1. Primo igitur in tractatu de universalibus de genere loquendum est.
Literal Translation:
“First therefore in (the) treatise concerning universals concerning genus must-be-spoken.”
Translation:
First, then, in the treatise on universals, one must speak about genus.
Explanation:
This is a programmatic opening sentence that sets out the order of discussion. St. Albert is beginning a treatment of universals and says that the first topic to be addressed is genus. In scholastic logic, genus is one of the basic ways in which things can be predicated and classified, so it makes sense to begin here before moving to more specific notions such as species, difference, property, and accident. For students, the key point is that this sentence does not yet argue anything; it simply announces the structure of the inquiry and shows the careful, ordered method typical of scholastic exposition.
2. Sed quia genus secundum intentionem logicam diffiniri non potest, nec diffinite cognosci, nisi prius multiplicitas huius nominis, genus, determinetur: ideo in primis determinanda est et distinguenda nominis generis multiplicitas, et maxime in his modis qui aliquam habent similitudinem ad intentionem illam generis, secundum quam logici genere utuntur.
Literal Translation:
“But because genus according to intention logical cannot be defined, nor definitely known, unless first (the) multiplicity of this name, genus, may-be-determined: therefore in the first (things) to-be-determined is and to-be-distinguished (the) multiplicity of the name of-genus, and especially in these modes which some have likeness to the intention that of-genus, according to which logicians by-genus use.”
Translation:
But because genus, according to its logical intention, cannot be defined or distinctly known unless the multiplicity of this term, “genus,” is first determined, therefore the various senses of the name “genus” must first be determined and distinguished, especially in those senses that bear some likeness to that notion of genus according to which logicians use the term.
Explanation:
St. Albert is laying out an important scholastic method here: before defining a key term, one must sort out the different ways the word is used. The word genus can have several meanings, and unless those meanings are distinguished, any definition will be confused. So he begins not by giving the logical definition immediately, but by clarifying the different senses of the name, especially those that resemble the technical logical sense. For students, the main point is that careful reasoning depends on careful attention to language: when a word has multiple meanings, the first step is to distinguish them so that the discussion can proceed with precision.
3. De aliis intentionibus, quia ad propositam intentionem non valent, est omittendum.
Literal Translation:
“Concerning the other intentions, because to the proposed intention they are not strong, it-must-be-omitted.”
Translation:
The other senses, because they do not serve the present purpose, must be omitted.
Explanation:
St. Albert is narrowing the discussion to what is useful for the argument at hand. After noting that a term can have several meanings, he now says that the other senses should be set aside because they do not help with the particular inquiry he is pursuing. This is a common scholastic move: first distinguish the possible meanings of a word, then focus only on the sense relevant to the present question. For students, the lesson is that good method requires not only making distinctions, but also knowing which distinctions matter for the immediate topic.
4. Nihil enim confert ad propositum scire masculinum genus, vel femininum, vel activum, vel passivum in grammaticis non ad propositam intentionem.
Literal Translation:
“For nothing indeed contributes to the proposed (thing) to-know masculine genus, or feminine, or active, or passive in grammarians not to the proposed intention.”
Translation:
For it contributes nothing to the matter at hand to know the masculine or feminine gender, or the active or passive in grammar, since these do not belong to the present intention.
Explanation:
St. Albert is giving an example of meanings or uses of related terms that are irrelevant to the logical discussion of genus. In grammar, one may speak of masculine and feminine gender, or of active and passive forms, but those belong to a different discipline and do not help define genus in the logical sense. His point is methodological: when investigating a technical concept, one must ignore nearby meanings that come from other fields if they do not advance the present inquiry. For students, this shows how carefully scholastic authors separate disciplines and insist that a term be understood according to the precise intention under discussion.
5. Et ideo de similibus generis intentionibus non est hic interponendum.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore concerning similar of-genus intentions not is here to-be-interposed.”
Translation:
And therefore nothing should be introduced here concerning intentions similar to that of genus.
Explanation:
St. Albert is continuing to narrow the scope of the discussion. Since certain related meanings do not help with the logical question under examination, they should not be brought into the present treatment. The phrase suggests a disciplined method: even when there are neighboring concepts or analogous uses of a term, they must be left aside if they would distract from the precise intention being studied. For students, the key point is that scholastic inquiry advances by careful focus, excluding material that may be interesting in itself but is not useful for the exact question at hand.
6. Dicitur autem per similitudinem et per proprietatem, ad quod etiam genus per similitudinem dictum transfertur.
Literal Translation:
“But it-is-said through similitude and through property, to which also genus through similitude having-been-said is transferred.”
Translation:
But it is used both by way of likeness and by way of proper usage, to which also the term “genus,” when used by likeness, is transferred.
Explanation:
St. Albert is distinguishing between a word used in its proper sense and a word extended by resemblance to another case. His point is that the term genus is not always said in exactly the same way: sometimes it belongs properly, and sometimes it is carried over by analogy or likeness. This matters because the logician must identify when genus is being used in its strict technical sense and when it is only being applied in an extended or similar way. For students, the key idea is that scholastic authors are very alert to shifts in meaning, especially when a term is borrowed from its proper sense and applied elsewhere because of some perceived similarity.
7. Per similitudinem autem dicitur dupliciter.
Literal Translation:
“Through similitude however it-is-said in-two-ways.”
Translation:
Now it is said by way of likeness in two ways.
Explanation:
This sentence introduces a division. St. Albert has just said that a term can be used by likeness as well as properly, and now he specifies that this likeness-based usage itself has two forms. In scholastic writing, such brief sentences often serve as signposts in the argument, marking the next distinction that will structure the discussion. For students, the important point is not yet the content of the two ways, but the method: Albert is carefully dividing the concept step by step so that each sense of the term can be handled precisely.
8. Uno scilicet modo dicitur genus multitudo aliquorum uno quodam modo se habentium ad unum aliquod, quod sui aliquid habet in tota multitudine illa, ita quod est in singulis ipsorum: in quo etiam communi existente in omnibus quodam modo secundum convenientiam se habent ad invicem, ita quod quilibet ad alium habeat similitudinem in illo quod inest sibi ex illo uno primo, quod causa est similitudinis in tota alia collectione.
Literal Translation:
“One namely mode genus is-said multitude of-some (things) in-one certain mode themselves having to one something, which of-itself something has in the whole multitude that, so that it is in singulars of-them: in which also common existing in all in-a-certain-mode according to agreement they have themselves toward each-other, so that any-one to another may-have similitude in that which is-in to-him from that one first, which cause is of-similitude in the whole other collection.”
Translation:
In one way, then, genus is called a multitude of things that are related in some one way to a certain one thing, which has something of itself in that whole multitude, so that it is present in each of them. And with this common element existing in all, they are also related to one another in a certain way by agreement, so that each has a likeness to the others in that which is present in it from that first one, which is the cause of likeness throughout the whole collection.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert is explaining one analogical sense of the word genus. A genus, in this broad sense, is a group of many things that are connected by reference to one source or principle which communicates something common to them all. Because that one source is present in some way in each member, the members resemble one another and belong together as a collection. The emphasis is on shared derivation and common likeness: each member has something from the same first principle, and that is why the whole set can be spoken of as one genus. For students, this is an important preparatory step, because Albert is not yet giving the strict logical definition of genus, but showing how the word can be applied where many things are unified by participation in one common origin or feature.
9. Secundum quam significationem Romanorum genus dicitur collectio tota parentelae, quae a Romulo descendit per successivam generationem.
Literal Translation:
“According to which signification (the) genus of-the-Romans is-said collection whole of-kinship, which from Romulus descends through successive generation.”
Translation:
According to this meaning, the race or stock of the Romans is called the whole collection of a family line that descends from Romulus through successive generation.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert gives a concrete example of the broader, likeness-based sense of genus he has just described. The “genus of the Romans” means the whole line of kindred descending from a common ancestor, Romulus. The unity of the group comes from shared origin: many persons belong together because they proceed in succession from one first source. For students, the important point is that this is not yet the strict logical sense of genus used in predication, but an extended sense in which a group is called one genus because of common descent and the likeness that follows from that shared principle.
10. Hoc enim totum dicitur Romuleum genus secundum habitudinem qua se habet ad unum primum parentem, scilicet Romulum.
Literal Translation:
“For this whole is-said Romulean genus according to relation by-which itself has to one first parent, namely Romulus.”
Translation:
For this whole is called the Romulean race on account of the relation by which it is ordered to one first parent, namely Romulus.
Explanation:
St. Albert is clarifying why the whole body of Roman descendants can be called one genus in this extended sense. The unity of the group comes from its relation to a single first ancestor, Romulus. So the name Romulean genus does not primarily point to a logical genus, but to a collection bound together by origin and lineage. For students, the important point is that Albert is still explaining an analogical use of the word genus: many members are gathered under one name because they are all referred back to one common source.
11. Et in hoc genere distinguitur illa collectio ab illa collectione quae ab aliquo alio parente descendit, sicut a primo genere Priami cum quo tota collectio ista Priami genus vocatur.
Literal Translation:
“And in this genus is-distinguished that collection from that collection which from some other parent descends, just-as from the first genus of-Priam with which whole collection this of-Priam genus is-called.”
Translation:
And in this sense of genus, that collection is distinguished from another collection which descends from some other parent, as from the original stock of Priam, from which that whole collection is called the race of Priam.
Explanation:
St. Albert is continuing the example of genus as a lineage or family stock descending from a first ancestor. A collection is identified and set apart from other collections by the parent from whom it descends. Just as the Romans are named from Romulus, so another whole line can be named from Priam. The point for students is that in this extended sense, genus means a group unified and distinguished by common origin. The name of the genus comes from the first ancestor, and that shared descent is what both binds the members together and separates them from other family lines.
12. Hoc autem advertendum est in ista generis significatione, quod unum est in omnibus illis qui ad illam pertinent generationem.
Literal Translation:
“But this is-to-be-noticed in that signification of-genus, that one (thing) is in all those who to that generation pertain.”
Translation:
But this must be observed in this meaning of genus: that one thing is present in all those who belong to that line of generation.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing attention to the key feature of this extended sense of genus: all the members of the lineage share something one and common. In the example of a family or race descending from a first ancestor, the many individuals are not just grouped together by name, but are united by a real relation to one common source. That is why he says that “one thing” is in all who belong to that generation. For students, the important point is that this prepares the mind for the more technical logical notion of genus by showing how multiplicity can still be gathered under a genuine unity.
13. Et hoc est semen propagationis a Romulo perfusum in tota illa collectione.
Literal Translation:
“And this is seed of-propagation from Romulus poured-through in whole that collection.”
Translation:
And this is the seed of propagation poured forth from Romulus through that whole collection.
Explanation:
St. Albert now identifies more precisely the “one thing” shared by all the members of the lineage: it is the generative seed or principle of descent that comes from the first ancestor and is diffused throughout the whole line. In this example, the unity of the genus is grounded in common propagation from Romulus, so that the whole collection bears a real connection to him through generation. For students, the important point is that Albert is still working with an extended, non-logical sense of genus, where a multitude is unified by a single originating principle communicated to all its members.
14. Secundo modo adhuc dicitur genus per annexum modum ad ante habitum, id quod est uniuscujusque generationis sive multitudinis generatae principium, quo fortissime generatum et a quo fortissima virtute exortum est.
Literal Translation:
“Second mode still is-said genus through annexed mode to before had, that which is of-each generation or of-multitude generated principle, by-which most-strongly the generated-(thing) and from which by most-strong power it has-risen.”
Translation:
In a second way, genus is still spoken of in a manner connected to the one previously treated: it is that which is the principle of each generation or of a generated multitude, by which the thing generated is most strongly constituted and from which it has arisen by a most powerful causality.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert introduces a second extended sense of the word genus. In the earlier sense, genus referred to the whole collection descending from a common source; now he shifts attention from the collection to the source itself, that is, to the principle from which the generated line arises. So genus can mean not only the family or race that proceeds from one origin, but also that originating source considered as the strongest principle of its coming-to-be. For students, the key point is that Albert is still not yet at the strict logical sense of genus. He is carefully mapping related meanings of the term so that, when he does arrive at the logical notion, it will be distinguished from these more natural and genealogical uses.
15. Et hoc dupliciter dicitur: vel a patre, qui primus genitor est in genere illo: vel ab eo loco in quo quis genitus est.
Literal Translation:
“And this in-two-ways is-said: either from (the) father, who first begetter is in genus that: or from that place in which someone has-been-begotten.”
Translation:
And this is said in two ways: either from the father, who is the first begetter in that line, or from the place in which someone has been born.
Explanation:
St. Albert is further dividing this second extended sense of genus as source or principle of origin. A thing may be said to have its genus either from the father, who stands as the first generative source in that family line, or from the place of birth, which can also function as an origin in a broader sense. This shows how flexible the word genus can be before it is narrowed to its strict logical meaning. For students, the point is that Albert is still clearing away related but non-logical uses of the term so that the technical sense of genus in logic can later be understood with greater precision.
16. Et priori quidem modo dicimus Orestem quidem a Tantalo proavo suo habere genus; Hilum vero dicimus habere genus ab Hercule, a quo sicut ab atavo genitus est.
Literal Translation:
“And in-the-prior indeed mode we-say Orestes indeed from Tantalus great-grandfather his to-have genus; Hyllus however we-say to-have genus from Hercules, from whom just-as from ancestor he has-been-begotten.”
Translation:
And in the first of these ways, we say that Orestes has his lineage from his great-grandfather Tantalus; and likewise we say that Hyllus has his lineage from Hercules, from whom he has been begotten as from an ancestor.
Explanation:
St. Albert is giving examples of the first branch of the second sense just mentioned, namely when genus is named from a forefather. Orestes is said to have his genus from Tantalus, and Hyllus from Hercules, because each line is traced back to a notable ancestor who serves as the source of the family stock. The point for students is that here genus means lineage or descent from a founding forebear, not yet genus in the strict logical sense. Albert is still distinguishing ordinary and extended uses of the term so that the technical philosophical meaning can later be defined without confusion.
17. Secundo autem modo (secundum quem patria sive locus principium generationis est) dicimus Pindarum Thebanum esse genere, Platonem vero dicimus genere Atheniensem.
Literal Translation:
“But in-the-second mode (according to which country or place principle of generation is) we-say Pindar Theban to-be by-genus, Plato however we-say by-genus Athenian.”
Translation:
But in the second way, according to which one’s country or place is a principle of generation, we say that Pindar is Theban by genus, and that Plato is Athenian by genus.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert gives examples of the second branch of this extended sense of genus, where the term is taken from place rather than from an ancestor. Thus Pindar is called Theban and Plato Athenian by genus because their city or homeland is treated as a source of origin. This is still not the strict logical sense of genus, but a broader usage tied to birth and belonging. For students, the important point is that Albert is carefully sorting out common and analogical meanings of the word before arriving at the technical meaning used by logicians.
18. Sicut enim pater est principium generationis per translationem seminis ex quo in omnes funditur ex uno virtus formativa multorum secundum propagationem, sic etiam patriam sive locum generationis dicimus esse principium, quia in loco et centro loci generationis tota virtus periodi caelestis adunatur, ut dicit Ptolemaeus, et in omnes in illo loco natos diffunditur.
Literal Translation:
“For just-as father is principle of-generation through transference of-seed from which into all is-poured-forth from one (the) formative power of-many according to propagation, so also fatherland or place of-generation we-say to-be principle, because in place and center of-place of-generation the whole power of-(the) celestial period is-brought-together, as says Ptolemy, and into all born in that place it-is-diffused.”
Translation:
For just as the father is a principle of generation through the transmission of seed, from which the formative power of many is poured forth from one source according to propagation, so also we say that one’s homeland or place of generation is a principle, because in the place and center of generation the whole power of the heavenly circuit is gathered together, as Ptolemy says, and is diffused into all those born in that place.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining why place of birth can be treated analogously to a father as a principle of generation. The father is the direct source from whom the generative and formative power is transmitted in bodily descent. In a parallel way, the homeland or birthplace is called a principle because the celestial influences associated with that place are thought to shape those born there. This reflects a classical and medieval cosmological view, drawn here from Ptolemy, that heavenly motions exercise causal influence in the sublunary world and that this influence is concentrated differently in different places. For students, the important point is that Albert is still discussing a broad, analogical sense of genus: one may be said to have a genus not only from ancestry but also from the place whose generative conditions mark a whole group in common.
19. Et ideo frequenter magis accedunt ad unum et colorem et ad unum morem, qui ex uno loco nati sunt.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore frequently more they-approach to one both color and to one custom, who from one place have-been-born.”
Translation:
And therefore those who have been born in one place frequently tend more toward one complexion and one manner of life.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing out the consequence of the previous claim about place as a principle of generation. If those born in the same place are shaped by a common set of conditions, especially the influence associated with that place, then it follows that they often show similar bodily traits and similar habits or customs. The point is not yet the strict logical meaning of genus, but an analogical one: a shared place of origin can produce a recognizable unity among many people. For students, this shows how medieval thinkers often connected physical environment, inherited disposition, and common social character when explaining why a group might be spoken of as one genus in an extended sense.
20. Unde etiam elementa in diversis locis valde sunt diversa in virtutibus suis quibus conveniunt ad generatorum constitutionem.
Literal Translation:
“Whence also (the) elements in diverse places greatly are diverse in their powers by-which they concur to constitution of-things-generated.”
Translation:
Hence even the elements in different places are greatly different in the powers by which they contribute to the constitution of generated things.
Explanation:
St. Albert is extending the same line of thought about place and generation. Different regions do not merely differ accidentally; they also differ in the active qualities or powers of the elements present there, and those differences help shape the beings generated in those places. In the medieval natural philosophy behind this claim, the elements and the qualities associated with them play a real role in the formation of living things, so variation in place helps explain variation in bodily constitution and disposition. For students, the main point is that Albert is reinforcing why place can be treated as a kind of principle of generation in an extended sense: what is generated in one region may share traits because the natural conditions there cooperate in a similar way in the making of those things.
21. In isto etiam modo patet, quod multitudo ab uno patre vel ab uno loco natorum ad unum refertur in quo continetur per unum quod in omnibus est, et ab illo quod principium illius multitudinis est, in omnes derivatur.
Literal Translation:
“In this also mode it-is-clear, that multitude of those born from one father or from one place is-referred to one in which it is-contained through one (thing) which in all is, and from that which principle of-that multitude is, into all it-is-derived.”
Translation:
In this way also it is clear that a multitude of those born from one father or from one place is referred back to one thing, in which it is contained through something one that is present in all, and which is derived into all from that which is the principle of that multitude.
Explanation:
St. Albert is gathering together the point of the two preceding examples, descent from one father and birth in one place. In both cases, a multitude is called one genus because it is traced back to a single principle from which something common is communicated to all the members. The many are not merely grouped together by an external label; they are united by a shared origin and by some one feature or influence present in all of them. For students, this is important because Albert is showing the basic pattern behind this analogical sense of genus: many things can be referred to one when one common principle flows from a single source into the whole collection.
22. Differunt autem istae duae generis significationes: quia prima est unius partiti in multa, secunda autem est multorum respicientium ad unum, quod est principium generationis eorum secundum modum parentis vel loci in quo generatur aliquis ad illius loci complexionem vel figuram.
Literal Translation:
“But these two significations of-genus differ: because the first is of-one divided into many, the second however is of-many looking-back to one, which is principle of-generation of-them according to mode of-parent or of-place in which someone is-generated unto complexion or figure of-that place.”
Translation:
But these two meanings of genus differ: because the first is of one thing divided into many, while the second is of many things looking to one, which is the principle of their generation, whether in the manner of a parent or of a place in which someone is generated according to the complexion or character of that place.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert draws a careful distinction between the two extended senses of genus he has been discussing. In the first sense, genus names a whole that is spread out or divided into many members, as when one lineage extends through many descendants. In the second sense, genus names the relation of many back to one source, namely the parent or the place that serves as the principle of their generation. So the first emphasizes one becoming manifest in many, while the second emphasizes many being traced back to one origin. For students, this is an important scholastic clarification: Albert is showing that even related uses of a term can differ in their logical structure, and that precision about this structure is necessary before arriving at the strict logical meaning of genus.
23. Quod enim quidam dicunt patriam et locum non esse principium generationis, nisi quoad figuram, penitus falsum est: quia sic tota destrueretur scientia generationis uniuscujusque, quam in libro qui dicitur arabice Adarba, quadripartitum autem latine Ptolemaeus ostendit: in quo ostendit periodi virtutem in centro loci ejus qui nascitur congregari: et ex virtute sic in centro nati congregata natum accipere complexionem et formam et figuram et colorem et morem et fortunam.
Literal Translation:
“For that which certain (men) say, (that) country and place not to-be principle of generation, unless as-to figure, utterly false is: because thus whole would-be-destroyed (the) science of-generation of-each-one, which in (the) book which is-called in-Arabic Adarba, but Quadripartitum in Latin, Ptolemy shows: in which he shows (the) power of-(the) period in (the) center of-(the) place of-him who is-born to-be gathered-together: and from (the) power thus in (the) center of-the-one-born gathered-together, the-one-born to-receive complexion and form and figure and color and custom and fortune.”
Translation:
For what some say, namely that one’s country and place are not a principle of generation except with respect to outward figure, is wholly false. For in that case the entire science of each one’s generation would be destroyed, which Ptolemy sets forth in the book called in Arabic Adarba and in Latin the Quadripartitum. There he shows that the power of the heavenly cycle is gathered in the center of the place of the one being born, and that from the power thus gathered at the center of the newborn, the one born receives temperament, form, figure, color, custom, and fortune.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert argues strongly against the view that place of birth affects only outward appearance. He says that this would undermine the whole science of generation as described by Ptolemy, because the place of birth is understood to receive and concentrate celestial influence, and that influence helps account for many features of the person born there. So place is not merely a superficial condition affecting shape alone, but a real principle that contributes to bodily constitution, appearance, habits, and even worldly condition. For students, the important point is that Albert is still explaining the broader sense in which genus can be connected with place: a common place of origin matters because it communicates a shared formative influence to those generated there.
24. Et haec quidem secunda generis significatio (propter hoc quod est in uno in multa se diffundendo secundum suae virtutis potentiam, in quo omnia uniuntur et continentur) videtur promptissima ad generis logici declarationem.
Literal Translation:
“And this indeed second of-genus signification (on-account-of this that it is in one into many itself diffusing according to of-its virtue’s potency, in which all are-united and are-contained) seems most-ready to of-genus logical declaration.”
Translation:
And this second meaning of genus, because it consists in one thing diffusing itself into many according to the power of its virtue, in which all are united and contained, seems especially well suited for explaining logical genus.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert says that the second extended meaning of genus is the most useful starting point for understanding genus in the logical sense. That is because this meaning already has the right basic structure: one principle extends to many things, and those many are unified and contained under that one source. This resembles the logical notion of genus, which is one common nature predicated of many things. For students, the key point is that Albert is moving from looser, analogical uses of the word toward its technical logical meaning, and he sees this second sense as the best bridge because it most clearly shows how unity can be present across multiplicity.
25. Secundum hanc rationem sunt et dicuntur, qui ex genere Romuli descenderunt.
Literal Translation:
“According to this account are and are-called, those who from the genus of-Romulus have-descended.”
Translation:
According to this understanding, those who have descended from the line of Romulus both are and are said to belong to that genus.
Explanation:
St. Albert is applying the point just made to the example of the descendants of Romulus. They are not only called one genus by a mere name; rather, according to this account, they truly belong to that genus because they proceed from one originating principle and remain united under it. The sentence reinforces the idea that a genus, in this extended sense, involves both real derivation from one source and the corresponding way of speaking about that shared origin. For students, the important point is that Albert is still using the example of lineage to prepare for the logical notion of genus, where many things are gathered under one common principle.
26. Nec collectio ista diceretur genus unum, nisi esset unum continens ea sicut principium a quo per generationem descenderunt.
Literal Translation:
“Nor collection this would-be-called genus one, unless there-were one containing them as principle from which through generation they have-descended.”
Translation:
Nor would this collection be called one genus unless there were one thing containing them as the principle from which they have descended through generation.
Explanation:
St. Albert is emphasizing what makes a collection truly one genus in this extended sense. It is not enough that many individuals are simply grouped together; they must be held together by one common principle from which they descend by generation. That one source gives the collection its unity and makes it possible to speak of it as one genus rather than as a mere aggregate. For students, the key point is that Albert continues to stress the relation between multiplicity and a single originating principle, since this prepares the way for the logical notion of genus as something one that contains many under itself.
27. Et hoc modo dicuntur multi Cecropidae, qui ex genere successive descenderunt primi Cecropis: et horum proximi secundum lineam eiusdem consanguineitatis.
Literal Translation:
“And in this mode are-called many Cecropidae, who from the genus successively have-descended of-the-first Cecrops: and of-these the-nearest according to the line of-the-same consanguinity.”
Translation:
And in this way many are called Cecropidae, who have descended successively from the stock of the first Cecrops, and among these are those nearest according to the line of that same blood relationship.
Explanation:
St. Albert gives another example of genus in the sense of lineage descending from a first ancestor. The Cecropidae are those who are named from Cecrops because they come forth in succession from his line. He adds that among them one can also speak of those who are nearer according to the same line of kinship, which shows that this kind of genus includes degrees of proximity within a shared ancestry. For students, the main point is that the unity of the group comes from descent from one first source, and this continues to prepare the way for the logical idea of genus as one principle containing many under it.
28. Sic enim multa essent ab uno, sicut in genere logico ab uno genere primo per divisionem differentiarum essent multae species, in quibus omnibus salvatur generis natura potestate sive virtute ad speciem determinatam, sicut et semen generantis primi per successivam generationem formatur ad hunc et ad illum.Literal Translation:
“For thus many would-be from one, just-as in genus logical from one genus first through division of-differences would-be many species, in which all is-preserved of-genus (the) nature in potency or power to species determined, just-as also (the) seed of-the-one-generating first through successive generation is-formed to this-one and to that-one.”
Translation:
For in this way many would come from one, just as in logical genus many species come from one first genus through the division of differences. In all of these the nature of the genus is preserved in potency or virtue toward a determinate species, just as the seed of the first generator is formed through successive generation into this individual and that one.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert makes the comparison to logical genus more explicit. Just as many descendants can proceed from one ancestral source, so many species proceed from one first genus through the differentiating divisions that specify it. The common nature of the genus remains present in all the species, not as an undetermined abstraction floating apart from them, but as something retained and expressed in determinate forms. The comparison to seed helps students see the point: one originating principle is successively shaped into many distinct outcomes without ceasing to be the source of their unity. Albert is using the example of natural generation to illuminate how genus can remain one while being realized in many species.
29. Patet igitur, quod primus modus generis causatur a secundo, et reducitur ad ipsum sicut ad causam.
Literal Translation:
“It-is-clear therefore, that (the) first mode of-genus is-caused by the second, and is-led-back to it just-as to cause.”
Translation:
It is clear, therefore, that the first mode of genus is caused by the second and is reduced to it as to its cause.
Explanation:
St. Albert is concluding the comparison between the two extended senses of genus. The first sense, in which genus refers to a whole line or collection descending into many, depends upon the second sense, in which genus refers to the originating principle from which that multitude comes. In other words, the collection is called a genus because there is first a source or cause that unifies and produces it. For students, the key point is that Albert is organizing these meanings causally and hierarchically: the more derivative sense is explained by the more fundamental one. This prepares the way for the logical account of genus, where one common principle grounds the unity of many.
30. Et ideo secundus modus principalior est, quam primus, et promptior ad designandum genus logicum, sicut per similitudinem potest describendo designari.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore (the) second mode more-principal is, than (the) first, and more-ready for designating genus logical, just-as through similitude it can by-describing be designated.”
Translation:
And therefore the second mode is more principal than the first, and better suited for indicating logical genus, insofar as it can be described by way of likeness.
Explanation:
St. Albert concludes that the second sense of genus is more fundamental than the first because it names the source or principle from which the many proceed, whereas the first names the resulting collection. For that reason, the second sense is also a better guide for understanding logical genus. It is not the strict logical notion itself, but it resembles it more closely, since logical genus too is one principle extended to many things and containing them under a common account. For students, the important point is that Albert is using analogical meanings of the word genus as stepping stones: the nearer an analogical sense comes to showing how one is present in many, the more useful it becomes for clarifying the technical logical meaning.
31. Per prius ergo quoad istam similitudinem dicitur genus uniuscujusque generationis principium.
Literal Translation:
“Through the prior therefore as-to this similitude is-said genus of-each generation principle.”
Translation:
Therefore, in the primary way with respect to this likeness, genus is called the principle of each generation.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing a conclusion from the comparison he has been making between ordinary and logical uses of the word genus. If we are speaking according to this likeness, the term belongs first and more properly to the principle from which a generation proceeds, rather than to the collection that results from it. That is why this sense is closer to logical genus: it emphasizes one source from which many arise and by which they are held together. For students, the key point is that Albert is steadily moving from genealogical examples toward the logical notion of genus by identifying the originating principle as the most fundamental analogate.
32. Dehinc autem et per posterius dicitur genus et multitudo collecta eorum quae ab uno principio ut Romulo descenderunt, sicut dictum est in prima generis designatione.
Literal Translation:
“Then however also and through the posterior is-said genus also (the) multitude collected of-those who from one principle as Romulus have-descended, just as it was said in the first designation of-genus.”
Translation:
Then, in a secondary way, genus is also said of the collected multitude of those who have descended from one principle, such as Romulus, as was said in the first description of genus.
Explanation:
St. Albert is completing the order between the two earlier senses of genus. If the word belongs first to the originating principle of a line, it belongs afterward and in a secondary way to the gathered multitude that comes from that principle. So the descendants themselves can be called a genus because they proceed from one source and remain united under it, as in the example of those descended from Romulus. For students, the key point is that Albert is arranging these meanings in order: first the source, then the collection derived from the source. This helps prepare for logical genus, where what matters most is the one principle under which many are contained.
33. Huius autem probatio est: quia multitudinem sive collectionem dividentes sive discernentes et ab aliis separantes, qui sunt alterius generis, dicebamus ante illam collectionem genus esse Romanorum vel Romuleorum, et in hoc ab aliis collectionibus separari: nec multitudinem genus esse diceremus, nisi prius intelligeretur unum generationis principium, a quo illa descendit multitudo.
Literal Translation:
“Of-this however proof is: because the multitude or collection dividing or distinguishing and from others separating, who are of-another genus, we-were-saying before that collection genus to-be of-the-Romans or of-the-Romuleans, and in this from other collections to-be-separated: nor the multitude genus to-be we-would-say, unless first there-were-understood one principle of-generation, from which that descends multitude.”
Translation:
The proof of this, however, is as follows: when we divide or distinguish a multitude or collection and separate it from others that are of another genus, we say that that collection is the genus of the Romans or of the Romuleans, and that in this respect it is set apart from other collections. Nor would we call the multitude a genus unless one principle of generation were first understood, from which that multitude descends.
Explanation:
St. Albert is proving that the collected multitude is called a genus only because it is understood in relation to one prior source. When we distinguish one people or family line from another, such as the Romans from other lineages, we do not call that collection a genus merely because it is a crowd of many persons. We call it a genus because we already understand it as descending from one principle of generation, one founding source from which the whole line proceeds. For students, the key point is that the unity of genus does not come from the many as many, but from the one origin that makes the many belong together and allows them to be distinguished from other groups.
34. Et ideo primus modus generis non dicitur genus, nisi per secundum, et ideo reducitur primus ad secundum sicut ad causam.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore the first mode of-genus is not called genus, except through the second, and therefore the first is led-back to the second just-as to (the) cause.”
Translation:
And therefore the first mode of genus is called genus only through the second, and for that reason the first is reduced to the second as to its cause.
Explanation:
St. Albert is restating his main ordering of these two extended senses of genus. The first sense, in which genus names the collected multitude descending from one source, is not called genus in its own right apart from the second sense. It receives that name because of the second sense, namely the originating principle from which the multitude comes. So the first depends on the second and is explained by it as by its cause. For students, the key point is that Albert wants us to see that the unity of a genus is grounded first in a source or principle, and only secondarily in the collection that proceeds from it. This is why the second sense is closer to the logical notion of genus.
35. Fuit etiam primus a nobis positus, quia minus facit ad propositum: sicut et de ambabus istis significationibus prius dicimus, quam de genere logico, ut minus intenta dimittantur, et longius a proposito ponantur.
Literal Translation:
“It-was also first by us posited, because it less does toward the proposed (thing): just as also concerning both these significations we first speak, than concerning genus logical, so-that the less-intended (things) may-be-dismissed, and farther from the proposed (thing) may-be-placed.”
Translation:
It was also placed first by us because it contributes less to the matter at hand; and so too we speak first about both of these meanings before speaking about logical genus, so that the less relevant points may be set aside and placed further from the main subject.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining his order of exposition. He says that the first sense discussed was put first not because it is the most important, but because it is less useful for the main question. In the same way, he treats both of these broader meanings of genus before turning to logical genus, so that the less pertinent meanings can be cleared away and left behind. For students, this shows a very typical scholastic method: first sort out secondary or less relevant senses of a term, then move toward the precise technical sense that directly serves the argument.
36. Et ut sciatur, quod similia paulatim et gradatim perficiuntur ad propositi declarationem.
Literal Translation:
“And so-that it may-be-known, that similar-(things) little-by-little and step-by-step are-brought-to-completion for declaration of-the-proposed-(thing).”
Translation:
And this is so that it may be known that analogous things are developed little by little and step by step for the clarification of the matter at hand.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining the pedagogical method behind his order of discussion. He has been using similar or analogous meanings of genus before arriving at the strict logical sense, and here he says that this is done so the reader may see how such likenesses are gradually refined toward a clear understanding of the main question. The idea is that learning often proceeds by stages: one begins with related and more accessible cases, and then moves step by step toward the precise concept under investigation. For students, this is an important reminder that scholastic exposition is often deliberately ordered to lead the mind from the less exact to the more exact.
37. Et ideo etiam genus intentum post omnia similia dicimus ultimo.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore also genus intended after all similar-(things) we-say last.”
Translation:
And therefore we speak of the genus under consideration last, after all the similar senses have been treated.
Explanation:
St. Albert is concluding his explanation of method. Since he has been using related and analogous meanings of genus to prepare the mind step by step, he now says that the genus actually intended, that is, the proper logical genus under discussion, is treated last. The reason is pedagogical and methodological: the less exact and more remote similarities are handled first, so that the precise object of inquiry can finally be understood more clearly. For students, the key point is that Albert is deliberately leading the reader from broader and more familiar uses of the term to its strict technical sense.
38. Est autem attendendum, quod a matre una a qua multi descenderunt, non sumitur ad genus logicum similitudo: quia mater non est principium formale multorum, sed materiale, et sicut formatum, et non sicut formans.
Literal Translation:
“But it-is to-be-attended, that from (the) mother one from whom many have-descended, not is-taken to logical genus similitude: because mother not is principle formal of-many, but material, and as having-been-formed, and not as forming.”
Translation:
But it must be noted that the likeness to logical genus is not taken from one mother from whom many have descended, because the mother is not the formal principle of many, but the material principle, and that as something formed, not as forming.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert marks an important limit in the comparison he has been using between natural generation and logical genus. The analogy to logical genus works better from the father or from a formal originating principle than from the mother, because in the Aristotelian-Scholastic framework he is using, the mother is understood chiefly as the material principle, while the father is treated as the formal and formative principle. Since logical genus is being approached through the idea of one formal principle extending to many, the maternal line does not serve as the preferred likeness. For students, the main point is not simply the biological claim itself, but the philosophical distinction underneath it: Albert is trying to explain logical genus through what gives form and unity to many things, not merely through what supplies the material in which that form is received.
39. Genus autem logicum principium est ut forma: quia aliter non praedicaretur de eo cuius est genus: sed est ut forma indistincta, quae totum est esse speciei secundum esse informe et indistinctum, distinguibile tamen ad formam speciei.
Literal Translation:
“But genus logical principle is as form: because otherwise not it-would-be-predicated of that of-which it is genus: but it is as form indistinct, which whole is being of-species according to being un-formed and indistinct, distinguishable however to form of-species.”
Translation:
Logical genus, however, is a principle as form, because otherwise it would not be predicated of that of which it is the genus. But it is a form that is indistinct, one which is the whole being of the species according to an indeterminate and indistinct mode of being, though still capable of being distinguished into the form of the species.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert comes to the heart of the logical notion of genus. Genus is not merely a collection or a source in the way earlier examples suggested, but a formal principle that can be predicated of the species under it. That is why he says it is a principle “as form.” Yet it is not the fully determinate form of a species; rather, it is an indistinct and less determined formal content which contains the whole being of the species in a general way. The species then adds the determination that makes this common formal content to be this definite kind of thing. For students, the key point is that genus already includes the essential nature, but only in a broad and undifferentiated mode; species brings that same nature to a more precise and determinate expression.
40. Et quamvis a loco similitudo trahatur ad generis logici designationem, tamen a tempore non trahitur aliqua similitudo: quia tempus est mensura et numerus motus et mutationis.
Literal Translation:
“And although from place similitude is drawn to of-genus logical designation, nevertheless from time not is-drawn any similitude: because time is measure and number of motion and of change.”
Translation:
And although a likeness is drawn from place for the explanation of logical genus, nevertheless no such likeness is drawn from time, because time is the measure and number of motion and change.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert marks another limit in the analogies he has been using to clarify logical genus. Place can supply a likeness because it can function as a kind of principle or common condition shared by many things generated there. Time, however, does not work in the same way, because time is not a formal principle containing or determining many things under one common nature; rather, it is the measure and numbering of motion and change. For students, the main point is that logical genus must be illuminated by analogies that involve a unifying principle present across many things, and time does not provide that sort of unity, since its role is to measure succession and alteration rather than to ground a shared essence.
41. Et ideo est in fieri, et non est in esse generatorum principaliter.
Literal Translation:
“And therefore it is in becoming, and it is not in the being of-generated-(things) principally.”
Translation:
And therefore it belongs principally to becoming, not to the being of generated things.
Explanation:
St. Albert is explaining why time does not provide a good likeness for logical genus. Time belongs chiefly to the process of coming-to-be, because it measures motion and change, and so it is associated with things insofar as they are being generated. But logical genus belongs to what a thing is, that is, to its essence or formal being, not merely to the process by which it comes into existence. For students, the key point is that genus concerns stable intelligible being, whereas time concerns the succession and movement involved in becoming.
42. Genus autem natorum est et in esse constitutorum.
43. Propter quod etiam in libro de intelligibilibus dicitur locus esse mensuram entis, tempus autem esse mensuram motus dicitur, quia eius esse est in motu et mutatione.
Literal Translation:
“Genus however of (things) born is and of (things) constituted in being.”
Translation:
Genus, however, belongs to things that have been born and established in being.
Explanation:
St. Albert is completing the contrast with time. Time belongs chiefly to the process of coming-to-be, to motion and change as something is being generated. Genus, by contrast, belongs to things once they have been brought forth and stand in actual being. The point is that genus is not mainly about the transition into existence, but about the stable intelligible nature of things that already are. For students, this helps show why genus is tied to essence and predication rather than to temporal succession or the process of generation itself.
44. Est autem attendendum, quod Avicenna dicit quod isti ambo modi extenduntur etiam ad artificialia.
Literal Translation:
“But it-is to-be-attended, that Avicenna says that these both modes are-extended also to artificial-things.”
Translation:
But it must be noted that Avicenna says that both of these modes are extended even to artificial things.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert notes that the two analogical senses of genus he has been discussing are not limited to natural generation alone, but can also be applied to things made by art. By citing Avicenna, he indicates that one may speak in a similar way of an originating principle and of a collection proceeding from it even in the case of artifacts. For students, the important point is that Albert is broadening the usefulness of these preliminary distinctions: the patterns that help explain genus are not confined to family descent or natural birth, but can also appear in human making, where many products may be traced to one source, model, or productive principle.
45. Aliquando enim dicuntur coriarii omnes, qui sunt de collectione coriariorum ab uno aliquo qui excellebat in illo artificio: sicut nautae dicuntur calepsitae a quodam Calepso, qui floruit in arte nautica: et fabri dicuntur Tubalcaitae a Tubalcaim, qui artem fabrorum invenit: et musici dicuntur pythagorici a Pythagora, qui perfecit ea quae in arte sunt musica.
Literal Translation:
“For sometimes are-called tanners all, who are of the collection of-tanners from one some-one who excelled in that craft: just-as sailors are-called calepsitae from a certain Calypso, who flourished in nautical art: and smiths are-called Tubalcaites from Tubalcain, who the art of-smiths discovered: and musicians are-called Pythagoreans from Pythagoras, who perfected those things which in the art are of-music.”
Translation:
For sometimes all tanners are named from the guild or body of tanners deriving from some one man who excelled in that craft; just as sailors are called Calypsites from a certain Calypso, who flourished in the nautical art, and smiths are called Tubalcaites from Tubalcain, who discovered the craft of smiths, and musicians are called Pythagoreans from Pythagoras, who perfected the things belonging to the musical art.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert applies the earlier analogical senses of genus to the arts. Just as a natural lineage can be named from one ancestor, so a whole class or tradition of craftsmen can be named from some outstanding founder, inventor, or perfecter of an art. The point is that a multitude can be gathered under one name because it traces back to one originating principle, even when the connection is not by bodily generation but by transmission of an art, discipline, or practice. For students, the key idea is that Albert is showing how the notion of genus can be extended from natural descent to intellectual and artistic traditions: many practitioners are unified under one source because they receive, continue, or imitate what began from that one.
46. Hoc tamen est minus proprium: quia id quod est in omnibus ex isto principio, non est substantiale et naturale, sed accidentale illis in quibus est.
Literal Translation:
“This however is less proper: because that which is in all from this principle, is not substantial and natural, but accidental to-those in which it is.”
Translation:
This, however, is less proper, because what is present in all from such a principle is not something substantial and natural, but accidental to those in whom it is found.
Explanation:
St. Albert is qualifying the comparison he has just made between natural lineage and the transmission of an art. When a group is named from a founder of some craft or discipline, the unity they share does not come from a common substantial nature, as in natural generation, but from something accidental, namely an acquired art or practice. That is why this usage is less proper. For students, the key point is that logical genus is ultimately tied to what belongs to things essentially, not merely to what can be added to them from outside. A shared craft can unify many people in a real way, but not as deeply as a shared nature does.
47. Genus autem logicum omnibus speciebus inest ut natura et substantia.
Literal Translation:
“Genus however logical to-all species is-in as nature and substance.”
Translation:
Logical genus, however, is present in all species as nature and substance.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert contrasts logical genus with the looser, more accidental unity found in arts and crafts. A logical genus is not something merely added from outside, like a shared trade or acquired skill. Rather, it is present in all the species under it as their nature and substance, that is, as part of what they essentially are. For students, the main point is that genus in logic belongs to the inner constitution of things and is said of them according to their essence, which is why it serves as a true principle of predication and classification.
48. His ergo modis genus dicitur in quolibet.
Literal Translation:
“By-these therefore modes genus is-said in any-(thing).”
Translation:
Therefore, genus is spoken of in each case in these ways.
Explanation:
St. Albert is concluding this preliminary survey of the different senses in which the word genus can be used. He has distinguished several related meanings, some more proper and some less proper, in order to prepare for the strict logical sense. This sentence serves as a summary marker: the term genus is used in these various ways wherever the relevant conditions apply. For students, the important point is that Albert has been clearing the ground by mapping the word’s range of meanings before moving on to the more exact logical treatment.
49. Aliter autem accipitur apud Philosophos, sicut in sequenti patebit capitulo.
Literal Translation:
“But otherwise it-is-taken among Philosophers, just-as in (the) following will-be-clear chapter.”
Translation:
But among the philosophers it is understood in another way, as will become clear in the following chapter.
Explanation:
St. Albert is signaling a transition. After surveying the various common and analogical senses of genus, he now says that philosophers take the term in a different way, one that will be explained next. This prepares the reader for a more technical treatment and indicates that the preceding discussion has been preliminary. For students, the key point is that scholastic authors often distinguish ordinary or extended uses of a term from the stricter sense used in philosophy, and Albert is now about to move into that more precise account.
50. Colligentes igitur summatim quae dicta sunt, dicimus quod videtur neque genus neque species simpliciter sive modo uno et in una intentione dici.
Literal Translation:
“Collecting therefore summarily the-things which have-been-said, we-say that it-seems neither genus nor species simply or by mode one and in one intention to-be-said.”
Translation:
Gathering together, then, in summary what has been said, we say that it seems that neither genus nor species is spoken of simply, or in only one way and with one single intention.
Explanation:
St. Albert is drawing together the results of the preceding discussion. Since he has already shown that the word genus is used in several related senses, he now extends the same point to species: neither term is used in just one absolutely simple and univocal way. Instead, both are said according to different intentions or respects. For students, the important point is methodological as well as doctrinal: before giving a strict logical account of genus and species, Albert wants the reader to understand that these words have a range of uses, and that philosophical precision requires distinguishing those uses rather than assuming one flat meaning throughout.
51. Dico autem videtur, et non, est: quia istae generis acceptiones magis sunt in nostra acceptione et cognitione, quam in rei natura et existentia.
Literal Translation:
“But I-say it-seems, and not, it-is: because these acceptions of-genus more are in our apprehension and cognition, than in the nature and existence of-the-thing.”
Translation:
But I say “it seems,” and not “it is,” because these senses of genus exist more in our way of understanding and knowing than in the nature and existence of the thing itself.
Explanation:
Here St. Albert adds an important qualification to his summary. He had just said that genus and species do not appear to be spoken of in one single way, but now he explains why he says “it seems” rather than stating it absolutely. The multiplicity he has been describing belongs chiefly to our conceptual grasp and the different ways we understand and speak about things, not primarily to the thing’s own reality outside the mind. For students, the key point is that Albert is distinguishing between the order of thought and language and the order of being. The many “senses” of genus arise especially from how the intellect considers things under different aspects, even though the thing itself is not thereby multiplied in the same way in reality.
52. Et primo quidem quoad nos dicitur genus collectio multorum quodammodo uno modo se habentium ad unum aliquod, quod est illius collectionis secundum generationem principium, et quae se aliquo modo habent ad invicem in uno quod a principio suae generationis est in singulis ipsorum secundum totam illam collectionem.
Literal Translation:
“And first indeed as-to us is-called genus (the) collection of-many somehow in-one mode themselves having to one something, which is of-that collection according-to generation (the) principle, and which themselves in-some mode have toward each-other in one (thing) which from (the) principle of-their generation is in (the) singulars of-them according-to the whole that collection.”
Translation:
And first, as regards our way of understanding, genus is called a collection of many things which in some one way are related to some one thing that is the principle of that collection according to generation, and which are also related to one another in some way through one thing that is in each of them from the principle of their generation throughout that whole collection.
Explanation:
St. Albert is here summarizing the first way in which we speak of genus from the side of our own understanding. In this sense, genus means a group of many individuals who are united because they all stand in relation to one common generative source, and because something from that source is found in each of them. So the many belong together both by reference to one principle and by a likeness they have among themselves through what they have received from that principle. For students, the important point is that this is still a preliminary and analogical sense of genus: Albert is describing how the mind first recognizes a common unity among many before he moves to the stricter logical sense.
53. Secundum quam significationem Romanorum collectio genus dicitur ab habitudine unius, dico autem Romuli.
Literal Translation:
“According to which signification (the) collection of-the-Romans genus is-called from relation of-one, I say however of-Romulus.”
Translation:
According to this meaning, the collection of the Romans is called a genus from its relation to one man, namely Romulus.
Explanation:
St. Albert is applying the summary definition he has just given to the example of the Romans. The Roman people are called a genus in this broad sense because they are understood in relation to one originating source, Romulus. Their unity as a collection comes not merely from being many persons gathered together, but from their common reference to one founder from whom the line is conceived to proceed. For students, the key point is that Albert is still working with the analogical, genealogical sense of genus, where many are united under one by common origin, as a preparation for the stricter logical meaning.
54. Et dicitur genus multitudinis illius per relationem aliquo modo ad invicem secundum id quod est in eis ex Romulo.
Literal Translation:
“And it-is-called genus of-the-multitude of-that through relation in-some-mode to each-other according-to that which is in them from Romulus.”
Translation:
And it is called the genus of that multitude by reason of the relation they have in some way to one another according to what is in them from Romulus.
Explanation:
St. Albert adds here that the multitude is called a genus not only because all are referred back to one source, but also because the members are related to one another through what they share from that source. In the case of the Romans, what comes from Romulus provides a common bond within the whole multitude, so that the many are connected among themselves as well as traced back to one founder. For students, the important point is that genus in this broad sense includes both a vertical relation to an origin and a horizontal relation of likeness among those who derive from it.
55. Et hoc est, quia habent ad invicem eam quae ab illo Romulo est cognationem secundum divisionem vel separationem ab aliis generibus aliorum avorum, quae dicitur vel denominatur ab aliis patribus vel avis.
Literal Translation:
“And this is, because they have toward each-other that which from that Romulus is kinship according to division or separation from other genera of other grandfathers, which is called or denominated from other fathers or grandfathers.”
Translation:
And this is because they have toward one another that kinship which comes from Romulus, according to a distinction or separation from other lineages descending from other forefathers, which are named or designated from other fathers or grandfathers.
Explanation:
St. Albert is clarifying why the descendants of Romulus can be called one genus in this broad genealogical sense. They are united among themselves by a kinship that comes from their common relation to Romulus, and this shared bond also sets them apart from other family lines that descend from different ancestors. So genus here does not mean merely a crowd of people with the same name, but a group marked off from others by common origin and common kinship. For students, the important point is that this sense of genus includes both unity within the group and distinction from other groups, each of which is named from its own ancestral source.
56. Dicitur autem et aliter rursus genus quod est unius generationis principium ab eo parente qui genuit, vel ab eo loco in quo quis generatus est propter causam quae in ante habitis posita est.
Literal Translation:
“But it-is-said also and otherwise again genus that which is of-one generation principle from that parent who begot, or from that place in which someone has-been-generated on-account-of (the) cause which in the things had-before has-been set-forth.”
Translation:
But again, genus is also spoken of in another way as that which is the principle of a generation, either from the parent who begot it or from the place in which someone was generated, for the reason that was set forth in the preceding discussion.
Explanation:
St. Albert is here restating the second broad sense of genus that he had already explained earlier. In this sense, genus does not mean the whole collected line descending from one source, but rather the source itself from which the line proceeds, either the parent who generates or the place of generation. He adds that this is so for the reason already given above, namely that both parent and place can be treated as principles from which a common likeness is derived into many. For students, the key point is that Albert is summarizing the earlier distinctions before moving further, and he continues to show how these analogical senses prepare the mind for the stricter logical meaning of genus.
57. Sic enim Orestem dicimus a Tantalo quidem habere genus: Hilum autem cum domo et familia sua genus habere ab Hercule.
Literal Translation:
“For thus Orestes we-say from Tantalus indeed to-have genus: Hyllus however with house and family his genus to-have from Hercules.”
Translation:
For thus we say that Orestes has his lineage from Tantalus, while Hyllus, together with his household and family, has his lineage from Hercules.
Explanation:
St. Albert is giving concrete examples of the second broad sense of genus, where the word refers to the source or principle from which a line descends. Orestes is said to have his genus from Tantalus, and Hyllus along with his whole house and family from Hercules, because each is traced back to a founding ancestor. The point for students is that genus here still means lineage or stock in a genealogical sense, not yet genus in the strict logical sense. Albert is using these ancestral examples to show how many can be referred back to one originating principle.
58. Et rursus quidem a loco denuntinantes Pindarum Thebanum esse, Platonem vero Atheniensem.
Literal Translation:
“And again indeed from place declaring Pindar Theban to-be, Plato however Athenian.”
Translation:
And again, designating them from place, we say that Pindar is Theban, and Plato Athenian.
Explanation:
St. Albert gives here the companion example of calling someone’s genus from place rather than from ancestry. Just as one may trace a person to a founding parent, so one may also identify him by the place from which he comes. Thus Pindar is called Theban and Plato Athenian. The point is still the same broader, analogical sense of genus: many ways of naming origin exist, and place can function as a principle of belonging or derivation in a looser sense before Albert arrives at the strict logical meaning of genus.
59. Etenim patria uniuscujusque generationis principium est, quemadmodum et pater, ut in praehabitis expositum est.
Literal Translation:
“For indeed (the) fatherland of-each generation principle is, just-as also (the) father, as in the things previously-had it-has-been-expounded.”
Translation:
For a man’s homeland is indeed a principle of his generation, just as his father is, as was explained earlier.
Explanation:
St. Albert is here restating the claim that place of birth can be considered a principle of generation in an analogical sense, much as a father is a principle of generation in a more direct sense. His point is not that homeland generates in exactly the same way as a parent, but that one’s place of origin helps account for a shared character among those born there and so can serve as a source from which a common likeness is understood to proceed. For students, this continues the broader preliminary discussion of genus: before reaching the strict logical meaning, Albert is showing how both ancestry and place can function as principles by which many are referred back to one origin.
60. Haec autem secunda generis acceptio videtur esse promptissima generis significatio.
Literal Translation:
“But this second acceptance of-genus seems to-be most-ready signification of-genus.”
Translation:
But this second acceptance of genus seems to be the most fitting signification of genus.
Explanation:
St. Albert is saying that, among the several senses of genus he has distinguished, the second is the one best suited to serve as the clearest and most useful meaning for the discussion. The word promptissima suggests not just “quickest,” but most apt, ready, or suitable for the purpose at hand. In context, this means that the second sense of genus provides the best bridge toward the logical notion he wants to explain. For students, the key point is that Albert is ranking the different preliminary meanings he has surveyed and identifying the one that most naturally prepares the mind for the strict philosophical treatment of genus.
61. Romani ideo dicti sunt Romani, quia illi a genere descenderunt Romuli: et Cecropidae sunt, qui ex genere descenderunt Cecropis: et horum proximi per eamdem causam sunt de eodem genere.
Literal Translation:
“Romans for-that-reason have-been-called Romans, because those from the genus have-descended of-Romulus: and Cecropidae are, who from the genus have-descended of-Cecrops: and of-these the-nearest through the same cause are of the same genus.”
Translation:
The Romans are called Romans for this reason: because they have descended from the line of Romulus; and the Cecropidae are those who have descended from the line of Cecrops; and those nearest among them are of the same genus for the same reason.
Explanation:
St. Albert is reinforcing his point that a genus, in this extended genealogical sense, is named from a first ancestor from whom a whole line descends. The Romans take their name from Romulus, and the Cecropidae from Cecrops, because each group is understood as proceeding from one founding source. He then adds that those who are nearest within such a line are said to belong to the same genus by the same principle, namely shared descent from a common origin. For students, the key idea is that this broad sense of genus depends on lineage and common source, and Albert is still using it as a stepping stone toward the stricter logical sense of genus.
62. Et prius quidem, hoc est, per prius appellatur genus uniuscujusque generationis principium: dehinc autem et per posterius dicitur genus etiam multitudo eorum qui descenderunt ab uno principio, ut a Romulo Romulei.
Literal Translation:
“And first indeed, this is, through the prior, is-called genus (the) principle of-each generation: then however also and through the posterior is-called genus also (the) multitude of-those who have-descended from one principle, as from Romulus (the) Romuleans.”
Translation:
And in the primary sense, that is, in the prior way, genus is called the principle of each generation; then, in a secondary and posterior way, genus is also said of the multitude of those who have descended from one principle, as the Romuleans from Romulus.
Explanation:
St. Albert is restating the order between the two earlier meanings of genus. In the more primary sense, genus means the source or principle from which a line proceeds. In the more secondary sense, it means the whole multitude that has come forth from that source. So the descendants are called a genus only because they come from one prior principle, as the Romuleans come from Romulus. For students, the important point is that Albert is carefully ranking these meanings: first the originating source, then the group derived from it. That ordering helps prepare for the logical sense of genus, where what matters most is the one principle under which many are contained.
63. Cuius signum est: namque dividentes hoc genus sive discernentes et ab illis generibus separantes ipsum, dicebamus omnem illam Romanorum collectionem esse genus Romanorum.
Literal Translation:
“Of-which sign is: for indeed dividing this genus or discerning and from those genera separating it, we-were-saying all that collection of-the-Romans to-be genus of-the-Romans.”
Translation:
The sign of this is as follows: for when we divide or distinguish this genus and separate it from those other genera, we say that the whole collection of the Romans is the genus of the Romans.
Explanation:
St. Albert is offering a proof for the claim that the collected multitude is called a genus only in a secondary way. When we distinguish the Roman line from other lines, we speak of the whole Roman collection as the genus of the Romans. But this way of speaking already presupposes that the group has a real unity that allows it to be set apart from others. In other words, the multitude is called a genus because it is understood as one collection descending from a single source and therefore distinguishable from other such collections. For students, the key point is that Albert is showing how our speech about a “genus” of people depends on first grasping a common principle that unites them and marks them off from others.
64. Est autem in duobus dissimilitude ad genus logicum.
Literal Translation:
“There-is however in two (things) dissimilitude to genus logical.”
Translation:
There is, however, a dissimilarity to logical genus in two respects.
Explanation:
St. Albert is signaling an important qualification in the comparison he has been drawing between these broader senses of genus and the strict logical notion. Up to this point, the analogies have helped illuminate logical genus, but now he warns that the likeness is not complete. There are two points at which the comparison breaks down. For students, this is a typical scholastic move: after showing how an analogy helps, he now prepares to mark its limits so that the logical concept will not be confused with the merely analogous cases.
65. In uno quidem: quia principium generationis non secundum substantiam et secundum se totum est in collectione quae genus dicit, ita quod sit in quolibet totum.
Literal Translation:
“In one indeed: because (the) principle of-generation not according-to substance and according-to itself whole is in (the) collection which genus says, so that it may-be in any-one whole.”
Translation:
In one respect, this is so because the principle of generation is not present in the collection called a genus according to its substance and as a whole in itself, so that it would be wholly present in each member.
Explanation:
St. Albert is identifying the first point at which the genealogical sense of genus differs from logical genus. In a family line or lineage, the founding principle of generation is not wholly and substantially present in every descendant. Romulus, for example, is not entirely present in each Roman as the full principle itself. But logical genus is different: it is predicated of each species as something wholly present according to its common nature. For students, the key point is that the analogy from natural descent can only go so far. A generative source produces many descendants, but it is not itself wholly in each one the way a logical genus is present in each of its species according to intelligible content.
66. Genus autem logicum secundum se totum et secundum substantiam est in collectione specierum et in qualibet specie: propter quod etiam non praedicatur nomine et ratione principium generationis de collectione multorum qui descenderunt de ipso nisi denominative.
Literal Translation:
“Genus however logical according to itself whole and according to substance is in (the) collection of-species and in each species: on-account-of which also not is-predicated by-name and by-account (the) principle of-generation of (the) collection of-many who have-descended from it except denominatively.”
Translation:
Logical genus, however, is present as a whole in itself and according to substance in the collection of species and in each species. For that reason, too, the principle of generation is not predicated of the collection of many who have descended from it by name and definition, except only denominatively.
Explanation:
St. Albert is stating the first major difference between genealogical genus and logical genus. A logical genus is wholly present, according to its essential nature, both in the whole set of species under it and in each species individually. That is why it can truly be predicated of them. By contrast, a principle of natural generation is not present in that same full and essential way in all the descendants who come from it. So when a multitude is named from an ancestor, it is called by that name only denominatively, that is, by derivation from the source, not because the ancestor or generating principle is formally and essentially predicated of each member in the same way that a logical genus is predicated of its species.
67. Dicuntur enim Romani vel Romulei, non Romuli.
Literal Translation:
“For they-are-called Romans or Romuleans, not Romuluses.”
Translation:
For they are called Romans or Romuleans, not Romuluses.
Explanation:
St. Albert is illustrating the point he has just made about denominative predication. Descendants of Romulus are named from him, but they are not called by exactly the same name as if the ancestor himself were wholly and essentially predicated of them. They are called Romani or Romulei, names derived from Romulus, not Romuli. This shows the difference between genealogical naming and logical genus. In logical genus, the genus is truly predicated of each species according to its nature; but in lineage, the ancestor’s name is only extended derivatively to the descendants. For students, the key point is that this is one reason the analogy with logical genus is limited: descent from a source does not mean identity with that source.
68. Genus autem logicum praedicatur praedicatione substantiali de his quorum est genus.
Literal Translation:
“Genus however logical is-predicated by-predication substantial of-those of-which it is genus.”
Translation:
Logical genus, however, is predicated by substantial predication of those of which it is the genus.
Explanation:
St. Albert is now stating directly the feature that distinguishes logical genus from the merely analogical senses based on ancestry or origin. Logical genus is said of its inferiors in a substantial way, that is, it expresses part of what those things are in their essence. This is unlike genealogical naming, where descendants are only denominatively named from an ancestor. For students, the key point is that genus in logic belongs to the inner nature of the species under it. When a genus is predicated of a species, it is not merely an external label or a derived title, but a statement about the substance or essence of the thing itself.
69. In alio etiam est dissimilitudo: quia collectio quae dicitur genus, est quasi totum integrale ad genus vel in genere, cuius quodlibet est pars integralis, et omnes sunt totum.
Literal Translation:
“In another also there-is dissimilitude: because (the) collection which is-called genus, is as-if whole integral to genus or in genus, of-which whatever is part integral, and all are whole.”
Translation:
There is also a dissimilarity in another respect: because the collection that is called a genus is like an integral whole with respect to genus or within genus, of which each member is an integral part, and all together make up the whole.
Explanation:
St. Albert is giving the second point at which the genealogical or collective sense of genus differs from logical genus. A collection called a genus in the ordinary sense is like an integral whole: its members are parts, and the whole is made up by putting those parts together. A family line or people is this kind of whole, because each individual is only one part of the collection, and all together constitute it. But logical genus is not a whole of parts in that way. Its species are not parts that physically or integrally compose it; rather, genus is predicated of each species as a common essential nature. For students, the key point is that Albert is distinguishing two very different kinds of unity: the unity of a collection made up of members, and the unity of a common nature said of many.
70. Genus autem logicum est totum essentiale, cuius quaelibet species est pars subiectiva.
Literal Translation:
“Genus however logical is whole essential, of-which each species is part subjective.”
Translation:
Logical genus, however, is an essential whole, of which each species is a subjective part.
Explanation:
St. Albert is completing the contrast between a merely collected multitude and logical genus. A genealogical or social collection is an integral whole made up of many members as parts, but logical genus is a different kind of whole altogether: it is an essential whole. That means the species under it are not parts that physically make it up, but subjective parts, that is, distinct lower terms in which the same common nature is found and predicated. For students, the key point is that genus in logic is not a heap or aggregate of species; it is one essential nature present in many species, each of which falls under it as a determinate way of having that nature.
71. In hoc tamen aliquid similitudinis est: quia quamvis genus logicum secundum totam essentiam salvetur in qualibet specie, tamen non salvatur in qualibet specie secundum totum ambitum suae potestatis.
Literal Translation:
“In this however something of-similitude is: because although genus logical according-to whole essence is-preserved in each species, nevertheless not is-it-preserved in each species according-to whole extent of-its power.”
Translation:
Yet in this there is some likeness: because although logical genus is preserved according to its whole essence in each species, it is nevertheless not preserved in each species according to the whole range of its power.
Explanation:
St. Albert now introduces a subtle point of similarity after distinguishing logical genus from an integral collection. Logical genus is wholly present in each species according to essence, but no one species exhausts the full extension or scope of what the genus can embrace. For example, one species contains the genus truly, yet the genus also extends beyond that species to other species. For students, the key point is that genus is fully present essentially in each species, but not in such a way that one species contains the whole reach of the genus by itself. This helps explain how genus can remain one common nature while still extending to many specifically different determinations.
72. Et hoc habet aliquid similitudinis cum toto integrali praedicativo, cuius potestas ex multis potestatibus particularis integratur.
Literal Translation:
“And this has something of-similitude with whole integral predicative, of-which (the) power from many powers particular is-integrated.”
Translation:
And this has some likeness to a predicative integral whole, whose power is made complete from many particular powers.
Explanation:
St. Albert is noting a limited resemblance between logical genus and an integral whole. Although logical genus is not literally an integral whole made up of parts, it does resemble such a whole in this respect: the full range of its power is seen only across many determinate instances rather than in one alone. Just as an integral whole can be completed through the joining of many particular parts, so the full scope of a genus is manifested across many species. For students, the important point is that this is only a likeness, not an identity. Albert is carefully preserving the distinction between an essential whole, which genus truly is, and an integral whole, to which genus is only partially comparable in regard to the extension of its power.
