to-be common, nor any it-has aptitude unto this that in another and of another it-may-be.
But when it exists outside the art of the craftsman in the produced matter, it is particularized, and it cannot be common, nor does it have any aptitude for existing in another thing or being predicated of another.
St. Albert now explains the second mode of being of the artistic form. While the form in the mind of the craftsman is universal and common, once that form is realized in material production it becomes particularized. The design of a house in the architect’s intellect may apply to many houses, but this actual house built from that design is only this one individual structure. As embodied in matter, the form loses the universality it possessed intellectually and exists only as a singular thing. It can no longer be “in another” or “predicated of another,” because those are characteristics proper to universals. Albert uses this analogy to support the broader scholastic doctrine that universality belongs formally to the intellect, while forms existing in material reality are always individualized and particular.
41. Similiter autem in formis naturalibus esse videtur.
Similarly however in natural forms to-be is-seen.
And the same seems to be true, moreover, in natural forms.
St. Albert now applies the analogy drawn from art to the realm of nature itself. Just as an artistic form exists universally in the mind of the craftsman but individually in the produced object, so too natural forms appear to have a twofold mode of being. A natural form, such as humanity, exists universally in the intellect, where it is understood as common to many, but in external reality it exists only in particularized individuals such as Socrates or Plato. The comparison strengthens the argument that universality belongs formally to intellectual apprehension, whereas forms existing in nature are always individuated by matter and therefore singular.
42. In his enim intelligentia est ut artifex, et forma naturalis est forma in rebus, sicut forma artis in materia artificiati.
For in these indeed intelligence is as artificer, and natural form is form in things, just-as form of-art in matter of-artificiate.
For in these cases the intellect is like the craftsman, and the natural form is a form in things, just as the artistic form is in the matter of the artifact.
St. Albert completes the analogy between art and nature by identifying the role of the intellect with that of the craftsman. Just as the craftsman possesses an intelligible form that is later realized in material artifacts, so the intellect apprehends natural forms universally, while those same forms exist in reality only in individual things. The natural form—such as humanity—exists in concrete beings as individualized by matter, just as the form of a statue exists in bronze or marble. The intellect, however, considers the form apart from individuating conditions and thus understands it universally. The comparison reinforces the scholastic doctrine that universality belongs formally to the intellect, while the corresponding forms in external reality exist only as particularized instances in singular things.
43. Videtur ergo, quod si universale commune est et aptum natura esse in multis, quod hoc non habeat, nisi secundum quod est in intelligentia quae communis artifex est.
It-is-seen therefore, that if (the) universal common is and apt by-nature to-be in many, that this not it-may-have, unless according-to which it is in intelligence which common artificer is.
It seems, therefore, that if the universal is common and naturally suited to exist in many things, it possesses this only insofar as it exists in the intellect, which is the common craftsman.
St. Albert now states the conclusion drawn from the analogy between art and nature. A universal is characterized by commonness and by its aptitude to exist in many subjects, but this universality does not belong to the form as it exists in external things. In reality, forms exist only as individualized in matter. The universal possesses its common and communicable character only insofar as it exists in the intellect, just as the artistic form is common in the mind of the craftsman before being realized in singular artifacts. The intellect is called the “common craftsman” because it forms universal concepts that can apply to many individuals. Thus universality belongs formally to intellectual apprehension, while extra-mental existence belongs to singulars alone.
44. Universale ergo ut universale est, non est nisi quod in solis, nudis, purisque intellectibus est.
(The) universal therefore as universal is, not is except which in sole, nude, and pure intellects is.
Therefore the universal, insofar as it is universal, exists only in bare and pure intellects.
This is the conclusion of the sixth argument. St. Albert’s opponents maintain that universality as such belongs only to the intellect. In external reality, forms exist only as individualized in singular things, just as the form of an artifact exists individually in the finished product. But in the intellect, the form is abstracted from material and individuating conditions and thus becomes common and predicable of many. The intellect is called “bare and pure” because it considers the form apart from phantasms and sensible matter. Thus the universal exists formally as universal only in intellectual apprehension, even though the nature grasped universally has a real foundation in individual things outside the mind.
45. Septimo etiam per hoc confirmant hoc quod dicunt, quod in libro de Causis multipliciter probatum est, quod res in causa non est, nisi per modum et virtutem effecti per causam.
Seventhly also through this they-confirm this which they-say, that in (the) book concerning Causes manifoldly proved is, that thing in cause not is, except through mode and virtue of-effected through cause.
As a seventh argument, they also confirm what they say through this principle, which is proved in many ways in the Book of Causes: that a thing exists in its cause only according to the mode and power of the thing caused by the cause.
St. Albert now introduces a seventh argument grounded in the metaphysical principles of the Liber de Causis. The principle stated is that an effect exists in its cause not in exactly the same mode in which it exists in itself, but according to the mode and power proper to the cause. For example, an artifact exists in the mind of the craftsman intellectually and universally before it exists materially and individually in the finished product. The argument will apply this causal principle to universals: if universals exist in the intellect as caused intelligible forms, then they exist there according to the mode of intellect, which is immaterial and universal. Outside the intellect, however, forms exist according to the mode of material reality, namely as particularized individuals. Thus universality belongs to the intellectual mode of being rather than to things as they exist in nature.
46. In effectu autem causa non est, nisi per formam quam in effectum causa producit: quia omne quod de potentia producitur ad effectum, non producit nisi per id quod est in effectu tam in univocis accidentibus, quam in aequivocis: quia aequivoca ad univoca reduci necesse est.
In effect however cause not is, except through form which into effect cause produces: because every (thing) which from potency is-produced unto effect, not produces except through that which is in effect as-much in univocal accidents, as in equivocal-(things): because equivocal-(things) unto univocal-(things) to-be-reduced necessary is.
But in the effect the cause exists only through the form which the cause produces in the effect; because everything that is brought forth from potency into actuality produces only through that which is in the effect, both in univocal and in equivocal causes, since equivocal causes must ultimately be reduced to univocal ones.
St. Albert is elaborating the causal principle introduced in the previous sentence. A cause is present in its effect only through the form communicated to the effect. Whatever brings something from potency to actuality does so by producing a determinate form in the thing produced. This applies both to univocal causes, where the cause and effect share the same form—such as a man generating a man—and to equivocal causes, where the form exists in a higher or different mode in the cause—such as the sun causing life or heat. Yet even equivocal causation must ultimately be understood through reference to univocal causation, because the effect must receive some determinate likeness of the cause. The argument is preparing to show that whatever exists in effects outside the mind exists only in individualized form. Therefore, if universality belongs to the cause intellectually, it does not follow that the effect itself possesses universal existence in reality. Universality remains proper to the intellect’s mode of apprehension, while the effect in nature exists as singular and particular.
47. Forma igitur primae intelligentiae agentis in hoc quod effectus est, non est id nisi per conditionem et virtutem effectus.
Form therefore of-first intelligence of-agent in this that effect it is, not is that except through condition and virtue of-effect.
Therefore the form of the first acting intelligence, insofar as it exists in the effect, is not there except according to the condition and power of the effect.
St. Albert applies the causal principle directly to the relation between intellect and created things. The “first acting intelligence” refers to the higher intellectual cause from which forms proceed. When a form exists in an effect, it does not exist there in the same mode in which it exists in the intelligence that causes it, but according to the condition and capacity of the effect receiving it. Thus a form existing intellectually and universally in the cause becomes particularized and limited when received in material things. Humanity in the divine or intellectual source may be understood universally, but in Socrates it exists only as this individual humanity. The argument therefore supports the claim that universality belongs properly to intellect, whereas forms existing in nature are always conditioned by the particular mode of the subjects in which they are received.
48. Effectus autem individuus et singularis est.
Effect however individual and singular is.
But the effect is individual and singular.
St. Albert now states the decisive premise of the seventh argument. Whatever exists as an effect in extra-mental reality exists as a singular individual. Effects are always concrete and determinate: this man, this tree, this stone. Even if the form exists universally in the intellect of the cause, once it is received in an effect it exists according to the mode of the recipient, namely as individualized and singular. Therefore, universality cannot belong to things as they exist in nature, since every real effect is particularized. The argument again aims to show that universality belongs formally to the intellect, while extra-mental existence belongs only to singulars.
49. Ergo forma, sive substantialis, sive accidentalis, in effectu procedens ab intelligentia, individua est et singularis.
Therefore every form, whether substantial or accidental, as it proceeds into an effect from intelligence, is individual and singular.
Therefore form, whether substantial, whether accidental, in effect proceeding from intelligence, individual is and singular.
St. Albert now draws the conclusion from the causal principle he has been developing. Even if forms exist universally in intelligence as causes or exemplars, once they proceed into actual effects they exist only according to the mode of the effect receiving them. Since every effect in nature is singular and individual, every form existing in that effect—whether a substantial form such as humanity or an accidental form such as whiteness—must likewise be individualized and singular. Thus no form existing in nature possesses universality as such. Universality belongs only to the intellect, which apprehends forms apart from individuating conditions and conceives them as common to many.
50. Universale autem nec individuum, nec singulare est.
(The) universal however neither individual, nor singular is.
But the universal is neither individual nor singular.
St. Albert states the essential contrast upon which the entire argument depends. A universal, precisely as universal, is common to many and predicable of many; therefore it cannot be an individual or singular thing. Individuality belongs to what exists as this determinate being, such as Socrates or this particular tree, whereas universality belongs to what can be understood and affirmed of many individuals at once. Since every form existing in nature is individualized in its effect, it follows that universality cannot belong to forms as they exist outside the intellect. Rather, universality belongs to the intellect’s mode of understanding the common nature abstracted from singular things.
51. Universale ergo in effectu naturae extra intelligentiam procedens non est; in solis ergo et nudis, purisque intellectibus positum est.
(The) universal therefore in effect of-nature outside intelligence proceeding not is; in sole therefore and nude, and pure intellects placed is.
Therefore the universal does not proceed in the effect of nature outside the intellect; therefore it is situated only in bare and pure intellects.
This is the conclusion of the seventh argument. Since every effect existing in nature is singular and individual, and since every form received in such an effect is likewise individualized, the universal as universal cannot exist in the natural effect outside the intellect. Universality belongs only to the intellect, which abstracts forms from their individuating material conditions and conceives them as common to many. Thus the universal is said to exist only in “bare and pure intellects,” that is, in intellects considering forms apart from sensible matter and singularity. The argument once again denies separate universal existence in nature while affirming that universality belongs formally to intellectual apprehension.
52. Haec sunt quae ut fortiora inducunt, qui universalia in solo intellectu posita esse concedunt.
These are (the things) which as stronger they-induce, who universals in sole intellect placed to-be concede.
These are the stronger arguments brought forward by those who hold that universals exist only in the intellect.
St. Albert concludes this section by summarizing the position he has been presenting. The preceding arguments were the principal and strongest reasons advanced by philosophers who maintained that universals exist formally only in the intellect and not as separate realities in nature. Their central claim has been that everything existing outside the mind exists as singular and individual, whereas universality consists precisely in being common to many and predicable of many. Therefore universality, as such, belongs to intellectual abstraction rather than to extra-mental existence. At this stage Albert is still presenting and organizing the objections in a scholastic manner before offering his own resolution, which will preserve both the reality of common natures in things and the formal universality of concepts in the intellect.
53. Et ideo dicunt Aristotelem dixisse, quod universale est, dum intelligitur; singulare autem est, dum extra sentitur.
And therefore they-say Aristotle to-have-said, that (the) universal is, while it-is-understood; singular however is, while outside it-is-sensed.
And therefore they say that Aristotle taught that the universal exists insofar as it is understood, whereas the singular exists insofar as it is sensed outside the mind.
St. Albert here summarizes the intellectualist interpretation of Aristotle that has guided the preceding arguments. The universal exists as universal only in the act of understanding, because universality belongs to the intellect’s abstraction from individuating conditions. The singular, by contrast, exists outside the mind in sensible reality and is known through sense perception. Thus intellect and sense correspond to two different modes of being and knowing: sense apprehends singulars as they exist materially and individually, while intellect apprehends the common nature universally. The statement does not deny reality to singular things, nor does it reduce universals to mere words; rather, it distinguishes the universal mode of intelligibility from the singular mode of extra-mental existence.
54. Econtra autem illi qui universalia dicunt esse res extra intellectum existentes per se, fortiora inducunt septem, quibus maxime innituntur.
On-the-contrary however those who universals say to-be things outside intellect existing through themselves, stronger-(things) they-induce seven, upon-which most they-lean.
On the contrary, however, those who say that universals are things existing through themselves outside the intellect bring forward seven stronger arguments upon which they chiefly rely.
St. Albert now turns to the opposing side of the controversy. Up to this point he has presented the strongest arguments of those who maintain that universals exist formally only in the intellect. He now introduces the contrary position—namely, the realist view that universals possess some kind of existence outside the mind and are not merely intellectual conceptions. The phrase per se existentes suggests universals existing in their own right apart from intellectual abstraction, a position associated especially with stronger forms of realism influenced by Plato. As before, Albert follows the scholastic method by first presenting the strongest arguments of the opposing side before later resolving the question through distinction and synthesis.
55. Quorum primum est, quod hic homo non est nisi a simpliciter homine: et eadem ratione alius homo non est nisi a simpliciter homine, et sic de omnibus aliis.
Of-which (the) first is, that this man not is except from simply man: and by-the-same reason another man not is except from simply man, and thus concerning all others.
The first of these is that this man exists only by participation in man simply considered; and by the same reasoning another man also exists only by participation in man simply considered, and likewise with all others.
St. Albert now begins presenting the arguments of the stronger realist position, which maintains that universals possess some kind of real existence outside the intellect. The argument starts from the observation that individual men are recognized as men because they participate in or derive from a common nature called “man simply considered” (homo simpliciter). Socrates is a man not merely by being this individual, but because he possesses humanity; likewise Plato and every other man possess the same nature. The argument suggests that the common nature cannot be reduced entirely to intellectual abstraction, since it appears to ground the reality and intelligibility of all individual instances. Thus the realist contends that there must be some real foundation of universality existing outside the mind, common to the many individuals that participate in it.
56. Non autem potest homo esse, nisi ab eo quod est secundum rem in natura extra intellectum existens simpliciter.
Man however cannot to-be, except from that which is according-to thing in nature outside intellect existing simply.
But man cannot exist except from that which exists simply and really in nature outside the intellect.
St. Albert continues the realist argument by insisting that individual men must derive their humanity from something that truly exists in reality and not merely in thought. If Socrates and Plato are genuinely men, there must be a real basis for their common humanity existing outside the intellect. The phrase secundum rem emphasizes existence “according to reality” and not merely according to conceptual understanding. Thus the argument maintains that “man simply considered” cannot be only an intellectual abstraction, since abstractions alone cannot account for the real nature shared by many individuals. The realist therefore argues that some common nature must exist in things themselves outside the mind, grounding the unity and intelligibility of all individual men.
57. Propter quod dicitur homo dignissima creaturarum.
On-account-of which man most-dignified of-creatures is-said.
For this reason man is said to be the most noble of creatures.
St. Albert adds this remark to reinforce the realist claim that humanity signifies a real nature existing in things and not merely a conceptual abstraction. Man is called the most noble of creatures because humanity denotes a genuine perfection found in reality outside the mind. The dignity attributed to man would lose its objective foundation if “man” were only a mental construct without any real basis in nature. Thus the argument suggests that universal natures such as humanity must correspond to something real and objective in creatures themselves, even if their universality as universal is grasped by the intellect.
58. Si enim hoc conveniret huic homini secundum quod hic homo, non conveniret alii.
For if this might-belong-to this man according-to which this man, not it-might-belong-to another.
For if this belonged to this man insofar as he is this particular man, it would not belong to another.
St. Albert continues the realist argument by distinguishing what belongs to a thing as an individual from what belongs to it according to a common nature. If the dignity or humanity of Socrates belonged to him merely insofar as he is this singular individual, then it could not also belong to Plato or any other man. But humanity is common to many individuals, and the predicates belonging to man as man apply universally to all men. Therefore, the argument concludes that there must be something more than mere individuality grounding these common attributes—namely, a common nature shared among individuals. This is intended to show that universality cannot be reduced entirely to intellectual abstraction, since the common nature appears to have a real foundation in things themselves.
59. Similiter quod homo est rationalis, non convenit huic secundum quod hic: quia tunc alii non conveniret.
Similarly that man is rational, not it-belongs-to this-(one) according-to which this-(one): because then to-another not it-might-belong.
Likewise, that man is rational does not belong to this individual insofar as he is this individual, because then it would not belong to another.
St. Albert continues the realist line of reasoning by applying the same principle to the defining property of man, namely rationality. Socrates is rational not merely because he is this singular individual, but because he possesses the common nature of humanity. If rationality belonged to him only insofar as he is this particular man, then rationality could not also belong to Plato or to any other human being. Yet rationality is universally predicated of all men. Therefore, the argument concludes that there must be a common nature shared among individuals which grounds these universal predicates. The point is to show that what is universally true of men cannot be explained solely by their individuality, but must arise from a real common essence existing in things themselves.
60. Ergo convenit secundum quod homo.
Therefore it-belongs according-to which man.
Therefore it belongs to him insofar as he is man.
St. Albert now states the conclusion of the argument. Rationality belongs to Socrates not because he is this particular individual, but because he possesses the nature of man. What is predicated universally of all men must belong to them according to their common humanity rather than according to their individuating conditions. The argument is intended to establish that there is a real common nature shared among individuals, since universal predicates such as “rational” are grounded in what men are essentially. Thus the realist position maintains that universality is not merely a subjective construct of the intellect, but is founded upon a real essence existing in things themselves.
61. Ergo homo secundum quod homo, et non hic homo, est aliquid in natura praeter intellectum existens.
62. Eadem ratio est de animali secundum quod animal.
The same reason is concerning animal according-to which animal.
The same reasoning applies to animal insofar as it is animal.
St. Albert extends the previous argument from the species “man” to the more universal genus “animal.” Just as rationality belongs to Socrates insofar as he is man, so the properties belonging to animals belong to individual creatures insofar as they possess the nature of animality. What is universally predicated of animals cannot arise merely from the individuality of this horse, this dog, or this man, but from the common nature shared among them. The argument is meant to show that universal predicates are grounded in real common essences and not merely in the intellect’s arbitrary grouping of singulars.
63. Secundum est, quod sicut dicit Aristoteles, eadem sunt quibus res est, et quibus cognoscitur et scitur.
(The) second is, that just-as says Aristotle, the-same-(things) are by-which thing is, and by-which it-is-cognized and it-is-known.
The second argument is that, as Aristotle says, the same things are that by which a thing exists and that by which it is known and understood.
St. Albert now presents the second argument for the realist position. The principle attributed to Aristotle is that knowledge corresponds to being: a thing is known through the very form or nature by which it is what it is. Thus the intellect does not merely invent universals, but knows things through their real essences. If man is known as rational, it is because rational humanity truly constitutes what man is in reality. Therefore the universal nature by which a thing is understood must have some real foundation outside the mind, since cognition depends upon the actual being of the thing known. The argument aims to show that universals cannot be mere mental fabrications, because scientific knowledge would otherwise lack objective grounding in reality itself.
64. Non est autem scientia nisi de universali et per universale.
Not is however science except concerning universal and through universal.
But scientific knowledge exists only concerning the universal and through the universal.
St. Albert continues the realist argument by appealing to the nature of science itself. Scientific knowledge does not concern merely isolated singulars as such, but universal truths and causes. We do not have science of Socrates simply as this individual man, but of man as man, of animal as animal, and of the universal principles belonging to such natures. Moreover, science proceeds “through the universal,” because demonstrations, definitions, and necessary conclusions all depend upon common natures that apply universally. The argument therefore maintains that universals must have some real foundation in things themselves; otherwise scientific knowledge would lack objective necessity and would be reduced to subjective mental constructions.
65. Ergo res non est, nisi per id quod universale est.
Therefore thing not is, except through that which universal is.
Therefore a thing exists only through that which is universal.
St. Albert draws the realist conclusion from the preceding premises. Since a thing is known through the same principle by which it exists, and since science concerns universals, the reality of a thing must be grounded in what is universal within it. In other words, Socrates is a man because he possesses humanity, and humanity is what makes scientific knowledge of man possible. The argument does not mean that the universal exists separately apart from individuals in the Platonic sense, but that the common nature is the intelligible and essential principle by which individual things are what they are. Thus universals cannot be merely subjective constructs of the intellect, since they correspond to the real essences grounding the being and knowability of things.
66. Scientia enim non est nisi de rebus et per res, praecipue in physicis.
For science not is except concerning things and through things, especially in physical-(things).
For science exists only concerning things and through things, especially in natural science.
St. Albert strengthens the realist argument by insisting that scientific knowledge is grounded in reality itself. Science is not merely about concepts in the mind, but about real things and the real principles found in them. This is especially evident in natural philosophy (physica), where knowledge depends upon studying actual beings in nature and discovering their causes, forms, and operations. Therefore, if science proceeds through universals, those universals must correspond to something real in things themselves and cannot be mere mental fabrications. The argument aims to show that universal natures have an objective foundation in reality because scientific understanding depends upon them.
67. Ergo universalia sunt res extra intellectum.
Therefore universals are things outside intellect.
Therefore universals are realities existing outside the intellect.
This is the conclusion of the second realist argument. Since science concerns real things and proceeds through universals, and since things are known through the same principles by which they exist, universals must correspond to something real outside the mind. Otherwise scientific knowledge would concern only mental constructions rather than reality itself. The argument does not necessarily claim that universals exist separately from particulars in the Platonic sense, but it does insist that universal natures have genuine extra-mental reality and are not merely products of intellectual abstraction without foundation in things.
68. Si enim essent in intellectu tantum, essent rerum intentiones, et non res ipsae.
For if they-might-be in intellect only, they-might-be intentions of-things, and not things themselves.
For if they existed only in the intellect, they would be merely concepts of things and not the things themselves.
St. Albert here sharpens the realist objection against placing universals solely in the intellect. If universals existed only mentally, then they would be nothing more than intentiones rerum—intellectual conceptions or representations of things—rather than realities grounded in the things themselves. But science, definition, and predication concern real natures, not merely subjective thoughts. Therefore the realist argues that universals must correspond to something objectively real outside the mind. The point is not necessarily that universals exist separately as independent substances, but that the common natures understood universally must have genuine reality in things themselves and not exist merely as mental signs or concepts.
69. Tertio inducunt, quod forma quae dat esse, non habet esse a materia, quamvis sit in materia: sed habet esse ab agente secundum formam et agente univoco.
Thirdly they-induce, that form which gives to-be, not has to-be from matter, although it may-be in matter: but has to-be from agent according-to form and univocal agent.
As a third argument they bring forward that the form which gives being does not receive its existence from matter, although it exists in matter, but receives its existence from the agent according to the form and from a univocal agent.
St. Albert now presents a third realist argument grounded in Aristotelian metaphysics of form and causality. A substantial form, such as humanity, gives actuality and being to matter, but does not derive its own formal intelligibility from matter itself. Matter receives form; it does not produce the form’s essential nature. Rather, the form comes from the agent cause, especially a univocal agent—that is, an agent producing something of the same kind, as a man generates a man. The argument aims to show that form possesses a reality and intelligibility prior to and independent of the individuating role of matter. Since the form is the principle by which a thing is what it is, and since it comes from the causal activity of form itself rather than from matter, the realist concludes that common natures have a genuine reality not reducible to material individuation or mere intellectual abstraction.
70. Et secundum quod est ab agente, vere est, et est extra intellectum: et tamen non est hoc vel illud, sed est simpliciter.
And according-to which it is from agent, truly it is, and it is outside intellect: and nevertheless not it is this or that, but it is simply.
And insofar as it comes from the agent, it truly exists and exists outside the intellect; and yet it is not this thing or that thing, but exists simply.
St. Albert continues the realist argument by distinguishing the form according to its origin from the way it exists in individuated matter. The form, as proceeding from the agent cause, possesses real existence outside the intellect and is not merely a mental concept. Yet considered in itself, it is not “this” or “that” individual thing—that is, not yet determined to a particular singular subject. Rather, it exists simpliciter, as a common nature prior to individuation by matter. The argument aims to show that the common form has a real extra-mental status distinct from both mere conceptual existence and complete singular individuation. This is a strong realist position emphasizing that the universal nature is grounded in reality itself before the intellect abstracts it universally.
71. Sed universale est, quod secundum se non est hoc vel illud, sed est simpliciter communicabile factum hoc vel illud.
But universal is, which according-to itself not is this or that, but is simply communicable made this or that.
But the universal is that which, considered in itself, is neither this thing nor that thing, but is something simply communicable, made to be this or that.
St. Albert here gives a profound definition of the universal from the realist perspective. The universal, taken in itself, is not intrinsically individuated; it is neither Socrates nor Plato, neither this horse nor that horse. Rather, it is a common nature capable of being communicated to many individuals. Humanity, considered absolutely, is not itself a singular man, but it becomes “this” or “that” when received in individuated matter. The phrase simpliciter communicabile is crucial: the universal is by nature shareable or predicable of many. Thus the argument maintains that the common nature possesses a reality prior to individuation, while singularity arises through its reception in particular subjects. This moves toward the scholastic doctrine of the natura communis, the common nature which in itself is neither universal nor singular, but becomes universal in the intellect and singular in individual things.
72. Ergo universale simpliciter et secundum se separatum ab agente et in natura existens est, quamvis non sit hoc vel illud.
Therefore (the) universal simply and according-to itself separated from agent and in nature existing is, although not it-may-be this or that.
Therefore the universal, considered simply and in itself, exists in nature as something separate from the agent, although it is not this thing or that thing.
St. Albert here states the realist conclusion drawn from the preceding argument about forms and causality. Since the form comes from the agent and possesses real existence prior to individuation by matter, the universal nature is said to exist in reality independently of the intellect. Yet it does not exist as a determinate individual—neither this man nor that man—but as a common nature capable of being communicated to many individuals. The phrase “separate from the agent” does not necessarily mean separated as an independently subsisting Platonic Form, but rather distinct from the causal activity of the agent and possessing its own real intelligible content in nature. The argument aims to establish that universal natures have genuine extra-mental reality even though they are not singular things.
73. Universale ergo simpliciter est, et magis est quam particulare, sive hoc vel illud.
(The) universal therefore simply is, and more is than particular, whether this or that.
Therefore the universal exists simply, and exists more truly than the particular, whether this thing or that thing.
St. Albert here presents the strong realist conclusion of the argument. The universal nature is said to exist simpliciter—that is, in an absolute and intelligible way—not merely as this or that individual instance. Moreover, it is said to “exist more” than the particular because the universal expresses the essential and enduring nature of a thing, whereas particulars are individuated, changeable, and limited instances of that nature. Humanity, for example, is more fundamental intelligibly than Socrates or Plato considered merely as singulars, because it is humanity that explains what they are. This reflects a deeply realist and partially Platonic tendency: the universal is regarded as possessing a higher degree of intelligibility and ontological primacy than the transient particulars in which it is instantiated.
74. Et haec fuit obiectio Platonis, qui dixit universalia esse formas.
And this was (the) objection of-Plato, who said universals to-be forms.
And this was the position of Plato, who said that universals are Forms.
St. Albert now identifies the philosophical source of the preceding realist argument. Plato held that universals are real Forms existing in themselves, apart from particular sensible things. According to this view, the universal nature—such as Humanity, Animality, or Justice—is more fundamental and more truly real than the individual instances that participate in it. Particulars are what they are by sharing in these universal Forms. Albert calls this an obiectio because he is presenting it as a major philosophical position to be examined rather than immediately accepted. The argument culminates in the Platonic claim that universals possess a real and superior mode of existence independent of the intellect and prior to particular things.
75. Quarto adducunt: quia id quod est ab agente formaliter, vere est in natura: et tamen de esse suo formali nihil habet a materia: sed ab eo quod est in materia, habet quod est forma huius vel illius.
Fourthly they-adduce: because that which is from agent formally, truly is in nature: and nevertheless concerning its formal to-be nothing it-has from matter: but from that which is in matter, it-has that it is form of-this or of-that.
As a fourth argument they bring forward that what proceeds formally from an agent truly exists in nature; and yet, with respect to its formal being, it receives nothing from matter, but from being in matter it receives only that it is the form of this thing or that thing.
St. Albert here continues the realist argument concerning the status of forms in nature. A form, insofar as it comes from the agent cause, possesses genuine reality independently of matter. Matter does not give the form its essential intelligibility or formal being; rather, matter only individuates the form, making it the form of this particular thing or that particular thing. Humanity, for example, does not derive its essence from matter, but matter makes humanity exist as Socrates or Plato. Thus the argument distinguishes between the form considered formally in itself and the same form as individuated in material subjects. The realist conclusion is that the common nature has a reality prior to individuation and therefore cannot be reduced merely to singular material existence or to intellectual abstraction alone.
76. Ens autem vere ab agente non secundum quod est huius vel illius, verissime habet esse in natura et agente formaliter: quia uno modo se habet ad omnia quae ab eo exemplificantur.
Being however truly from agent not according-to which it is of-this or of-that, most-truly has to-be in nature and formally in-agent: because in one mode itself it-has toward all (things) which by it are-exemplified.
But being, insofar as it truly proceeds from the agent and not insofar as it is of this thing or that thing, possesses existence most truly in nature and formally in the agent, because it relates in one and the same way to all the things exemplified by it.
St. Albert deepens the realist argument by distinguishing the form according to its formal origin from the individuated way it exists in material subjects. The form, considered as proceeding from the agent, has a universal and intelligible mode of being that is prior to its contraction into this or that individual. It exists “most truly” in the agent formally because the agent contains the form in a unified and universal manner, relating equally to all the individual things that can exemplify it. For example, the form of humanity in its formal intelligibility stands in the same relation to Socrates, Plato, and every other man. Matter does not constitute the essence of the form but only limits and individuates it. Thus the argument supports the realist claim that universal natures possess a real formal being in nature and in the causal source from which particulars derive their determinate existence.
77. Quod ergo sic est, verissime est apud naturam: quia esse suum non est ab aliquo obumbratum vel variatum.
That therefore which thus is, most-truly is before nature: because its to-be not is by anything overshadowed or varied.
Therefore, that which exists in this way exists most truly in nature, because its being is not obscured or diversified by anything.
St. Albert continues the realist reasoning by arguing that the universal nature, considered in itself prior to individuation, possesses a purer and more fundamental mode of being than particular things. In individual material subjects, the common nature becomes “obscured or diversified” through the limiting conditions of matter, quantity, and singularity. Humanity, for example, appears differently in Socrates and Plato because each instance is individuated and conditioned materially. But the nature considered formally in itself is not subject to such division or variation. Therefore the realist claims that the universal nature exists “most truly” insofar as it is considered apart from individuating conditions. This reflects the Platonic tendency within the argument: what is universal and formally one is regarded as more fully intelligible and more fundamentally real than the many singular instances in which it is diversified.
78. Forma autem secundum quod uno modo se habet ad omnia particularia sua sic est, et tale habet esse.
Form however according-to which in one mode itself it-has toward all its particulars thus is, and such it-has to-be.
But the form, insofar as it stands in one and the same relation to all its particulars, exists in this way and possesses such a mode of being.
St. Albert continues the realist argument by emphasizing the unity and invariability of the form considered in itself. The common form—such as humanity—relates equally to all its individual instances, whether Socrates, Plato, or any other man. Precisely because it maintains the same intelligible relation to all particulars, the form possesses a mode of being that transcends the diversity and changeability found in singular material things. The realist therefore argues that the universal form has a more unified and stable existence than its particular instantiations, which vary according to matter and individuation. This supports the claim that the common nature possesses a genuine reality not reducible merely to singular individuals or to mental abstraction alone.
79. Hoc autem modo est universale.
This however mode is (the) universal.
Now this mode is what the universal is.
St. Albert here identifies universality precisely with the mode just described: namely, the form insofar as it stands in one and the same relation to all its particular instances. A universal is not this or that individual thing, but the common nature considered according to its communicability and sameness across many particulars. Humanity, for example, is universal because it relates equally to Socrates, Plato, and every other man. The argument therefore defines the universal not by singular existence in matter, but by the unified intelligible mode through which one nature is common to many individuals.
80. Ergo universale verissime est in natura, et verius est quam particulare.
Therefore (the) universal most-truly is in nature, and truer is than particular.
Therefore the universal exists most truly in nature, and exists more truly than the particular.
This is the conclusion of the fourth realist argument. Since the form considered in itself possesses one and the same intelligible relation to all its particulars and is not diversified by matter, the realist concludes that the universal has a more perfect and stable mode of being than singular things. Particulars are many, variable, and materially individuated, whereas the universal nature is one, common, and intelligibly unified. Thus the universal is said to exist “more truly” than the particular, because it expresses the essential reality underlying all individual instances. This strongly reflects the Platonic tendency that regards universal forms as ontologically and intelligibly prior to the changing world of singular things.
81. Quinto inducunt, quod forma dat esse rei et specie et ratione: et natura non est nisi lumen intelligentiae terminatum ad hoc, et incorporatum isti.
Fifthly they-induce, that form gives to-be to-thing both by-species and by-ratio: and nature not is except light of-intelligence terminated unto this, and incorporated to-this.
As a fifth argument they bring forward that form gives being to a thing both according to species and according to intelligible structure; and nature is nothing other than the light of intelligence limited to this thing and embodied in this thing.
St. Albert here presents a highly metaphysical realist argument influenced by Neoplatonic and Aristotelian themes. Form gives existence to a thing not only as an individual but also according to its species and intelligible essence (ratio). Nature itself is described as a kind of “light of intelligence” received into and limited by material subjects. In other words, the intelligible form exists first in a higher and more universal mode and then becomes contracted and embodied in particular material things. Humanity, for example, is an intelligible principle that becomes this individual humanity in Socrates or Plato through material individuation. The argument therefore treats nature as the embodiment or limitation of intelligible form and concludes that universality has a real foundation in the very structure of being, not merely in intellectual abstraction.
82. Quod ergo dat esse et rationem, aut habet ab hoc quod est incorporatum isti, et terminatum ad hoc, aut non.
That therefore which gives to-be and ratio, either it-has from this that it is incorporated to-this, and terminated unto this, or not.
Therefore, that which gives being and intelligible structure either has this from being embodied in this thing and limited to this thing, or it does not.
St. Albert now frames the realist argument as a dilemma concerning form. The form is what gives a thing both its existence and its intelligible essence (ratio). The question is whether the form possesses this power because it is individuated and embodied in a particular material subject, or whether its formal intelligibility is prior to such individuation. If the form derives its essential character merely from being “this” particular embodied form, then its universality and intelligibility would depend entirely on matter and singularity. But the realist argument intends to deny this. The form gives intelligibility and being not because it is contracted into this individual, but because it possesses an intelligible nature in itself prior to material limitation. Matter merely individuates and restricts what is formally and intelligibly common.
83. Constat autem quod non habet dare esse et rationem secundum quod est terminatum ad hoc, et secundum quod est incorporatum isti: quia hoc accidit isti, et ab hoc accidente non potest habere actum substantialem.
It-is-established however that not it-has to-give to-be and ratio according-to which it is terminated unto this, and according-to which it is incorporated to-this: because this happens-to this-(one), and from this accident not it-can have substantial act.
But it is evident that it does not have the power to give being and intelligible structure insofar as it is limited to this thing and embodied in this thing, because this belongs to it accidentally, and from an accident it cannot possess a substantial act.
St. Albert here argues that a form does not derive its essential power from its individuation in matter. Being “this” particular form embodied in “this” subject is accidental to the form, not essential to it. Humanity, for example, does not give existence and intelligibility because it is the humanity of Socrates specifically; rather, it gives those because it is humanity as such. Individuation by matter merely contracts and limits the form to a particular instance. Since accidental features cannot account for a thing’s substantial act or essential nature, the realist concludes that the form’s power to give being and intelligibility must belong to it prior to and independently of its singular embodiment. Thus the common nature possesses a reality more fundamental than its individuated manifestations.
84. Habet ergo ab hoc quod est lumen intelligentiae, quae est dans esse in natura.
It-has therefore from this that it is light of-intelligence, which is giving to-be in nature.
Therefore it has this from the fact that it is a light of intelligence, which gives being in nature.
St. Albert concludes the argument by locating the source of form’s power in its intelligible character rather than in matter. A form gives being and intelligibility because it participates in the “light of intelligence”—that is, in the intelligible principle from which natural being proceeds. Matter does not account for the form’s essential actuality; it merely limits and individuates what is already formally intelligible. Thus the realist position understands nature itself as the embodiment of intelligible form. The common nature possesses its causal and intelligible power because it derives from intelligence as a formal principle, and for this reason universality is grounded in reality itself rather than arising merely from mental abstraction.
85. Non autem dat esse in natura, nisi quod vere in natura est.
Not however it-gives to-be in nature, except that which truly in nature is.
But it does not give being in nature except that which truly exists in nature.
St. Albert here states the concluding principle of the argument. If the intelligible form gives being to things in nature, then the form itself must truly possess some reality in nature; for nothing can communicate what it does not in some way possess. A merely mental construct could not be the source of real natural existence. Therefore the realist concludes that the common nature grounded in the form must itself have genuine extra-mental reality. The argument is intended to show that universals are not merely conceptual abstractions of the intellect, but correspond to real formal principles existing in things themselves and giving them their intelligibility and being.
86. Ergo forma quae dat esse in natura, vere in natura est extra intellectum.
Therefore form which gives to-be in nature, truly in nature is outside intellect.
Literal Translation:
“Therefore (the) form which gives being in nature, truly in nature is outside (the) intellect.”
Translation:
Therefore, the form that gives a thing being in nature truly exists in nature outside the intellect.
Explanation:
This sentence makes a classic Scholastic point about the reality of form. Albert is saying that the form by which a natural thing actually is what it is is not merely a thought in the mind; it is really present in the thing itself. In other words, form is not just an intellectual label or mental construction, but a genuine principle of a thing’s real existence in the natural world. The phrase extra intellectum emphasizes that such form has reality apart from our thinking about it.
87. Sicut forma artis non dat artificiato esse in genere et specie artificiati, nisi secundum quod in artificiato vere est, et extra intellectum artificis: quamvis hoc quod dat esse artificiato, non habeat ab eo secundum quod in artificiato est, sed secundum quod est ab artifice.
Literal Translation:
“Just as (the) form of art does not give to-(the)-artifact being in genus and species of-(the)-artifact, unless according to that which in the artifact truly it is, and outside (the) intellect of-(the)-artisan: although this which gives being to-(the)-artifact, not it-may-have from it according to that which in the artifact it is, but according to that which it is from the artisan.”
Translation:
Just as the form of an art does not give an artifact its being in the genus and species of that artifact except insofar as that form is truly present in the artifact itself and outside the mind of the artisan, although what gives being to the artifact has this not from the artifact insofar as it is in the artifact, but insofar as it comes from the artisan.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing an analogy from art to nature. An artisan first has the form of what he makes in his mind, but the artifact does not actually become this kind of thing until that form is realized in the object itself. A chair is not a chair merely because the carpenter thinks of it; it must actually receive that form in the finished work. At the same time, the form present in the artifact comes from the artisan as its cause, not from the artifact itself. This helps clarify the earlier claim about natural forms: to give real being, a form must truly exist in the thing and not merely in an intellect, even if in some cases it proceeds from an external cause.
88. Sexto adducunt, quod lumen faciens colores, non amittit aliquid per hoc quod est in corpore terminato: nec aliquid accipit essentiae vel virtutis ad agendum, quamvis ei quod constituitur per ipsum, multa accidant per hoc quod ad hoc vel illud terminatur.
Literal Translation:
“Sixth they-adduce, that light making colors, does not lose anything through this that it is in (a) terminated body: nor does it receive anything of essence or of power for acting, although to-that which is constituted through it, many things happen through this that to this or to that it is terminated.”
Translation:
Sixth, they bring forward the point that light, which makes colors visible, does not lose anything by being in a bounded body; nor does it receive anything in essence or in power for acting, although many things happen to that which is constituted by it because it is bounded in one way or another.
Explanation:
Here Albert is reporting another argument, using light as an example. Light itself does not become less light, nor does it gain some new essence or power, simply because it is received in a particular limited body. Yet the thing constituted by that light can be affected in many ways depending on the limits and conditions under which the light is present. The point is to distinguish what belongs to a principle in itself from what belongs to the subject that receives or is determined by it. In Scholastic terms, a form or power may remain the same in itself while the effects or conditions of the thing informed by it vary according to its particular mode of limitation.
89. Ergo similiter lumen intelligentiae, quod de se formas largitur, non amittit id quod de se vel ab efficiente habet, per hoc quod est in isto vel in illo: nec aliquid accipit essentiae vel virtutis ab hoc quod terminatur ad hoc vel illud, quamvis ei quod constituitur ab isto multa conveniant secundum quod lumen istud constituens agit in hoc vel illo.
Literal Translation:
“Therefore similarly (the) light of intelligence, which from itself bestows forms, does not lose that which from itself or from (the) efficient (cause) it has, through this that it is in this or in that: nor does it receive anything of essence or of power from this that it is terminated to this or to that, although to-that which is constituted by this, many things are-fitting according to that which this constituting light acts in this or in that.”
Translation:
Therefore, in the same way, the light of intelligence, which of itself bestows forms, does not lose what it has from itself or from its efficient cause by being in this thing or that; nor does it receive anything of essence or power from being limited to this or that, although many features belong to what is constituted by it according to the way this constituting light acts in one thing or another.
Explanation:
Albert now applies the analogy of bodily light to intellectual light. The power of intelligence to communicate or bestow forms does not change in its own essence simply because it is present in one subject rather than another. It neither loses something of what it is nor gains some new essential power merely by being determined to this case or that case. What does vary is the thing constituted by that intellectual light, since different results follow depending on how that light is received and how it acts in a particular subject. The larger Scholastic point is that the determining conditions belong chiefly to the recipient or constituted thing, not to the essential nature of the illuminating intellectual principle itself.
90. Sic autem virtutem constituendi habens, est vere in natura, et non secundum quod est in isto vel in illo.
Literal Translation:
“Thus moreover having (the) power of constituting, it is truly in nature, and not according to that which it is in this or in that.”
Translation:
Thus, having the power of constituting, it truly exists in nature, and not merely according as it is in this thing or that.
Explanation:
Albert’s point here is that a principle which has the power to constitute or determine things is truly real in nature in itself, not only as it happens to be present in one subject or another. The reality of such a power does not depend on this particular instance or that particular instance, but belongs to it as a genuine principle of nature. This continues the argument that forms or intellectual lights are not merely accidental to their subjects or reducible to our way of considering them; rather, they have a real status as principles that ground the being and constitution of things.
91. Hoc autem dicitur existens simpliciter et verissime et ex natura unam aptitudinem habens ad omnia quibus dat esse et rationem.
Literal Translation:
“This moreover is-said existing simply and most-truly and by nature one aptitude having to all to-which it gives being and account.”
Translation:
Moreover, this is said to exist simply and most truly, and by nature to have one aptitude for all the things to which it gives being and intelligible character.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing out the consequence of the previous argument. A principle that truly gives being and intelligibility to many things must itself be said to exist in the fullest and truest sense. It is not tied essentially to one particular instance, but has by nature a single and unified power or aptitude extending to all the things that receive being and intelligible structure from it. The word ratio here suggests not just “reason” in a modern psychological sense, but the intelligible form or account by which a thing can be understood. So the point is that this principle is both really existent and universally proportioned to the things it actualizes and makes knowable.
92. Hoc autem est genus et species prout sunt universalia.
Literal Translation:
“This moreover is genus and species insofar as they are universals.”
Translation:
Moreover, this is genus and species insofar as they are universals.
Explanation:
Albert here identifies the principle he has been describing with genus and species taken precisely as universals. That is, he is not speaking of genus and species merely as words or as mental labels, but as what is common and communicable across many individuals. The earlier argument has been building toward the claim that what gives being and intelligibility to many things has a kind of real foundation, and now Albert says that this is what genus and species are considered as universals. For students, the key point is that genus and species are being treated here at the level of universal intelligibility: they name what can be truly predicated of many things and what expresses a common formal content shared across individuals.
93. Genus ergo et species universalia verissime sunt in natura.
Literal Translation:
“Genus therefore and species universal most-truly are in nature.”
Translation:
Therefore genus and species, as universals, exist most truly in nature.
Explanation:
Albert is now stating the conclusion toward which the preceding arguments have been moving. If that which gives being and intelligible structure to many things is truly real in nature, then genus and species, considered as universals, must also be most truly in nature. The point is not that universals float around separately as detached objects, but that they have a real foundation in things themselves and are not merely inventions of the mind. For students, this is an important Scholastic claim: universality as known by the intellect is grounded in what is really present in nature.
94. Septimo inducunt, quod id quod secundum naturam et virtutem est ante rem, ab eo quod est post ipsum, nec esse accipit nec unitatem vel multiplicationem secundum seipsum, nisi secundum quod habet in isto vel illo quod post ipsum est.
Literal Translation:
“Seventh they-introduce, that that which according to nature and power is before (the) thing, from that which is after itself, neither receives being nor unity or multiplication according to itself, except according to that which it has in this or that which after itself is.”
Translation:
Seventh, they argue that what is prior to a thing by nature and power does not receive its being, nor its unity or multiplicity, from what is posterior to it, except according as it is had in this or that thing which comes after it.
Explanation:
Albert is making another argument for the reality and priority of universal principles. If something is prior by nature and by causal power, then it cannot depend for its own being on things that are posterior to it. So genus or species, considered in itself, does not become real because later individual things exist, nor does it become one or many in itself because of those individuals. Rather, unity and multiplication belong to it only insofar as it is found in this or that posterior subject. The point for students is that what is naturally prior is not constituted by what comes after it, even though it may be instantiated in many later things.
95. Universale autem sive forma quae est rei causa et principium, est ante rem secundum causam et naturae ordinem.
Literal Translation:
“But (the) universal or form which is of-(the)-thing cause and principle, is before the thing according to cause and order of nature.”
Translation:
But the universal, or the form which is the cause and principle of a thing, is prior to the thing according to causality and the order of nature.
Explanation:
Albert now identifies the universal, or form, as something prior to the individual thing in a definite Scholastic sense. He does not mean that the universal necessarily exists earlier in time, but that it is prior as cause and by the order of nature: it is a principle through which the thing is what it is. In this framework, form is not something that arises only after individual things are observed and grouped by the mind; rather, it is a real grounding principle that explains the being and intelligibility of the thing. For students, the key distinction is between temporal priority and causal or natural priority: the form is “before” the thing because it explains it.
96. Ergo ab eo in quo est, nec accipit esse, nec unitatem, nec multiplicationem secundum quod ipsum est in se; quamvis multiplicetur tantum secundum esse quod habet in isto vel illo.
Literal Translation:
“Therefore from that in which it is, neither does it receive being, nor unity, nor multiplication according to that which itself is in itself; although it is multiplied only according to being which it has in this or in that.”
Translation:
Therefore, from that in which it exists, it does not receive being, unity, or multiplicity according as it is in itself, although it is multiplied only according to the being that it has in this thing or in that.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing the conclusion from the previous point about the priority of universal form. If a universal or form is prior by cause and by the order of nature, then it does not get its own being or unity from the particular subjects in which it is found. In itself, it is not made to be what it is by those individual instances. Still, it can be said to be multiplied insofar as it exists in many different subjects. So the multiplicity belongs to the form as instantiated in this or that thing, not to the form considered in itself. This is another step in the argument that universals have a real foundation and are not merely produced by the mind out of individual cases.
97. Si ergo in se accipiatur, nihil horum habet ab eo in quo est.
Literal Translation:
“If therefore in itself it-may-be-taken, nothing of-these it-has from that in which it is.”
Translation:
If, therefore, it is taken in itself, it has none of these from that in which it is.
Explanation:
Albert is tightening the conclusion of the previous argument. If the universal or form is considered in itself, then it does not derive any of these features, namely being, unity, or multiplicity, from the particular subject in which it exists. The subject is the place where the form is instantiated, but it is not the source of the form’s essential character as form. This helps preserve the Scholastic claim that the universal has a real intelligible content and causal priority that is not simply manufactured by the individual things that receive it.
Note: I began confirming accuracy of texts with original document here.
98. Secundum seipsum autem acceptum verissime est: quia secundum se acceptum non habet hoc quod non sit nisi in intellectu: quamvis ab intellectu cognoscente et causante.
Literal Translation:
“But according-to itself however taken, most-truly it is: because according-to itself taken it does not have this, that it not be except in (the) intellect: although by (the) intellect knowing and causing.”
Translation:
But taken in itself, it exists most truly; because, taken in itself, it does not have this condition, that it exists only in the intellect, although it is taken by the intellect as knowing and causing.
Explanation:
Albert’s point is that the universal or form, considered in itself, has genuine reality and is not merely a thought in a mind. The crucial phrase is non sit nisi in intellectu: it is not the kind of thing whose whole being is only mental. The closing phrase, ab intellectu cognoscente et causante, suggests that it may indeed be considered by an intellect that knows and causes, but that does not reduce it to a mere product of thought. For students, the main idea is that being known by intellect does not mean being unreal; Albert is defending the claim that what the intellect knows universally has a true foundation in nature.
99. Secundum se ergo acceptum verissime est res in natura sumpta simplici existens.
Literal Translation:
“According-to itself therefore taken, most-truly it is (a) thing in nature, taken (as) simple, existing.”
Translation:
Therefore, taken in itself, it is most truly a thing existing in nature, considered as simple.
Explanation:
Albert is saying that when this universal or form is considered in itself, it is not merely something thought up by the mind, but a real thing grounded in nature. The phrase sumpta simplici indicates that it is being considered in a simple or undivided way, apart from the many particular conditions it has in individual things. So the intellect’s abstract consideration does not make the thing unreal; rather, it considers in a simplified way something that truly exists in nature.
100. Sic autem universale est aptitudinem habens ad omnia sua singularia.
Literal Translation:
“Thus moreover (the) universal is aptitude having to all its singulars.”
Translation:
Now in this way the universal is that which has an aptitude toward all its singulars.
Explanation:
Albert is defining the universal in terms of its relation to the many individual things that fall under it. A universal is not tied to just one instance, but has a natural openness or fitness to extend to all its singulars. In Scholastic language, this means that the universal is what can be said of many individuals and what is intelligibly common to them. The word aptitudo is important here: it suggests an inherent capacity or ordination, not merely a verbal convenience. So Albert is continuing his argument that the universal has a real grounding in nature while also being communicable to many individual subjects.
101. Universale ergo verissime est et res in natura est, etiam absque eo quod in intellectu solo, puro, et nudo sit acceptum.
Literal Translation:
“Universal therefore most-truly is and (a) thing in nature is, even without this that in (the) intellect alone, pure, and bare it may-be taken.”
Translation:
Therefore the universal most truly exists and is a thing in nature, even apart from being taken in the intellect alone, purely and in a bare way.
Explanation:
Albert is here stating the conclusion of the whole argument very plainly. The universal is not merely a mental abstraction or a concept that exists only when the mind strips away all the features of particular things and considers something in a purely intellectual way. Rather, it has a real foundation in nature itself. The intellect can consider the universal solo, puro, et nudo, that is, in abstraction from particular conditions, but that act of consideration does not create the universal’s reality. Instead, the universal is already grounded in the real forms and natures of things, and for that reason Albert says it exists verissime, “most truly.”
102. Ecce haec fortiora sunt, quae illi pro una parte et alia inducunt in suarum assertionem opinionum.
Literal Translation:
“Behold these stronger things are, which they for one part and the other introduce for (the) assertion of their opinions.”
Translation:
Behold, these are the stronger arguments that they bring forward on one side and the other in support of their opinions.
Explanation:
Albert is concluding this section by saying that these are the strongest considerations advanced by the opposing sides in the debate. The phrase pro una parte et alia shows that he is summing up arguments from both positions rather than endorsing one immediately in this sentence. For students, this is a useful marker in a Scholastic text: it signals the close of a dispute or review of objections before a resolution or judgment. In other words, Albert has laid out the most powerful arguments each side offers about the status of universals, and he is preparing the ground for deciding the question.
103. Nos autem quantum sufficit praesenti intentioni ista solventes, dicimus quod universale triplicem habet considerationem, scilicet secundum quod in seipso est natura simplex et invariabilis: et secundum quod refertur ad intelligentiam: et secundum quod est in isto vel in illo.
Literal Translation:
“But we however, insofar as suffices to-(the) present intention, these things resolving, say that (the) universal a threefold consideration has, namely according to that which in itself it is (a) simple and invariable nature: and according to that which it is referred to intelligence: and according to that which it is in this or in that.”
Translation:
But we, resolving these points insofar as is sufficient for the present purpose, say that the universal admits of a threefold consideration: namely, insofar as in itself it is a simple and unchangeable nature; insofar as it is related to intelligence; and insofar as it exists in this thing or that.
Explanation:
Albert now begins to give his own solution to the dispute. After presenting the strongest arguments on both sides, he says that the key is to distinguish three ways in which the universal can be considered. First, it can be considered in itself, as a simple and unchanging nature. Second, it can be considered as related to intelligence, that is, as known by the intellect. Third, it can be considered as existing in particular things, in this individual or that one. This threefold distinction is important because it allows Albert to preserve what is true in several positions at once: the universal has a real foundation, it is genuinely known by the mind, and it is also instantiated in singular things.
104. Primo quidem modo simplex est natura, quae dat esse et rationem et nomen, et verissimum est inter omnia quae sunt, nihil habens alienae naturae admixtum, nec conditione alienae naturae variatum.
Literal Translation:
“By-the first indeed mode, simple is (the) nature, which gives being and account and name, and most-true it is among all things which are, nothing having of-foreign nature admixed, nor by-(the) condition of-foreign nature varied.”
Translation:
In the first way, the nature is simple, which gives being, intelligible account, and name; and it is most true among all the things that are, having nothing of an alien nature mixed with it, nor being varied by the condition of an alien nature.
Explanation:
Albert is here explaining the first of the three ways in which the universal can be considered: in itself. Considered in this way, the nature is simple because it is taken apart from the particular conditions that belong to this individual or that one. It is what gives a thing its being, its intelligible definition or account, and the name by which it is known. For that reason he calls it verissimum, “most true,” since it is not mixed up with features belonging to something else or altered by accidental conditions that come from outside its own nature. The point for students is that Albert is treating the universal nature, in this first consideration, as the pure formal content of the thing, not yet as individualized in matter or as merely conceived by the mind.
105. Per hoc autem quod est in isto vel in illo, multa accidunt ei secundum esse: quorum primum est, quod est particulatum et individuatum; secundum, quod est multiplicabile, vel multiplicatum; tertium autem, quod est incorporatum, et habens in se diversas passiones quibus est subiectum, et alia huiusmodi infinita, quia materia infinita accidunt.
Literal Translation:
“But through this that it is in this or in that, many things happen to it according to being: of which the first is, that it is particularized and individuated; the second, that it is multipliable, or multiplied; the third moreover, that it is incorporated, and having in itself diverse passions to-which it is subjected, and other infinite things of-this-kind, because of matter infinite things happen.”
Translation:
But by the fact that it exists in this individual or that one, many things happen to it with respect to its mode of being. The first is that it becomes particularized and individuated. The second is that it is capable of multiplication, or is multiplied. The third is that it is embodied and has within itself various properties or affections to which it is subject, along with infinitely many other such features, because infinitely many things arise from matter.
Explanation:
Albert is now describing what happens to a universal nature when it exists in particular things. In itself the nature is simple, but when it is received in this individual or that one, it takes on conditions that belong to individualized existence. It becomes particular and distinct as this member of a species, it is multiplied across many individuals, and it is embodied in matter, which brings with it many changing properties and affections. The key point is that these features do not belong to the nature simply as such, but to the nature as existing in material individuals. This is part of Albert’s larger solution: the same nature can be considered in itself, in the intellect, and in singular things, and many of the complications arise only at the level of its existence in matter.
106. Per hoc autem quod est in intellectu, dupliciter consideratur, scilicet aut secundum relationem ad intellectum intelligentiae primae cognoscentis et causantis ipsum, cuius illa natura simplex radius quidam est.
Literal Translation:
“But through this that it is in (the) intellect, in-two-ways it-is-considered, namely either according to relation to (the) intellect of-(the) first intelligence knowing and causing it, of-which that simple nature (a) certain ray is.”
Translation:
But insofar as it is in the intellect, it is considered in two ways: namely, either according to its relation to the intellect of the First Intelligence, which knows and causes it, of which that simple nature is a certain ray.
Explanation:
Albert now turns to the way the universal is considered as existing in intellect, and he begins by dividing this into two further senses. In this sentence he gives the first: the universal nature can be considered in relation to the intellect of the First Intelligence, that is, the first knowing and causing source. The claim that the simple nature is “a certain ray” of that intelligence suggests that created natures reflect or derive from a higher intellectual source. Since the sentence says dupliciter and aut, it clearly introduces a division whose second member has not yet appeared in this excerpt.
107. Aut secundum relationem ad intellectum per abstractionem cognoscentem ipsum.
Literal Translation:
“Or according-to relation to (the) intellect through abstraction knowing it.”
Translation:
Or according to its relation to the intellect that knows it through abstraction.
Explanation:
This is the second member of the distinction Albert began in the previous sentence. After speaking of the universal in relation to the First Intelligence that knows and causes it, he now adds the human or created intellect that knows it by abstraction. That means the intellect comes to know the universal by drawing out the common nature from particular things. So Albert is showing that the universal can be related to intellect in two ways: as grounded in the divine or first knowing cause, and as understood by our minds through abstraction from singulars.
108. Et primo quidem modo accidit ipsi radium et lumen intelligentiae agentis esse et simplex et purum esse, et immateriale et immobile et incorporale et incorruptibile, et perfectibile intellectus possibilis, et eiusdem possibilis intellectus esse motivum ad actum: sicut color movet visum ad actum secundum actum lucidi quod est in ipso quando secundum actum color est.
Literal Translation:
“And in-the first indeed mode it-happens to it to-be (a) ray and light of-(the) intelligence agent, and to-be simple and pure, and immaterial and immobile and incorporeal and incorruptible, and perfective of-(the) possible intellect, and of-the same possible intellect to-be motive to act: just-as color moves sight to act according-to (the) act of-(the) luminous which is in it when according-to act color is.”
Translation:
And in the first way, it belongs to it to be a ray and light of the agent intelligence, and to be simple and pure, immaterial, immovable, incorporeal, and incorruptible, and to perfect the possible intellect and move that same possible intellect to act, just as color moves sight to act through the actuality of the luminous element that is in it when the color is actually present.
Explanation:
Albert is explaining what belongs to the universal nature when it is considered in relation to the agent intellect, as in the first of the two ways of being in intellect. In that respect, the universal is described as a kind of ray or light proceeding from the agent intelligence, and so it is marked by the qualities proper to intelligible light: simplicity, purity, immateriality, and incorruptibility. Its role is to bring the possible intellect from potency to act, that is, to make the intellect actually understand. The comparison with color and sight is important: just as color does not move vision unless it is made actually visible by light, so too the intelligible form moves the possible intellect to actual understanding through the illuminating action of the agent intellect.
109. Secundum autem relationem quam habet ad intellectum cognoscentem, non causantem, habet quod talis intellectus secundum quod abstrahit ipsum, agit in ipso universalitatem (quam de natura sua ante habuit) per hoc quod separat ipsum a materia et materialibus individuantibus.
Literal Translation:
“According however to relation which it has to (the) intellect knowing, not causing, it has that such intellect according to that which it abstracts it, acts in it universality (which by its nature its own before it had) through this that it separates it from matter and from material individuating-(things).”
Translation:
But according to the relation it has to an intellect that knows it, not one that causes it, it has this: that such an intellect, insofar as it abstracts it, brings about universality in it, which it already had beforehand by its own nature, by separating it from matter and from material individuating conditions.
Explanation:
Albert is now speaking about the universal as related to a knowing intellect that does not cause the thing, but only understands it. In this case, the intellect makes the universal appear as universal by abstraction, that is, by mentally separating the common nature from matter and from the individuating features that make it this particular thing. Yet Albert is careful to add that the nature already had this universality beforehand in its own nature. So the intellect does not invent the universal out of nothing; rather, it draws out and considers, in an abstract way, what is already really grounded in the thing.
110. Et sic intelligitur quod dicit Aristoteles, quod universale est dum intelligitur: particulare vero dum sentitur.
Literal Translation:
“And thus is-understood what says Aristotle, that (the) universal is while it is understood: (the) particular truly while it is sensed.”
Translation:
And thus what Aristotle says is understood: that the universal exists insofar as it is understood, whereas the particular exists insofar as it is sensed.
Explanation:
Albert is clarifying how Aristotle’s statement should be taken. The universal is known as universal by the intellect, because the intellect abstracts the common nature from individuating material conditions; the particular, by contrast, is grasped as particular through sense, since sense always knows this individual thing here and now. The point is not that the universal is unreal unless someone thinks about it, but that it has the character of universality precisely in the mode in which it is understood. Likewise, the particular is encountered precisely in the mode in which it is sensed. This fits Albert’s larger argument that the same nature can be considered in itself, in the intellect, and in singular things.
111. Et illud Avicennae dictum, quod intellectus in formis agit universalitatem.
Literal Translation:
“And that saying of-Avicenna, that (the) intellect in forms acts universality.”
Translation:
And likewise that saying of Avicenna is to be understood: that the intellect brings about universality in forms.
Explanation:
Albert is adding Avicenna’s formulation to support the same point he has just made from Aristotle. The intellect is said to “bring about universality” in forms, not because it creates the nature itself, but because it considers the form apart from the individuating conditions of matter. In that way, what exists in singular things comes to be known under a universal aspect. So the universal is not a fiction invented by the mind; rather, the intellect makes the form universal in the order of understanding by abstracting it from the conditions that make it this particular thing.
112. Et hoc est quod dixerunt antiqui triplices esse formas, ante rem scilicet, quae sunt formae secundum se acceptae, principia rerum existentes: et in re sive cum re ipsa, quae sunt formae existentes in ipsis, dantes eis nomen et rationem, per id quod sunt aptae esse in multis et universales, non tamen secundum quod sunt in illis: secundum enim quod sunt in illis, particularizatae et individuatae et ad singularitatem ductae sunt.
Literal Translation:
“And this is what said (the) ancients, threefold to be forms, before the thing namely, which are forms according-to themselves taken, principles of-things existing: and in the thing or with the thing itself, which are forms existing in them, giving to-them name and account, through this that they are apt to be in many and universal, not however according to that which they are in them: according-to that indeed which they are in them, particularized and individuated and to singularity led they are.”
Translation:
And this is what the ancients meant when they said that forms are threefold: namely, before the thing, as forms considered in themselves and existing as principles of things; and in the thing, or together with the thing itself, as forms existing in those things and giving them their name and intelligible account by being suited to exist in many and to be universal, though not insofar as they are in those things. For insofar as they are in those things, they are particularized, individuated, and drawn down to singularity.
Explanation:
Albert is summarizing an old Scholastic division of forms. First, forms are considered ante rem, “before the thing,” that is, in themselves as principles by which things are what they are. Second, forms are considered in re, “in the thing,” as actually existing in individual subjects and giving those subjects their definition and name. In this second mode, the form is naturally apt to be universal because the same kind of nature can belong to many things, yet when it exists in this or that particular subject it is no longer universal in that concrete mode of existence, but individualized. So Albert is carefully distinguishing the common nature in itself from the same nature as instantiated in singular things.
113. Sunt etiam formae post rem, quae sunt formae per abstractionem intellectus ab individuantibus separatae et in quibus intellectus agit universalitatem.
Literal Translation:
“There are also forms after the thing, which are forms through abstraction of-(the) intellect from individuating-(things) separated, and in which (the) intellect acts universality.”
Translation:
There are also forms after the thing, which are forms separated from individuating conditions by the abstraction of the intellect, and in which the intellect brings about universality.
Explanation:
Albert now gives the third member of the traditional division of forms: forms post rem, “after the thing.” These are not forms existing separately out in reality after the individual thing, but forms as grasped by the intellect after it abstracts them from the individuating conditions of matter. In this mode, the intellect makes the form universal in the order of knowledge by considering what is common apart from what makes it this particular individual. So the same nature can be considered before the thing as principle, in the thing as instantiated, and after the thing as abstracted and universal in the mind.
114. Et primae quidem substantialia rerum principia sunt, secundae autem rerum substantiae, tertiae autem accidentia et qualitates, quae notae rerum in anima acceptae vocantur et dispositiones vel habitus.
Literal Translation:
“And the first indeed substantial principles of-things are, the second however substances of-things, the third however accidents and qualities, which notes of-things in (the) soul received are-called and dispositions or habits.”
Translation:
And the first indeed are the substantial principles of things, while the second are the substances of things, and the third are accidents and qualities, which are called the received notions of things in the soul, and dispositions or habits.
Explanation:
Albert is completing the threefold distinction of forms. The first forms, those considered before things, are the substantial principles by which things have their being. The second, those in things, are the actual substances or formal realities present in the things themselves. The third, those after things, are not the substances themselves as they exist outside the mind, but the accidental qualities or intellectual states by which the soul possesses knowledge of things. These are called the notions of things received in the soul, and also dispositions or habits, because they belong to the knower as stable forms of understanding. The point is that the same nature can be considered as principle, as existing in the thing, and as known in the mind, but these are not all in the same mode of being.
115. His ergo supra prelibatis dicimus, quod universalia, hoc est, naturae quae universalia vocantur, secundum se accepta, sunt et verissime sunt ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia et invariabilia.
Literal Translation:
“These things therefore above having-been-premised, we say, that universals, this is, natures which universals are-called, according-to themselves taken, are and most-truly are ungenerable and incorruptible and invariable.”
Translation:
Therefore, with these points set forth above, we say that universals, that is, the natures which are called universals, considered in themselves, exist and most truly exist, and are ungenerated, incorruptible, and unchangeable.
Explanation:
Albert is now giving his own formal conclusion after laying out the distinctions and arguments above. Universals, understood as natures considered in themselves, are said to exist most truly because they are not being considered under the changing conditions that belong to particular material things or under the accidental mode in which they are present in the mind. In that respect they are called ungenerated, incorruptible, and unchangeable, not because individual things in the world do not come to be and pass away, but because the nature itself, taken precisely as nature, is not subject to those material conditions. This is a central Scholastic claim: the universal has a real and stable foundation, even though it exists in different modes in singular things and in the intellect.
116. Sunt etiam extra, vel praeter intellectum solum, nudum, et purum, sicut incontradicibiliter probant secundae inductae rationes: secundum autem quoddam esse, in rebus sunt, scilicet secundum esse individuatum quod actu est in his quae sunt ultimo et in esse perfecto constituta in natura: propter quod illa res natura a physicis vocatur.
Literal Translation:
“They are also outside, or beyond, (the) intellect alone, bare, and pure, just-as incontrovertibly prove the second adduced arguments: according however to a certain being, in things they are, namely according to individuated being which in act is in these which are lastly and in perfect being constituted in nature: on account of which that thing nature by the natural-philosophers is-called.”
Translation:
They also exist outside, or apart from, the intellect alone, bare and pure, as the second set of arguments introduced above prove beyond contradiction. Yet according to a certain mode of being they are in things, namely according to individuated being, which exists actually in those things that are constituted in nature as ultimate and complete beings. For this reason that thing is called nature by the natural philosophers.
Explanation:
Albert is now drawing together the distinction between universals as considered in themselves and universals as existing in particular things. They are not merely in the intellect taken in a purely abstract way; they have reality outside the mind. Yet in the world of concrete things they exist according to an individuated mode of being, that is, as this nature in this particular thing. So the same nature that can be considered universally is, in physical reality, found as instantiated in singular beings that are fully constituted in nature. That is why the physicists, or natural philosophers, call such a thing nature: they are considering the form or essence as it exists in an actual natural subject.
117. Adhuc autem secundum quoddam esse sunt in intellectu: et hoc dupliciter, scilicet in intellectu per cognitionem causante et agente, et in intellectu cognoscente per abstractionem ea per universalitatem agente et educente.
Literal Translation:
“But further according to a certain being they are in (the) intellect: and this in-two-ways, namely in (the) intellect through cognition causing and acting, and in (the) intellect knowing through abstraction, acting upon them through universality and drawing-(them)-out.”
Translation:
Moreover, according to a certain mode of being they are in the intellect; and this in two ways: namely, in the intellect that causes and acts through knowledge, and in the intellect that knows by abstraction, bringing them forth and rendering them universal.
Explanation:
Albert is now completing the threefold account of universals by explaining more precisely how they are in the intellect. They are present there in two distinct ways. First, they are in the intellect as in a knowing cause, that is, in the higher or productive intellect that gives rise to or grounds them intellectually. Second, they are in the intellect that knows by abstraction, which draws the universal nature out from individuating conditions and considers it under the aspect of universality. So the same nature can exist in itself, in things as individuated, and in intellect in these two different intellectual modes.
118. Ad id ergo quod primo medio pro prima parte opinionis inducitur, quod cum dicunt Aristoteles et Boethius, quod omne quod est, ideo est, quia unum numero est: hoc intelligitur de his quae ultimo actu in natura perfecta sunt, de illis enim verum est.
Literal Translation:
“To that therefore which by-the first middle for the first part of-the opinion is introduced, that when say Aristotle and Boethius, that every-thing which is, therefore is, because one in number it is: this is understood of those things which in ultimate act in nature perfected are, of those indeed true it is.”
Translation:
Therefore, as to what is brought forward by the first argument for the first side of the opinion, namely that Aristotle and Boethius say that everything which exists does so because it is numerically one, this must be understood of those things which are perfected in nature in their ultimate actuality; for of those things it is true.
Explanation:
Albert is beginning to answer the objections from the first side. He says that the claim of Aristotle and Boethius, that whatever exists is numerically one, is true, but only if it is understood of things that are fully actualized and complete in nature, that is, individual concrete beings. In that sense, real existence in the fullest physical way belongs to singulars, which are numerically one. This does not overthrow the earlier teaching about universals, because Albert has already distinguished different modes of being: what is true of fully constituted individual things need not be said in exactly the same way of universals considered in themselves.
119. Sed universalia hoc modo non sunt: sunt enim ut rerum principia, et non ut res ultimo actu in natura constitutae et completae.
Literal Translation:
“But universals in-this way are not: they-are for of-things principles, and not as things in ultimate act in nature constituted and completed.”
Translation:
But universals are not in this way; for they exist as principles of things, and not as things constituted and completed in nature in ultimate actuality.
Explanation:
Albert is answering the objection that whatever truly exists must be numerically one in the way that individual things are one. He says that universals are not beings in that mode. They are not complete individual things standing in the final act of natural existence; rather, they are principles of things. So the rule that applies to fully constituted singulars does not apply in the same way to universals. This preserves his distinction between individual substances, which exist as numerically one completed things, and universals, which exist more fundamentally as principles that give intelligibility and being to those things.
120. Aut sic intelligitur, quod unum numero sit dictum a numero ultimi esse, vel a numero essentiae.
Literal Translation:
“Or thus it-is-understood, that one in number may-be said from (the) number of-final being, or from (the) number of-essence.”
Translation:
Or else it is understood in this way: that “one in number” may be said either with reference to the number of final existence, or with reference to the number of essence.
Explanation:
Albert is offering a further distinction to clarify the phrase “one in number.” It can be taken in one sense from the number belonging to a thing’s final, completed existence in reality, which applies to individual concrete beings. Or it can be taken from the number of essence, which points to the formal or essential unity of a thing. This helps him answer the objection more carefully, because the same phrase does not have to mean only numerical individuality in the strict sense of a completed singular thing. In this way, he preserves room for speaking about universals and essences as having their own kind of unity without confusing that with the fully individuated existence of particular things.
121. Esse enim quod est unum numero, habet esse suae essentiae: sicut et universale unum numero, est unum numero essentiae et non duo vel tria (quamvis numerus materiae et accidentis sit) in multis et de multis.
Literal Translation:
“For being which is one in number, has being of its essence: just as also the universal one in number, is one in number of essence and not two or three (although number of matter and of accident is) in many and of many.”
Translation:
For what is one in number has the being of its essence. In the same way, the universal, though one in number, is one in number with respect to essence and not two or three, even though there is numerical plurality of matter and accident in the many things in which it exists and of which it is predicated.
Explanation:
Albert is sharpening the distinction between unity of essence and multiplicity in individuals. The universal is one, not because it is one singular thing numerically in the way Socrates is one individual, but because the essence itself is one and the same. What becomes many is not the essence as essence, but the material and accidental conditions under which that essence exists in different subjects. So humanity, for example, is one in essential content, even though it is found in many human beings who differ numerically by matter and accidents.
122. Et hoc accidit sibi et non convenit ei secundum se: et sic intelligitur quod dicitur, quod participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo.
Literal Translation:
“And this happens to it and does not befit it according-to itself: and thus is-understood what is-said, that by-participation of-(the) species many men are one man.”
Translation:
And this happens to it, and does not belong to it in itself; and in this way one understands the saying that, by participation in the species, many men are one man.
Explanation:
Albert is saying that the multiplicity found in many individual men does not belong to the species or essence considered in itself, but only happens to it insofar as it exists in particular subjects. The universal nature is not of itself many; rather, many individuals participate in the one species. That is why he can say that many men are “one man” by participation in the species: not because they are one individual, but because they share one and the same human essence. This continues his argument that plurality belongs to matter and individuation, while unity belongs to the essence as such.
123. Similiter dicendum ad id quod secundo dicunt, quod illud quod separatum habet esse extra intellectum in natura, est hoc aliquid: quia separatum esse habere dicitur duobus modis.
Literal Translation:
“Similarly it-must-be-said to that which secondly they say, that that which separated has being outside (the) intellect in nature, is this something: because to have separated being is-said in two ways.”
Translation:
Likewise, one must reply to what they say in the second place, namely that whatever has separate being outside the intellect in nature is a particular thing. For “to have separate being” is said in two ways.
Explanation:
Albert is now answering another objection. The objection claims that if something exists outside the intellect in nature and has separate being, then it must be a definite individual, a hoc aliquid, “this particular thing.” Albert’s response begins by introducing a distinction: “separate being” can be understood in two different senses. This is a classic Scholastic move. Rather than denying the premise outright, he clarifies the meaning of the key term so that the argument can be answered more precisely. The next sentence will presumably explain those two senses and show that universals can be said to exist outside the intellect without therefore being individual substances in the strictest sense.
124. Uno scilicet modo quo separatum esse habet id quod in se habet esse non dependens ad aliquid, ad hoc quod esse habeat quod sit extra ipsum: et sic non generaliter verum quod dicunt: quia universale sic separatum, habet esse in natura, et tamen non est hoc aliquid.
Literal Translation:
“By one namely mode by which separate being has that which in itself has being not depending on anything, for this that it may have being which is outside it: and thus not generally true what they say: because the universal thus separated, has being in nature, and yet is not this something.”
Translation:
In one way, “to have separate being” belongs to that which has being in itself, not depending on something else in order to have being outside itself. And in this sense what they say is not true universally, because the universal, being separate in this way, has being in nature and yet is not a particular thing.
Explanation:
Albert is giving the first of the two senses in which something may be said to have “separate being.” In this first sense, a thing is separate because its being does not depend on being in something else as in a subject. Taken this way, the objection fails, because something can have real being in nature without therefore being a definite individual hoc aliquid. The universal, as Albert understands it, can be “separate” in this sense, since it has a real foundation in nature, but it is still not a singular thing. So he is continuing to distinguish real extra-mental being from full individuation.
125. Alio modo separatum esse dicitur, quod in se est indivisum, et ab aliis per discretionem divisum et separatum.
Literal Translation:
“By-another mode separate being is-said, which in itself is undivided, and from others by distinction divided and separated.”
Translation:
In another way, separate being is said of that which is undivided in itself and divided and set apart from others by distinction.
Explanation:
Albert now gives the second sense of “separate being.” In this sense, a thing is separate because it is an individual, internally undivided and distinct from other things. This does describe a hoc aliquid, a particular subject marked off from others. The point of the distinction is to answer the objection from the previous sentence: not everything that exists outside the intellect is separate in this second, individuated way. A universal may have real being in nature without being a singular thing distinct from all others in the manner of an individual substance.
126. Et hoc modo generaliter verum est quod dicunt: quia sic non nisi singulariter existentia separatum habent esse.
Literal Translation:
“And in this mode generally true it is what they say: because thus not unless singularly existing (things) separate have being.”
Translation:
And in this sense what they say is generally true, because in this way only things existing as singulars have separate being.
Explanation:
Albert now grants the objection in this second sense of separation. If “separate being” means being distinct in itself and divided off from others as an individual, then only singular things have such being. So the claim is true when taken of individuation. But this does not overturn his earlier point, because universals can still have reality outside the intellect in the first sense, without being singular substances in the second sense. His solution depends on carefully distinguishing these two meanings of separation.
127. Ad id quod tertio inducunt per dictum Avicennae, dicendum quod omne quod est in individuo (secundum quod est in individuo) singulare est.
Literal Translation:
“To that which third they introduce through (the) saying of-Avicenna, it-must-be-said that every-thing which is in (the) individual (according to that which it is in (the) individual) singular is.”
Translation:
To what they bring forward in the third place from the saying of Avicenna, it must be said that everything which is in an individual, insofar as it is in an individual, is singular.
Explanation:
Albert’s reply turns on the qualifying phrase secundum quod est in individuo. He grants that whatever exists in an individual is singular precisely insofar as it exists in that individual. In other words, the common nature, when it is present in Socrates or Plato, is indeed singular in that mode of existence. But that does not mean the nature is singular in itself. The point is to distinguish the nature as such from the same nature as individuated in a particular subject.
128. Sed id quod in individuo est, nil prohibet esse universale, non secundum quod est in individuo acceptum: hoc enim secundum se acceptum, nihil prohibet esse quale quid, et non hoc aliquid.
Literal Translation:
“But that which in (the) individual is, nothing prevents to be universal, not according to that which it is in (the) individual taken: this for according-to itself taken, nothing prevents to be a such something, and not this something.”
Translation:
But nothing prevents that which is in an individual from being universal, not insofar as it is taken as being in the individual; for this, taken in itself, nothing prevents from being a thing of such a kind and not a particular thing.
Explanation:
Albert is making the distinction explicit. The nature that exists in an individual is singular insofar as it exists in that individual, but the very same nature can still be universal when it is not considered under that individuated mode. Taken in itself, it is not necessarily a hoc aliquid, “this particular thing,” but a quale quid, a thing of such-and-such a kind, that is, a nature or essence. So the presence of the universal in individuals does not destroy its universality; it only means that, in individuals, it exists under singular conditions.
129. Si quis autem sic objiciat, Quod est in individuo est in eo per modum individui.
Literal Translation:
“But if anyone thus may-object, What is in (the) individual is in it through (the) mode of-(the) individual.”
Translation:
But if someone should object in this way, “What is in an individual is in it according to the mode of the individual.”
Explanation:
Albert is introducing a further objection against his position. The objection presses the point that whatever exists in an individual must exist there under individuated conditions, that is, in the mode proper to a singular thing. This is a serious challenge, because if the common nature is always received in an individual according to the mode of that individual, then it might seem that the nature can never truly be universal except in thought. Albert is setting up this objection so that he can answer it by distinguishing again between the mode in which a nature exists in a subject and what that nature is when considered in itself.
130. Individuum autem est hoc aliquid.
Literal Translation:
“But (the) individual is this something.”
Translation:
But an individual is a particular thing.
Explanation:
This is the second step in the objection Albert is reporting. If whatever is in an individual is in it according to the mode of the individual, and if an individual is a hoc aliquid, a definite “this something,” then it seems to follow that whatever is in an individual must also be a hoc aliquid. The phrase is a standard Scholastic way of describing a concrete singular subject, something determinate and distinct in its own right. Albert is building up the objection before replying to it.
131. Ergo illud quod est in individuo, est singulare et hoc aliquid.
Literal Translation:
“Therefore that which is in (the) individual, is singular and this something.”
Translation:
Therefore, what is in an individual is singular and a particular thing.
Explanation:
This is the conclusion of the objection Albert has been setting up. If whatever is in an individual is there according to the mode of the individual, and if an individual is a hoc aliquid, a definite particular thing, then it seems to follow that whatever is in an individual must itself be singular and a hoc aliquid. The force of the objection is to deny that anything existing in individuals could still be universal in any real sense. Albert will answer this by distinguishing between the mode in which a nature exists in an individual and the nature considered in itself.
132. Non valet argumentum.
Literal Translation:
“Not avails (the) argument.”
Translation:
The argument does not hold.
Explanation:
Albert now gives his brief rejection of the objection. He denies that the reasoning is valid, which means that the conclusion does not follow in the way the objector claims. The likely point, in light of the surrounding discussion, is that although a nature exists in an individual according to an individuated mode of being, it does not follow that the nature considered in itself is nothing but a singular hoc aliquid. The objection confuses the mode of existence in the subject with the nature as such.
133. Quod enim est in individuo, non semper est in eo per modum esse individui, sed aliquando per modum principii individui.
Literal Translation:
“For that which is in (the) individual, not always is in it through (the) mode of (the) being of-(the) individual, but sometimes through (the) mode of-(the) principle of-(the) individual.”
Translation:
For what is in an individual is not always in it according to the mode of the being of the individual, but sometimes according to the mode of the principle of the individual.
Explanation:
Here Albert explains why the previous objection fails. Something present in an individual need not always be there as an individualized being in the full sense; it may instead be present as a principle of the individual. That is exactly how he wants us to think about the common nature or form. The form exists in the individual not simply as another singular thing alongside the individual, but as that by which the individual is what it is. So the nature can be in the individual as its constitutive principle without itself being reduced, in its own formal content, to mere singularity.
134. Et non oportet quod hoc secundum id quod est, sit individuum et hoc aliquid: quia potest esse quale quid.
Literal Translation:
“And not it-is-necessary that this according to that which it is, may-be individual and this something: because it can be a such something.”
Translation:
And it is not necessary that this, according to what it is, be an individual and a particular thing, because it can be a thing of such a kind.
Explanation:
Albert is clarifying that what exists in an individual as its principle need not itself, in what it is, be an individual hoc aliquid. It can instead be a quale quid, a “such-and-such thing,” that is, a nature or essence considered according to its kind rather than as a singular subject. This is his answer to the objection: the common nature present in an individual is not forced to be singular in its own formal content simply because it is found in a singular being. It can still be a universal nature, even though it exists in an individuated subject.
135. Et ideo in argumento paralogismus est figurae dictionis: quia interpretatur quale quid ut hoc aliquid.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore in (the) argument (there) is (a) paralogism of-figure of-speech: because it interprets a such something as this something.”
Translation:
And therefore there is in the argument a paralogism of figure of speech, because it interprets a thing of such a kind as a particular thing.
Explanation:
Albert identifies the precise fault in the objection: it commits a fallacy of expression by confusing two different kinds of predication. It treats a quale quid, a nature or essence considered as a “such-and-such thing,” as if it were the same as a hoc aliquid, a singular individual or “this particular thing.” That verbal and conceptual shift makes the argument invalid. His point is that the common nature present in an individual need not itself be an individual subject; it can remain a universal nature even while existing in a singular.
136. Ad id autem quod quarto inducunt, dicendum quod universale secundum esse quod habet in singulari, non habet aliud esse quam esse singularis: et hoc probat Aristoteles contra eos qui dixerunt formas universales distinctum et divisum esse retinere praeter esse singularis (sicut ex sigillo receptum) esse separatum ab illo sicut separatum est esse sigilli et cerae sigillatae: sed quod id quod est in singulari, non habeat esse naturae et principii, non secundum quod est in singulari, sed secundum se acceptum, non probat Aristoteles: quia hoc est verum et necessarium in omni natura.
Literal Translation:
“To that however which fourth they introduce, it-must-be-said that the universal according-to being which it has in (the) singular, does not have other being than (the) being of-(the) singular: and this Aristotle proves against those who said universal forms distinct and divided being to retain beyond (the) being of-(the) singular (just-as from a seal received) being separated from it just-as separated is (the) being of-(the) seal and of-(the) wax having-been-sealed: but that that which is in (the) singular, may not have being of-(the) nature and of-(the) principle, not according to that which it is in (the) singular, but according-to itself taken, Aristotle does not prove: because this is true and necessary in every nature.”
Translation:
But to what they bring forward in the fourth place, one must say that the universal, according to the being it has in the singular, does not have any being other than the being of the singular. And this Aristotle proves against those who said that universal forms retain a distinct and separate being apart from the being of the singular, as though the being received from a seal were separate from it just as the being of the seal is separate from the being of the sealed wax. But Aristotle does not prove that what is in the singular does not have the being of a nature and of a principle, not insofar as it is in the singular, but insofar as it is taken in itself; for this is true and necessary in every nature.
Explanation:
Albert’s reply is very careful. He grants that, as existing in a singular thing, the universal does not have some second, separate act of existence alongside the singular; its existence there is simply the existence of the singular itself. This is the point Aristotle uses against those who imagined forms as if they remained separately detached from individuals, like a stamp and the wax it impresses. But Albert says this does not settle the whole issue. Aristotle does not thereby prove that what is in the singular cannot also be considered in itself as a nature and principle. So Albert distinguishes two claims: the universal does not have a separate existential act apart from the singular when it is in the singular, but the nature considered in itself still truly has the character of nature and principle.
137. Ad id quod quinto objicitur, dicendum quod essentiae rerum secundum quod essentiae sunt, non incipiunt esse nisi per accidens et per aliud, scilicet incipientibus esse his in quibus sunt.
Literal Translation:
“To that which fifth is-objected, it-must-be-said that (the) essences of-things according to that which essences they are, do not begin to be except through accident and through another, namely these in which they are beginning to be.”
Translation:
To the fifth objection, one must say that the essences of things, insofar as they are essences, do not begin to exist except accidentally and through another, namely through those things in which they begin to exist.
Explanation:
Albert is saying that essences, considered precisely as essences, do not come to be in their own right as though they were independent individual things. Rather, they begin to exist only accidentally, that is, insofar as the individual subjects in which they are present begin to exist. So when a new individual comes into being, the essence is said to begin to be only in that derivative sense. This fits his larger argument that the essence or universal nature is not itself generated as a singular thing, even though it exists in generated individual beings.
138. In his enim per consequens etiam illa esse incipiunt.
Literal Translation:
“For in these by consequence also those to be begin.”
Translation:
For in these, as a consequence, those also begin to exist.
Explanation:
Albert is continuing the point from the previous sentence. When the individual things come to be, the essences present in them are also said to begin to be, but only consequentially and not as independently generated realities. Their beginning is derivative from the coming-to-be of the subjects in which they exist. This reinforces his distinction between an essence considered in itself and the same essence as present in generated singulars.
139. Et hoc non accidit eis, nisi secundum quod in illis sunt: secundum seipsa autem nec incipiunt nec desinunt esse secundum naturam, sed sunt radii luminis intelligentiae universaliter agentis, quae Deus est: quae cum seipsa sit agens, non est assignare quod incipiat vel desinat nisi secundum quod agit hoc vel illud in singulari.
Literal Translation:
“And this does not happen to them, except according to that which in those they are: according to themselves however neither do they begin nor cease to be according to nature, but they are rays of the light of the intelligence acting universally, which is God: which since itself is acting, it is not possible to assign that it begins or ceases except according to that which it acts this or that in the singular.”
Translation:
And this does not happen to them except insofar as they are in those things. But considered in themselves, they neither begin nor cease to be according to their nature; rather, they are rays of the light of the universally acting Intelligence, which is God. And since that Intelligence is itself always acting, one cannot assign to it beginning or ceasing except insofar as it acts this or that in singular things.
Explanation:
Albert now reaches one of the highest metaphysical points in the discussion. Essences or universal natures only begin or cease to exist accidentally insofar as they are instantiated in generated and corruptible singulars. But considered in themselves as natures, they do not properly begin or perish. Why? Because they are rooted in the eternal divine intellect. Albert describes them as “rays of the light” of the universally acting Intelligence, namely God.
This does not mean that universals float around as independently existing Platonic entities. Rather, their ultimate foundation lies in the eternal divine knowledge through which God knows and causes creatures. Since God’s intellectual activity does not begin or end, the natures grounded in that divine intellect are, in themselves, stable and unchanging. What begins and ceases are the individual instantiated effects in the material world: this man, this tree, this horse.
140. Ad id autem quod sexto inducunt, dicendum quod quamvis forma artis habeat quod exemplar commune est, ab hoc quod a tali exivit artifice: tamen postquam exivit, adhuc habet id quando secundum se ut forma artis accipitur: et habet hoc in lignis, et lapidibus, quamvis hoc non habeat secundum quod existit in lignis et lapidibus.
Literal Translation:
“To that however which sixth they introduce, it-must-be-said that although (the) form of art has that (it) common exemplar is, from this that from such (an) artisan it-went-out: nevertheless after-it went-out, still it has that when according-to itself as form of art it-is-taken: and it has this in woods, and stones, although this it does not have according-to that which it exists in woods and stones.”
Translation:
But to what they bring forward in the sixth place, it must be said that although the form of art has its being as a common exemplar from the fact that it has proceeded from such an artisan, nevertheless, after it has proceeded forth, it still retains this when it is considered in itself as a form of art. And it has this in wood and in stone, although it does not have it insofar as it exists in the wood and the stone.
Explanation:
Albert is answering the objection by using the example of an artistic form. The form of an artifact is first in the artisan as a common exemplar, and in that sense it comes from the artisan. Yet even after it is realized in materials, it can still be considered in itself as the form of the art and so retains that common character. At the same time, when it exists in particular pieces of wood or stone, it does not possess that commonness precisely as existing in those individual materials, because there it is instantiated in a particular way. The point is parallel to his teaching on universals: the same form can be common when considered in itself, yet particularized in the subjects in which it exists.
141. Et similiter de formis naturalibus existentibus ab intelligentia.
Literal Translation:
“And similarly about forms natural existing from intelligence.”
Translation:
And similarly with natural forms existing from intelligence.
Explanation:
Albert is applying the artistic analogy directly to natural forms. Just as the form of an artifact can be considered as a common exemplar while still being instantiated in particular materials, so too natural forms can be understood as proceeding from intelligence and yet existing in individual natural things. The sentence is brief, but its role is clear: what was said about artistic forms is meant to hold in an analogous way for natural forms as well. This supports Albert’s larger claim that a form may have a universal or common character without that character being destroyed simply because the form exists in singular subjects.
142. Et ideo secundum se acceptae sunt communes et universales etiam quae sunt in singularibus, quamvis non secundum quod sunt in singularibus habeant id.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore according-to themselves taken they-are common and universal even those which are in singulars, although not according to that which they are in singulars they have that.”
Translation:
And therefore, taken in themselves, even those forms that are in singulars are common and universal, although they do not have this insofar as they are in singulars.
Explanation:
Albert is drawing the conclusion from the analogy he has just made. Forms that exist in singular things can still be common and universal when they are considered in themselves. Their universality does not belong to them precisely as they are existing in this or that individual, because there they are particularized, but it does belong to them according to their own nature. This is one of Albert’s central points throughout the passage: the same nature is singular in its mode of existence in individuals, yet universal when taken in itself.
143. Si autem quis inferat dicens: Si non secundum quod sunt in singularibus habent id: ergo habent secundum quod non sunt in singularibus.
Literal Translation:
“If however anyone may-infer saying: If not according to which they are in singulars they have that: therefore they have according to which not they are in singulars.”
Translation:
But if someone were to object by saying, “If they do not have this insofar as they exist in singular things, then they must have it insofar as they do not exist in singular things.”
Explanation:
This sentence introduces a possible objection in a schola
Literal Translation:
“It-is paralogism according to fallacy of division: because the divided (thing) he-infers from that which according to composition had-been said.”
Translation:
It is a paralogism according to the fallacy of division, because he infers something taken in a divided sense from what had been said in a composite sense.
Explanation:
St. Albert is identifying the objection as a logical mistake, not a valid refutation. The error is the fallacy of division, which happens when someone takes a statement that is true in a combined or qualified sense and then wrongly breaks it apart into a different sense. Here the opponent takes a claim made “according to composition,” that is, with its terms understood together in a certain qualified way, and draws from it a conclusion “according to division,” as though the same words could be separated and redistributed without changing the meaning. For students, the key point is that scholastic argument depends very carefully on how a proposition is construed, and a small shift in logical form can produce a false conclusion even when the words look similar.stic argument about universals and their mode of being. The objector is reasoning in a very strict either-or way: if a nature or universal does not possess something precisely as it exists in individual things, then it must possess it apart from those individual things. The point of the objection is to force a distinction between being in singulars and being outside singulars. In context, this kind of argument usually prepares for a clarification that the matter is more subtle than the objector suggests, because a universal can be considered under different aspects without requiring that it exist as a separate thing apart from particulars.
144. Est paralogismus secundum fallaciam divisionis: quia divisum infert ex eo quod secundum compositionem dictum fuerat.
Literal Translation:
“It-is paralogism according to fallacy of division: because the divided (thing) he-infers from that which according to composition had-been said.”
Translation:
It is a paralogism according to the fallacy of division, because he infers something taken in a divided sense from what had been said in a composite sense.
Explanation:
St. Albert is identifying the objection as a logical mistake, not a valid refutation. The error is the fallacy of division, which happens when someone takes a statement that is true in a combined or qualified sense and then wrongly breaks it apart into a different sense. Here the opponent takes a claim made “according to composition,” that is, with its terms understood together in a certain qualified way, and draws from it a conclusion “according to division,” as though the same words could be separated and redistributed without changing the meaning. For students, the key point is that scholastic argument depends very carefully on how a proposition is construed, and a small shift in logical form can produce a false conclusion even when the words look similar.
145. Ad id autem quod septimo et ultimo inducitur, dicendum esse videtur, quod omne quod est in effectu secundum quod effectus esse habet ultimum, secundum quod est in effectu illo, singulare est: et sic intelligitur quod probatur in libro de Causis.
Literal Translation:
“To that however which seventh and last is introduced, to-be-said to-be seems, that every (thing) which is in effect according to that which effect being has ultimate, according to that which is in effect that, singular is: and thus is understood that which is proved in (the) book concerning Causes.”
Translation:
But to the point that is introduced seventh and last, it seems one should say this: everything that exists in an effect, insofar as the effect has being in an ultimate way, is singular insofar as it exists in that effect; and in this way one understands what is proved in the Book of Causes.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert is answering the final objection by distinguishing a thing as it exists in its cause from the way it exists in its effect. Once something is present in an effect as the effect’s own completed, determinate act of being, it exists there as singular, that is, as this particular instance and not as a universal taken in abstraction. His point is that whatever may be more universal or more eminent in a cause becomes particularized when it is received in an individual effect. That is why he says this is the right way to understand the teaching of the Book of Causes: what comes forth in effects is contracted to the mode of the recipient, so in the effect it is found as something singular.
146. Sed id quod in effectu secundum se acceptum per modum principii et causae formalis ipsius effectus secundum se accepti, nihil prohibet de se communicabile et commune esse, sicut iam saepius dictum est.
Literal Translation:
“But that which in effect according to itself having-been-accepted through mode of principle and of-cause formal of-that-effect itself according to itself having-been-accepted, nothing hinders of itself communicable and common to-be, just as now more-often has-been-said.”
Translation:
But that which is considered in the effect in itself, by way of the principle and formal cause of the effect considered in itself, is not prevented from being in itself communicable and common, as has already been said more often.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert adds an important distinction to the previous claim that whatever exists in an effect as an effect is singular. If we consider the effect simply as this individual thing, then it is singular; but if we consider within the effect the formal principle by which the effect is what it is, that formal aspect can still be communicable and common. In other words, the nature or form present in this individual can still be understood as something shared by many individuals of the same kind. This is a standard scholastic move: the same reality can be viewed either as individuated in this particular subject or as a common formal nature considered in itself. Albert is showing that singular existence in the thing does not destroy the universality or communicability of the form as form.
147. Ea autem quae secundo inducta sunt, puto de necessitate concludere.
Literal Translation:
“But those (things) which secondly were introduced, I think by necessity to conclude.”
Translation:
But the points that were introduced second seem to me to conclude with necessity.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert is briefly judging the force of one of the earlier arguments in the discussion. He says that the points brought forward in the second place do not merely suggest a conclusion but establish it necessarily. In scholastic writing, this is a way of marking that a particular line of reasoning has real demonstrative weight within the dispute. For a student, the important thing is that Albert is not treating all the preceding arguments as equally strong: some objections are dismissed as logically flawed, while others are acknowledged as genuinely compelling and therefore must be answered with care.
