Diction, also, will possess what is decorous, if it is pathetic and ethical, and analogous to the subject matter. But the analogous is effected by neither speaking of things grand and magnificent slightly, nor of abject things, venerably, and magnificently; nor giving ornament to a vile appellation. For if this is not adopted, the composition will appear to be a comedy; which is the case with that of Cleon. For some things which he writes, are just as if a man should say, “A venerable fig.” Diction becomes pathetic, by reciting insolent behaviour in the language of an angry person. But when conduct has been impious and shameful, then the diction becomes pathetic, by speaking indignantly, and cautiously; and when conduct has been laudable, this is effected by speaking with admiration. But in things of a lamentable nature, the pathetic is produced by a humble diction. And the like method must be adopted in other things. Appropriate diction, also, persuades to the truth of a thing. For the soul of the auditor is deceived by false reasoning, in consequence of conceiving that the orator speaks the truth; because the auditors are thus affected in such like orations. Hence, they fancy that things are as the orator says, though they are not so. The auditor, likewise, becomes similarly affected with him who speaks pathetically, though he should say nothing to the purpose. Hence, many astonish the hearers, by the tumultuous manner in which they deliver their orations. Moreover, ethical diction is a demonstration from signs, because this when appropriate is consequent to every genus and habit. But I mean by genus, indeed, age; such as a child, or a man, or an old man; sex, as man or woman; and nation, as a Lacedæmonian, or Thessalian. And by habits, I mean those things which produce the variety of conditions in life; for the lives of men are not such as they are according to every habit. If, therefore, the diction has appellations adapted to the habit, it will become ethical. For a rustic and a well educated man, will not say the same things, nor speak after the same manner. But the auditors are somewhat affected by that figure, which the writers of orations abundantly use; as, “Who does not know this? All men know it.” For the auditor, from shame confesses that he participates of that knowledge, of which every one else partakes. Opportune, however, or not opportune use is common to all the species. But the remedy in every hyperbole is that celebrated advice self-correction; for it is necessary that the orator should correct himself. For the thing then appears to be true, though it may seem to be incredible, because the incredibility of it is not concealed from the orator. Farther still, every thing analogous is not to be used at once; for thus the artifice will be concealed from the bearer. I mean for instance, that if the names are harsh, yet must not the voice, or countenance, or other appropriate things, be such as to express that harshness; otherwise, it will become manifest what each of these is. But if the names are harsh, and the voice or countenance is not adapted to such names, the artifice will be latent. If, therefore, soft things be spoken harshly, and harsh things gently, they will lose the power of persuading. But epithets and compound words, if they are numerous, and especially such as are foreign, are adapted to him who speaks pathetically. For we pardon the orator, who when enraged calls some evil heaven-reaching, or immense. These epithets, also, and compound words, may be used by the orator, when he has already moved the auditors, and inspired them with a divine fury, either by praising or dispraising, or by exciting them to anger or love, which Isocrates does in his Panegyric, towards the end, where he has the words “fame and memory.” And “those who endured.” For those who are agitated with a divine fury, speak things of this kind, so that the auditors admit what is said, in consequence of being similarly affected. Hence, this form of diction is also adapted to poetry; for poetry partakes of divine inspiration. Either, therefore, this form of diction must be adopted in the cases already mentioned, or irony must be employed, as it was by Gorgias, and Socrates in the Phædrus of Plato.
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