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1. One thing is said to be prior to another in four ways.
2. First, indeed, and most principally according to time; according to which, one thing is said to be older, and more ancient than another. For it is said to be older and more ancient, because the time is longer.
3. In the second place, [one thing is said to be prior to another,] because it does not reciprocate according to the consequence of existing. Thus, one is prior to two. For two existing, it immediately follows that one is; but one existing, it is not necessary that two should exist. Hence, the consequence of the existence of the remainder does not reciprocate from the existence of one. But a thing of that kind appears to be prior, from which the consequence of existing does not reciprocate.
4. In the third place, the prior is predicated according to an individual order, as in sciences and discourses. For in the demonstrative sciences, the prior and posterior subsist in order; since the elements are prior in order to the diagrams; and in grammar the elements are prior to syllables. And in a similar manner in discourses; for the proem is prior in order to the narration.
5. Farther still, besides what we have mentioned, the better and the more honourable appear to be prior by nature. For the multitude are accustomed to say that those whom they more honour and love are prior in their esteem. This, however, is nearly the most foreign of all the modes.
6. So many, therefore, nearly are the modes of priority which are adopted.
7. But, besides the above-mentioned, there also may appear to be another mode of the prior. For of those which reciprocate according to the consequence of existence (mode 3, above), that which is in any respect the cause of the existence of the one, may be justly said to be prior by nature. And that there are certain things of this kind is manifest. For, that man exists, reciprocates according to the consequence of existence with the true sentence respecting him. For if man is, the sentence is true by which we say that man is. And it reciprocates. For if the sentence is true by which we say that man is, then man is. A true sentence, however, is by no means the cause of the existence of a thing; but it appears that a thing is, in an individual respect, the cause that a sentence is true. For in consequence of a thing existing, or not existing, a sentence is said to be true or false.
8. Hence one thing may be said to be prior to another according to five modes.
Return to Aristotle, Categories
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