This lecture is intended for students enrolled in the Academy’s Classical Reasoning One course. If you’re not enrolled and would like to join us for self-paced studies, please visit classicalliberalarts.com. My name is William Michael. I’m the Academy headmaster, and I’ll be leading this study of the first part of chapter two of Porphyry’s Introduction.
This chapter has a lot of important material, and rather than try to cram it all into one lecture, I think it’s better if we divide it into two parts so that we can discuss everything carefully and completely. So this is the first part of chapter two of Porphyry’s Introduction.
Porphyry, as a reminder, was a Platonic philosopher who lived in the great city of Tyre and he lived between 234 and 305 AD, so make sure you keep this chronology clear. Aristotle wrote the Categories around 350 BC. And here we’re studying an introduction to that work, to the Categories by Porphyry, who lived from 234 to 305 AD, so 600 years after Aristotle, Porphyry composed this work, the Introduction as an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories, because Aristotle’s teaching can be very difficult to study, especially when a student is centuries removed from Aristotle’s own time and culture and Porphyry wrote this very helpful, very important introduction to explain the meaning of five important words that we’ll find in Aristotle’s writings, which are easy to misunderstand and that can lead us to misinterpret what Aristotle is teaching.
These five important words are called the predicables. The five predicables: different kinds of predicates or different kinds of things that can be spoken of a subject. The five predicables to name them are genus, species, difference, property and accident. And we saw in chapter one that the goal of this introduction is to explain the meaning of these five important terms, because they’re essential to rightly understand Aristotle’s philosophy.
So we’re going to study the five predicables, and in this second chapter, we’re going to study genus and species. In the first part this lecture, we’ll study genus, and then in the second part, we’ll study what Porphyry teaches about species. So two parts for chapter two, as I mentioned.
This text, Porphyry’s Introduction became very important in the Middle Ages when Aristotle’s works were interpreted and explained by Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastic philosophers. If we look at copies of Aristotle’s Organon that were published in medieval times and in early modern times, we’ll regularly find Porphyry’s Introduction added as an appendix and published with Aristotle’s work. So it was recognized as a very helpful resource for those interested in learning Aristotelian philosophy.
And as we get into chapter two here, we’re going to study what I think is one of the most important chapters in all of our philosophical studies. If you can grasp what Porphyry explains in chapter two of the Introduction here, you’re going to have a very clear understanding of much of what you’re going to study in the writings of Aristotle, a very important chapter that really puts a student on a new level of philosophical study. So we’re going to take our time and work through this lesson carefully.
Now, as I said, this is a long chapter, long text. We’re not going to read it here. You should have already read the text one time through before starting this lecture. If you haven’t, please pause the lecture and go read through the text one time before listening to this talk. If you’ve already read through the chapter one time, that’s great, and you can continue, but I’d like you to stop and go read if you haven’t already, then pick up when you’re ready.
Division
The first thing we need to do, as always, is divide the text and recognize the important divisions or parts in the text. We’re going to recognize two important parts. And as I said, remember, this lecture is covering the first part of chapter two. So these, these are the two parts of the first part that sounds very mystic, but that’s how this is going to be arranged.
Porphyry begins the chapter by stating his purpose. He says, it seems that neither genus nor species is simply denominated. It seems that neither genus nor species is simply denominated. In other words, these two words, genus and species are used in a number of different ways. There is not one simple, clear meaning for each of these words in the writings of ancient philosophers. They are not simply denominated, but they are used to name a number of different ideas, so there’s confusion concerning these words.
His goal is to show that these two words, genus and species, have multiple meanings, and to establish their proper philosophical definition. So we’re going to learn what the proper meaning of each of these words is for the study of Aristotelian philosophy.
This first part of the chapter, we’re going to divide into two parts. First, from the beginning, we read for a collection of certain things, for a collection of certain things. And in this first part, we’re going to learn the three different meanings of the term genus. The three different meanings of the term genus, we’re going to see one is genealogical, one is geographical and one is philosophical. So we’re going to learn the three meanings of genus.
Part Two begins in Section Eight, where we read, which also describing they explain, which also describing they explain. That marks the beginning of the second part of chapter two. And here we’re going to really examine the philosophical definition of genus, and we’re going to compare and contrast it with the other predicables. We’re going to talk about how it’s like species and difference property and accidents and how it’s different from those other predicables so we can learn this method of clarification that Porphyry uses. First he establishes a definition, and then he compares to show how this idea is like other similar ideas, but then to show how it differs from them. That’s how he accomplishes this work of clarifying the meaning of these five predicables. So that’s our goal here in this first part of chapter two.
Interpretation
So having divided the text into those two parts and sort of prepared for our lecture here, let’s go ahead and begin walking through the interpretation of the content of this lesson. So part one the three meanings of genus, and you should mark these in the text.
When you study Porphyry, writes quote, It seems indeed that neither genus nor species is simply denominated. It begins by noting, as I said, that the words genus and species are not used in just one simple way. This word denominated that he uses means named or called. And remember the way that Aristotelian philosophers, the way that ancient philosophers thought about objects, ideas and words, is very important.
Objects that exist outside the mind are the reality. They are the primary substances to use Aristotle’s term. They are the reality our minds, if we think of it, almost as a camera record an image of things that exist outside the mind, things that we can perceive and things that we’re also conscious of, so sometimes things that are not outside the mind. So we have these ideas of things, either conceived of by the mind or existing outside the mind. And our minds are like are like files on a computer containing lots of stored images and videos and sounds and other perceived ideas.
So we’ve got objects outside the mind, objects within the mind, and then we’ve got the ideas, or the records, the signs of those different things. So we’ve got objects ideas and then and then spoken words are signs or symbols of those ideas. So we’ve got these three things, objects, ideas and spoken words. We can also add a fourth, written words, which are symbols of spoken words. So objects, ideas, spoken words and written words. That’s how Aristotle teaches about these different things.
So when we talk about ideas and words and objects, it’s important to understand this way of looking at things. So we’re talking about ideas and words here, because when we talk about logic, it’s not just ideas. This is the study of rational philosophy. It’s the study of reasoning, but it’s not just ideas, because it’s impossible for us to think or speak about anything without using words. So logic is not just something that takes place in the mind. It also involves speech. And we’re talking about spoken things, signs of ideas.
So when he says denominated, he means we name something. So when we use the name, when we use the spoken word, genus, the problem is that that word is used as a sign for a number of different ideas. The word or name genus is used as a symbol for a number of different ideas. The same thing is true of species. The word species is used as a symbol for a number of different ideas, and that leads to confusion, because we can use the same words, but we use them to signify different ideas, so we’ve got to clarify and that’s why it’s always important to define terms, to identify the ideas that are being represented by the words that we use, and make sure that others whom we’re communicating with agree to use the words to represent those same ideas.
So denominated means named or called genus and species are not simply denominated. They’re not used in a simple way to represent just one idea each, but they’re used to represent a number of different ideas. The words have multiple meanings, and we need to be careful to understand which meaning is intended when we read the writings of Aristotle, Porphyry goes on and says, speaking of the first meaning of the term genus, he says, a collection of certain things subsisting in a certain respect, with reference to one thing and to each other, is called genus.
So he gives us here the first meaning, and it’s quite a mouthful, a collection. That’s the important part realize, genus refers to a collection of certain things subsisting in a certain respect. With reference to one common thing and to each other. That’s one meaning of the term genus, and by this, he means a genealogical or family, meaning a group of people who are related to each other because they descend from a common ancestor.
Subsisting. This word subsisting just means existing. You’ll find it used interchangeably in our English translations. But to subsist means to exist, and it says that it subsists in a certain respect with reference to one thing. That means this class of things, this family, exists as a class because of a relation to one common thing, namely a common ancestor. So that’s the first use of this term genus. It refers to a family or a class of of things that relate to one common ancestor. That’s the first meaning.
He goes on to say, according to which signification, giving us an example here, according to which signification the genus of the Heracleidae. Heracleidae, that means the family of Heracles or Hercules. The Heracleidae that name Heracleidae names a genus it’s denominated from the habitude, a new word, habitude from one thing I mean, from Hercules and the multitude of those who derive in a certain respect alliance from him being thus denominated according to abscission, from other genera.
So that’s a sentence or two with a lot of new vocabulary that you need to read through slowly and make sure you understand every word you read. As I mentioned, the Heracleidae, that big, fancy word there refers to the descendants of Heracles. That’s all that that word means Heracleidae, means the sons or the family of Heracles. So we read Heracleidae referring to Heracles. It’s also referred to as Hercules here, because Hercules is just the Roman form of the Greek name Heracles.
It says it’s denominated from the habitude. This is not a word that’s commonly used in modern English. The word habitude just means a relationship. So a habitude is something, some relation that’s had between different persons or things a certain connection. He then uses the word abscission. It’s denominated according to abscission from other genera. Abscission means separation, or cutting off, separating different groups based on this habitude, this relationship they have to a common ancestor, separating those who have this relationship from those who don’t have this relationship.
So the family of Hercules or Heracles gets its name from the relationship that they have to Him as their ancestor, and this separates them from other families, from other genera or classes. This shows how genus can mean a family line that’s distinguished from other family lines. That’s the first meaning of the term genus.
He goes on then to identify the second meaning of genus. We read in Porphyry after another manner, also the principle of the generation of everyone is again denominated genus so in a more general way, and it’s going to get complicated when we’re talking about genus, genera, generation, genealogy generator, the term general, all of these are related. So I’m sorry if that gets a little confusing, but this second meaning is a little more general than the first meaning, because it speaks of anyone denominated based on either the person or the place from which they’re born.
He says, After another manner, the principle of the generation. Generation of everyone is again denominated genus, whether from the generator or from the place in which someone is born. So it can be geographical based on the place of origin. When he says generation, he’s obviously referring to the birth or the origin of something, and the generator is the source, the father or parent from which something is born. So genus can refer to a family line, who your father is, or it can also be used to refer to the place of your birth, the people where you are from. So this is the second meaning he gives.
And then he goes on to provide another example, as he did before he says, quote, hence we say that Orestes derived his genus from Tantalus, but Hyllus derived his genus from Hercules. And again, in another sense, we say that Pindar was by genus a Theban, but Plato was an Athenian that would be the genus of Plato in this second sense.
So these are examples from Greek history and mythology. Orestes and Hyllus are identified by their family lines. Orestes traces his ancestry back to Tantalus, and Hyllus traces his ancestry back to Hercules. This identifies their genus. Pindar and Plato are identified by their cities of origin. Pindar came from Thebes, while Plato came from Athens. So again, this second usage of the term genus shows both ways that genus can be used to indicate someone’s background or origin.
He goes on to write for country is a certain principle of the generation of everyone in the same manner as a father. So he explains that both your father and your country of birth serve as sources of your origins, or sources of your identity. The origin of your identity, both of those, both your father and your country or place of origin give you a certain nature or character, your father is the source of your family nature and your country, the place where you’re born usually gives you your cultural nature. It’s worth noting that the Latin word for country is patria, and we talk about patriotism as love for your country. It’s really love for the place of your birth. To be patriotic is a virtue. So these are the first two meanings of the term genus
Porphyry goes on to say this signification appears to be one that is most easily adopted. This signification appears to be one that may be easily adopted. The genealogical meaning seems to be the most natural or obvious meaning of the term genus because it follows from the basic idea of generation and family relationships. People naturally think of genus in terms of family lines, because that is how we experience relationships in everyday life. We think of ourselves simply and naturally according to these relationships to our birth and to to our ancestors, those who are called Heracleidae, Porphyry writes, derive their origin from the genus of Hercules, the Cecropidae, who derive their genus from Cecrops. And also those who have an affinity or relationship to these so he gives us more examples of genealogical genus.
The Cecropidae were descendants of Cecrops, who was a legendary king of Athens. Just to clarify Cecropidae, we already talked about Heracleidae, so you should know what that means. Now, Cecropidae, right? The descendants of Cecrops. He uses the word affinity. He says, also those who have an affinity to these affinity, as I mentioned, just means relationship or connection. You can see how that’s a. A almost a synonym for habitude.
So the term genus, the point he’s making is that genus includes not just direct descendants, but also those who are related by marriage or adoption or possess any kind of relation to that principle or origin of the genus. He says, The first genus is denominated that whence the principle of the generation of any one is derived, but afterwards the multitude of those who originate from one principle, as, for instance, from Hercules, which genus defining and separating from others. We call the whole collected multitude the genus of the Heracleidae.
So again, he’s just clarifying there that genus can refer to the original ancestor or to the whole group of his descendants. The genus is both the source and the collection of those who come from that source.
So all of that is to give us the first two meanings or two uses of the term genus, and that brings us to the important part of the lesson, where we finally move on to the third meaning of genus, which is going to be the philosophical meaning, the one that we’re actually going to make use of as we study Aristotle’s reasoning.
He says, quote, again, after another manner, genus is denominated that to which species is subjected, being thus called, perhaps, according to the similitude of these, again, again, difficult language I know to read through. But once you get used to the language, learn the meaning of the terms. It’s just going to become normal. So be patient. Genus is denominated that to which species is subjected, being thus called according to the similitude of these.
So here he introduces Porphyry, that is, introduces the third meaning, the philosophical meaning, the one that we’re actually interested in. When he says that species is subjected to genus, the word subjected means placed under. And that can be confusing in this chapter, subjected means placed under, and we’re actually going to study in later in this chapter exactly what he means by this. But the basic idea, just to give you an introduction so you understand the meaning of this line to be placed under assumes that we understand that there is a certain kind of logical hierarchy that exists in Aristotle’s teaching.
Aristotle, not only are there lots of different objects, lots of different ideas that signify those objects and lots of different words that signify those ideas. But there’s a logical system, a logical hierarchy of these ideas and names, and it starts at the top of this hierarchy with with the most general genus, the largest group that contains all the others beneath it. So think of it as like a like a tree, where you start with the with the whole group at the top, and then that divides into different groups, and then those groups divide into smaller groups, and that continues all the way down until you have individual things, individuals.
So there’s this, this concept of this logical hierarchy, or this, this tree of ideas of genera and species. And this is actually called the tree of Porphyry, the tree of Porphyry. And if you if you’re interested, if you go online and just Google tree of Porphyry or Porphyrian tree, you should find an article by me, you know, on the Classical Liberal Arts Academy website where I share at least one image from medieval or early modern literature, where this tree of Porphyry is drawn out and you can see what this logical hierarchy looks like. But we’re going to study that in a little bit further on in this chapter, but, but that’s the idea of species.
Is being subjected to genus, we’re going to learn that the species is a class within a genus, so genus is on the top, and then species is subjected or set under genus. That’s what’s meant here. So pretty easy to understand once you get this concept in mind, which Porphyry seems to take for granted, the philosophical genus, the genus we’re talking about here is like the genealogical genus, because both of them serve as sources or principles for what comes under them, just as Hercules or Heracles, is the principle of his family line, a genus like animal is the principle that contains all the different species of animals.
So you can see how the word genus. In both cases, it refers to a similar idea, similar, but not the same, similar. But here philosophically, we’re not talking about a person and his descendants. We’re talking about a class of things, and then the classes into which that larger class can divide so animal would be a genus, and then the different classes of animals within that would be species. And again, we’ll study that in a little bit further down in this chapter, Porphyry goes on to write a genus of this kind is a certain principle of the things which are under it, and appears also to comprehend all the multitude which is under it.
So a philosophical genus serves as a source or a foundation for the species under it, and it includes or contains, comprehends all of them, just as Hercules is the principle of the Heracleidae animal is the principle that contains all the different kinds of animals, man, horse, dog and so on.
It’s worth noting, just just as a side note here that you know, we might think about this comparison between, you know, Heracles as the father of this whole multitude of descendants and and think that this is, This is like a genus, like animal. It’s interesting to note that in in ancient literature, especially in the Bible, well, we’ll often see this illustration where it’s said that the descendants of a person were contained in his loins, you know, before they were born. And it’s almost as if all of his children were contained in his body, and over time, they all came into existence. So there is this, this, this image of the father or the head of the family containing all of his descendants as as a as a genus, as it were, as a class or a container. So we see that language used even in Sacred Scripture.
All right, so a genus of this kind is a certain principle of the things which are under it. It appears to comprehend or contain all the multitude which is under it. Porphyry then writes, since, therefore genus is denominated in a threefold manner. So this is wrapping up part one here. Since genus is denominated in a threefold manner, the third is that which is considered by philosophers. The third definition is the one that we’re interested in for our study of philosophy.
So Porphyry has established here, helpfully, the three different meanings that are used for this term genus, the genealogical meaning, the geographical meaning and the philosophical meaning. As I said, this is the end of of the first part of this lecture. The first part of of chapter two. We’re going to move to the second part, where we focus and really go into detail in understanding the philosophical meaning and compare and contrast it to other predicables.
Remember this, this meaning, this, this idea of genus as that to which species is subjected. This is the philosophical meaning so, so get all of the thought of fathers and ancestors and descendants. Get all of that out. Of your head, because in philosophy, that’s not what we’re talking about when we say genus. We’re talking about this logical hierarchy classes of ideas, and that’s what we’re going to focus on as we continue in this chapter.
So Porphyry goes on and he says, which also describing. That marks the beginning of this second part, which also describing. They explain when they say that genus. Here’s a clearer definition from Porphyry. Genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species. In answer to the question, what the thing is, that’s our official definition, our philosophical definition of genus, you need to make sure, I would recommend you commit this to memory. Make sure you understand every part of this definition, because every part is important. I’ll repeat it. Genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species in answer to the question What a thing is.
So if we point at something and say, What is this? One possible answer for that question would be to name the genus of that thing. So for example, if I pointed to a man and I said, What is this, we could answer and say, This is a man, or this is an animal. When we say, this is an animal, we would be naming the genus of that thing. The predicate would be a genus. So that’s the idea. A genus is that which is predicated of many things, right? It’s predicated of a class which contains many things. It’s a name for a class, the things in this class differ in species, and they answer to the question, what is this?
The word predicated. Again, if you study grammar, study classical grammar, you know what predicate means. It means that which is said about a subject. So again, if I say, what is this? And I say, this is an animal, the subject. Is this? Whatever it is that we’re looking at or pointing to, that’s the subject. And then is an animal? Is what is predicated or said about the subject? So predicated means asserted of or spoken of or attributed to a genus is something that can be said of or predicated of many different species that it contains.
When we ask the question, what is this thing? Animal can be predicated of man, what is this? This man is an animal. But animal can also be predicated of horse. We could point to a horse, say, what is this? And we can say, this is an animal. We can point to a dog, say, what is this? And someone can say, this is an animal. So the term animal can be predicated of a number of different things, of many things, which are the same in genus but which differ in species. They all belong to the same class, but they belong to different classes within that class, within that genus.
If we were to ask, what is a horse, we would begin and this is going to be important. Remember, in chapter one, we learned that this study is important for the formation of definitions. If we point to a horse and say, What is this, the first thing that we should identify whenever we attempt to define something, the first thing we should do is identify the genus to which it belongs. So if we pointed at a horse and said, What is what is this? What is a horse? Our first answer would be to name the genus. It is an animal. The genus tells us the essential nature that the different species share. So the first thing we name about something is the genus to which it belongs. The class
Porphyry goes on and says, For of things which are predicated. And that phrase right there is very important, of things which are predicated. That’s what we’re talking about here. The five predicables, genus, species, difference, peculiarity and accident. The five predicables are, quote, things which are predicated. That’s what we’re talking about.
So Porphyry writes of things which are predicated the predicables, some are predicated of one thing only. Now, if we, if we think about those five predicables, genus, species, difference, peculiarity and accident, none of them we’ll see are predicated of one thing only. So what in the world is Porphyry talking about here? Well, he’s talking about another kind of predicate, which is individuals. He says, some are predicated of one thing only as individuals. And then He gives us an example. He says, as for instance, Socrates.
So the individual man, Socrates, that one man Socrates, myself, I would be William, Michael. That would be the name for this one man. That’s the name of an individual. So if someone pointed at me and said, Who is that? The answer would be, that is William Michael. That would be a predicate. That’s an individual. It doesn’t name a class. It names one object, one thing, one person.
So of things which are predicated, some are predicated of one thing only individuals or proper names, as, for instance, Socrates or this man, as if you were pointing at one man and you named him, this man or that thing, if you pointed At an individual thing, an individual actual thing, and said, What is that thing? You would be naming an individual. Some terms, just to clarify this can only be applied to one particular thing.
It’s worth noting that in grammar, when we when we name an individual, we often put the first letter of that name in the upper upper case, we capitalize proper names. We capitalize the names of individuals. So that’s a good way to see how the study of reasoning relates to grammar. Socrates refers to one specific person. This man refers to one specific person. These are called individuals, or in logic, we may sometimes refer to them as particulars, because they can’t be shared. The names that is can’t be shared by many different things, a name that’s used to to signify a class is called a common name or a common noun. A name that’s used to identify an individual is called a proper name or a proper noun.
Porphyry goes on to say quote others. Other predicables are predicated of many things, and the word many here just means more than one. Other predicables are predicated of many things, such as genera and species differences, peculiarities and accidents. These are predicated of many things in common and are not peculiar to any individual thing. So all the five predicables are predicated of many things, of multiple things, of classes. They’re common names. All the five predicables that were focused on in the introduction, they’re common names. They’re names of classes.
So Porphyry is explaining these five predicables, and they are common or universal terms that can be predicated of many different individuals. So what he what he’s done there, you know, it’s easy to miss this. What he’s done is he’s taken this first term genus, and he has shown us that it is not like individuals, but it is like the other predicables. So he’s made this distinction to help us understand exactly what genus is. It’s different from one thing and similar to other things. It’s different from individual because an individual is predicated of only one thing, where genus is predicated of many things, but genus is like the other predicable species. Difference, peculiarity, accident, because they’re all predicated of many things. So this is something that genus has in common with the other predicables. They are all predicated of many things.
Porphyry goes on and says, genus is indeed such as animal. He is giving us examples here of each of the five predicables. Genus is such as animal species, such as man, difference, such as rational peculiarities, such as risible and accident, such as white, black to sit. So he gives us examples, as I said, of the predicable it’s very helpful to see what they are by an example.
Animal, which is a genus applies to many different species. Man, which is a species, applies to many individuals. Rational is a difference. It distinguishes man from other animals. So a difference is that which distinguishes one member of a genus from the others, risible, which means able to laugh. Risible is a peculiarity, because it can only be predicated of one species. Risible, able to laugh, can only be predicated of the species. Man, there’s no other species that can be said to be able to laugh. And then the last three terms, he gives White, black and to sit. These are accidents. They are properties that are spoken of many things. But they can come and go. They can be true of something at one time and not true of something at another time. So they are different from the other, the other predicables. They can come and go without changing what something essentially is those are accidents.
So he gives us a little preview here, a table of contents of what we’re going to be studying in the future, chapters of this book, content yet to study. He says genera, which is the plural form of genus, genera differ from things which are predicated of one thing only, that is individuals. Genera differ from individuals only in this they’re predicated of many things. So the first distinction is that genera differ from individuals because genera apply to many things. While individuals apply only to one thing, Socrates can be said of one person when when used properly. But animal can be spoken of many different creatures, of many different species.
Porphyry goes on to write genera differ from those which are predicated of many things, and in the first place from species. So here’s how genus and species differ. Species is predicated of many things like genus, but species is not predicated of things which differ in species. Species is not predicated of things which differ in species. So genus and species as ideas are similar. The difference is that genus is used to name a class which contains many different species, but species is used to refer to only one species. It’s not used to refer to many different species.
He then says, species are predicated of many things, but not of things differing in species, but in number. And this sometimes confuses students. What does it mean, but differing in number? Well, if we’ve got a bunch of individuals, they don’t differ in species. They all belong to the same species. They differ in number. And what that means is, we have a number of individuals. Socrates is different from Plato in number. Socrates is person or or man. Number one, Plato is man. Number two, Aristotle would be man number three. They differ in number but they don’t differ in species. So species are predicated of many things which differ in number. Genus is predicated of many things which differ in species. So that gives us a distinction between genus and species. We’ve learned the definition of genus now we understand exactly how genus and species differ from each other.
He goes on to say, thus, man being a species is predicated of Socrates and of Plato, who do not differ from each other in species, but in number, so man is a species, and it applies to both Socrates and Plato, but they’re two of the same kind. Kind of thing. They are both man. They differ only as individual persons. They differ in number, not as different species.
Porphyry then says, animal being a genus is predicated of man and ox and horse. These differ in species, not in number only. So this name or predicate animal applies to man, applies to ox, applies to horse, and applies to any other species of animal. And these are all genuinely different kinds of animals, different species, not just different individuals like Socrates and Plato. So a man and a horse are different types or different classes, different kinds of animals, not just different individual animals.
Porphyry goes on and says again, genus differs from peculiarity the next of the predicables genus differs from peculiarity in this peculiarity is predicated of many things, but is predicated of only one species, of which it is the peculiarity so genus is predicated of many different species. Peculiarity is predicated of only one species. A peculiarity sometimes you’ll also see the name property refers to the same thing. A peculiarity belongs to only one species and all the individuals in that species. And this distinguishes peculiarity from genus, which applies to many different species. So a property or peculiarity is more specific than a genus.
He goes on to say, Thus, risibility, which is an example of a peculiarity. Risibility is predicated of man alone and of the individuals of the human species, but genus is not predicated of one species, but of many which differ many things, I should say, many individuals which differ in species. So the ability to laugh risibility belongs only to humans, and it belongs to all humans. It’s a peculiarity of humans, no other animal. No other species of animal can truly laugh. We may say that a hyena laughs, but that’s just that’s just personification. We’re just saying it acts as if it’s laughing. It’s not actually laughing. Animal belongs to many different species of animals, and so this shows that property is more restrictive than genus. That’s a difference between genus and property. Property is more restrictive. It refers to only one species.
He goes on then to compare genus with difference and accidents. He says, farther still, genus differs from difference and from accidents which are common, because though differences and accidents which are common are both predicated of many things, and they are predicated of things which differ in species, they are not predicated in answer to the question, what is this? So genus is like difference and accident, they’re both predicated, or all of them are predicated of many things. They’re also similar in that genus, difference and accident are all predicated of more than one species. But what’s different about them? What’s different between genus, difference and accident, is that genus is an answer to the question, what is this? What is this? But difference and accident answer a different question. They answer the question, what kind of thing is this? Or what quality of thing is this? What kind of thing is this?
So difference in accident, similar in a number of different ways, to genus, but they differ in that they answer a different question, what kind of a thing is this genus tells us what something is, essentially. It answers the question, what is this? Differences and accidents tell us what kind of thing it is or how it is qualified. It answers the question, what kind it. And when we ask what kind of thing is this, we’re asking for different qualifications, different modifications, different variations between things. We’re not asking what it is. We’re asking what kind of a thing is this? And we can answer that in many different ways.
Porphyry goes on and says certain persons inquiring what that is, of which these things are predicated. We answer that it is genus. When someone asks us, what is this, we answer with a genus. We do not answer that it is differences or accidents. He goes on and says, when anyone asks what kind of a thing man is? We can say that man is a rational being in answer to the question, what kind of a thing is a crow? We can say that a crow is a black thing. These are examples that show us how differences and accidents answer the different question, What kind, rather than what is this? What kind rational which is a difference tells us what kind of animal man is. It distinguishes man from all other animals. Black tells us what kind of a bird a crow is it describes an accidental property of a crow.
Porphyry writes, rational is difference, but Black is accident. When we ask, What Is Man, we answer, man is an animal. Animal is the genus of man. He then goes on and says, hence, because genus is predicated of many things, it is separated from individuals which are predicated of one thing only. But because it’s predicated of things differing in species. It’s distinguished from things which are predicated as species or as peculiarities, and because it’s predicated in answer to the question, what is this? It’s separated from differences and from common accidents.
So what? What Porphyry has done here, really helpfully and brilliantly, is he’s given us a definition of genus, and then he’s in the definition. If we think about the definition, the points made in the definition lead to the different comparisons that we looked at. For example, He starts by saying, genus is that which is predicated of many things that distinguishes genus from individuals. He then says, differing in species, that distinguishes genus from both species and peculiarity. And then his definition. Goes on to say in answer to the question, what is this to distinguish genus from differences and accidents? So that definition that he gave us of genus explains to us exactly what genus is and how it differs from all of the other predicables. That’s a master definition. So it’s worth that’s why I said it’s worth memorizing and paying attention to the different parts, because they’re very significant.
He goes on to finish this section, he says the above mentioned description of the conception of genus contains nothing superfluous and nothing deficient, nothing superfluous and nothing deficient. He concludes that his definition is complete. It’s precise. How can he prove that? How can he know that his definition is complete and precise because it contains nothing superfluous, nothing is said or mentioned in the definition that’s not necessary, and it contains nothing deficient. That means it doesn’t lack anything, but it covers everything. The definition is is complete. So this definition that he gives us of genus captures exactly what makes something a genus rather than a species or a difference, a property or an accident, even an individual.
So that brings us to the end of this first part of the second chapter on genus and species. So after studying this, you should make sure that you memorize the definition of genus and that you have a clear understanding of how or you could answer the question, How is genus? Genus like each of the other predicables, and how is genus different from each of the other predicables? You can see that when you can answer those questions, you will have a crystal clear understanding of what the philosophical meaning of genus is now, having gone through all that, and I know this is long. I told you there’s a lot of important content in this lesson.
Memory Work
I’d like to provide you with some memory work. Here, I have eight different points that I’d like to suggest that are worth memorizing. So eight points of memory work. Let me go through them quickly.
First genus has three meanings, genealogical, geographical and philosophical. Genus has three meanings, genealogical, geographical and philosophical.
Second, genealogical genus refers to family lines descended from a common ancestor. Genealogical genus, the first meaning, refers to family lines descended from a common ancestor.
Number three, geographical genus refers to people from the same place or country. Geographical genus refers to people from the same place or country.
Number four, philosophical genus. The third meaning of genus, philosophical genus is predicated of many things differing in species in answer to what is this? Philosophical genus is predicated of many things, differing in species in answer to the question, what is this?
Number Five genus differs from individuals because genus applies to many things, while individuals apply to only one thing, genus differs from individuals because genus applies to many things, while individuals apply to only one thing
number six, genus differs from species because genus applies to different species, while species applies to only different individuals.
Number seven genus differs from property because genus applies to many species, while property applies to only one species. Genus differs from property because genus applies to many species, while property applies to only one species.
And lastly, genus differs from difference and accident, because genus answers the question, what is this? While difference and accident answer the question, what kind of a thing is this. So genus differs from difference and accident, because genus answers the question, What is this, while difference and accident answer the question, what kind of a thing is this?
Conclusion
So that’s it, for the content of the first part of chapter two. In this lecture, we’ve studied the first part of chapter two of Porphyry’s Introduction. We’ve discussed, very importantly, the three different meanings of genus and the philosophical definition that distinguishes genus from the other predicables, which is the goal of this introduction.
In our next lesson, our next lecture, I should say we’re going to continue with the second part of chapter two. So remember, we’re still in chapter two. We’re going to continue with the second part of the chapter. And just as we’ve studied the definition of genus in this chapter or in this part this lecture, I should say, sorry, we’re going to study the definition of species in the next lecture. We’re also going to study in detail this idea of the logical hierarchy, or the tree of Porphyry that I mentioned before. We’ll study that more in the second half of chapter two.
So having gone through all of that, I hope that was helpful. Now it’s time for you to reread and study the lesson for yourself. Remember that there’s an article titled how to study for mastery, which explains exactly how you should go about studying in order to master the content and be able to demonstrate your mastery. So I recommend that so re read the lesson, study it carefully, develop your understanding and prepare for our next lecture. You.
If you’ve got any questions about the content of this lecture, if anything was not clear, or you think there’s anything that I that I should have spoken about that I left out, please just get in touch and let me know. I’m happy to help you. You can contact me by going to classicalliberalarts.com, backslash support, or by just writing to mail at classicalliberalarts.com
Once again, my name is William Michael. I’m the headmaster of the Classical Liberal Arts Academy, and I hope this lecture has been helpful. God bless your studies.
Mr. William C. Michael, O.P.
Headmaster
Classical Liberal Arts Academy
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