In this lesson, we continue our study of Aristotle’s ten Categories. Having studied Substance, Quantity and Relatives, we move on to Quality in chapter 8.
Translation
by Thomas Taylor
1. I denominate Quality that according to which certain things are said to be of such kinds.[efn_note]”such kinds” – Latin, quales.
2. But quality is among the number of things which are multifariously predicated.
I. Habit and Disposition
3. One Species of quality, therefore, is called habit and disposition[efn_note]”disposition” – Latin, affectio.[/efn_note]
4. But habit differs from disposition in this, that it is a thing more lasting and stable. And of this kind are the sciences and the virtues. For science appears to rank among the number of things which are more stable, and are with difficulty removed. In like manner virtue, such as justice and temperance, and everything of this nature, does not appear to be easily removed or easily changed. But dispositions are said to be things, which are easily moved and rapidly changed; such as heat and cold, disease and health, and other things of this kind. For a man is disposed after a manner according to these, but is rapidly changed, from being hot becoming cold, and passing from health to disease. The like also takes place in other things: unless some one through length of time has become naturalized to these, and the disposition is incurable, or cannot without great difficulty be removed; in which case it may be called a habit.
5. But it is evident that those things ought to be called habits which are more lasting, and are with greater difficulty removed. For those are not said to possess a scientific habit, who do not very much retain the dogmas of science, though they are disposed after an individual manner according to science, either worse, or better. Hence, habit differs from disposition in this, that the latter is easily removed, but the former is more lasting, and is with more difficulty removed.
6. Habits are also dispositions; but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have habits, are also after a manner disposed according to them; but those who are disposed are not also entirely in the possession of habit.
II. Natural Strength and Weakness
7. Another Species of Quality is that according to which we say that men are pugilistic, or adapted to the course, or healthy, or diseased; and, in short, whatever is said to take place according to natural power or weakness. For each of these is not denominated from being disposed after an individual manner, but from possessing a natural power or inability of doing something easily, or of suffering nothing. Thus, men are said to be pugilistic, or adapted to the course, not because they are disposed after an individual manner, but from possessing a natural power of doing something easily. And they are said to be healthy, from possessing a natural power of suffering nothing easily from casual circumstances; but to be diseased, from possessing a natural weakness of suffering nothing easily from any thing casual. The hard and the soft have a subsistence similar to these. For a thing is said to be hard from possessing a power of not being easily divided; and that is said to be soft, which has an imbecility with respect to this very thing.
III. Passive Qualities & Passions
8. The third Species of quality consists of passive qualities and passions. And things of this kind are such as sweetness, bitterness, sourness, and everything allied to these; and farther still, heat and cold, whiteness and blackness.
9. That these, therefore, are qualities is evident. For the recipients of them are called from them qualia. Thus, honey from receiving sweetness, is said to be sweet; and a body from receiving whiteness, is said to be white. The like also takes place in other things.
10. But they are called passive qualities, not because the recipients of the qualities suffer any thing. For neither is honey said to be sweet, from suffering any thing; nor any thing else among other things of this kind. Similarly to these also, heat and cold are said to be passive qualities, not from the recipients themselves suffering any thing; but because each of the above mentioned qualities is productive of passion in the senses, they are called passive qualities. For sweetness produces an individual passion according to taste, and heat according to the touch. And in a similar manner the rest.
11. But whiteness and blackness, and other colours, are not called passive qualities after the same manner with the above-mentioned, but in consequence of being produced from passion. That many mutations, therefore, of colours are produced through passion is evident. For a man when he blushes, becomes red; and when he is terrified, pale; and everything else of this kind. Hence, if anyone naturally suffers a passion of this kind, it is likely that he will have a similar colour. For the disposition which is now produced about the body when he blushes, may also be produced in the natural constitution; so that a similar colour will be naturally produced.
12. Such symptoms, therefore, of this kind as receive their beginning from certain passions which are difficult to be moved, and are permanent, are called passive qualities. For whether in the natural constitution paleness or blackness is produced, they are called qualities; for according to these we call them quales; or whether through long disease or heat, paleness or blackness happens to the same person, and he is not easily restored to his former condition, or these remain through the whole of life; these also are called qualities; for in a similar manner from these we call them quales. But such symptoms as are produced from things which are easily dissolved, and rapidly restored to their former condition, are called passions, and not qualities; for they are not called according to them certain quales. For neither is he who blushes in consequence of being ashamed called red; nor is he who is pale through being terrified called pale; but they are rather said to have suffered something. Hence things of this kind are indeed called passions, but not qualities.
13. Similarly to these also passive qualities and passions are denominated in the soul. For such things as immediately, from the birth of anyone, are produced from certain passions difficult to be removed,–these are called qualities; such as insanity, anger, and things of this kind. For men are said to be quales according to these, viz. wrathful, and insane. In a similar manner also, such other mutations of a thing from its proper condition as are not natural, but are produced from certain other symptoms, which are with difficulty removed, or which are, in short, immoveable;–these also, and things of this kind are called qualities; for those who possess them are called quales according to them. But such as are produced from things which are easily and rapidly restored to their former condition, are called passions; as for instance, if anyone being afflicted becomes more angry. For he is not called angry, who in a passion of this kind is more wrathful, but he is rather said to have suffered something. And hence things of this kind are indeed said to be passions, but are not called qualities.
IV. Figure
14. The fourth Species of quality is figure, and the morphe which is about everything; and besides these, rectitude and curvature, and whatever else is similar to possess an individual quality. For to be a triangle or a square is said to be an individual quale, and also a right line or a curve. According to morphe also, everything is said to be quale.
15. The rare and the dense likewise, the rough and the smooth may appear to signify an individual quale. It seems, however, that these are foreign from the division of quality; since each of them rather appears to manifest an individual position of parts. For a thing is said to be dense from having its parts near to each other; but a thing is said to be rare, from having its parts distant from each other. And a thing is smooth, indeed, from its parts being situated in an individual respect in a right line; but it is rough, because one part exceeds, and another is deficient.
16. Perhaps, therefore, there may appear to be an individual other mode of quality; but those we have enumerated are nearly such as are mostly adopted.
17. The above-mentioned, therefore, are qualities[efn_note]”qualities” – Latin, qualitates[/efn_note].
Of Qualia
18. But those things are qualia which are paronymously denominated according to them; or which in some other manner are denominated from them.
19. Most, therefore, and nearly all of them are called paronymously; as for instance, a white [man] from whiteness, a grammarian from grammar, and a just [man] from justice; and in a similar manner in the rest.
20. Some things, however, because names are not given to qualities, cannot be paronymously denominated from them. Thus, a racer or a pugilist, who is so called according to natural power, is not paronymously denominated from any quality. For names are not given to the powers, according to which these are called quales; as names are given to sciences, according to which men are said to be pugilists, or wrestlers, from disposition. For there is said to be a pugilistic and palaestric science; and from these those who are disposed to them are paronymously denominated quales.
21. Sometimes, however, the name being assigned [to quality] that which is called quale according to it is not paronymously denominated. Thus, from virtue a worthy man derives his appellation; for from possessing virtue, he is said to be worthy, but he is not paronymously denominated from virtue. A thing of this kind, however does not take place in many things.
22. Those things, therefore, are called qualia which are paronymously denominated from the above-mentioned qualities, or which are in some other manner denominated from them.
23. But contrariety is inherent in quality. Thus, justice is contrary to injustice, whiteness to blackness, and other things in a similar manner. Things also which subsist according to them are denominated qualia. Thus, the unjust is contrary to the just, and the white to the black.
24. A thing of this kind, however, does not happen in all things. For nothing is contrary to the yellow, or the pale, or to such like colours, though they are qualities.
25. Farther still, if one of contraries is a quality, the other also will be a quality. And this is evident from particulars, to anyone who directs his attention to the other categories. Thus, if justice is contrary to injustice, but justice is a quality, injustice also is a quality. For no one of the other categories accords with injustice, neither quantity, nor relation nor where, nor, in short, anyone of things of this kind, except quality.
26. Qualia also receive the more and the less. For one thing is said to be more or less white than another; and one thing is said to be more or less just than another. The same thing likewise receives an accession. For a thing which is white, is capable of becoming still more white.
27. This, however, is not the case with all, but with most things. For some one may doubt whether justice can be said to be more or less justice; and in a similar manner in other dispositions. For some doubt about things of this kind; and assert that justice is not entirely said to be more or less than justice, nor health than health. But they say that one person has more of health than another, and that one person has less of justice than another; and in a similar manner with respect to grammar, and other dispositions. The things, however, which are denominated according to these, indubitably receive the more and the less. For one man is said to be more a grammarian than another, and to be more just and healthy than another; and in a similar manner in other things.
28. But triangle and square do not appear to receive the more and the less, nor any other figure. For those things which receive the definition of a triangle, and the definition of a circle, are all of them similarly triangles, or circles. But of things which do not receive the same definition, one is not said to be more [an individual quality] than another. For a square is not more than an oblong, a circle; since neither of them receives the definition of the circle. In short, unless both receive the definition of the thing proposed, the one cannot be said to be more [an individual quality] than the other. All qualities, therefore, do not receive the more and the less.
29. Hence, of the above-mentioned particulars, no one is the peculiarity of quality.
30. Things, however, are said to be similar or dissimilar according to qualities alone. For one thing is not similar to another according to anything else than so far as it is quale. Hence it will be the peculiarity of quality, to be called similar or dissimilar according to it.
31. It is not, however, necessary to be disturbed, lest anyone should say, that we, proposing to speak of Quality, include many things which are Relatives; for we said earlier that habits and dispositions are among the number of Relatives.
32. For nearly in all things of this kind, the Genera are said to be Relatives; but of particulars no one is a relative. Thus, science being a Genus, that which it is, it is said to be with reference to something else; for it is said to be the science of an individual thing. But of particulars, no one is said to be that which it is, with reference to something else. Thus, grammar (a particular science) is not said to be the grammar of something; nor music the music of something; unless perhaps according to Genus these also are said to be Relatives. For instance, grammar is said to be the science of something, not the grammar of something; and music is the science of something, not the music of something. So that particular sciences are not among the number of Relatives. We are said, however, to be quales from particular sciences; for we possess these. And we are said to be scientific from possessing certain particular sciences. Hence these are particular qualities according to which we are sometimes said to be quales; but these are not among the number of Relatives.
33. Again, if the same thing should be a particular quality and a relative, there is no absurdity that it should be numerated in both Genera.
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