Now, however, we shall assert that the first mover is necessarily without parts, and has no magnitude, those things being first defined which are prior to this assertion. But of these one is, that it is not possible for any thing finite to move in an infinite time: for there are three things, that which is moved, that which moves, and the third, that in which it is moved, viz. time. But these are either all of them infinite, or all finite, or some are, for instance, two, or one. But let A be th.at which moves; B that which is moved; and infinite time C. Let D, therefore, move some part of B, and let this part be E. It will not therefore move in a time equal to C; for it moves more in a greater time; so that F is not an infinite time. Thus then, by adding to D, I shall consume A; and by adding to E, I shall consume B. But I shall not consume the time by always taking away the equal, because it is infinite. Hence the whole force A will move the whole magnitude B in a finite time, which is a part of C. It is not therefore possible, that any thing can be moved by that which is finite, with an infinite motion. Hence it is evident, that it is impossible for that which is finite to move in an infinite time. And in short, that it is not possible there can be an infinite power in a finite magnitude, is from these things manifest: for let there be always a greater power, which makes the equal in a less time, as, for instance, a power heating, or sweetening, or throwing, and in short; moving. It is necessary therefote that from that which is finite indeed but possesses an infinite power, that which is passive should suffer, and more than from another: for infinite power is greater. Besides, there cannot be any time: for if there is a time A in which an infinite force heats, or impels; let the time be A B in which some finite force does this: by always adding a greater finite force to this, I shall at length arrive at that which moves in the time A: for by always adding to that which is finite, I shall surpass every finite; and by taking away, I shall in a similar manner diminish. A finite, therefore, will move in an equal time with an infinite magnitude. But this is impossible. Hence, nothing finite can possess an infinite power. Neither, therefore, can there be a finite power in that which is infinite; though there may be a greater power in a less magnitude. Let A B, therefore, be infinite. Hence B C has a certain power, which in a certain time will move D, viz. in the time E F. If therefore I take the double of B C, it will move in half the time E F: for let there be this proportion. Hence it will move in the time F H. Thus therefore, always assuming I shall never pass through A B; but I shall always assume a time less than the given time. The power, therefore, will be infinite: for it surpasses every finite power. But of every finite power it is necessary that the time also should be finite: for if it moves in a certain time which is so much, a greater power will move in a less, but yet in a definite time, according to conversion of proportion. But every power is infinite, as well as every multitude and magnitude which surpasses every finite power.
This also may be demonstrated as follows: Let us assume in a finite magnitude a certain power, the same in genus with that which is in an infinite magnitude, and which measures the power placed in the infinite magnitude. That there cannot therefore be an infinite power in a finite magnitude, nor a finite power in an infinite magnitude, is from these things manifest. Concerning, however, things which are locally moved, it will be well, in the first place, to propose a certain doubt: for if every thing which is moved is moved by something; with respect to such things as do not move themselves, how are some of these, in a certain respect moved continually, that which moves not touching? As, for instance, things which are thrown. But if he who moves at the same time moves something else, as the air, which moves being moved; it is similarly impossible to be moved, when the first neither touches nor moves. But all must be at the·same time moved; and cease to be moved, when the first mover ceases, though he should act like a stone, viz. should move that which moves. It is nccessary, however, to assert this, that the first mover causes either such air, or water, or something else of this kind, to move, which is naturally adapted to move and be moved. Yet it does not at the same time cease to move and be moved; but it ceases to be moved, when the mover ceases to move. Still, however, it moves; and therefore it moves something else which adheres. And of this there is the same reason. But it ceases when a less power of moving is impressed in that which adheres. And it finally ceases, when that which is prior no longer causes it to move, but alone to be moved. It is however necessary, that these should at the same time cease, viz. that which moves, that which is moved, and the whole motion. This motion, therefore, is ingenerated in those things which may at one time be moved, and at another be at rest; and is not continued, but appears to be so: for it is either of those things which are successive, or of those things which touch each other; since that which moves is not one thing, but many things adhering to each other. Hence a motion of this kind is produced in air, and in water; which some assert to be an antiperistasis. But it is impossible to solve in any any other way, the subjects of doubt, than in that which we have mentioned. But an antiperistasis makes all things to move and be at the same time moved; and consequently likewise to rest. Now, however, one certain thing appears to be continually moved. By what therefore? for it is not moved by itself. But since among beings it is necessary, there should always be a continued motion, and this is one, and it is necessary that there should be one motion of a certain magnitude (for that which is without magnitude is not moved), and of one thing, and by one thing; for otherwise it will not be continued, but the one will adhere to the other, and be divided; hence that which moves if it is one, either moves, being moved, or being immoveable. And if indeed it is moved, it will necessarily follow that it will be changed, and will be at the same time moved by something. Hence the progression will stop, and we shall arrive at that which is moved by the immoveable: for it is not necessary that this should be at tbe same time changed, but it will always be able to move something; since that which thus moves is without labour; and this motion is equable, either alone, or in the most eminent degree: for the mover has not any mutation whatever. It is likewise necessary that neither should that which is moved by the immovable have any mutation, in order that the motion may be similar. But it is necessary that the first mover should either be in the middle, or in a circle: for these are principles. Those things also are moved most swiftly which are most near to the mover: and such is the motion of the universe. Hence that which moves is there. It is, however, dubious, whether any thing which is moved can move continually, but not as that which impels again and again, in consequence of being continually successive: for it is requisite either that it should impel, or draw, or do both, or receive something different, viz. one thing from another, as was before observed of things which are thrown. But if being divisible, air or water moves, yet they move as being always moved; and in both ways, it is not possible that the motion can be one, but adhering. Hence that motion alone is continued which is produced by the immoveable: for always subsisting similarly, it will also continually subsist similarly, with respect to that which is moved. These things, therefore, being determined, it is evident that it is impossible for that which first moves and is immoveable, to have any magnitude: for if it possessed magnitude, it is necessary that it should either be finite or infinite. But that it is impossible there should be an infinite magnitude, has been before demonstrated in the Physics. And that a finite magnitude cannot have an infinite power, and that it is impossible for any thing to be moved in an infinite time by that which is finite, has been just now demonstrated. But the first mover produces a perpetual motion, and in an infinite time. It is evident, therefore, that it is indivisible, without parts, and has no magnitude.
