In this chapter, Aristotle continues his refutation of those philosophers who claim that all reality is simply “one,” especially Parmenides and Melissus. He demonstrates that the very act of speaking about “being” requires distinctions within reality, for things may be one in one respect and many in another. A man, for example, may be one person while possessing many attributes and parts. Aristotle therefore teaches that unity and multiplicity are not mutually exclusive, but coexist according to different modes of being. Students should observe how carefully Aristotle distinguishes between substance and accident, whole and part, potency and actuality, showing that confusion arises whenever these distinctions are ignored. This chapter is especially important because it prepares the way for Aristotle’s later doctrine of matter and form by defending the reality of plurality, change, and predication. As you read, consider how Aristotle’s reasoning protects philosophy from the errors that arise when abstract ideas are separated from the concrete realities known through sense and reason.
1. Τόν τε δὴ τρόπον τοῦτον ἐπιοῦσιν ἀδύνατον φαίνεται τὰ ὄντα ἓν εἶναι· καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐπιδεικνύουσι, λύειν οὐ χαλεπόν.
Literal Translation:
“the and indeed way this proceeding-by, impossible appears the beings one to-be; and from what-things they-demonstrate, to-loose not difficult.”
Translation:
Proceeding in this way, it appears impossible that beings are one; and from the very things by which they try to prove it, the argument is not hard to undo.
Explanation:
Aristotle begins by saying that the Eleatic claim that all being is one cannot stand if one follows their argument in this form. He also signals that their own premises will provide the means for answering them. This sets the tone for the chapter: he is not merely rejecting the conclusion, but showing that the reasoning offered for it collapses from within.
2. ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐριστικῶς συλλογίζονται καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ Παρμενίδης—καὶ γὰρ ψευδῆ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστοί εἰσιν αὐτῶν οἱ λόγοι—μᾶλλον δ᾿ ὁ Μελίσσου φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν ἀλλ᾿ ἑνὸς ἀτόπου δοθέντος τἆλλα συμβαίνει· τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐθὲν χαλεπόν.
Literal Translation:
“both for eristically reason-syllogistically both Melissus and Parmenides; for also false-things they-take and unsyllogistic are of-them the arguments; but rather the of-Melissus (argument is) crude and not having difficulty [but one absurdity having-been-granted the other-things follow; and this (is) in-no-way difficult].”
Translation:
For both Melissus and Parmenides argue contentiously: they take false premises, and their arguments are not valid syllogisms. But Melissus’ argument is especially crude and presents no real difficulty, since once one absurd point is granted, the rest follows easily.
Explanation:
Aristotle accuses both thinkers of arguing eristically, that is, in a contentious or merely victory-seeking way rather than with sound demonstration. Their fault is twofold: they assume false starting points and they fail to reason properly from them. Melissus is singled out as easier to refute, because his whole case depends on accepting one bad assumption, after which the rest of the mistaken conclusions simply tumble out.
3. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν παραλογίζεται Μέλισσος, δῆλον·
Literal Translation:
“that indeed therefore reasons-fallaciously Melissus, clear.”
Translation:
So that Melissus is reasoning fallaciously is clear.
Explanation:
Aristotle now turns from general criticism to direct diagnosis. He is going to show not merely that Melissus is wrong, but that the error lies in the structure of the argument itself.
4. οἴεται γὰρ εἰληφέναι, εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἅπαν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον οὐκ ἔχει.
Literal Translation:
“for he-thinks to-have-taken, if the having-come-to-be has a beginning every-(case), that also the not having-come-to-be not has.”
Translation:
For he thinks he has established that, if everything that comes to be has a beginning, then what has not come to be also has no beginning.
Explanation:
Aristotle identifies Melissus’ mistaken inference. Melissus moves from a true-looking claim about generated things, namely that whatever comes to be has a beginning, to a claim about what is ungenerated, as though the one directly implied the other. Aristotle thinks that this leap is invalid: the fact that generated things begin does not by itself settle the status of what is ungenerated.
5. εἶτα καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, τὸ παντὸς οἴεσθαι εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοῦ πράγματος καὶ μὴ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ γενέσεως μὴ τῆς ἁπλῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀθρόας γινομένης μεταβολῆς.
Literal Translation:
“next also this (is) absurd, the of-everything to-think to-be a beginning of the thing and not of the time, and of coming-to-be not of-the simple only but also of alteration, just-as not all-at-once occurring change.”
Translation:
And further this too is absurd: to think that every beginning is a beginning of the thing and not of the time, and that this applies not only to simple coming-to-be but also to alteration, as though change did not occur all at once.
Explanation:
Aristotle presses the point by distinguishing different senses of “beginning.” A thing may have a temporal beginning without there being some separate beginning belonging to its essence in the way Melissus supposes. He also reminds the reader that not all change is absolute generation; alteration is also a kind of change, and it unfolds through time. Melissus’ argument blurs these distinctions and so becomes confused.
6. Ἔπειτα διὰ τί ἀκίνητον, εἰ ἕν;
Literal Translation:
“next through what (reason) unmoved, if one?”
Translation:
Next, why must it be unmoved, if it is one?
Explanation:
Here Aristotle challenges another Eleatic assumption. Even if one granted unity, it would not yet follow that the one must be motionless. Unity and immobility are not identical notions, so the inference requires justification.
7. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ μέρος ἓν ὄν—τοδὶ τὸ ὕδωρ—κινεῖται ἐν ἑαυτῷ, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ πᾶν;
Literal Translation:
“for just-as also the part one being, this here the water, moves in itself, through what (reason) not also the whole?”
Translation:
For just as a part, though being one, for example this water here, moves within itself, why should not the whole also do so?
Explanation:
Aristotle uses a simple physical example. A single body of water can still undergo internal motion, so mere unity does not exclude movement. This shows that the Eleatic inference from oneness to rest is much too quick.
8. ἔπειτα ἀλλοίωσις διὰ τί οὐκ ἂν εἴη;
Literal Translation:
“next alteration through what (reason) not would be?”
Translation:
Next, why could there not be alteration?
Explanation:
He pushes the same point further. Even if one denied locomotion, one would still need to explain why qualitative change should be impossible. Aristotle is widening the discussion from motion in place to change more generally.
9. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ εἴδει οἷόν τε ἓν εἶναι (πλὴν τῷ ἐξ οὗ· οὕτως δὲ ἓν καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν τινες λέγουσιν, ἐκείνως δ᾿ οὔ)·
Literal Translation:
“but indeed not-even in-form possible one to-be (except in-respect-of that from-which; thus but one also of-the natural-philosophers some say, in-that-way but not).”
Translation:
Indeed, it is not even possible for it to be one in form, except in the sense of the underlying source; and in that sense some natural philosophers do speak of one, but not in the Eleatic way.
Explanation:
Aristotle now distinguishes different senses of unity. Some earlier thinkers spoke of one underlying material principle, and that claim can make sense. But that is very different from saying that being is one in the strict Eleatic sense, with no real multiplicity or difference at all.
10. ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἵππου ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει, καὶ τἀναντία ἀλλήλων.
Literal Translation:
“for human of-horse other in-form, and the-contraries of-one-another.”
Translation:
For a human being is different in form from a horse, and contraries are different from one another.
Explanation:
This sentence supplies the obvious evidence for formal plurality. Different species have different forms, and opposites are not reducible to one another. Aristotle’s point is that the world as experienced and thought already shows irreducible formal differences, so a strict claim of oneness cannot account for things as they are.
11. Καὶ πρὸς Παρμενίδην δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῶν λόγων, καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι εἰσὶν ἴδιοι·
Literal Translation:
“and against Parmenides moreover the same way of-the arguments, and if any other (arguments) are peculiar.”
Translation:
And against Parmenides too the same general mode of argument applies, along with any further points that are special to him.
Explanation:
Aristotle shifts from Melissus to Parmenides. Much of the criticism already given can be used again, though Parmenides’ own formulation also raises some distinct issues that Aristotle will address.
12. καὶ ἡ λύσις τῇ μὲν ὅτι ψευδής, τῇ δὲ ὅτι οὐ συμπεραίνεται—
Literal Translation:
“and the solution in-the-one-way because (it is) false, in-the-other because not is-concluded.”
Translation:
And the refutation is one way because the premise is false, another way because the conclusion does not follow.
Explanation:
Aristotle says Parmenides can be answered on two levels. One can deny the truth of what he assumes, and one can also deny that his conclusion follows even if the assumption were granted. This is a careful logical distinction: false premises and invalid inference are not the same problem.
13. ψευδὴς μὲν ᾗ ἁπλῶς λαμβάνει τὸ ὂν λέγεσθαι, λεγομένου πολλαχῶς,
Literal Translation:
“false indeed in-that he takes simply the being to-be-said, being-said in-many-ways.”
Translation:
It is false insofar as he takes “being” in a simple sense, though “being” is spoken in many ways.
Explanation:
This is one of Aristotle’s central criticisms. Parmenides treats “being” as though it had only one univocal meaning, but Aristotle insists that “being” has several senses. Once that is recognized, the Eleatic argument loses much of its force, because it trades on an oversimplified use of a highly flexible term.
14. ἀσυμπέραντος δὲ ὅτι, εἰ μόνα τὰ λευκὰ ληφθείη, σημαίνοντος ἓν τοῦ λευκοῦ, οὐθὲν ἧττον πολλὰ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ οὐχ ἕν.
Literal Translation:
“not-concluding but because, if only the white-things should-be-taken, while-signifying one the white, nothing less many the white-things and not one.”
Translation:
And it does not conclude, because even if only white things were taken, though “white” signifies one thing, the white things would still be many and not one.
Explanation:
Aristotle offers an analogy. A term may have one meaning without all the things falling under it becoming numerically one. Many things can be called white, even though “white” has one sense. Likewise, even if “being” had one signification, it would not follow that all beings are one thing.
15. οὔτε γὰρ τῇ συνεχείᾳ ἓν ἔσται τὸ λευκὸν οὔτε τῷ λόγῳ·
Literal Translation:
“for neither by-continuity one will-be the white nor by-account.”
Translation:
For the white will be one neither by continuity nor by definition.
Explanation:
Aristotle clarifies the analogy. The many white things do not become physically continuous into one body, nor do they become one in definition simply because they share whiteness. This helps expose the ambiguity in Parmenides’ move from unity of meaning to unity of reality.
16. ἄλλο γὰρ ἔσται τὸ εἶναι λευκῷ καὶ τὸ δεδεγμένῳ,
Literal Translation:
“for other will-be the to-be for-white and the (to-be) for-that-which-has-received-(it).”
Translation:
For being white and being that which has received whiteness will be different.
Explanation:
Aristotle distinguishes the attribute from the subject that has the attribute. Whiteness is one thing; the thing that is white is another. This distinction matters because Parmenides’ argument tends to erase the difference between what is predicated and that of which it is predicated.
17. καὶ οὐκ ἔσται παρὰ τὸ λευκὸν οὐθὲν χωριστόν·
Literal Translation:
“and not will-be beside the white nothing separate.”
Translation:
And there will be nothing separate apart from the white.
Explanation:
Aristotle is still granting the opponent’s restrictive setup for the sake of argument. Even if nothing separate is posited besides whiteness, the distinction between whiteness and the bearer of whiteness still has to be made in thought.
18. οὐ γὰρ ᾗ χωριστὸν ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶναι ἕτερον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ ᾧ ὑπάρχει.
Literal Translation:
“for not insofar-as separate but in-being different the white and that-to-which it-belongs.”
Translation:
For the white and that to which it belongs are different not as separate things, but in their being.
Explanation:
This is a subtle metaphysical point. Aristotle is not requiring spatial or independent separation between property and subject. He only insists that they differ in account or being: whiteness is not identical with the thing that is white. That is enough to undermine the Eleatic simplification.
19. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο Παρμενίδης οὔπω ἑώρα.
Literal Translation:
“but this Parmenides not-yet had-seen.”
Translation:
But Parmenides had not yet seen this.
Explanation:
Aristotle ends the point with a historical judgment. He presents Parmenides as an important thinker who nonetheless lacked later conceptual distinctions, especially the difference between a thing and what is predicated of it.
20. Ἀνάγκη δὴ λαβεῖν μὴ μόνον ἓν σημαίνειν τὸ ὄν, καθ᾿ οὗ ἂν κατηγορηθῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπερ ὂν καὶ ὅπερ ἕν.
Literal Translation:
“necessary indeed to-take not only one to-signify the being, of-whatsoever it may-be-predicated, but also what-being and what-one.”
Translation:
One must therefore assume not only that “being” signifies one thing wherever it is predicated, but also that it signifies what being itself is and what one itself is.
Explanation:
Aristotle now sharpens the requirement of the Eleatic position. It is not enough to say that the word “being” has one signification; one must also show that what is meant by being and by one is something self-identical and properly grasped. He is exposing how much the argument depends on unexamined assumptions about predication and essence.
21. τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς καθ᾿ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται·
Literal Translation:
“for the accidental according-to an underlying something is-said.”
Translation:
For what is accidental is said of some underlying subject.
Explanation:
Aristotle introduces his theory of predication. An accident is not self-standing; it is always said of some subject. This principle is essential for breaking apart the Eleatic attempt to treat all being as a single undifferentiated item.
22. ὥστε ᾧ συμβέβηκε τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔσται (ἕτερον γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος)· ἔσται τι ἄρα οὐκ ὄν.
Literal Translation:
“so-that that-to-which has-belonged the being not will-be (for different from the being); there-will-be something therefore not-being.”
Translation:
So that to which being belongs will not itself be being, since it is different from being; therefore there will be something that is not-being.
Explanation:
Aristotle is driving the Eleatic position into difficulty by using its own assumptions. If being is treated like an accident predicated of something else, then that underlying thing would have to be different from being and thus count as not-being. But the Eleatics want to exclude not-being altogether, so the position becomes self-defeating.
23. οὐ δὴ ἔσται ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχον τὸ ὅπερ ὄν.
Literal Translation:
“not indeed will-be in-another belonging the what-being.”
Translation:
Therefore what-being itself will not belong to another thing.
Explanation:
To avoid the previous absurdity, the Eleatic would have to say that being itself is not predicated of some underlying subject. Aristotle is showing how tightly constrained the position becomes once ordinary distinctions of predication are taken seriously.
24. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ὄντι αὐτῷ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πολλὰ τὸ ὂν σημαίνει οὕτως ὥστε εἶναί τι ἕκαστον·
Literal Translation:
“for not will-be for-it being to-be, if not many the being signifies thus so-as each to-be something.”
Translation:
For it will not belong to it to be, unless “being” signifies many things in such a way that each thing is something that is.
Explanation:
Aristotle argues that unless being is said in multiple ways, there is no coherent way for individual things to be what they are. This is a major Aristotelian principle: reality is articulated, and language about being must reflect that articulation.
25. ἀλλ᾿ ὑπόκειται τὸ ὂν σημαίνειν ἕν.
Literal Translation:
“but it-has-been-laid-down the being to-signify one.”
Translation:
But the assumption is that being signifies one thing.
Explanation:
This is the Eleatic premise stated plainly. Aristotle restates it so the contradiction with the previous point will stand out clearly.
26. εἰ οὖν τὸ ὅπερ ὂν μηδενὶ συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκείνῳ, τί μᾶλλον τὸ ὅπερ ὂν σημαίνει τὸ ὂν ἢ μὴ ὄν;
Literal Translation:
“if therefore the what-being to-nothing has-belonged, but that-thing, why rather the what-being signifies the being than not-being?”
Translation:
If then what-being belongs to nothing else but is just that thing itself, why should what-being signify being any more than not-being?
Explanation:
Aristotle presses the problem further. If being is made utterly self-contained and unrelated to anything else, then there is no evident reason why it should count as being rather than not-being. The Eleatic claim is supposed to secure certainty, but Aristotle argues that it dissolves the very intelligibility of being.
27. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ὅπερ ὂν ταὐτὸ καὶ λευκόν, τὸ λευκῷ δ᾿ εἶναι μὴ ἔστιν ὅπερ ὄν (οὐδὲ γὰρ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ οἷόν τε τὸ ὄν· οὐθὲν γὰρ ὂν ὃ οὐχ ὅπερ ὄν), οὐκ ἄρα ὂν τὸ λευκόν—οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥσπερ τι μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅλως μὴ ὄν.
Literal Translation:
“for if will-be the what-being the-same also white, but the for-white to-be not is what-being (for neither to-have-belonged to-it is-it-possible the being; for nothing (is) being which not (is) what-being), not therefore being the white; not thus however as some not-being, but wholly not-being.”
Translation:
For if what-being itself is also the same as white, but being white is not what-being itself, and indeed being cannot belong to it as an accident, since nothing is being that is not what-being itself, then white is not a being at all, not merely in some qualified sense of non-being, but altogether non-being.
Explanation:
This is a dense reductio argument. Aristotle shows that if one identifies being itself with some feature like white, then anything falling short of pure self-identical being gets excluded from reality altogether. The result is absurd, because whiteness can plainly be truly predicated, yet the Eleatic framework would force it into total non-being. Aristotle’s larger point is that reality cannot be understood without distinctions between essence, attribute, and subject.
28. τὸ ἄρα ὅπερ ὂν οὐκ ὄν·
Literal Translation:
“the therefore what-being not being.”
Translation:
So then what-being itself would be not-being.
Explanation:
Aristotle states the contradiction starkly. The Eleatic premises, pushed consistently, reverse themselves and make being collapse into not-being.
29. ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅτι λευκόν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ὂν ἐσήμαινεν·
Literal Translation:
“for true to-say that (it is) white, but this not-being signified.”
Translation:
For it is true to say that something is white, yet this would have signified what is not-being.
Explanation:
Aristotle appeals to ordinary truth. We do make true statements such as “it is white.” If the Eleatic theory forces such truths to refer to what is not at all, then the theory has gone wrong rather than common discourse.
30. ὥστ᾿ εἰ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν σημαίνει ὅπερ ὄν, πλείω ἄρα σημαίνει τὸ ὄν.
Literal Translation:
“so-that if also the white signifies what-being, more-than-one therefore signifies the being.”
Translation:
So if white too signifies what-being, then being signifies more than one thing.
Explanation:
This is the logical payoff. Once another predicate can be brought under the heading of being, the claim that being signifies only one thing is lost. Aristotle has shown that the Eleatic thesis cannot be maintained without contradiction.
31. Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἕξει τὸ ὄν, εἴπερ ὅπερ ὂν τὸ ὄν· ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ ἕτερον τὸ εἶναι τῶν μορίων.
Literal Translation:
“not therefore not-even magnitude will-have the being, if-indeed what-being the being; for to-each different the to-be of-the parts.”
Translation:
Therefore being will not even have magnitude, if being is what-being itself; for the being of each of its parts would be different.
Explanation:
This bracketed sentence extends the same criticism to extension and divisibility. If being were strictly self-identical in the Eleatic sense, it could not even have parts or magnitude, since each part would introduce a distinction in being. Aristotle’s point is that the doctrine strips reality of the very features needed to describe the physical world.
32. Ὅτι δὲ διαιρεῖται τὸ ὅπερ ὂν εἰς ὅπερ ὄν τι ἄλλο, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ φανερόν·
Literal Translation:
“that but is-divided the what-being into what-being something other, also by-the-account clear.”
Translation:
And that what-being is divided into other cases of what-being is clear also from the definition.
Explanation:
Aristotle now turns from reductio to positive analysis. The very structure of definition shows that being can be articulated into distinct forms or kinds. This supports his broader claim that reality is not a featureless one.
33. οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ ὄν τι, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ζῷον ὅπερ ὄν τι εἶναι καὶ τὸ δίπουν.
Literal Translation:
“for-example the human if is what-being something, necessary also the animal what-being something to-be and the two-footed.”
Translation:
For example, if man is some instance of what-being, then animal and two-footed must also be instances of what-being.
Explanation:
A definition like “man is a two-footed animal” breaks the thing into intelligible components. If man truly is, then the elements present in his definition must also in some way be. Aristotle uses this to show that being is not an indivisible block but is articulated through intelligible structures.
34. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ὅπερ ὄν τι, συμβεβηκότα ἔσται·
Literal Translation:
“for if not what-being something, accidental-things they-will-be.”
Translation:
For if they are not instances of what-being, they will be accidents.
Explanation:
If the parts of the definition are not genuinely real in their own right, they would have to be treated as accidental features. Aristotle is setting up why that option fails.
35. ἢ οὖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑποκειμένῳ.
Literal Translation:
“either therefore to-the human or to-some other underlying-(thing).”
Translation:
Either they would belong accidentally to man or to some other underlying subject.
Explanation:
This states the alternatives. If “animal” and “two-footed” are merely accidental, they must be accidents of something. Aristotle will show that neither possibility works.
36. ἀλλ᾿ ἀδύνατον·
Literal Translation:
“but impossible.”
Translation:
But that is impossible.
Explanation:
Aristotle now rejects the accidental reading outright. The next sentences explain why the terms in a definition cannot be merely incidental add-ons.
37. συμβεβηκός τε γὰρ λέγεται τοῦτο, ἢ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ οὗ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν (οἷον τὸ μὲν καθῆσθαι ὡς χωριζόμενον, ἐν δὲ τῷ σιμῷ ὑπάρχει ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ῥινὸς ᾗ φαμὲν συμβεβηκέναι τὸ σιμόν).
Literal Translation:
“for accidental indeed is-said this, either what admits to-belong and not to-belong, or of-which in the account there-belongs that-to-which it-has-belonged (for-example the sitting on-the-one-hand as separable, but in the snub there-belongs the account of-the nose to-which we-say to-have-belonged the snubness).”
Translation:
For “accidental” means either what can belong and not belong, or else something whose account includes the subject to which it belongs, as sitting is separable, while in “snub” the account of nose is included, since snubness is said to belong to a nose.
Explanation:
Aristotle gives a careful account of accident. Some accidents are separable, like sitting, which a thing may have or not have. Others are inseparable in definition, like snubness, which belongs specifically to a nose. These distinctions help him show that the parts of an essence, such as animal and two-footed in man, are not accidents at all.
38. ἔτι ὅσα ἐν τῷ ὁριστικῷ λόγῳ ἔνεστιν ἢ ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τούτων οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ ὅλου (οἷον ἐν τῷ δίποδι ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἢ ἐν τῷ λευκῷ ὁ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου).
Literal Translation:
“further as-many-things as in the defining account are-in or from which it-is, in the account of-these not is-present the account of-the whole (for-example in the two-footed the of-the human, or in the white the of-the white human).”
Translation:
Further, whatever is present in the defining account, or whatever a thing is composed from, does not in the account of those items contain the account of the whole, as the account of man is not contained in that of two-footed, nor that of the white man in that of white.
Explanation:
This is a key logical point about definitions. The parts that make up a definition do not themselves contain the whole definition of the thing defined. “Two-footed” does not already mean “man.” So these definitional elements cannot be treated as accidental predicates of the whole in the same way as ordinary attributes.
39. εἰ τοίνυν ταῦτα τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκε τὸ δίπουν, ἀνάγκη χωριστὸν εἶναι αὐτό (ὥστε ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν μὴ δίπουν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον), ἢ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ δίποδος ἐνέσται ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος.
Literal Translation:
“if therefore these-things in-this-way has the manner and to-the human has-belonged accidentally the two-footed, necessary separate to-be it (so-that it-might-admit not two-footed to-be the human), or in the account the of-the two-footed will-be-in the of-the human account.”
Translation:
If then things are this way and two-footed belongs to man accidentally, it must either be separable from him, so that man could fail to be two-footed, or else the account of man will be contained in the account of two-footed.
Explanation:
Aristotle draws out the consequences. If “two-footed” were accidental to man, then it should either be removable while man remains man, or else it would have to contain the full essence of man. But neither is acceptable. Thus “two-footed” belongs essentially, not accidentally.
40. ἀλλ᾿ ἀδύνατον·
Literal Translation:
“but impossible.”
Translation:
But that is impossible.
Explanation:
Again Aristotle states the verdict plainly. The accidental interpretation cannot stand.
41. ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐκείνου λόγῳ ἔνεστιν.
Literal Translation:
“for that in the of-that account is-in.”
Translation:
For the former is contained in the account of the latter.
Explanation:
The point is that the relation of definitional inclusion runs the other way. The more basic term belongs in the account of the more complex one, not vice versa. This preserves the structure of essence and definition.
42. εἰ δ᾿ ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκε τὸ δίπουν καὶ τὸ ζῷον καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἑκάτερον ὅπερ ὄν τι, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἂν εἴη τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἑτέρῳ.
Literal Translation:
“if but to-another has-belonged accidentally the two-footed and the animal and not is each what-being something, also the human would then be of-the accidentals to-another.”
Translation:
But if two-footed and animal belong accidentally to something else, and neither is an instance of what-being, then man too would be one of the accidents belonging to another subject.
Explanation:
Aristotle shows that the problem spreads upward. If the elements in the definition of man are merely accidental to some underlying subject, then man himself becomes accidental as well. That would strip substantial beings of their substance, which is precisely what Aristotle refuses to allow.
43. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν τι ἔστω μηδενὶ συμβεβηκός, καὶ καθ᾿ οὗ ἄμφω, καὶ ἑκάτερον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων λεγέσθω· ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτων ἄρα τὸ πᾶν.
Literal Translation:
“but let the what-being something be having-belonged-accidentally to-nothing, and that-of-which both (are said), and each and the from-these be-said; from indivisibles therefore the all.”
Translation:
Rather, let what-being itself belong accidentally to nothing, and let both predicates be said of it, each separately and also the compound made from them; the whole, then, will be composed out of indivisibles.
Explanation:
Aristotle concludes the line of reasoning by showing where the Eleatic view is pushed if it tries to avoid accidents: it arrives at a whole made from indivisible units or irreducible terms. This is not Aristotle’s own mature theory of substance here so much as a demonstration that the Eleatic assumptions force awkward consequences when applied consistently.
44. Ἔνιοι δ᾿ ἐνέδοσαν τοῖς λόγοις ἀμφοτέροις, τῷ μὲν ὅτι πάντα ἓν εἰ τὸ ὂν ἓν σημαίνει, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, τῷ δὲ ἐκ τῆς διχοτομίας, ἄτομα ποιήσαντες μεγέθη.
Literal Translation:
“some but gave-way to-the arguments both, to-the-one because all (are) one if the being one signifies, because is the not-being, and to-the-other from the dichotomy, indivisible making magnitudes.”
Translation:
Some, however, yielded to both arguments: to the first by saying that if being signifies one thing, then not-being exists; and to the second by making magnitudes indivisible in response to the dichotomy.
Explanation:
Aristotle notes that later thinkers accepted parts of these Eleatic pressures and adjusted their own views accordingly. Some admitted a kind of not-being in order to preserve plurality, while others responded to paradoxes of division by positing indivisible magnitudes. He is situating the discussion within the wider history of Greek philosophy.
45. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ὡς, εἰ ἓν σημαίνει τὸ ὂν καὶ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐκ ἔσται οὐθὲν μὴ ὄν·
Literal Translation:
“clear but also that not true that, if one signifies the being and not possible at-once the contradiction, not will-be nothing not-being.”
Translation:
It is also clear that it is not true that, if being signifies one thing and contradiction cannot hold at the same time, there will be nothing that is not-being.
Explanation:
Aristotle rejects a common Eleatic-style inference. Even if one keeps the principle of non-contradiction and grants some unity of signification, it still does not follow that every kind of not-being is impossible. The argument confuses different senses of being and non-being.
46. οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει (μὴ ἁπλῶς εἶναι ἀλλὰ) μὴ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν.
Literal Translation:
“for nothing hinders (not simply to-be but) not-being something to-be the not-being.”
Translation:
For nothing prevents not-being from being something in a qualified sense, though not being simply.
Explanation:
This is a very Aristotelian distinction. “Not-being” need not mean absolute nothingness; it can mean something that is not this or not in this way. Once this qualified sense is allowed, much of the Eleatic force disappears.
47. τὸ δὲ δὴ φάναι παρ᾿ αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν ὡς εἰ μή τι ἔσται ἄλλο, ἓν πάντα ἔσεσθαι, ἄτοπον.
Literal Translation:
“the but indeed to-say besides itself the being that if not something there-will-be other, one all will-be, absurd.”
Translation:
But indeed to say, besides being itself, that unless there is something else all things will be one, is absurd.
Explanation:
Aristotle calls out the strange demand that there must be some entity “besides being itself” in order for multiplicity to exist. He finds that formulation confused from the start, because it misunderstands what it means for things to be many.
48. τίς γὰρ μανθάνει αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν εἰ μὴ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν τι εἶναι;
Literal Translation:
“for who understands itself the being if not the what-being something to-be?”
Translation:
For who understands being itself except as some determinate what-being?
Explanation:
Aristotle brings the discussion back to intelligibility. We only grasp being when it is articulated as some definite thing. Pure undifferentiated being, stripped of all determination, is not genuinely knowable.
49. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲν ὅμως κωλύει πολλὰ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
Literal Translation:
“if but this, nothing nevertheless hinders many to-be the beings, just-as has-been-said.”
Translation:
And if that is so, nothing after all prevents beings from being many, as has been said.
Explanation:
This is the practical conclusion of the whole argument. Once being is understood through determinate forms and predications, plurality is no threat to intelligibility. Aristotle has cleared space for a world of many real beings.
50. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἓν εἶναι τὸ ὂν ἀδύνατον, δῆλον.
Literal Translation:
“that indeed therefore thus one to-be the being impossible, clear.”
Translation:
So it is clear that being cannot be one in this way.
Explanation:
Aristotle closes the discussion by summing up the result. The Eleatic thesis, at least in the strict form he has examined, fails because it rests on false assumptions about being, predication, and unity, and because it cannot account for motion, change, form, or multiplicity. The chapter therefore clears the ground for Aristotle’s own account of nature as a realm of many beings undergoing real change.
The sources, goals, method, outline, and direction of this lesson are the work of Mr. William C. Michael, O.P., Headmaster of the Classical Liberal Arts Academy. The written copy has been composed from his materials and instructions with the assistance of artificial intelligence tools, and reviewed and approved by him before publication.
