He who directs his attention to a polity, what each is, and what the quantity which it possesses, should nearly consider, in the first place, what a city is. For now this is a subject of doubt; some, indeed, asserting that the city has performed a certain deed, but others, not the city, but the oligarchy, or the tyrant. We see, however, that the whole business of the politician and legislator is conversant with a city. But a polity is a certain order of those who inhabit a city. Since, however, a city pertains to things of a composite nature, in the same manner as any thing else which belongs to wholes, indeed, but is composed of many parts, it is evident that we must first enquire what a citizen is. For a city is a certain multitude of citizens; so that it must be considered whom we ought to call a citizen, and who is a citizen. For a citizen is frequently a subject of doubt; since all persons do not acknowledge the same person to be a citizen. For he who is a citizen in a democracy, is frequently not a citizen in an oligarchy. Those, therefore, who obtain this appellation in a different way, such for instance as denizens, we shall omit. A citizen, however, is not a citizen from the place in which he inhabits; for both strangers and slaves partake of habitation in common. Nor are those citizens who are in such a way partakers of justice, as to sue and be sued; for this also is granted to those who bargain and traffic with citizens. Frequently, therefore, strangers do not perfectly partake of these things, without the protection of a patron, to whom it is necessary they should apply; on which account, they in a certain respect imperfectly partake of a community of this kind. Hence, it must be said of these, as of boys, who are not yet, on account of their age enrolled, or of old men who are dismissed from public service, that they are in a certain respect citizens, yet not completely so, but with some exceptions; for the one are imperfect, and the other worn out, or something else of this kind; since it makes no difference. What we mean, however, is evident. For we investigate one who is simply a citizen, and who is not accused of any such thing as we have mentioned, which requires correction; since similar doubts and solutions of those doubts may be adduced respecting those who are banished or infamous. Nothing, however, more characterizes a citizen simply and absolutely so called, than having a share in the judicial and executive part of the government. But with respect to offices, some are determined according to time, so that the same person is not, in short, permitted to fill them twice; or by certain definite times; or they are indefinite, such as the office of a judge and a pleader. Perhaps, therefore, some one may say, that such persons are not magistrates, and that they have no share in the government; though it is ridiculous to say that those who have the greatest authority have no part in the magistracy. The dispute, however, is about a name. For that which is common to a judge and a pleader is anonymous, and it is dubious what both these ought to be called. Let it, therefore, for the sake of a definition, be denominated an indefinite magistracy. And we consider those persons to be citizens, that after this manner have a share in the government. Such, therefore, nearly is the person who of all those who are called citizens, is most appropriately entitled to this appellation. It is necessary, however, not to be ignorant, that of things in which the subjects are specifically different, and one of which is first, another second, and another in a consequent order, that which is common is either nothing at all, so far as they are such, or has but a slender subsistence. But we see that polities specifically differ from each other, and that some of them are posterior, and others prior; for those that have deficiencies and degeneracies, must necessarily be posterior to those that are without such faults. What, however, we mean by degeneracies, will be hereafter evident. Hence a citizen must necessarily differ according to the difference of polities; so that he who, in a democracy, is especially said to be a citizen, may also be a citizen in other polities, but not necessarily. For in some states the people have no power, nor have they any general assembly, but a few select men. The trial, also, of different causes is assigned to different persons; as in Lacedæmon, the disputes concerning contracts are decided by some of the ephori; but the senate decide in cases of murder. And perhaps some other magistrate is a judge in other offences. The same method, also, is adopted in Carthage; for certain magistrates determine all causes. The definition, however, we have given of a citizen, will admit of correction. For in other polities, the authority of a pleader and a judge is not indefinite, but is defined according to the office. For in these, either all or some of the citizens, are permitted to plead and judge, either about all, or about certain things. Who a citizen is, therefore, is from these things evident. For he who is permitted to share in the deliberative or judicial part of government, is, as we say, a citizen of that city in which such permission is given. But a city is, in short, a multitude of such persons, sufficient for all the requisite purposes of life.
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