Return to St. Albert the Great, Logic
Prelection
In this opening chapter on the nature of logic, St. Albert the Great introduces students to one of the most important foundations of all liberal learning: the right use of reason. Logic is not merely a school subject or an exercise in argument, but the art by which the mind is guided from what is known to what is unknown, from confusion to understanding, and from error to truth. Following Aristotle and the ancient philosophical tradition, St. Albert explains that logic serves every science because it teaches the intellect how to define, judge, and reason correctly. As students of the Classical Liberal Arts Academy, you should approach this study with humility and seriousness, recognizing that clear thinking is necessary not only for philosophy and theology, but for the pursuit of wisdom itself. Through the careful discipline of logic, the mind is prepared to contemplate truth in an orderly way, and ultimately to direct all knowledge toward the knowledge of God, who is Truth itself.
Chapter 01. Utrum logica sit scientia et specialis?
1. Intentionibus primum de logica, considerandum est qualis scientia sit logica, et an sit aliqua pars Philosophiæ, et ad quid necessaria, et cujus utilitatis: deinde autem de quo est,et quæ divisio ipsius: ut habitis omnibus partibus ipsius sciatur quando est perfecte vel imperfecte tradita vel descripta.
Literal Translation:
“Concerning intentions first about logic, to-be-considered is of-what-sort science may-be logic, and whether it may-be some part of Philosophy, and unto what (it may be) necessary, and of-what utility: then moreover about what it is, and what division of-it: so that, all the parts of-it having-been-had, it may-be-known when it is perfectly or imperfectly handed-down or described.”
Translation:
First, concerning logic, one must consider what kind of science logic is, whether it is some part of philosophy, for what it is necessary, and what usefulness it has. Then one must consider what it is about and what its division is, so that once all its parts have been set forth, it may be known when it has been taught or described perfectly or imperfectly.
Explanation:
This sentence lays out a very scholastic program for introducing a discipline. Before treating the details of logic, the author says we should first ask foundational questions: what sort of knowledge logic is, whether it belongs within philosophy, why it is needed, and what good it does. Only after that should we ask about its subject matter and its internal divisions. The final clause shows why this matters: if we know the whole structure of logic and all its parts, then we can judge whether an account of logic is complete or incomplete. For students, this is a classic example of the medieval habit of beginning with order and definition before argument, so that the learner knows both what the science is and how its parts fit together.
2. Circa omnia enim hæc diversa dicere videntur Antiqui.
Literal Translation:
“Concerning all indeed these (things) diverse (things) to-say seem the Ancients.”
Translation:
For on all these points, the Ancients seem to speak in different ways.
Explanation:
This sentence explains why the earlier questions about logic must be examined carefully. The reason is that the ancient authorities do not all speak with one voice about these matters, but appear to differ from one another. In a scholastic context, that is an important starting point: when respected earlier thinkers seem to disagree, the task is not simply to choose one at random, but to distinguish the issues clearly and arrive at a well-ordered judgment. For students, this line shows the method of beginning inquiry from apparent disagreement among authorities, which then invites careful definition and resolution.
3. Quidam enim Antiquorum logicum nullam esse scientiam contenderunt, dicentes non posse esse scientiam id quod est omnis scientae sive doctrinae modus.
Literal Translation:
“For certain of-the-Ancients logic no science to-be contended, saying not to-be-able to-be science that which is of-every science or of-teaching mode.”
Translation:
For some of the Ancients maintained that logic is not any science, saying that what is the method of every science or doctrine cannot itself be a science.
Explanation:
This sentence gives one side of the dispute mentioned just before. Some ancient thinkers argued that logic should not be called a science in its own right, because they understood it as a general method used by all the sciences rather than as one distinct field of knowledge among others. In other words, if logic is the tool or mode by which every science teaches and reasons, they thought it cannot itself stand alongside those sciences as another member of the same class. For students, this is an important scholastic question: is logic merely an instrument of knowing, or is it also something that can be studied as a true science with its own subject and principles?
4. Modus autem omnis doctrinae logica est: eo quod aliquo generat persuasionis utitur omnis qui docet, vel astruere conatur aliquid: omnis autem persuasio per sermonem logica est, sive syllogismo, sive enthymemate, sive inductione, sive exemplo utatur qui docet vel persuadet.
Literal Translation:
“But mode moreover of-every teaching logical is: by-this that some genus of-persuasion uses every (one) who teaches, or to-establish attempts something: every moreover persuasion through speech logical is, whether syllogism, whether enthymeme, whether induction, whether example may-use (he) who teaches or persuades.”
Translation:
Now the method of every teaching is logical, because everyone who teaches or tries to establish something uses some kind of persuasion. And every persuasion that works through speech is logical, whether the one teaching or persuading uses a syllogism, an enthymeme, an induction, or an example.
Explanation:
This passage explains the reasoning behind the earlier claim that some ancients denied that logic is a science. Their argument is that logic is the mode or method present in every act of teaching, because teaching always involves leading someone to assent through some form of persuasion. Since this persuasion takes place through speech and reasoning, it belongs to logic whether it is fully demonstrative, as in a syllogism, or less formal, as in an enthymeme, induction, or example. For students, the key point is that logic is here being viewed as the common rational structure of all instruction and argument, which is why some thinkers treated it more as an instrument used by the sciences than as a separate science itself.
5. Modus igitur omnis doctrinae logicæ est.
Literal Translation:
“The mode therefore of every teaching logical is.”
Translation:
Therefore, the method of every teaching is logical.
Explanation:
This sentence draws the conclusion from the previous argument. Since every teacher uses some form of rational persuasion, and every such persuasion through speech belongs to logic, it follows that the method of all teaching is logical. In the larger scholastic discussion, this supports the position that logic is universal in use: it is present wherever teaching, reasoning, or demonstration occurs. For students, the line is important because it shows why some thinkers hesitated to call logic a distinct science. If logic functions as the common method of all instruction, it can seem more like an instrument used by every science than a separate field alongside them.
6. Et sic omnis doctrinae modus est scientiae logica.
Literal Translation:
“And thus of-every teaching the mode is of-science logic.”
Translation:
And thus the method of every teaching belongs to logic as a science.
Explanation:
This sentence seems to restate the previous conclusion, but the wording as given is somewhat uncertain, especially in the phrase scientiae logica. The basic point is still clear enough: logic is being presented as the mode or method that underlies all teaching. In the flow of the argument, this supports the view that logic is not merely one science among others in the ordinary way, but the rational method employed throughout all sciences and forms of instruction. For students, the important idea is that logic here is being treated as the universal framework of teaching and reasoning, which is why some ancient thinkers placed it in a special category.
7. Nulla igitur est doctrina specialis, quae logica sit dicenda.
Literal Translation:
“No therefore is (a) special teaching, which logical may-be to-be-called.”
Translation:
Therefore, there is no special doctrine that ought to be called logic.
Explanation:
This is the conclusion of the argument being presented from those ancient thinkers. If logic is the method used in every kind of teaching, then, they reason, it cannot also be a distinct and special doctrine of its own. In other words, something universal to all the sciences does not seem to belong to one particular science as its proper subject. For students, this is an important step in the debate because it sharpens the problem: is logic only the common method of all disciplines, or can it still be studied as a distinct body of knowledge? The rest of the discussion will need to answer that challenge.
8. Propter quod et Aristoteles in secundo primae philosophiae suae, et similiter Averroes dicunt omnis scientiae modum esse ipsam scientiam quae est et vocatur logica, et quod non simul addisci potest scientia et scientae modus, sed oportet prius discere modum, et deinde per modum iam perfecte apprehensum, addiscere tentare scientiam.
Literal Translation:
“On account of which also Aristotle in the second of-his first philosophy, and similarly Averroes say of-every science the mode to-be the very science which is and is-called logic, and that not at-the-same-time to-be-learned can science and of-science mode, but it-behooves first to-learn the mode, and then through the mode now perfectly apprehended, to-learn to-attempt the science.”
Translation:
Because of this, Aristotle in the second book of his First Philosophy, and likewise Averroes, say that the method of every science is that very science which is and is called logic; and they say that a science and the method of that science cannot be learned at the same time, but one must first learn the method, and then, through that method once it has been perfectly grasped, try to learn the science.
Explanation:
This sentence strengthens the argument by appealing to major authorities. The point is that logic is so fundamental to learning that it must be acquired before the other sciences can be properly studied. If logic is the method by which every science proceeds, then a student cannot learn a science well without first understanding the mode of reasoning that governs it. For students at the Academy, this is an important scholastic principle: right method comes before full mastery of subject matter. Logic is therefore presented not merely as one topic among others, but as the intellectual instrument that prepares the mind to learn the other sciences in an orderly and disciplined way.
9. Sed non satis consideraverunt, quod quamvis scientiae sint multae, et quaelibet specialem habeat modum, qui differt a modo alterius, sicut et unaquaeque scientia differt ab altera: est tamen unus communis modus scientiae per quoddam commune quod est in omni scientia.
Literal Translation:
“But not sufficiently they-considered, that although sciences may-be many, and each (one) a special mode may-have, which differs from the mode of-another, just as also each science differs from another: there-is nevertheless one common mode of-science through a certain common (thing) which is in every science.”
Translation:
But they did not consider sufficiently that, although there are many sciences, and each has its own special method, which differs from the method of another just as each science differs from another, there is nevertheless one common method of science by reason of a certain common feature that is present in every science.
Explanation:
Here the author begins to answer the earlier objection. He grants part of what the ancients said: there are indeed many sciences, and each science has its own proper method suited to its own subject matter. But he adds that this is not the whole story, because all sciences also share something in common, and from that common element there arises a common mode of scientific reasoning. This is a crucial scholastic distinction. Logic need not be denied the status of a science simply because it is used by all the sciences. Rather, logic can study what is common to scientific reasoning as such, while the individual sciences still retain their own special methods. For students, this is the beginning of the resolution: logic is universal not because it replaces all the sciences, but because it considers what belongs to them all in common.
10. Et hoc est quod per investigationem rationis ex cognito devenitur ad cognitionem incogniti: hoc enim fit in omni scientia quocumque modo dicta, sive sit demonstrativa, sive non demonstrativa.
Literal Translation:
“And this is that by the investigation of reason from the known it-is-come to the cognition of-the-unknown: this indeed is-done in every science in-whatever mode spoken, whether it may-be demonstrative, or non-demonstrative.”
Translation:
And this is the point: through the inquiry of reason one proceeds from what is known to the knowledge of what is unknown. For this happens in every science, however it may be described, whether it is demonstrative or non-demonstrative.
Explanation:
This sentence explains what the common method of all science actually is. The author says that every science shares this basic pattern: reason begins from something already known and moves from there to knowledge of something not yet known. That movement from known to unknown is the universal rational process that logic studies. It does not belong only to strict demonstrative sciences, where conclusions are proved with necessity, but also to other kinds of disciplined inquiry that are not demonstrative in the same way. For students, this is a key step in the argument, because it shows why logic can be a true science of its own: it considers the common structure of reasoning that is at work in every kind of learning.
11. Et gratia illius communis, est in omni scientia modus unus communis omnis scientiae.
Literal Translation:
“And on-account-of that common (thing), there is in every science one common mode of-every science.”
Translation:
And because of that common element, there is in every science one common method shared by every science.
Explanation:
This sentence draws the conclusion from the previous point. Since every science proceeds by reason from what is known to what is unknown, there is a common feature present in them all. Because of that shared feature, one can speak of a single common method belonging to every science. This is important for the larger argument about logic, because it shows that logic can study something genuinely universal without erasing the differences among the individual sciences. For students, the point is that logic concerns the common rational pattern found in every science, even though each science also has its own proper subject matter and special way of proceeding.
12. Et hic modus est per actum rationis, qui ratiocinio sive argumentatio est, de cognitione cogniti procedens in scientiam ejus quod erat incognitum, secundum quod Isaac in libro de Diffinitionibus rationem diffiniens, dicit quod ratio est animae intellectualis virtus, faciens currere causam in causatum.
Literal Translation:
“And this mode is through act of-reason, which reasoning or argumentation is, from cognition of-the-known proceeding into knowledge of-that which was unknown, according-to that which Isaac in the book On Definitions, defining reason, says that reason is of-the intellectual soul the power, making to-run the cause into the caused.”
Translation:
And this method works through an act of reason, which is reasoning or argumentation, proceeding from knowledge of what is known to knowledge of that which was unknown. Accordingly, Isaac, defining reason in the book On Definitions, says that reason is a power of the intellectual soul that makes the cause run into the thing caused.
Explanation:
This sentence gives a fuller definition of the common method shared by all the sciences. That method is the act of reason itself, namely reasoning or argumentation, by which the mind moves from what it already knows to knowledge of what it did not yet know. The citation from Isaac is meant to clarify the nature of reason: reason is a power of the intellectual soul that traces the relation between cause and effect, moving from one to the other. In scholastic thought, this is a very important description, because it shows that reasoning is not random mental activity but an ordered movement of the mind. For students, the key idea is that logic studies this universal act of rational progression, the disciplined motion by which the intellect advances from known principles toward new understanding.
13. Causam generaliter vocans et large, omne quod secundum intellectum simpliciter, vel quoad nos antecedit ut cognitum, per cuius cognitionem ductu rationis devenitur in notitiam incogniti.
Literal Translation:
“Cause generally calling and broadly, every (thing) which according to intellect simply, or as-to us, precedes as known, through whose cognition by-guidance of reason it-is-come into notice of-the-unknown.”
Translation:
Using the word “cause” in a general and broad sense, he means anything that, either in itself according to the intellect or in relation to us, comes before as known, and through the knowledge of which, under the guidance of reason, one arrives at knowledge of what was unknown.
Explanation:
This sentence explains that the word cause is being used here in a wide sense, not only for a strict efficient or metaphysical cause. It means anything known beforehand that can serve as a starting point for reason’s movement toward something not yet known. The distinction between what is prior “according to the intellect simply” and what is prior “with respect to us” is important in scholastic thought: something may be more intelligible in itself, or it may be what we know first in our actual process of learning. For students, the main point is that reasoning begins from some prior known principle or fact and is led from that starting point into new knowledge; this is exactly the universal movement of mind that logic studies.
14. Hic autem modus quamvis communis sit per hoc quod ponitur in qualibet scientia, tamen secundum se consideratus, et non immixtus scientiis, est quoddam per se distinctum ab omnibus aliis.
Literal Translation:
“But this mode although common it may-be by this that it is posited in every science, nevertheless according to itself considered, and not mingled-with the sciences, is a certain (thing) through itself distinct from all others.”
Translation:
But although this method is common because it is found in every science, nevertheless, when it is considered in itself and not as mixed in with the sciences, it is something distinct in its own right from all the others.
Explanation:
This sentence is a key step in resolving the earlier objection. The author grants that the method of reasoning is common to every science, since all the sciences use it. But he adds an important distinction: if that method is considered in itself, apart from its use within the individual sciences, then it stands as something properly distinct. This is how logic can be both universal and yet still have its own status. For students, the central point is that a thing does not cease to be a proper object of study simply because it is used everywhere. Logic is present throughout the sciences, but when we study reasoning itself as reasoning, we are studying something with its own distinct character.
15. Et hoc modo consideratus hic modus, potest esse subjectum scientiae, et scientia specialis de ipso est: in qua tamen scientia eumdem modum observari necesse est, quia scientia talis modi non nisi modo logico doceri potest: ut enim dixit Avicenna, modus hic omnibus hominibus (per hoc quod intellectuales sunt quodammodo per naturam) inditus est.
Literal Translation:
“And in this way considered this mode, can be subject of-science, and science special concerning it is: in which nevertheless science the-same mode to-be-observed necessary is, because science of-such mode not except by-logical mode to-be-taught can: for as said Avicenna, this mode to-all men (through this that intellectual they are in-a-certain-way by nature) has-been-bestowed.”
Translation:
And when this method is considered in this way, it can be the subject of a science, and there is a special science about it. In that science, however, the same method must necessarily be observed, because the science of such a method can be taught only in a logical way. For, as Avicenna said, this method has been bestowed on all men, insofar as they are by nature intellectual in a certain way.
Explanation:
This sentence brings the argument to an important conclusion: because the common method of reasoning can be considered in itself, it can become the proper subject of a distinct science, namely logic. Yet there is also a kind of reflexive feature here: logic must use the very method it studies, since the science of reasoning can only be taught by reasoning. The appeal to Avicenna adds the further point that this logical power is not something wholly artificial or foreign to us, but is in some way naturally given to human beings as intellectual creatures. For students, the key idea is that logic is both natural and disciplined: it grows out of a power already present in the human mind, but it becomes a true science when that power is examined, ordered, and taught systematically.
16. Sed imperfectus est qui ainnatura est: perficitur autem per artem adhibitam.
Literal Translation:
“But imperfect is what by-nature is: it-is-perfected moreover through art having-been-applied.”
Translation:
But what exists by nature is imperfect; it is brought to perfection by the application of art.
Explanation:
This sentence continues the point made just before about logic being in some way naturally present in human beings. The author says that what is given by nature is not yet complete in its developed form, but must be perfected through art, that is, through disciplined training and systematic instruction. In this context, the meaning is that human beings naturally possess the power of reasoning, but logic as an art helps refine, direct, and complete that power. The form ainnatura in your text appears uncertain and is very likely to mean a natura or something equivalent, but the sense of the sentence is still clear: nature provides the beginning, and art brings that beginning to fuller perfection.
17. Id enim quod in natura est, seminarium et imperfectum est, et quasi in potentia existens.
Literal Translation:
“For that which in nature is, seminal and imperfect is, and as-if in potency existing.”
Translation:
For what is present in nature is in a seminal and imperfect state, existing as it were in potency.
Explanation:
This sentence explains more precisely why nature alone is not enough for full perfection. What is in us by nature exists first like a seed: real, but undeveloped; present, but not yet brought to completion. The word seminarium suggests something germinal or seed-like, and in potentia indicates that it exists as a capacity that can be further actualized. In the context of the discussion of logic, the point is that the power of reasoning belongs to human nature from the beginning, but it is initially only a potential or incomplete possession. For students, this is a classic scholastic theme: nature gives the starting principle, while art and discipline bring that principle to fuller act and perfection.
18. Ex hoc enim quod homo intellectualis est et intelligentiae stratum, in quo sternuntur formae intellectuales in actu luminis intelligentiae, et per intellectum compositivus est unius formae cum alia per compositionem vel divisionem, fit homo admirativus eorum quae comprehendit accipiendo per sensum et intellectum, vel per intellectum solum.
Literal Translation:
“For from this that man intellectual is and of-intelligence (a) substrate, in which are-spread forms intellectual in (the) act of-(the) light of-intelligence, and through intellect compositive he is of-one form with another through composition or division, man becomes wonder-filled of-those-things which he comprehends receiving through sense and intellect, or through intellect alone.”
Translation:
For because man is intellectual and is a kind of substrate for intelligence, in which intellectual forms are laid out in the actual light of understanding, and because through intellect he is able to combine one form with another by composition or division, man becomes filled with wonder at the things he grasps, whether by receiving them through sense and intellect together or through intellect alone.
Explanation:
This sentence explains why wonder arises naturally in man. Because the human being is intellectual, he is capable of receiving intelligible forms and of actively working with them in thought. The phrase about composition and division refers to the mind’s power to join or separate concepts in judgment, which is one of the basic acts of rational thinking. As man receives things through sense and then understands them, or even considers some things by intellect alone, he becomes struck with wonder at what he apprehends. For students, this is an important philosophical point: wonder is not a weakness or confusion, but a sign of the intellect awakening to reality and beginning the movement toward knowledge.
19. Per hoc autem quod admirativus est, suspenditur ad inquisitionem, et per inquisitionem comparat unum alteri.
Literal Translation:
“But through this that wonder-filled he is, he-is-suspended unto inquiry, and through inquiry he-compares one (thing) to-another.”
Translation:
And because he is filled with wonder, he is drawn into inquiry, and through inquiry he compares one thing with another.
Explanation:
This sentence describes the next step in the movement of knowledge. Wonder does not leave the mind idle; rather, it holds the mind in attention and moves it toward inquiry. In that inquiry, the intellect begins to compare things, setting one beside another in order to understand their relations. This is a very important scholastic account of how human knowing begins and develops: wonder leads to investigation, and investigation works by comparison. For students, the line shows that reasoning does not arise out of emptiness, but from the mind’s amazement before reality and its desire to understand by making careful distinctions and connections.
20. Per comparationem autem unius cum altero, ab eo quod est notum deducitur ad ignoti notitiam.
Literal Translation:
“But through comparison of one with another, from that which is known it-is-led to knowledge of-the-unknown.”
Translation:
And by the comparison of one thing with another, one is led from what is known to knowledge of what is unknown.
Explanation:
This sentence states very clearly the basic movement of reasoning. By comparing one thing with another, the mind starts from something already known and is led onward to knowledge of something not yet known. In the context of the whole passage, this is one more step in the account of how logic arises from the natural activity of the intellect: wonder leads to inquiry, inquiry leads to comparison, and comparison leads from the known to the unknown. For students, this is a concise statement of the rational process itself, and it helps explain why logic can be studied as the science of that process.
21. Et sic hic logicae modus a natura quidem incipit: perficitur autem arte, et usu et exercitio recipit perfectionem: sicut et Victorinus optime dicit, quod natura facit habilem, ars facilem, usus autem potentem: sic enim natura perfectae sunt omnes artes et omnes scientiae.
Literal Translation:
“And thus this mode of-logic from nature indeed begins: it-is-perfected however by art, and by use and exercise it receives perfection: just-as also Victorinus most-well says, that nature makes capable, art (makes) facile, use however (makes) powerful: for thus by nature all arts and all sciences are perfected.”
Translation:
And so this method of logic does indeed begin from nature, but it is perfected by art, and through use and exercise it receives its full perfection. As Victorinus also says very well, nature makes one capable, art makes one skillful, and use makes one powerful. For in this way all the arts and all the sciences are brought to perfection.
Explanation:
This sentence gathers the whole argument into a clear educational principle. Logic begins in a natural power already present in man, but that natural beginning is not enough by itself. Art, meaning disciplined instruction, gives form and order to that native capacity, while repeated use and exercise bring it to maturity and strength. The quotation from Victorinus expresses this beautifully: nature gives aptitude, art gives trained facility, and practice gives real power. For students, the point is that learning logic is not the addition of something alien to the mind, but the cultivation and completion of a power already planted in human nature; and the same pattern holds, the author says, for all the arts and sciences.
22. Et hinc est, quod ars naturam imitatur.
Literal Translation:
“And from-here it-is, that art nature imitates.”
Translation:
And from this it follows that art imitates nature.
Explanation:
This brief sentence states a classic philosophical principle. Because the arts perfect powers and tendencies that are already rooted in nature, art does not work against nature but follows and imitates it. In the context of the discussion of logic, the point is that the art of logic is not an artificial imposition on the human mind; rather, it develops and orders the natural movement of reason itself. For students, this is an important scholastic idea: good art and disciplined learning do not replace nature, but bring nature’s beginnings toward their proper completion.
23. Et sicut dicit Hesiodus: Quidam per solam naturam in talibus sunt perfecti et boni: quidam autem non per naturam, sed quia Doctores talium in animo ponunt: et illi boni efficiuntur talia in animo ponentes, per comprehensionem principiorum artis et scientae: quidam vero tam erronei sunt, quod nihil talium in se habent, nec ab aliis suscipere possunt, quos Hesiodus ad verum et bonum congnoscendum reputat inutiles.
Literal Translation:
“And just as says Hesiod: certain (men) through nature alone in such (things) are perfect and good: certain (men) however not through nature, but because teachers place such (things) in (the) mind: and those are made good, placing such (things) in (the) mind, through comprehension of principles of-art and of-science: certain (men) indeed truly so errant are, that nothing of-such (things) in themselves they have, nor from others can they receive, whom Hesiod for the true and good to-be-known judges useless.”
Translation:
And as Hesiod says, some men are perfect and good in such matters by nature alone. Others are not so by nature, but become so because teachers place such things in their minds; and these become good by receiving such things inwardly through grasping the principles of art and science. But others are so misguided that they have nothing of this kind in themselves and cannot receive it from others; these Hesiod judges useless for knowing the true and the good.
Explanation:
This passage extends the discussion of nature, art, and instruction by dividing learners into kinds. Some are naturally well disposed and excel almost on their own; others need teachers, but can still become good by receiving instruction and understanding the principles of an art or science. A third group, however, is described as so disordered that they neither possess the needed disposition within themselves nor are able to receive it from others. In context, the point is educational as well as philosophical: human beings differ in their readiness for truth, but teaching remains genuinely powerful for those whose minds can be formed. The sentence also reinforces the larger scholastic theme of the passage, namely that science and art perfect the mind by bringing its natural capacities into act.
24. Patet igitur quod logica una est specialium scientiarum, sicut in fabrlii in qua specialis est ars fabricandi malleum: cuius tamen usus omnibus adhibetur, quae arte fabrili fabricantur .
Literal Translation:
“It-is-clear therefore that logic one is of-special sciences, just-as in smith-craft in which special is (the) art of-fabricating (a) hammer: of-which nevertheless (the) use to-all (things) is-applied, which by-art smithly are-fabricated.”
Translation:
It is clear, therefore, that logic is one of the special sciences, just as in the smith’s craft there is a special art of making a hammer, although the use of that hammer is applied to all the things that are made by the smith’s art.
Explanation:
This sentence gives a very vivid comparison to resolve the whole debate. Logic is said to be a special science in its own right, even though it is used everywhere, just as the art of making a hammer is one particular skill within the smith’s craft, yet the hammer itself is used for making many different things. The point is that something can be both distinct in itself and widely useful in many other activities. That is exactly how the author wants us to understand logic: it has its own proper subject matter, but its use extends throughout the other sciences. The form fabrlii in your text appears to be a faulty reading for something like fabrili or a related form, but the comparison with the smith’s craft is still clear from the context.
25. Investigatio enim, sive ratio investigans ignotum per notum, specialis quoddam est, quod passiones habet et differentias et partes et principia: quae dum de ipso probantur, ars et scientia efficitur specialis, cuius usus postea omnibus adhibetur scientiis.
Literal Translation:
“For investigation, or reason investigating the unknown through the known, a certain special (thing) is, which passions has and differences and parts and principles: which, while concerning it are proved, art and science it-is-made special, whose use afterwards to-all is-applied sciences.”
Translation:
For inquiry, or reason investigating the unknown through the known, is a certain special thing that has properties, differences, parts, and principles. And when these are demonstrated concerning it, it becomes a special art and science, whose use is afterward applied to all the sciences.
Explanation:
This sentence completes the argument for why logic can truly be called a special science. The act of inquiry itself, that is, reason moving from what is known to what is unknown, is not just a vague universal tool; it has its own structure, properties, divisions, and first principles. Because it has this definite intelligible content, it can be studied in an ordered way, and when those features are demonstrated, there arises a distinct art and science of it, namely logic. For students, the key point is that logic is universal in usefulness but special in subject matter: it is used by all the sciences, yet it is itself a proper field of study because reasoning has its own nature that can be analyzed and taught.
25. Sic igitur patet, quod logica generaliter dicta, scientia est specialis, de qua nunc est tractandum.
Literal Translation:
“Thus therefore it-is-clear, that logic generally called, science is special, concerning which now it-is to-be-treated.”
Translation:
Thus, then, it is clear that logic, generally speaking, is a special science, and it is this science that must now be treated.
Explanation:
This sentence serves as the formal conclusion to the whole preceding argument. After answering the objection that logic is merely the common method of all teaching, the author now states plainly that logic is indeed a distinct or special science. It is “general” in the sense that its use extends across all the sciences, but it is still “special” because it has its own subject matter and can be studied in its own right. For students, this is an important scholastic resolution: logic is both universal in usefulness and distinct in nature. Having established that point, the author now says the proper treatment of logic can begin.
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