The infinite, however, happens to subsist in a way contrary to what it is asserted to be by others: for the infinite is not that beyond which there is nothing, but it is that of which there is always something beyond. The truth of this is evidenced in rings, which are said to be infinite because they have not the part in which the seal is fixed, on which account, something beyond may always be assumed; though this is said according to a certain similitude, and not properly: for it is necessary that this property should be inherent, and that the same thing should never be assumed. But this is not the case in a circle, since that alone which is successive is always different. The infinite, therefore, is this; of which some quantity being taken, it is always possible to assume something beyond. But that pertaining to which there is nothing beyond is perfect and a whole. For thus we define the whole, that of which nothing is absent pertaining to the parts; as, for instance, the whole man, or the whole chest. But as we define particulars, so likewise that which has a proper and principle subsistence; as, for instance, the whole is that pertaining to which there is nothing beyond. But that pertaining to which something external is absent, that is not all, whatever it may be that is absent. With respect, however, to the whole and the perfect, they are either entirely the same or allied by nature. But nothing is perfect which has not an end; and the end is a bound. On this account it is proper to think that Parmenides spoke better than Melissus: for the latter says that the infinite is a whole; but the former, that the whole is finite, and equally balanced from the middle: for to conjoin the infinite with the universe and the whole, is not to connect line with line.
