Aristotle begins this chapter by examining the errors of earlier philosophers who claimed that reality is “one” and therefore denied the possibility of change and motion. Since natural philosophy studies things that move and change, Aristotle argues that anyone who denies motion destroys the very subject of physics itself. He shows that although beings may be united in one respect, they are not simply one in every respect, for the world plainly reveals diversity, opposition, generation, and corruption. In this lesson, students should pay careful attention to Aristotle’s method: he does not merely assert the truth, but carefully distinguishes meanings and examines the consequences of false principles. The chapter therefore introduces an essential habit of philosophical reasoning—namely, that truth is preserved through careful distinctions. As you read, consider how Aristotle defends the reality of nature, change, and multiplicity against abstract theories that contradict experience and reason.
1. Ἀνάγκη δ᾿ ἤτοι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ πλείους· καὶ εἰ μίαν, ἤτοι ἀκίνητον (ὥς φησι Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος) ἢ κινουμένην (ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοί, οἱ μὲν ἀέρα φάσκοντες εἶναι οἱ δ᾿ ὕδωρ τὴν πρώτην ἀρχήν)· εἰ δὲ πλείους, ἢ πεπερασμένας ἢ ἀπείρους· καὶ εἰ πεπερασμένας πλείους δὲ μιᾶς, ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ ἀριθμόν· καὶ εἰ ἀπείρους, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἓν σχήματι δὲ ἢ εἴδει διαφερούσας, ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας.
Literal Translation:
“(It is) necessary and either one to be the principle or more; and if one, either unmoved (as Parmenides and Melissus say) or being-moved (just as the natural philosophers, some indeed saying air to be, others but water, the first principle); but if more, either limited or unlimited; and if limited and more than one, either two or three or four or some other number; and if unlimited, either thus just as Democritus, one in kind but in shape or in form differing, or even contraries.”
Translation:
The principle must be either one or many. If it is one, it must be either unmoving, as Parmenides and Melissus say, or moving, as the natural philosophers say, some holding air and others water to be the first principle. If it is many, then it must be either finite or infinite; and if finite and more than one, then either two, three, four, or some other number. If infinite, then either, as with Democritus, they are one in kind but differ in shape or form, or they are even contraries.
Explanation:
Aristotle opens by laying out the full field of possible positions about first principles. He is classifying earlier thinkers by the number and character of the principles they propose. The method is important: before arguing, he maps the logical options. This sets up the rest of the chapter, where he tests these alternatives and shows which kinds of claims about being and nature can actually stand.
2. Ὁμοίως δὲ ζητοῦσι καὶ οἱ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦντες πόσα· ἐξ ὧν γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἐστί, πρῶτον ζητοῦσι ταῦτα πότερον ἓν ἢ πολλά, καὶ εἰ πολλά, πεπερασμένα ἢ ἄπειρα· ὥστε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον ζητοῦσι πότερον ἓν ἢ πολλά.
Literal Translation:
“Similarly and they-seek also the ones the beings seeking how-many; out of which for the beings are, first they-seek these whether one or many, and if many, limited or unlimited; so-that the principle and the element they-seek whether one or many.”
Translation:
In the same way, those who inquire how many beings there are ask the same questions. For they first ask whether the things out of which beings are constituted are one or many, and if many, whether they are finite or infinite. So they are asking whether the principle and the element are one or many.
Explanation:
Aristotle connects the question about principles with the question about beings themselves. To ask how many kinds of things there are at the most basic level is really to ask about first principles and elements. He is narrowing the discussion: ontology and natural philosophy meet here, because both ask what reality is fundamentally made of.
3. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν.
Literal Translation:
“for (a) principle (is) of some-(thing) or of some-(things).”
Translation:
For a principle is a principle of something or of some things.
Explanation:
This brief sentence gives Aristotle’s basic definition. A principle is never sheer isolation; it is always the starting point of something else. That matters because a theory claiming absolute unity in such a way that nothing proceeds from it risks destroying the very meaning of “principle.”
4. ὅμοιον δὴ τὸ σκοπεῖν εἰ οὕτως ἓν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην θέσιν ὁποιανοῦν διαλέγεσθαι τῶν λόγου ἕνεκα λεγομένων (οἷον τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον, ἢ εἴ τις φαίη ἄνθρωπον ἕνα τὸ ὂν εἶναι) [ἢ λύειν λόγον ἐριστικόν, ὅπερ ἀμφότεροι μὲν ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι, καὶ ὁ Μελίσσου καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδου—καὶ γὰρ ψευδῆ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστοί εἰσιν—μᾶλλον δ᾿ ὁ Μελίσσου φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν].
Literal Translation:
“like indeed the to-examine whether thus one and toward another position whatsoever to-discuss of the for-argument’s-sake said-(things) (for example the Heraclitean, or if someone should-say man one the being to-be) [or to-loosen a contentious argument, which indeed both have the arguments, both that of Melissus and that of Parmenides—for both false-(things) they-take and unsyllogistic they-are—but rather that of Melissus (is) crude and not having difficulty].”
Translation:
To examine whether being is one in this way is much like arguing against any other thesis put forward merely for the sake of argument, such as the Heraclitean one, or as if someone were to say that man alone is being. It is also like refuting an eristic argument, which both the arguments of Melissus and Parmenides are, since they assume false premises and are not valid syllogisms, though Melissus’ argument is the cruder one and raises no real difficulty.
Explanation:
Aristotle lowers the status of these monist arguments. He suggests that some of them do not belong to serious inquiry into nature at all, but are closer to verbal or contentious exercises. His criticism is both logical and methodological: the arguments begin from false assumptions and fail to reason properly. That is why he treats them as worth handling only in a limited way.
5. ἀλλ᾿ ἑνὸς ἀτόπου δοθέντος τὰ ἄλλα συμβαίνει· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν χαλεπόν.
Literal Translation:
“but of one absurdity having-been-granted the other-(things) follow; and this (is) nothing difficult.”
Translation:
But once one absurdity is granted, the rest follow; and that is not at all difficult.
Explanation:
Aristotle means that a bad starting point can generate many further errors automatically. If a philosopher accepts one impossible assumption, the rest of the system may unravel by itself. This is part of his broader concern with first principles: getting the starting point wrong corrupts everything that comes after.
6. ἡμῖν δ᾿ ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια κινούμενα εἶναι· δῆλον δ᾿ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.
Literal Translation:
“to-us but let-it-be-laid-down the things by-nature either all or some being-moved to-be; clear but from the induction.”
Translation:
Let it be assumed for us that things that exist by nature are either all in motion or at least some are; and this is clear from induction.
Explanation:
This is Aristotle’s fundamental starting point for natural science. Nature is the realm of things that move or undergo change. Since observation shows that natural things do move, a theory denying motion simply fails to address nature as we actually encounter it. That is why Aristotle can set such theories aside from physics proper.
7. ἅμα δ᾿ οὐδὲ λύειν ἅπαντα προσήκει, ἀλλ᾿ ἢ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν τις ἐπιδεικνὺς ψεύδεται, ὅσα δὲ μή, οὔ (οἷον τὸν τετραγωνισμὸν τὸν μὲν διὰ τῶν τμημάτων γεωμετρικοῦ διαλῦσαι, τὸν δ᾿ Ἀντιφῶντος οὐ γεωμετρικοῦ).
Literal Translation:
“at-the-same-time but not-even to-refute all-(things) is-fitting, but either as-many-as from the principles someone showing proves-falsely, but as-many-as not, not (for example the quadrature the one indeed through the segments (is for) a geometer to-refute, but that of Antiphon not (for) a geometer).”
Translation:
At the same time, it is not appropriate to refute every argument, but only those in which someone goes wrong while reasoning from the principles; those that do not do this need not be addressed. For example, it belongs to the geometer to refute the quadrature by means of segments, but not the quadrature of Antiphon.
Explanation:
Aristotle is drawing a line around the proper task of a science. A discipline must answer errors relevant to its own principles, not every confused claim anyone might make. The example from geometry shows that some mistakes are internal and deserve technical refutation, while others fall outside the science because they miss the subject so badly.
8. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἐπειδὴ περὶ φύσεως μὲν οὔ, φυσικὰς δὲ ἀπορίας συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ἴσως ἔχει καλῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν διαλεχθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν· ἔχει γὰρ φιλοσοφίαν ἡ σκέψις.
Literal Translation:
“nevertheless but since concerning nature indeed not, natural difficulties but it-happens to-say to-them, perhaps it-holds well for a little to-discuss concerning them; for it-has philosophy the inquiry.”
Translation:
Still, since they are not really speaking about nature, but they do happen to raise difficulties relevant to natural philosophy, it may be worthwhile to discuss them briefly; for the inquiry has philosophical interest.
Explanation:
Aristotle grants that these arguments, though not properly physical, still touch questions a natural philosopher must understand. So he will not ignore them entirely. This shows his intellectual fairness: even confused arguments can force clearer thinking if they raise genuine puzzles.
9. Ἀρχὴ δὲ οἰκειοτάτη πασῶν, ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν, πῶς λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες εἶναι ἓν τὰ πάντα, πότερον οὐσίαν τὰ πάντα ἢ ποσὰ ἢ ποιά· καὶ πάλιν πότερον οὐσίαν μίαν τὰ πάντα (οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἕνα ἢ ἵππον ἕνα ἢ ψυχὴν μίαν) ἢ ποιόν, ἓν δὲ τοῦτο (οἷον λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων)· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα διαφέρει τε πολὺ καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγειν.
Literal Translation:
“Beginning but most-proper of all, since in-many-ways is-said the being, how they-say the ones saying to-be one all-things, whether substance all-things or quantities or qualities; and again whether one substance all-things (for example one man or one horse or one soul) or a quality, one but this (for example white or hot or some other of the such-things); for these all differ both greatly and impossible (it is) to-say.”
Translation:
The most appropriate starting point of all, since being is said in many ways, is to ask how those who say that all things are one mean this: do they mean that all things are substance, or quantity, or quality? And again, do they mean that all things are one substance, such as one man or one horse or one soul, or one quality, such as white or hot or some other such thing? For all these possibilities differ greatly, and some are impossible to maintain.
Explanation:
Aristotle now applies one of his most important principles: “being” is said in many ways. Before refuting the claim that all things are one, he insists that we must ask in what category this “one” is being asserted. This is a classic Aristotelian move, because many philosophical errors come from failing to distinguish substance, quantity, and quality.
10. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐσία καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιόν—καὶ ταῦτα εἴτ᾿ ἀπολελυμένα ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων εἴτε μή—πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα· εἰ δὲ πάντα ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, εἴτ᾿ οὔσης οὐσίας εἴτε μὴ οὔσης, ἄτοπον, εἰ δεῖ ἄτοπον λέγειν τὸ ἀδύνατον. οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· πάντα γὰρ καθ᾿ ὑποκειμένου τῆς οὐσίας λέγεται.
Literal Translation:
“if indeed for there-will-be both substance and quantity and quality—and these whether separated from one-another or not—many (are) the beings; but if all-(things are) quality or quantity, whether substance existing or not existing, absurd, if one-must absurd call the impossible. for nothing of the others separate is apart from substance; for all-(things) according to (a) subject of substance are-said.”
Translation:
For if there are substance, quantity, and quality, whether these are separate from one another or not, then beings are many. But if everything is quality or quantity, whether substance exists or not, that is absurd, if the impossible is to be called absurd. For none of the other categories exists separately apart from substance; all are predicated of substance as their subject.
Explanation:
Here Aristotle uses his doctrine of categories against radical monism. If substance, quantity, and quality are all real, then being is already many in an essential way. But if someone tries to reduce everything to quality or quantity, that fails because qualities and quantities depend on a substance in which they exist. Substance is primary.
11. Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ ὂν ἄπειρον εἶναί φησιν. ποσὸν ἄρα τι τὸ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ ἄπειρον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, οὐσίαν δὲ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἢ ποιότητα ἢ πάθος οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (εἰ ἅμα καὶ ποσὰ ἄττα εἶεν)· ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ἀπείρου λόγος τῷ ποσῷ προσχρῆται, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῷ. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν καὶ οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ ποσόν, δύο καὶ οὐχ ἓν τὸ ὄν· εἰ δ᾿ οὐσία μόνον, οὐκ ἄπειρον, οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἕξει οὐδέν· ποσὸν γάρ τι ἔσται.
Literal Translation:
“Melissus but the being infinite to-be says. a quantity therefore something the being; for the infinite (is) in the quantity, but substance infinite to-be or quality or affection not is-possible unless by-accident (if at-the-same-time also quantities some they-should-be); for the account of the infinite makes-use-of quantity, but not substance nor the quality. if indeed therefore also substance it-is and quantity, two and not one the being; but if substance only, not infinite, nor magnitude will-it-have none; for a quantity something it-will-be.”
Translation:
Melissus says that being is infinite. Therefore being must be some sort of quantity, for the infinite belongs in the category of quantity. It is not possible for substance, quality, or affection to be infinite except accidentally, if they were also quantities in some respect. For the account of the infinite uses quantity, not substance or quality. If, then, being is both substance and quantity, it is two and not one; but if it is substance alone, it will not be infinite and will have no magnitude at all, since magnitude is a kind of quantity.
Explanation:
Aristotle presses Melissus by category-analysis. To call being “infinite” is already to treat it quantitatively. But if being has quantity as well as substance, then it is not simply one. If it is only substance, then calling it infinite makes no sense. This is a sharp example of Aristotle’s method: he refutes a thesis by showing that its own language commits it to distinctions it denies.
12. Ἔτι ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν πολλαχῶς λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, σκεπτέον τίνα τρόπον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἓν τὸ πᾶν. λέγεται δ᾿ ἓν ἢ τὸ συνεχὲς ἢ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ ὧν ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἷς ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὥσπερ μέθυ καὶ οἶνος.
Literal Translation:
“further since also itself the one in-many-ways is-said just-as also the being, one-must-examine in-what way they-say to-be one the all. and one is-said either the continuous or the indivisible or of-which the account the same and one the of the what-it-was-to-be, just-as strong-drink and wine.”
Translation:
Further, since “one” itself is said in many ways, just as “being” is, we must examine in what way they say that the whole is one. For “one” may mean the continuous, or the indivisible, or things whose account and essence are one, as with “strong drink” and “wine.”
Explanation:
Aristotle now shifts from the many senses of “being” to the many senses of “one.” This is crucial, because a philosophical claim can seem deep while resting on an ambiguity. Unity can mean continuity, indivisibility, or sameness in definition. Unless that is clarified, the claim that all things are one remains too vague to evaluate.
13. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν συνεχές, πολλὰ τὸ ἕν· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ διαιρετὸν τὸ συνεχές. (ἔχει δ᾿ ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὅλου—ἴσως δὲ οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλ᾿ αὐτὴν καθ᾿ αὑτήν—πότερον ἓν ἢ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ πῶς ἓν ἢ πλείω· καὶ εἰ πλείω, πῶς πλείω· καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῶν μὴ συνεχῶν· καὶ εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ ἓν ἑκάτερον ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς.)
Literal Translation:
“if indeed therefore continuous, many the one; to infinity for divisible the continuous. (there-is but a difficulty concerning the part and the whole—perhaps but not toward the argument but itself in itself—whether one or more the part and the whole, and how one or more; and if more, how more; and concerning the parts the not continuous; and if to-the whole one each as indivisible, because also themselves to-themselves.)”
Translation:
If, then, the one is continuous, the one is many, since the continuous is divisible without limit. There is also a difficulty about part and whole, perhaps not for this argument but in itself: whether the part and the whole are one or many, and how they are one or many; and similarly about parts that are not continuous; and if each part is one with the whole as indivisible, then each will also be one with itself.
Explanation:
Aristotle argues that continuity does not solve the problem of unity, because what is continuous is also divisible. So calling all things “one” in the sense of a continuous whole still leaves multiplicity within it. The parenthetical note shows Aristotle’s habit of spotting deeper puzzles that branch out from the immediate debate.
14. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, οὐθὲν ἔσται ποσὸν οὐδὲ ποιόν· οὐδὲ δὴ ἄπειρον τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ Μέλισσος φησιν.
Literal Translation:
“but indeed if as indivisible, nothing will-be quantity nor quality; nor indeed infinite the being, just-as Melissus says.”
Translation:
But if the one is taken as indivisible, then it will have neither quantity nor quality; nor, accordingly, will being be infinite, as Melissus says.
Explanation:
If absolute unity means indivisibility, then the thing cannot have extension, magnitude, or qualitative determination. That directly conflicts with Melissus’ claim that being is infinite. Aristotle is showing that different monist claims undermine one another when examined carefully.
15. Τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ ἓν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ ὂν σκοπεῖν οὐ περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι σκοπεῖν· ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τῷ γεωμέτρῃ οὐκέτι λόγος ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀνελόντα τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀλλ᾿ ἤτοι ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης ἢ πασῶν κοινῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῷ περὶ ἀρχῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀρχή ἐστιν, εἰ ἓν μόνον καὶ οὕτως ἕν ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἀρχή τινος ἢ τινῶν φησιν· οὐδὲ πεπερασμένον, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης, τὸ γὰρ πέρας ἀδιαίρετον, οὐ τὸ πεπερασμένον.
Literal Translation:
“the indeed therefore whether one and unmoved the being to-examine not concerning nature is to-examine; just-as for also to-the geometer no-longer argument is toward the one having-done-away-with the principles, but either of-another science or common to-all, thus neither to-the one concerning principles; for no longer (a) principle it-is, if one only and thus one it-is; for the principle principle of something or of some-things says; nor limited, as Parmenides (says), for the limit (is) indivisible, not the limited-(thing).”
Translation:
To investigate whether being is one and unmoving is not to investigate nature. For just as the geometer has no longer any argument against someone who abolishes the principles, except perhaps one belonging to another science or common to all sciences, so too the student of principles cannot argue with such a person. For if being is only one in this way, it is no longer a principle at all, since a principle is a principle of something or of some things. Nor can it be finite, as Parmenides says, since the limit is indivisible, not the limited thing.
Explanation:
This is one of the chapter’s key claims. A theory that denies plurality and motion removes itself from φυσική, the study of nature. Aristotle compares this to geometry: if someone rejects the basic starting points, the science cannot proceed with him from within its own method. He also repeats that a principle must stand in relation to what comes from it, so sheer isolated unity cannot function as a principle.
16. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τῷ λόγῳ ἓν τὰ ὄντα πάντα (ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον), τὸν Ἡρακλείτου λόγον συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς· ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔσται ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ—ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, καὶ οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα ὁ λόγος ἔσται αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μηδέν—καὶ τὸ τοιῳδὶ εἶναι καὶ τοσῳδὶ ταὐτόν.
Literal Translation:
“but indeed if in account one the beings all-(are) (as cloak and garment), the of Heraclitus account it-happens them to-say; for the same it-will-be to-good and to-bad to-be and not-good and good—so-that the same will-be good and not good and man and horse, and not concerning the one to-be the beings the argument will-be for-them but concerning the nothing—and the to-be of-such-a-kind and of-so-much (are) the same.”
Translation:
But if all beings are one in account, as “cloak” and “garment” are one, then they end up saying Heraclitus’ doctrine. For being will be the same for good and bad, and for not-good and good; so the same thing will be good and not good, man and horse. Then their argument will no longer be about beings being one, but about nothing being anything definite at all; and being of such a quality and being of such a quantity would be the same.
Explanation:
Aristotle here attacks semantic monism, the idea that all things are one because they share one account. If this is pushed far enough, distinctions collapse completely: good and bad, man and horse, quality and quantity. That does not establish unity; it destroys intelligibility. Aristotle sees this as a slide into emptiness rather than a real ontology.
17. Ἐθορυβοῦντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι τῶν ἀρχαίων ὅπως μὴ ἅμα γένηται αὐτοῖς τὸ αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά.
Literal Translation:
“they-were-troubled but also the later ones of the ancients how not at-the-same-time there-come-to-be for-them the same one and many.”
Translation:
Even the later thinkers among the ancients were troubled about how the same thing might not turn out to be both one and many at once.
Explanation:
Aristotle notes that later philosophers recognized the problem. Once one begins carefully analyzing unity, multiplicity keeps reappearing. This shows that the tension between one and many was a central and persistent issue in early Greek philosophy, not something Aristotle is inventing.
18. διὸ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἔστιν ἀφεῖλον (ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων), οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετερρύθμιζον, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λευκός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ λελεύκωται, οὐδὲ βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ βαδίζει, ἵνα μή ποτε τὸ ἔστι προσάπτοντες πολλὰ εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἕν, ὡς μοναχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τοῦ ὄντος.
Literal Translation:
“therefore some indeed the ‘is’ removed (just-as Lycophron), but others the expression altered, because the man not white is but has-been-whitened, nor walking is but walks, in-order-that not ever the ‘is’ attaching they-make many to-be the one, as in-only-one-way being-said the one or the being.”
Translation:
Therefore some removed the word “is,” as Lycophron did, while others altered their wording, saying not “man is white” but “man has been whitened,” and not “man is walking” but “man walks,” so that by attaching “is” they might not make the one become many, on the assumption that “one” or “being” is said in only one way.
Explanation:
Aristotle describes linguistic strategies used to avoid the conclusion that one thing can be many in different respects. By changing grammar, these thinkers hoped to avoid multiplying being. Aristotle thinks this is misguided, because the real issue is conceptual, not merely verbal. The mistake comes from assuming that “being” has only one sense.
19. πολλὰ δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἢ λόγῳ (οἷον ἄλλο τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι καὶ μουσικῷ, τὸ δ᾿ αὐτὸ ἄμφω· πολλὰ ἄρα τὸ ἕν) ἢ διαιρέσει, ὥσπερ τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὰ μέρη.
Literal Translation:
“many but the beings either in account (for example other (is) the to-white to-be and to-musical, but the same both; many therefore the one) or by division, just-as the whole and the parts.”
Translation:
But beings are many either in account, as being white and being musical are different though they belong to the same thing, so that the one is therefore many, or by division, as with the whole and its parts.
Explanation:
Aristotle gives two straightforward senses in which multiplicity is real. One thing can have multiple accounts or predicates, and one whole can be divided into parts. These examples show that unity and multiplicity are not always contradictory. A single thing can be one in one respect and many in another.
20. ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἤδη ἠπόρουν καὶ ὡμολόγουν τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι—ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον ταὐτὸν ἕν τε καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι, μὴ τἀντικείμενα δέ· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἓν καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ.
Literal Translation:
“here but already they-were-at-a-loss and they-were-agreeing the one many to-be—as if not possible the same one both and many to-be, but not the opposites; for there-is the one both in-potentiality and in-actuality.”
Translation:
At this point they fell into perplexity and even admitted that the one is many, as though the same thing could not be both one and many, though not opposites in the same respect; for the one exists both potentially and actually.
Explanation:
Aristotle ends this stretch by pointing toward his own solution. The problem arises when philosophers assume that one and many are simply flat opposites. But the same thing can be one and many in different ways, especially once we distinguish potentiality and actuality. This anticipates a major Aristotelian strategy: careful distinctions dissolve false contradictions.
The sources, goals, method, outline, and direction of this lesson are the work of Mr. William C. Michael, O.P., Headmaster of the Classical Liberal Arts Academy. The written copy has been composed from his materials and instructions with the assistance of artificial intelligence tools, and reviewed and approved by him before publication.
