The foundation, therefore, indeed, of a democratical polity, is liberty; for it has been usual to say this, as if in this polity alone the people participated of liberty. For it is said that this is the aim of every democracy. Of liberty, however, one part consists in alternately governing and being governed. For popular [or democratic] justice, is to possess the equal according to number, but not according to desert. This, therefore, being popular justice, it is necessary that the multitude should possess the supreme power; and that whatever the majority determine should be final, and just. For they say that each of the citizens ought to have the equal. Hence, in democracies it happens that the poor have more authority than the rich; for they are more in number. For that possesses the supreme power which is conformable to the opinion of the majority. This, therefore, is one indication of liberty, which all those who are the friends of a democracy establish as the boundary of a polity. But another indication is this, for any one to live as he pleases. For they say, that this is the work of liberty, since it is the province of a slave to live not as he wishes to live. This, therefore, is the second boundary of a democracy. Hence is derived the claim not to be governed; especially, indeed, by no one; but if this cannot be admitted, to be governed only by rotation; and this contributes to the liberty which is according to equality. These things, however, being premised, and such being the principle, such rules as the following are democratic: that all the magistrates should be chosen out of all the people; and that all the people should govern each, and each in his turn all. That the magistrates should be chosen by lot, either all of them, or for those offices which require experience and art. That no census, or the smallest possible, should be required as a qualification for a magistrate. That no one should be in the same office twice, or very few, or seldom, except in the army. That either all the magistrates, or as many as possible, should be of a short duration. That all the citizens be permitted to judge from all particulars, and in all causes; or about most things, and those of the greatest consequence, and of the most principal nature; such as about correcting and calling the magistrates to account, the state of the polity, and private contracts. That the general assembly should have the supreme authority in all things; but that the magistracy should have no supreme power in any thing, or in very few things. But of magistracies, a senate is best adapted to a democracy, where the whole community is not paid for giving their attendance; for in that case the power of this magistracy is taken away. For then the people will refer to it all causes, in consequence of being paid largely for attending, as we have before observed in a former book. In the next place fees should be given to all, but especially to the general assembly, the courts of justice, and the magistrates; and if not to all these, they should, however, be given to the magistrates, and the courts of justice, the senate, and the principal general assemblies, or to those magistrates who are obliged to eat at a common table. Farther still, since an oligarchy is defined by nobility of birth, by wealth and education, things pertaining to a democracy appear to be contrary to these, viz., an ignoble birth, poverty, and sordid occupations. No office, likewise, should be perpetual; but if any such should remain after the ancient change of the government, then the power of it should be entirely destroyed; and the elections should be made by lot. These are the things, therefore, which are common to democracies; but they happen from that justice which is acknowledged to be democratic. And this consists in all the citizens possessing an arithmetical equality, which especially appears to constitute a democracy, or government of the people. For this equality then subsists when the rich have no more share in the government than the poor, and when they do not alone possess the supreme authority, but all the citizens are equal according to number, [i.e. according to arithmetical proportion]. For thus they will think that equality and liberty exist in the polity.
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