Let anger, therefore, be the appetite in man of apparent revenge in conjunction with pain, in consequence of a seeming neglect or contempt of himself, or of some one belonging to him. If, therefore, anger is this, it is necessary that he who is angry should always be angry with some particular person; as for instance, with Cleon, but not with man; and that he is angry because Cleon has done or intended to do something to himself, or to some one belonging to him. It is also necessary that a certain pleasure arising from the hope of revenge, should be consequent to all anger. For it is pleasant for a man to fancy that he shall obtain the object of his desire; but no one aspires after those things which appear to him to be impossible. He who is angry, however, aspires after things which it is possible for him to obtain. Hence it is well said by Achilles concerning anger, that, Anger increases in the mortal breast, Sweeter than trickling honey to the taste, For a certain pleasure is consequent to anger both on this account, and because the thoughts of those who are angry are entirely employed on revenge. The phantasy, therefore, or imagination which is then ingenerated in the soul, produces pleasure, in the same manner as the imagination which is ingenerated in dreams. Since, however, neglect is the energy of opinion about that which appears to deserve no regard; (for we conceive that both good and evil, and what contributes to these are worthy of attention, but such things as are nothing, or very trifling, we conceive to be of no worth whatever)—hence, there are three species of neglect, viz. contempt, insolence and contumely. For that which men despise they neglect; since they despise that which they conceive to be of no worth; and those things which are of no worth they neglect. He also who insults another person appears to despise him; for insult is an impediment to the will of another person, not that he who offers the insult may derive a certain advantage himself, but that he may prevent the person insulted from deriving it. Since, therefore, he does not expect to derive any advantage himself, he neglects the other person. For it is evident that he does not apprehend any injury will accrue to himself from the insult; since if he did, he would be afraid, and would not neglect the person he insults; nor any advantage to the person insulted, which, deserves to be mentioned; for if he did he would be anxious to make him his friend. He, also, who acts contumeliously towards another neglects him; for contumely is to injure and pain another person in those things in which shame befalls the sufferer, and this not that any thing else may be done to him than what is done, but that he may receive pleasure from the act. For those who return an injury do not act contumeliously, but take revenge. The cause, however, of pleasure to those that calumniate is this, that they fancy they excell in a greater degree by acting ill. Hence, young men and those that are rich are contumelious; for they fancy that they thus acquire a superiority to others. But ignominy pertains to contumely; and he who disgraces another neglects him. For that which is of no worth, has no honour either of evil or good. Hence, Achilles when angry says, The affront my honour stains, While he my valour’s guerdon thus detains. And, Disgrac’d, dishonour’d, like the vilest slave. As being enraged on account of these things. Men also think it fit that they should be greatly honoured by those who are inferior to them in birth, in power, in virtue, and in short, in that in which they very much excel another person; as for instance, the rich man excels the poor man in money; the rhetorician excels in speaking him who is unable to speak; the governor him who is governed; and he who fancies himself worthy to command, him who deserves to be commanded. Hence, it is said, Great is the wrath of Jove-descended kings. And, For tho’ we deem the short-liv’d fury past, Tis sure the mighty will revenge at last. For men are indignant on account of their transcendency. Men, likewise, think that they ought to be greatly honoured by those by whom any one should think they ought to be benefitted; but these are such as they have benefitted, or do benefit, either they themselves, or some one belonging to them, or such as they do wish, or have wished to benefit. It is now therefore manifest from these things, how men are disposed when they are angry, and with whom, and from what causes they are angry. For they are angry, indeed, when they are aggrieved. For he who is aggrieved desires something; whether he is aggrieved by any opposition directly made against him; as when a man is prevented from drinking that is thirsty; or if an opposition is not directly made against him, yet it appears to be made indirectly; or if any one acts contrary to him, or does not co-operate with him; or if any thing else disturbs him thus disposed,—from all these circumstances he is angry. Hence the sick, the poor, those that are in love, those that are thirsty, and in short those that desire any thing, and do not act rightly, are disposed to be angry, and are easily provoked, and especially with those that neglect their present condition. Thus for instance, the sick are angry with those that neglect them in things pertaining to their disease; the poor, with those that neglect them in things pertaining to their poverty; warriors with those that neglect them in warlike affairs; and lovers with those that neglect them in amatory concerns; and in a similar manner in other things. For each is prepared to exercise his anger against those that neglect them, by the inherent passion. Farther still, men are likewise disposed to be angry when things happen contrary to their expectation. For that which is very much contrary to opinion is more grievous, just as what is very much contrary to opinion produces delight, if that which is wished for is accomplished. Hence, also, seasons and times, and dispositions and ages render it apparent what kind of persons are easily disposed to anger, and when and where; and that when they are most in these circumstances, they are most easily excited to anger. Men, likewise, are angry with those that laugh at, deride and mock them; for by so acting they insult them. They are also angry with those that offend them in such things as are indications of contumely. But it is necessary that these should be things of such a kind, as are not directed to any other end, and are of no advantage to those that do them; for they appear to be done solely through contumely. Men also are angry with those that defame and despise things to which they are most devoted. Thus for instance, those that are ambitious of excelling in philosophy, are angry with those who speak contemptuously of philosophy; those who pay great attention to the form and beauty of the body, are angry with those that despise it; and in a similar manner in other things. This also is much more the case, if they suspect that they either do not at all possess these things, or do not firmly possess them, or do not appear to do so. But when they fancy they very much excell in those things for which they are reviled, they pay no attention to the scoffs of others. Men are likewise angry with their friends more than with those that are not their friends; for they think it is more proper that they should be benefitted by them than not. They are also angry with those who have been accustomed to honour, or pay attention to them if they no longer associate with them as formerly; for they fancy that by so acting they are despised by them. They are likewise angry with those that do not return the kindness which they have received, nor make an equal recompense; and also with those who act contrary to them, if they are their inferiours; for all such things appear to be attended with contempt; the one indeed as of inferiours, but the other as by inferiours. They are also angry in a greater degree, if they are despised by men of no account; for anger was supposed by us to arise from undeserved neglect or contempt; but it is fit that inferiours should not despise their superiours. Men likewise are angry with their friends if they do not speak or act well, and still more so, if they do the contraries to these. Also, if they are not sensible of their wants; as was the case with the Plexippus of Antipho when he was angry with Meleager; for it is a sign of neglect not to be sensible of the wants of a friend; since those things are not concealed from us to which we pay attention. They are likewise angry with those that rejoice in their misfortunes, and in short with those who are not at all concerned when they are in adversity; for this is an indication either of hostility or neglect. Also with those who pay no attention to them when they are aggrieved; on which account they are angry with those who are the messengers of evil. And likewise with those who willingly hear or see their maladies; for in this case, such persons resemble either those who neglect them, or their enemies. For friends condole with their friends in their afflictions; and all men grieve on surveying their own maladies. They are likewise angry with five kinds of persons by whom they are neglected; with those with whom they stand in competition for honour; with those they admire; with those by whom they wish to be admired; with those whom they reverence; and with those by whom they are reverenced. For if they are neglected by any of these, they are in a greater degree angry. They are also angry with those who despise them, by injuring their parents, children, wives, and such as are in subjection to them, and whom it would be disgraceful in them not to assist. Likewise with those that are ungrateful; for neglect or contempt from these is unbecoming. They are also angry with such as employ irony and dissimulation towards those who are seriously employed; for irony pertains to contempt. Likewise with those that benefit others, but not themselves; for this also indicates contempt, not to think a man deserving of that which all other persons are thougt to deserve. Forgetfulness also is productive of anger, as for instance, of names, though it is but a trifling thing. For forgetfulness seems to be an indication of neglect; since oblivion is produced from negligence; and negligence is inattention. And thus we have shown who the persons are by whom anger is excited, how they are disposed, and from what causes others are angry with them. It is likewise evident that an orator ought to frame his auditors to such a temper as they are in when they are angry, and show that the opponents are guilty of those things which excite anger, and that they are such persons as men are accustomed to be angry with.
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