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1. Those things are said to be Relatives that are said to be what they are from belonging to other things, or in whatever other way they may be referred to something else.
2. Thus, the greater is that which it is, by being so called with reference to something else; for it is said to be greater than an individual thing. And the double is that which it is by being so called with reference to somethings else; for it is said to be the double of an individual thing. And in a similar manner with respect to other things of this kind. Such things, however, are among the number of relative, such as habit, disposition, sense, science, position. For all that we have enumerated are what they are, by being so called from belonging to other things, or in whatever other manner they may be referred to something else; nor are they any other things. For habit is said to be the habit of some one; science the science of something; and position the position of something; and in a similar manner with respect to other things. Relatives therefore are such things as are said to be what they are, from belonging to other things.
3. Or in whatever other manner they may be referred to something else. Thus, the mountain is said to be great. The similar also is said to be similar to something; and others things of this kind are in like manner said to be what they are with relation to something.
4. Reclining, however, standing still, and sitting, are certain positions; and position is among the number of Relatives. But to recline, or to stand still, or to be seated, are not indeed themselves positions, but are paronymously denominated from the above-mentioned positions.
5. Contrariety, however, is inherent in Relatives. Thus, virtue is contrary to vice, each of them being a relative; and science is contrary to ignorance.
6. But contrariety is not inherent in all Relatives; for to the double nothing is contrary, nor to the triple, nor to any things of this kind.
7. Relatives, however, appear to receive the more and the less. For the similar and the dissimilar are said to be so more and less; and the equal and the unequal are said to be so more and less; each of them being a relative. For the similar is said to be similar to something; and the unequal, unequal to something.
8. All Relatives, however, do not receive the more and the less. For the double is not said to be more and less double, nor anyone of things of this kind.
9. But all Relatives are referred to things which reciprocate. Thus, a servant is said to be a servant of a master; and a master, the master of a servant. The double also is the double of the half; and the half is the half of the double. The greater is greater than the less; and the less is less than the greater. The like also takes place in other things; except that they sometimes differ in diction by case. thus, knowledge is said to be the knowledge of that which is knowable; and that which is knowable is knowable by knowledge. Sense also is the sense of that which is sensible; and that which is sensible is sensible by sense.
10. Sometimes, however, they do not appear to reciprocate, if that is not appropriately attributed to which a thing is referred but he who attributes errs. thus, wing, if it is attributed to bird does not reciprocate, nor can we say bird of a wing; for the first is not appropriately attributed, viz. wing to bird. For wing is not predicated of it so far as it is bird, but so far as it is winged; since there are wings of many other things which are not birds. Hence, if it is appropriately attributed, it also reciprocates, thus, wing is the wing of that which is winged; and that which is winged is winged by wing.
11. Sometimes, however, it is, perhaps, necessary to invent a name if a name is not given to that to which it may be appropriately attributed. Thus, rudder, if it is attributed to ship, is not appropriately attributed. For rudder is not predicated of ship, so far as it is ship, since there are ships without rudders; and hence they do not reciprocate. For ship is not said to be the ship of a rudder. But, perhaps, the attribution will be more appropriate, if it is thus, attributed: rudder is the rudder of that which is ruddered; or in some other way; for a name is not assigned. And a reciprocation takes place, if it is appropriately attributed; for that which is ruddered is ruddered by a rudder. In a similar manner also in other things. Thus, head will be more appropriately attributed to that which is headed, than to animal. For a thing has not a head so far as it is an animal; since there are many animals which have not a head.
12. And perhaps someone may thus, easily assume those things to which a name is not given, if from those things which are first, he assigns names to those also with which they reciprocate; as in the instances above reduced, from wing, winged, and from rudder, ruddered.
13. All Relatives therefore, if they are appropriately attributed, are referred to things with which they reciprocate. For if they should be attributed to any thing casual, and not to the things to which they are truly referred, they will not reciprocate. But, I say, that neither will any thing reciprocate, if it is attributed to any things accidental to them, and not to that to which it is referred. thus, servant, if he is not attributed as the servant of master, but of man, or biped, or any things else of this kind, will not reciprocate; for the attribution is not appropriate.
14. If, however, that to which a thing is referred, is appropriately attributed, everything else which is accidental being taken away, and this things alone being left, to which it is appropriately attributed, if will always be referred to it. Thus, servant, if he is referred to master, everything else being taken away which is accidental to master, as the being a biped, the being capable of science, and the being a man, and his being a master, is alone left; in this case the servant will always be referred to him. For a servant is said to be the servant of a master.
15. But if that to which it is at any time referred is not appropriately attributed; other things being taken away, and that alone being left, to which it is attributed; in this case it will not be referred to it. For let a servant be referred to man, and a wing to bird and let the being a master be taken away from man; for servant will no longer be referred to man; since master not existing neither does servant exist. In a similar manner also, let the being winged be taken away from bird; and wing will no longer be in the number of Relatives; for that which is winged not existing, neither will wing be the wing of any things.
16. Hence it is necessary to attribute that to which a thing is appropriately referred. And if, indeed, a name is assigned, the attribution becomes easy; but if it is not assigned, it is perhaps necessary to invent a name. But being thus, attributed, it is evident that all Relatives are referred to things which reciprocate.
17. Relatives, however, appear to be naturally simultaneous; and in most of them, it is true that they are. For the double and the half are simultaneous; and the half existing, the double is; the master existing, the servant is; and the servant existing, the master is. Other things also are similar to these. They likewise co-subvert each other. For the double not existing, the half is not; and the half not existing, the double is not. The like also takes place in other things which are of this kind.
18. It does not, however, seem to be true in all Relatives, that they are simultaneous by nature. For the object of science may appear to be prior to science; since for the most part, with things pre-existing, we obtain the sciences of them. For in few things, or in none, can anyone see science originating together with the object of science.
19. Farther still, the object of science being subverted, co-subverts science; but science does not co-subvert the object of science. For the object of science not existing, the science of the object is not; but science not existing, nothing hinders but that the objects of science may exist. thus, in the quadrature of the circle, if it is an object of scientific knowledge, the science of it does not yet exist, though it is itself an object of science. Again, animal being taken away there will not be science, but it will happen that there will still be many objects of scientific knowledge.
20. Things also pertaining to sense subsist similarly to these; since the sensible appears to be prior to sense. For the sensible being subverted co-subverts sense; but sense does not co-subvert the sensible. For the senses are conversant with body, and are in body; but the sensible being subverted, body also is subverted; since body is among the number of sensibles; and body not existing, sense also is subverted. Hence the sensible co-subverts sense. But sense does not co-subvert the sensible. For animal being subverted, sense indeed is subverted, but there will still be the sensible, such, for instance, as body, the hot, the sweet, the bitter, and all such other things as are sensible.
21. Farther still, sense is produced together with that which is sensitive; for at one and the same time animal and sense are produced. But the sensible is prior to the existence of animal or sense. For fire and water and things of this kind from which the animal consists, are, in short, prior to the existence of animal or sense; so that the sensible will appear to be prior to sense.
22. It is, however dubious, whether no Substance is among the number of things which are Relatives, as seems to be the case, or whether this happen in certain secondary Substances. For it is true, indeed, in primary Substances; since neither the whole, nor the parts of primary Substances are Relatives. Thus, a man is not said to be a man of something; nor is an ox said to be an ox of something. In a similar manner also with respect to the parts of these. For a hand is not said to be a hand of some one, but the hand of some one; and a man is not said to be the man of some one; nor an ox the ox of some one; nor wood the wood of some one; but they are said to be the possession of some one. In things of this kind, therefore, it is evident that they are not among the number of Relatives. In some of the second Substances there is, however a doubt; for instance, head is said to be the head of some one; hand is said to be the hand of some one; and in like manner other things of this kind; so that these may appear to be among the number or Relatives.
23. If, therefore, the definition of Relatives has been sufficiently framed, it is among the number of things very difficult, or among the numbers of things impossible to show that no Substance ranks among Relatives.
24. But if the definition has not been sufficiently framed, but those things are Relatives, the Substance of which is the same as the being referred after an individual manner to an individual thing; something may perhaps be said in answer to these things.
25. The former definition, however, is consequent to all Relatives; yet it is not the same things, for the very being of them to consist in relation, and that being what they are, they are referred to other things.
26. And from hence it is manifest, that he who definitely knows anyone of Relatives, will also definitely know that to which it is referred. It is also, therefore, evident from these things, that if anyone knows that this particular thing is among the number of Relatives; and if the Substance of Relatives is the same as subsisting in an individual manner with reference to something; he will also know that with reference to which this particular thing after an individual manner subsists. For if, in short, he does not know that with reference to which this particular things after an individual manner subsists; neither will he know whether it subsists after an individual manner with reference to something.
27. And in particulars, indeed, a thing of this kind is evident. Thus, if anyone definitely knows that this particular thing is double, he will also immediately definitely know that of which it is the double. For if he does not know that it is the double of something definite, neither, in short, will he know that it is double. In like manner, if anyone knows that this particular thing is better than something else, it is necessary from what has been said, that he should immediately definitely know that than which it is better. But he will not indefinitely know that this is better than that which is worse: for a knowledge of this kind is opinion and not science; since he will not accurately know that it is better than something worse. For it may so happen that nothing is worse than it. Hence it is evidently necessary, that he who definitely knows any relative, should also definitely know that to which it is referred.
28. It is possible, however, definitely to know what the head and the hand are, and everything of this kind, which are Substances; but it is not necessary to know that to which they are referred. For it is not necessary to know definitely of whom this is the head, or of whom this is the hand. And hence these will not be among the number of Relatives. But if these are not among the number of Relatives, it will be true to say, that no Substance is a relative.
29. Perhaps, however, it is difficult for him to assert any thing very clear about things of this kind, who has not made them the subject of frequent consideration. And to have doubted about each of these is not useless.
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