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1. Substance, which is most properly, primarily, and especially so called, is that which is neither predicated of any subject, nor is in any subject; such for instance as, an individual man, an individual horse.
2. But secondary Substances are called Species, in which Species those Substances that are named primary Substances are contained—both these, and the Genera of these Species. thus, an individual man is contained in man as in Species; but the Genus of the Species man is animal. These, therefore, are called secondary Substances, such for instance as man and animal.
3. It is however evident from what has been, that of things which are predicated of a subject, it is necessary that both the name and the definition should be predicated of it. In this way, man is predicated of an individual man, as of a subject. The name is predicated of it; for you predicate man of an individual man. The definition of man is also predicated of an individual man: for an individual man is both man and animal; so that both the name and the definition are predicated of the subject.
4. But with respect to things which exist in a subject, of most, neither the name, nor the definition is predicated of the subject; but of some, nothing hinders but that the name may sometimes be predicated of the subject, though it is impossible that this should be the case with the definition. Thus, whiteness, which is in body as in a subject, is predicated of the subject, for body is said to be white. But the definition of whiteness can never be predicated of body.
5. All the rest, however, are either predicated of subjects of the primary Substances, or are in subjects in them. This is evident from the particulars which are obvious to all men. thus, animal is predicated of man: and therefore is also predicated of Socrates. For if animal were predicated of no individual men, neither, in short, would it be predicated of man. Also, color exists in body; and therefore it also exists in any individual body. For if it is not inherent in any of individual bodies, neither, in short, it is inherent in body. Hence, all other things are either predicated of the primary Substances (as subjects); or are inherent in them (as in subjects). The primary Substances therefore not existing, it is impossible that anyone of the other things should exist.
6. But of the secondary Substances, Species is more Substance than Genus; since it is nearer to the primary Substance. Thus, if anyone explains what the primary Substance is, he will explain it, in a manner more known and appropriate, by introducing Species than by Genus. For instance, he who explains what Socrates is, will explain it in a manner more known, by introducing man, than by animal; for the former is more the peculiarity of Socrates; but the latter is more common. He also who explains what an individual tree is, will explain it in a manner more known and appropriate, by introducing tree than by plant.
7. Farther still, the primary Substances, because they are placed under everything else, and everything else is predicated of these, or is inherent in these, on this account are especially called Substances. But as the primary Substances are to all other things, so is Species to Genus; since Species is placed under Genus. For Genera are predicated of Species; but Species are not reciprocally predicated of Genera. Hence Species is more Substance than Genus.
8. With respect to Species themselves however, no one of such of them as are not Genera, is more Substance than another. For he will not at all explain more appropriately, who introduces man in the explanation of a particular man, than he who introduces horse in the explanation of a particular horse.
9. After the same manner also in the primary Substance, one of them is not more Substance than another; for an individual man is not more Substance than an individual ox.
10. Reasonably therefore, after the primary Substances, Species and Genera alone among the rest, are said to be secondary Substances, since these alone, of the things which are predicated, make known the primary Substance. For if anyone explains what a particular man is, by introducing Species or Genus, he will appropriately explain it; and he will make it to be more known, by introducing man or animal; but whatever else he may introduce among all other things, will be introduced foreign from the purpose; such, for instance, as that he is white, or that he runs, or anything else of this kind. Hence these things alone among others are very properly said to be Substances.
11. Again, the primary Substances, because they are placed under all other things, and all other things are either predicated of these, or are inherent in these, are said to be most properly Substances. But as is the relation of the primary Substances to all other things, such also is the relation of the Species and Genera of the primary Substances to all the rest, since of these all the rest are predicated. For you say that an individual man is a grammarian; and therefore you also say that a man and an animal are a grammarian. And the like also takes place in other things.
12. It is common however to every Substance, not to be in a subject. For the primary Substance is neither inherent in a subject, nor is predicated of a particular subject. And with respect to secondary Substances, that no one of them is inherent in a subject is evident as follows: Man indeed is predicated of a particular man as of a subject, but is not inherent in a subject; for man is not inherent in an individual man. In a similar manner also, animal is predicated of a particular man as of a subject, but animal is not inherent in any individual man. Farther still, of those things which are inherent in a subject, nothing hinders but that the name may sometimes be predicated of the subject, but it is impossible that the definition should be predicated of it. Of secondary Substances, however, both the definition and the name are predicated of a subject; for you predicate the definition of man of an individual man, and in a similar manner the definition of animal. Hence Substance will not be among the number of things which are in a subject.
13. Not being inherent in a subject, however is not the peculiarity of Substance. Differences also belong to things which are not inherent in a subject. For pedestrious and biped, are predicated indeed of man as a subject, but are not inherent in a subject; for neither is biped, nor pedestrious in man . The definition also of Difference is predicated of that of which Difference is predicated. Thus, if pedestrious is predicated of man, the definition also of pedestrious will be predicated of man; for man is pedestrious.
14. Nor ought we to be disturbed, lest we should be at any time compelled to confess that the parts of Substances are not Substances, because they are in their wholes as in subjects (not as parts); for things which are in a subject were not said to be so, as parts which exist in any thing.
15. It also belongs to secondary Substances and Differences, that all things are synonymously predicated from them. For all the categories from these, are either predicated of individuals, or of Species. Thus, from the primary Substance there is no category; for it is predicated of no subject. But of secondary Substances, Species indeed is predicated of individuals; but Genus is predicated both of Species and individuals. In like manner also, Differences are predicated of Species and individuals. And the primary Substances receive the definition of Species and Genera; and Species receives the definition of Genus. For as many things as are asserted of that which is predicated, so many may also be asserted of the subject . In a similar manner, Species and individuals receive the definition of Differences. But those things were synonymous of which the name is common and definition the same. Hence all things which are predicated from Substances and Differences, are predicated synonymously.
16. Every Substance, however, appears to signify an individual thing. In the primary Substances, therefore, it is indubitable and true, that they signify an individual thing; for that which is signified is an individual and one in number. But in secondary Substances, though they appear indeed by the figure of appellation similarly to signify an individual thing when anyone says man or animal, yet this is not true, but they rather signify a thing with an individual quality. For the subject is not one, as the primary Substance, but man and animal are predicated of many things.
17. Secondary Substances do not signify a thing with an individual quality in a simple manner, as that which is white. For that which is white signifies nothing else than a thing with an individual quality, but Species and Genus specify quality about Substance; for they signify what quality an individual Substance possesses. The limitation, however, is more extended in Genus than in Species; for he who says animal comprehends to a greater extent than he who says man.
18. It also belongs to Substances, to have nothing contrary to them. For what can be contrary to the primary Substance, as, for instance, to an individual man, or to an individual animal? For there is nothing contrary to these; since nothing is contrary either to man or to animal. This however is since nothing is contrary either to man or to animal. This however is not peculiar to Substance, but is also found in many other things, as, for instance, in quantity. For nothing is contrary to two cubits, or three cubits, or to ten, or any thing of this kind. Unless some one should say that much is contrary to few; or the great to the small. But among definite quantities (rather than relative quantities) no one is contrary to another.
20. Substance also appears not to receive the more and the less. I do not say that one Substance is more or less Substance than another; for it has been already said that it is; but I say that every Substance is not said to be more or less that very thing which it is. thus, if this Substance is man, he will not be more or less man, neither himself than himself, nor another man than another. For one man is not more man than another; in the same manner as one white thing is more or less white than another; and one beautiful thing is more or less beautiful than another. The same thing also is said to be more or less than itself. Thus, a body which is white, is said to be more white now than formerly; and when hot is said to be more or less hot. But Substance is not said to be more or less Substance. For neither is man said to be more man now than formerly, nor anyone of such other things as are Substances. Hence Substance will not receive the more and the less.
21. It appears, however, to be especially the peculiarity of Substance, that being one and the same in number it is capable of receiving contraries; nothing of which kind can be adduced in other things which are not Substances; viz. that being one in number they can receive contraries. Thus, color, which is one and the same in number, is not white and black; nor is an action, which is one and the same in number, both depraved and worthy: and the like also takes place in other things which are not Substances. But Substance being one and the same in number, is capable of receiving contraries. Thus, an individual man being one and the same, at one time becomes white, and at another black; likewise hot and cold, depraved and worthy.
22. But in other things nothing of this kind is seen. Unless perhaps some one should object by saying that a sentence and opinion are capable of receiving contraries. For the same sentence appears to be both true and false. Thus, if the sentence is true, that some one sits, when he rises from his seat, this very same sentence will be false. In a similar manner also in opinion. For if anyone truly opines that an individual person sits, when that person rises from his seat, he will opine falsely, if he has the same opinion about him.
23. If however some one should admit this, yet it differs in the mode. For things which are in Substances, the Substances being changed, become the recipients of contraries. For that which from being hot becomes cold is changed; for it is changed in quality. This is also the case with that which from being white becomes black, and from being depraved, worthy. In a similar manner in other things, each of them receiving mutation, is capable of receiving contraries. A sentence and opinion, however, remain indeed themselves entirely immoveable; but the thing being moved, that which is contrary is produced about them. For the sentence, that some one sits, remains the same; but the thing being moved, it becomes at one time true, and at another false. In like manner also in opinion. Hence in this way it will be the peculiarity of Substance, to be capable of receiving contraries, according to the mutation of itself.
24. But if anyone should admit these things, viz. that a sentence and opinion can receive contraries, this is not true. For a sentence and opinion are not said to be capable of receiving contraries, because they receive something, but because a passive quality is produced about something else. For because a thing is or is not, a sentence is said to be true or false, and not because the sentence can receive contraries. For, in short, neither a sentence, nor opinion is moved by any thing. Hence, neither will they be capable of receiving contraries; since no contrary passive quality is produced in them. But Substance, in consequence of receiving contraries, is said to be capable of receiving contraries; for it receives disease and health; and whiteness and blackness; and since it receives each of things of this kind, it is said to be capable of receiving contraries.
25. Hence, the peculiarity of Substance will be this, that being one and the same in number, it can receive contraries according to the mutation of itself.
26. And thus much concerning Substance.
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