1. A quibus quaestionibus circa universalia sit abstinendum.
From which questions concerning universals there should-be abstaining.
2. Ne autem videatur quod nulla scientia de his sit, quae per logicae principia determinari non possunt: sed oportet quod altissimae sapientiae principiis determinentur.
Lest however it-may-seem that no knowledge of these things is, which through principles of-logic to-be-determined are not able: but it-is-necessary that by-principles of-highest wisdom they-be-determined.
3. Prima quidem est, an ista quae genera et species dicuntur, in re subsistant, aut non quidem in rerum natura sint subsistentia, sed in solis nudis purisque intellectibus per abstractionem a rebus factam sint posita?
The first indeed is, whether those things which genera and species are-called, in thing subsist, or not indeed in nature of-things are subsisting things, but in sole bare and pure intellects through abstraction from things made are posited?
4. Et dico solis intellectibus per exclusionem rerum, ita quod non in rebus sint.
And I-say in sole intellects through exclusion of-things, so that not in things they-may-be.
5. Nudos autem dico intellectus ab appendiciis materiae separatos, qui illorum tantum sunt, quae nunquam in materia fuerunt.
Bare however I-call intellects from appendages of matter separated, which of-those only are, which never in matter were.
6. Quae enim in materia fuerunt, non in nudis sunt intellectibus, sed sunt in intellectibus qui immixti sunt phantasiae et sensui.
For those things which in matter were, not in bare are intellects, but are in intellects which mingled are to-phantasy and to-sense.
7. Puros autem voco intellectus ex parte intelligibilis, ad quod nihil movet nisi solius intelligentiae lumen, et non phantasma receptum.
Pure however I-call intellects from part of-intelligible, to which nothing moves except light of-intelligence alone, and not phantasm received.
8. Sunt tamen qui aliter ea quae dicta sunt, interpretantur dicentes, quod in solis intellectibus sunt illa quoad nos, quae utrum sint et quomodo esse habeant, solus scit intellectus.
There-are however those who otherwise those things which have-been-said, interpret, saying, that in sole intellects are those things as-to us, which whether they are and how they may-have to-be, alone knows intellect.
9. Et tale esse in intellectu universalia habere dixerunt illi qui vocabantur Nominales, qui communitatem (ad quam particularia universalium, de quibus dicuntur ipsa universalia, referuntur) tantum in intellectu esse dicebant.
And such to-be in intellect universals to-have they-said those who were-called Nominalists, who commonness (to which particulars of-universals, concerning which universals themselves are-said, are-referred) only in intellect to-be were-saying.
10. Nudos autem vocant intellectus, qui ad scibile quod accipiunt non habent praescriptos habitus, qui disponant intellectum ad speculationem eorum quae in ipso sunt.
Bare however they-call intellects, which toward knowable-thing which they receive not have prescribed habits, which may-dispose intellect toward speculation of-those-things which in it are.
11. Sicut intellectus conclusionum praescriptum quaerit habitum principiorum per quem fit conclusio, et intellectus principiorum praescriptum sibi quaerit habitum notitiae terminorum, et sic de aliis.
Just-as intellect of-conclusions prescribed seeks habit of-principles through which is-made conclusion, and intellect of-principles prescribed for-itself seeks habit of-knowledge of-terms, and thus concerning the others.
12. Puros autem dicunt intellectus, qui mediante phantasmate non accipiuntur.
Pure however they-call intellects, which by-means-of phantasm are not received.
13. Sunt autem adhuc qui hoc referunt ad intellectum causantem et cognoscentem ista, qui est intellectus intelligentia illius quae irradiat super intellectuale animae nostrae.
There-are however still those who this refer to intellect causing and knowing these-things, which is intellect intelligence of-that-thing which irradiates upon intellectual of soul of-ours.
14. Et dicunt quod in solis intellectibus sunt, quae esse non habent nisi in lumine illius intelligentiae.
And they-say that in sole intellects they-are, which to-be not have except in light of-that intelligence.
15. Et sunt illi qui dicunt universalia non nisi ideale habere esse secundum quod universalia sunt, et non esse res coniunctas materiae, sed implere omnem materiam suam imaginibus particularium, sicut unus masculus multas implet feminas.
And there-are those who say universals not except ideal to-have to-be according-to that which universals they-are, and not to-be things conjoined to-matter, but to-fill all matter of-their-own with-images of-particulars, just-as one male fills many females.
16. Hi autem nudos dicunt intellectus separatos ab imaginibus, quas imprimunt in materiam.
These however bare they-call intellects separated from images, which they-imprint in matter.
17. Puros autem dicunt, eo quod impuritati naturalium principiorum in causando non permiscentur, sed ex suo lumine producunt formas universales, quae per distantiam ab ipsis impuritati materialium principiorum permiscentur, et tunc particulantur et determinantur.
Pure however they-call, by-this that to-impurity of-natural principles in causing they-are-not mingled, but from their own light they-produce universal forms, which through distance from themselves to-impurity of-material principles are-mingled, and then are-particularized and are-determined.
18. Nonnulli etiam dixerunt quod multiplicatio ista non ponitur nisi ad expressionem eiusdem rei per verborum quamdam inculcationem.
Some also have-said that this multiplication is-not posited except for expression of-the-same thing through a certain inculcation of-words.
19. Ab his ergo quaestionibus et aliis quae circumstant istas (quae determinari non possunt, nisi per principia quibus determinari habet intelligentiarum natura et illuminatio) abstinebimus quamvis tangemus eas, ut sciantur quae sunt.
From these therefore questions and others which surround these (which to-be-determined are not able, unless through principles by-which to-be-determined has nature and illumination of-intelligences) we-will-abstain although we-will-touch them, so-that they-may-be-known which they-are.
20. Cum per huius scientiae principia discuti et ad plenum determinari non possint, eo quod sapientia prima quoad altissimam eius partem est huiusmodi negotium; et ideo maioris et subtilioris egens est inquisitionis.
Since through principles of-this science to-be-discussed and to-be-determined to fullness they-are-not able, by-this that first wisdom as-to highest part of-it is business of-this-kind; and therefore of-greater and more-subtle needing is investigation.
21. Illud vero quod de his ex probabilibus scire utile est logico, in isto libro tentabo monstrare colligens probabilia ex Antiquorum dictis, et praecipue dicta sequens Peripateticorum, quae secta in philosophia probabilissima mihi videtur.
That however which concerning these things from probable-things to-know useful is to-the-logician, in this book I-will-attempt to-show collecting probable-things from sayings of-the-Ancients, and especially following sayings of-the-Peripatetics, which sect in philosophy most-probable to-me seems.
22. Secunda vero quaestio est, a qua hic abstineo, quod si detur quod subsistant in re extra intellectum, utrum sint subsistentia corporalia, an incorporalia sint?
Second however question is, from which here I-abstain, that if it-be-granted that they-subsist in thing outside intellect, whether they-are bodily subsisting-things, or incorporeal they-are?
23. Tertia quaestio est, utrum sint in sensibilibus singularibus suis posita secundum esse, an sint extra singularia in rebus solis metaphysicis, sicut dixisse Plato refertur?
Third question is, whether they-are in sensible singulars of-their-own posited according-to to-be, or they-are outside singulars in sole metaphysical things, just-as Plato is-reported to-have-said?
24. Hoc enim per rationes logicas ad plenum sciri non poterit, sed metaphysico determinanda relinquuntur.
For this through logical reasons to fullness to-be-known will-not-be-able, but to-the-metaphysician to-be-determined they-are-left.
25. Tres igitur sunt istae quaestiones de universalibus.
Three therefore are these questions concerning universals.
26. Prima quidem de esse ipsorum.
First indeed concerning to-be of-them.
27. Secunda de quidditate eorundem.
Second concerning quiddity of-the-same-things.
28. Tertia vero de comparatione ipsorum ad sua particularia.
Third however concerning comparison of-them to their particulars.
29. Et ideo quamvis hae quaestiones de omnibus sint universalibus vel esse possunt: tamen de generibus et speciebus ista praecipue quaeruntur tribus de causis.
And therefore although these questions concerning all universals are or are-able to-be: nevertheless concerning genera and species these things especially are-asked for three causes.
30. Quarum una est: quia ista cum praedicantur in quid, per se esse significantur.
Of-which one is: because these things when they-are-predicated in what, through themselves to-be are-signified.
31. Alia autem universalia cum praedicantur in quale, significant esse in alio, et ideo minus per se esse videntur.
Other however universals when they-are-predicated in what-kind, signify to-be in another, and therefore less through themselves to-be they-seem.
32. Secunda ratio est: quia alia tria in istis esse significantur: differentia enim in genere est potentia, et in specie secundum actum: proprium autem in specie et genere ut vere accidens: accidens autem commune in individuo.
Second reason is: because the other three in these to-be are-signified: for difference in genus is potency, and in species according-to act: property however in species and genus as truly accident: common accident however in individual.
33. Tertiam rationem quidam dicunt, quod omnia alia ad rationes istorum referuntur.
Third reason certain-men say, that all other things to accounts of-these are-referred.
34. Est enim quoddam differentiarum genus, cuius species sunt differentiae speciales: et similiter est in propriis et accidentibus.
For there-is a certain genus of-differences, of-which species are specific differences: and similarly it-is in properties and accidents.
35. Sed haec ultima ratio parvi valoris est.
But this last reason of small value is.
36. Prima autem ratio optima, et secunda bona, et secundum intentiones eorum qui haec dicebant sumpta.
First however reason best, and second good, and according-to intentions of-those who these-things were-saying taken.
Translation
From which questions concerning universals there should be abstaining.
Lest however it may seem that there is no knowledge of those things which cannot be determined through the principles of logic, but must be determined by the principles of highest wisdom.
The first question indeed is whether those things which are called genera and species subsist in reality, or whether they are not subsisting things in the nature of things, but are posited only in bare and pure intellects through abstraction made from things.
And I say “in intellects alone” by exclusion of things, so that they may not exist in things.
By “bare intellects” I mean intellects separated from the appendages of matter, which belong only to those things which have never existed in matter.
For those things which have existed in matter are not in bare intellects, but are in intellects mingled with phantasy and sense.
By “pure intellects” I mean, on the side of the intelligible, those to which nothing moves except the light of intelligence alone and not a received phantasm.
There are however some who interpret these matters otherwise, saying that those things are in intellects alone as far as we are concerned, whose existence and mode of being the intellect alone knows.
And such being in intellect those men called Nominalists said universals to possess, who said that commonness — to which particulars are referred by universals said of them — exists only in the intellect.
They call intellects “bare” when, toward the knowable object which they receive, they do not possess predetermined habits disposing the intellect toward speculation concerning those things which are in it.
Just as the intellect of conclusions seeks beforehand the habit of principles through which the conclusion is made, and the intellect of principles seeks beforehand for itself the habit of knowledge of terms, and so concerning the others.
They however call intellects “pure” which are not received by means of phantasms.
There are still others who refer this to the intellect causing and knowing these things, which is the intelligence illuminating the intellectual part of our soul.
And they say that those things are in intellects alone which have no being except in the light of that intelligence.
And there are those who say that universals possess only ideal being insofar as they are universals, and are not things conjoined to matter, but fill all their matter with images of particulars, just as one male fills many females.
These however call intellects “bare” insofar as they are separated from the images which they imprint upon matter.
They call them “pure” because they are not mingled with the impurity of natural principles in causing, but from their own light they produce universal forms, which through distance from themselves become mingled with the impurity of material principles, and then are particularized and determined.
Some also have said that this multiplication is posited only for expressing the same thing through a certain repetition of words.
Therefore from these questions and others surrounding them — which cannot be determined except through principles by which the nature and illumination of intelligences must be determined — we shall abstain, although we shall touch upon them so that it may be known what they are.
Since through the principles of this science they cannot be fully discussed and determined, because such inquiry belongs to first wisdom in its highest part, and therefore requires greater and more subtle investigation.
Nevertheless, that which is useful for the logician to know concerning these things from probable arguments I shall attempt to show in this book, collecting probable opinions from the sayings of the Ancients, and especially following the sayings of the Peripatetics, whose sect in philosophy seems to me most probable.
The second question, however, from which I abstain here, is this: if it be granted that universals subsist in reality outside the intellect, whether they are bodily subsisting things or incorporeal.
The third question is whether they exist in their sensible singulars according to being, or whether they exist outside singulars in purely metaphysical realities, as Plato is reported to have said.
For this cannot be fully known through logical reasoning, but is left to the metaphysician to determine.
Therefore these are the three questions concerning universals.
The first indeed concerns their existence.
The second concerns their quiddity.
The third concerns their relation to their particulars.
Therefore although these questions concern all universals or can concern them, nevertheless they are asked especially concerning genera and species for three reasons.
One of these reasons is because when these are predicated “in what,” they signify being through themselves.
Other universals however, when they are predicated “in what kind,” signify being in another, and therefore seem less to possess being through themselves.
The second reason is because the other three are signified as existing in these: for difference exists in genus as potency and in species according to act; property exists in species and genus as a true accident; and common accident exists in the individual.
A third reason some men give is that all other things are referred to the accounts of these.
For there is a certain genus of differences, whose species are specific differences; and similarly this is so in properties and accidents.
But this last reason is of little value.
The first reason however is best, and the second good, according to the intentions of those who said these things.
Summary
This chapter serves as a methodological prologue to the study of universals. St. Albert the Great explains which questions concerning universals belong properly to logic and which transcend logic and therefore belong to metaphysics or “first wisdom.” His aim is to establish the proper limits of logical inquiry while still acknowledging the profound metaphysical problems surrounding universals.
The text opens by identifying three great questions concerning universals:
- Whether genera and species truly subsist in reality or exist only in the intellect.
- If they subsist, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal.
- Whether they exist in sensible particulars or apart from them, as Plato taught.
These are the famous Porphyrian questions inherited from the Isagoge, which became foundational for medieval philosophy. Albert insists that such questions cannot be fully resolved through the principles of logic alone because they concern the deepest structure of being and intellect. Their complete determination belongs to metaphysics, especially to the study of intellect, immateriality, and the nature of being itself.
Albert then surveys several philosophical positions regarding universals. He mentions those who hold that universals exist only in the intellect through abstraction from particulars, a view associated with Nominalists. He also refers to more Platonic positions in which universals possess an ideal existence independent of material things. Other theories connect universals to separate intelligences illuminating the human mind. Albert does not attempt here to adjudicate these systems definitively; instead, he introduces them so students may know the principal opinions historically proposed.
A major concern throughout the chapter is the distinction between logic and metaphysics. Logic studies universals insofar as they are predicable and useful for reasoning. Metaphysics studies whether and how universals truly exist. Thus the logician may employ universals without first resolving all metaphysical controversies concerning their ontological status. Logic proceeds from what is probable and sufficient for rational discourse, while metaphysics seeks ultimate causes and highest certainty.
Albert explicitly declares his allegiance to the Peripatetic tradition, that is, the Aristotelian school, which he judges “most probable.” This is important because it situates his approach between extreme realism and nominalism. Universals are not treated as mere words, nor as separate Platonic entities existing independently from things, but as grounded in reality and known through abstraction from particulars.
The text also clarifies why genera and species receive primary attention among universals. Genus and species signify what a thing is (in quid), whereas difference, property, and accident are secondary because they signify qualities or modes inhering in another. Genus and species therefore appear to possess a more fundamental mode of being and intelligibility.
Albert further explains the internal relation among the five predicables:
- Difference exists within genus and species as actuality.
- Property flows from species and genus as a necessary accident.
- Common accident exists in individuals contingently.
Thus genus and species serve as the principal foundations from which the other predicables are understood.
Pedagogically, the chapter establishes an important scholastic principle: beginners should not attempt to resolve the highest metaphysical disputes before mastering the logical instruments needed to think clearly about them. Therefore Albert intentionally abstains from exhaustive metaphysical demonstration in this introductory work. He proposes instead to collect probable opinions from the Ancients and provide what is useful to the logician.
The chapter therefore functions as:
- a statement of methodological humility,
- a delimitation of the sciences,
- a survey of competing theories of universals,
- and a defense of the Aristotelian logical approach.
At a deeper level, the text reveals a characteristic feature of scholastic thought: the harmony and distinction between logic and metaphysics. Logic cannot answer every question about reality, but neither can metaphysics proceed without the logical analysis of universals and predication. The sciences are ordered hierarchically, each possessing its own principles and proper mode of inquiry.
