



The Euthyphro

by Plato

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Persons of the Dialogue:

Euthyphro

Socrates

Euthyphro. What a novel circumstance has happened, Socrates, that you, leaving the discussions in the Lyceum, are now waiting about the porch of the king? For you have not an action with the king, as I have.

Socrates: The Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action, but an accusation.

Euthyphro: What do you say? Some one, as it seems, has accused you. For I should not think that you would accuse another.

Socrates: I should not, indeed.

Euthyphro: Has, then, another accused you?

Socrates: Certainly.

Euthyphro: Who is he?

Socrates: I do not, Euthyphro, perfectly know the man: for he appears to me to be young, and of no note. But they call him, I think, Melitus; and he is of the town Pittheus: is you have in your recollection one Melitus, a Pitthean, who has long hair, a thin beard, and an aquiline nose.

Euthyphro: I do not recoiled him, Socrates. But what is his accusation of you?

Socrates: What is it? Not an ignoble one, as it appears to me. For it is no despicable thing, for one who is a young man, to be knowing in a circumstance of such a magnitude. For he knows, as he says, how the youth are corrupted, and who they are that corrupt them. And he appears to be a certain wise man; and seeing my ignorance, and considering me as one who corrupts his equals in age, to have accused me to the city, as to a mother. In consequence of this, he only of the citizens seems to me to have begun rightly. For it is right to pay attention to youth, in the first place, that they may become the most excellent characters: just as it is reasonable that a good

husbandman should first take care of the young plants, and after this of the others. Thus also Melitus perhaps will first cut us up who corrupt the blossoms of youth, as he says, and afterwards he will certainly pay attention to those of a more advanced age, and thus will be the cause of the most numerous and the greatest goods to the city. This is what may be expected to happen from one who makes such a beginning.

Euthyphro: I should wish it were so, Socrates; but I tremble, lest the contrary should happen. For, in reality, he appears to me, by trying to injure you, to begin to hurt the city from the Vestal hearth itself. But tell me by what part of your conduct it is that he says you corrupt the youth?

Socrates: The things of which he accuses me, O wonderful man, must be considered, when they are heard, as absurd. For he says that I am a maker of gods; and, as is I introduced new and did not believe in the ancient gods, has brought this accusation against me.

Euthyphro: I understand you, Socrates; it is because you say that a demoniacal power is every where present with you. This accusation, therefore, is brought against you as one that introduces novelties in divine affairs; and as well knowing that the multitude are always disposed to receive such kind of calumnies. For indeed they ridicule me as one insane, when I say any thing in a public assembly concerning the gods, and predict to them future events; though I do not predict to them any thing which is not true. At the same time, however, they envy all such as we are. But indeed it is not fit to pay any attention to them; but we should still go on in our own way.

Socrates: But, dear Euthyphro, to be ridiculed is perhaps a trifling thing. For the Athenians, as it appears to me, are not very much concerned whether or not a man is skilful in any thing, so long as he is not a teacher of his wisdom; but they are indignant with him whom they think makes others to be such, whether this is from envy, as you say, or from some other cause.

Euthyphro: With respect to this circumstance, therefore, how they may be affected towards me I am not very desirous to try.

Socrates: For perhaps you exhibit yourself but rarely, and are not willing to teach your wisdom; but I fear lest, through philanthropy, I should appear to disclose, with too much freedom, to every man whatever I possess, not only without taking a reward, but even willingly adding one, if any person is willing to hear me. As I therefore just now said, if they were only to ridicule me, as you say they do you, there would be nothing unpleasant in passing the time in a court of justice, jesting and laughing; but if they are in earnest, how this affair may terminate is immanifest, except to you diviners.

Euthyphro: Perhaps, however, Socrates, the affair will be nothing; but you will plead your cause successfully, and I also think that I shall mine.

Socrates: But what is the cause, Euthyphro, which you have to plead? Are you defendant or plaintiff?

Euthyphro: I am plaintiff.

Socrates: Whom do you prosecute?

Euthyphro: One whom, by prosecuting, I appear to be insane.

Socrates: What, then, do you pursue one that flies?

Euthyphro: He is very far from flying; for he is very much advanced in years.

Socrates: Who is he?

Euthyphro: My father.

Socrates: Your father? O best of men!

Euthyphro: He is, indeed.

Socrates: But what is the crime, and of what do you accuse him?

Euthyphro: Of murder, Socrates.

Socrates: O Hercules! The multitude, Euthyphro, will be ignorant how this can ever be right. For I do not think it is the province of any casual person to make such an accusation with rectitude, but of one who has made a very great proficiency in wisdom.

Euth, Very great indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Socrates: Is it any one of your relations who has been killed by your father? Though it certainly must be so; for you would not prosecute your father for the murder of a stranger.

Euthyphro: It is ridiculous, Socrates, is you think it makes any difference whether he who is slain is a stranger or a relation, and are not persuaded that this alone ought to be attended to, whether he who committed the murder did it justly or not; and, if justly, that he should be dismissed; but, is unjustly, that he should be prosecuted, even though he should be your domestic, and partake of your table. For you become equally defiled with him, if you knowingly associate with such a one, and do not expiate both yourself and him, by bringing him to justice. But to apprise you of the fact: The deceased was one of our farmers, who rented a piece of land of us when we dwelt at Naxos. This man, having one day drank too much wine, was so transported with rage against one of our slaves, that he killed him. My father, therefore, ordered him to be cast into a pit, with his hands and feet bound, and immediately sent hither, to consult one of the interpreters of sacred concerns what he should do with him; and in the meantime neglected this prisoner, and left him without sustenance as an assassin, whose life was of no consequence; so that he died for hunger, cold, and the weight of chains killed him, before the person my father had sent returned. Hence my father and the rest of my relations are indignant with me, because I, for the sake of a homicide, accuse my father of murder, which, as they say, he has not committed; and if he had,

since he who is dead was a homicide, they think I ought not to be concerned for the fate of such a man. For they say it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder; so little do they know the manner in which a divine nature is affected about piety and impiety.

Socrates: But, by Jupiter, Euthyphro, do you think you possess such an accurate knowledge about divine affairs, and how things holy and impious are circumstanced, that these things having taken place as you say, you are not afraid, lest in prosecuting your father you should commit an impious action?

Euthyphro: My profession, Socrates, would be of no advantage to me, nor would Euthyphro surpass in any respect other men, unless he accurately knew all such particulars.

Socrates: O wonderful Euthyphro, it will therefore be a most excellent thing for me to become your disciple, and before the determination of my process to let Melitus know that I have hitherto considered the knowledge of divine concerns as a thing of the greatest consequence; and that now, since he says I am guilty of acting in a rash manner, and introducing novelties concerning divine natures, I am become your disciple. If, therefore, I shall say, you acknowledge, O Melitus, that Euthyphro is wise and thinks rightly in such assaurs, think and judge also the same of me; but if you do not entertain this opinion, call him, my preceptor, to account before you call me, as one who corrupts elderly men, viz. me and his father; me by instructing, but him by reproof and punishing. And if he is not persuaded by me, but still continues his prosecution, or accuses me instead of you, it will be necessary to say the very same things on the trial, to which I shall have previously called his attention.

Euthyphro: It will so, by Jupiter, Socrates; and if he attempts to accuse me, I shall find, as I think, his weak side, and he will be called to account in a court of justice long before me.

Socrates: And I, O my dear associate, knowing these things, desire to become your disciple, as I am persuaded that no one, and not even Melitus himself, dares to look you in the face, though he so accurately, inartificially, and easily sees through me, that he has accused me of impiety. Now

therefore, by Jupiter, tell me that which you now strenuously contend you clearly know, viz. what kind of thing you assert holiness to be, and also unholiness, both respecting murder and other things? Or is not holiness the same with itself in every action? And again, is not unholiness, which is perfectly contrary to holiness itself, similar to itself? And does not every thing which it will be unholy to do, possess one certain idea according to unholiness?

Euthyphro: Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates: Tell me, then, what you say holiness, and also what unholiness is?

Euthyphro: I say, therefore, that holiness is that which I now do, viz. to prosecute him who acts unjustly either with respect to murder or sacrilege, or any thing else of a similar nature; whether the offending person be a father or mother, or any other whatever; and that not to prosecute such a one is impious. For see, Socrates, what a great proof I will give you in law that it is so, and which I have also mentioned to others, viz. that it is right not to spare an impious man, whoever he may be. For men are firmly persuaded that Jupiter is the best and most just of gods, and yet they acknowledge that he put his father in chains, because he unjustly swallowed his children; and again, that Saturn castrated his father, through other things of a similar nature: but they are indignant with me, because I prosecute my father who has acted unjustly; and thus these men assert things contrary to each other in what they say concerning the gods and concerning me.

Socrates: Is this the thing then, Euthyphro, on account of which I am brought to the bar, because when any one asserts things of this kind concerning the gods, I admit them with pain; and through which, as it seems, some one calls me an offender? Now, therefore, if these things thus appear also to you who are well acquainted with such particulars, it is necessary, as it seems, that we also should admit them. For what else can we say, who acknowledge that we know nothing about such things? But tell me, by Jupiter, who presides over friendship; do you think that these things thus happened in reality?

Euthyphro: Yes, and things still more wondersul than these, Socrates, of which the multitude are ignorant.

Socrates: Do you therefore think that the gods in reality wage war with each other, and that there are among them dire enmities and battles, and many other such like particulars as are related by the poets, with the representation of which by good painters our temples are decorated; and in the great Panathenaeae a veil full of such like variegated ornaments is carried into the Acropolis. must we say, O Euthyphro, that these things are true?

Euthyphro: Not these only, O Socrates; but, as I just now said, I can relate to you many other things concerning divine affairs if you are willing, which when you hear I well know that you will be astonished.

Socrates: I should not wonder; but you may relate these things to me hereafter, when you are at leisure. Now, however, endeavour to tell me more clearly that which I just now asked. For you have not yet, my friend, sufficiently answered my question what holiness is, but you have only told me that this which you are now doing is holy, viz. to prosecute your father for murder.

Euthyphro: And I spoke the truth, Socrates.

Socrates: Perhaps so. But, O Euthyphro, do you not also say that many other things are holy?

Euthyphro: I do.

Socrates: Recoiled, therefore, that I did not request you to teach me one or two from among many holy things, but what that form itself is by which all holy things are holy. For you have said that things unholy are unholy by one idea; and also that things holy are holy by another. Or do you not remember?

Euthyphro: I do.

Socrates: Teach me, therefore, what this very idea is, that looking to it, and using it as a paradigm, I may say that whatever thing of this kind you or any other does is holy, and that whatever is not of this kind is unholy.

Euthyphro: But if you wish it, Socrates, I will also tell you this.

Socrates: I do wish it.

Euthyphro: That, therefore, which is dear to the gods is holy, but that which is not dear to them is unholy.

Socrates: You have now answered, O Euthyphro, most beautifully, and in such a manner as I wished you to answer. Whether truly or not however, this I do not yet know. But you will doubtless in addition to this teach me that what you say is true.

Euthyphro: Certainly.

Socrates: Come then, let us consider what we say. That which is dear to divinity, and the man who is dear to divinity, are holy; but that which is odious to divinity, and the man who is odious to divinity, are unholy. But the holy is not the same with the unholy, but is most contrary to it. Is it not so?

Euthyphro: It certainly is so.

Socrates: And these things appear to have been well said,

Euthyphro: I think so, Socrates.

Socrates: But has it not, O Euthyphro, also been said that there is sedition among the gods, and that they oppose and are enemies to each other?

Euthyphro: It has been said.

Socrates: But let us thus consider, excellent man, about what particulars discord produces enmity and wrath. Is, therefore, I and you dissented in opinion concerning numbers, which of them were more in quantity, would this difference make us enemies, and should we be enraged with each other? Or, betaking ourselves to computation about things of this kind, should we not be quickly liberated from this dissension?

Euthyphro: Entirely so.

Socrates: Hence also, if we differed concerning the greater and the lesser, should we not, by applying ourselves to measuring, soon bring our disagreement to an end?

Euthyphro: We should.

Socrates: And, as I think, by betaking ourselves to weighing, we should be able to judge concerning the heavier and the lighter.

Euthyphro: Undoubtedly.

Socrates: About what then disagreeing, and not being able to recur to a certain criterion, should we become enemies to, and be enraged with, each other? Perhaps you cannot readily inform me; but consider whether they are such as these, viz. the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the base, good and evil. Are not these the things about which disagreeing, and not being able to arrive at a certain judgment of them, we become enemies to each other, when we do so become, you and I, and all other men?

Euthyphro: This, Socrates, is indeed the dissension, and it is about these things.

Socrates: But what? Do not the gods, O Euthyphro, if they disagree in any respect, disagree on account of these very things?

Euthyphro: By an abundant necessity.

Socrates: Different gods, therefore, O generous Euthyphro, according to your assertion, think different things to be just, beautiful, base, good and evil. For they never would oppose each other unless they disagreed about these things. Or would they?

Euthyphro: You speak rightly.

Socrates: Do they not severally, therefore, love those things which they think to be beautiful, good and just, but hate the contraries of these?

Euthyphro: Entirely so.

Socrates: But with respect to these very things, some of the gods, as you say, think them to be just, and others unjust; about which also being dubious, they oppose and wage war with each other. Is it not so?

Euthyphro: It is.

Socrates: The same things therefore, as it seems, are hated and loved by the gods; and the things odious to and dear to the gods will be the very same.

Euthyphro: So it appears.

Socrates: Hence also the same things will be holy and unholy, O Euthyphro, from this reasoning.

Euthyphro: It seems so.

Socrates: You have not therefore, O wonderful man, answered my question. For I did not ask you this, to whom the same thing is both holy and unholy: but, as it seems, that which is dear is also odious to divinity. So that, Euthyphro, there is nothing wonderful if in this which you are now doing, viz. punching your father, you should do that which is pleasing to Jupiter, but odious to Saturn and Heaven; and which is pleasing to Vulcan, but odious to Juno: and if any other of the gods differs from another about this very circumstance, you should in like manner do that which is approved by the one and hated by the other.

Euthyphro: But I think, Socrates, that no one of the gods will differ from another in this affair, and assert that it is not proper for him to suffer punishment who has unjustly slain any one.

Socrates: But what? Have you ever heard any man doubting, O Euthyphro, whether he who has unjustly slain another, or has done any thing else unjustly, ought to be punished?

Euthyphro: They never cease doubting about these things, both elsewhere and in courts of justice. For those that act unjustly in a very great degree, say and do every thing in order to escape punishment.

Socrates: Do they also, O Euthyphro, confess that they have acted unjustly? And confessing this, do they at the same time say, that they ought not to be punished?

Euthyphro: They by no means say this.

Socrates: They do not, therefore, say and do every thing. For I think they dare not say, nor even doubt this, that if they act unjustly punishment must be inflicted on them: but, as it appears to me, they deny that they have acted unjustly. Do they not?

Euthyphro: You speak the truth.

Socrates: They are not, therefore, dubious about this, whether he who acts unjustly ought to be punished; but they perhaps doubt who he is that acts unjustly, and by what action, and when, his conduct may be considered as unjust.

Euthyphro: True.

Socrates: Will not, therefore, the very same things happen to the gods if they oppose each other concerning things just and unjust, according to your assertion; and will not some of them say, that they act unjustly by each other, and others again deny this? Since, O wonderful man, no one, either of gods or men, dares to assert that punishment ought not to be inflicted on him who acts unjustly.

Euthyphro: They will: and what you now say, Socrates, is summarily true.

Socrates: But those who are dubious, as well gods as men, will be dubious respecting each of the transactions; if the gods disagree about any action, and some of them say that it is done justly, but others unjustly. Is it not so?

Euthyphro: Certainly.

Socrates: Come, then, my dear Euthyphro, teach me also that I may become more wise, what proof you have that all the gods think that he unjustly died, who having slain his fellow-servant, and being put in chains by the matter of the deceased, perished before he that bound him received the answer from the interpreters, which was to inform him how he ought to act; and that, on account of such a man, it is right for a son to prosecute his father and accuse him of murder. Come, endeavour to demonstrate to me something clear about these things, and that all the gods consider this action to be right more than any thing. And if you demonstrate this to me sufficiently, I will never cease praising you for your wisdom.

Euthyphro: But perhaps, Socrates, this is no trifling employment, otherwise I could clearly demonstrate it to you.

Socrates: I understand you: I appear to you to be more dull of apprehension than the judges; since you will evidently prove to them that your father's conduct was unjust, and that all the gods hate such-like actions.

Euthyphro: I shall demonstrate this very clearly, Socrates, if they will only hear what I have to say.

Socrates: But they will hear, if you shall appear to speak well. However, while you were just now speaking, I thus thought and considered with myself: If Euthyphro should especially convince me that all the gods think a death of this kind to be unjust, in what respect shall I have the more learned from Euthyphro what the holy is, and also the unholy? For this action, as it appears, will be odious to divinity. It has not, however, yet appeared from this, what is holy, and what not. For that which is odious has also appeared to be dear to divinity. So that I will grant you this, Euthyphro, and if you please let all the gods think it to be unjust, and let them all hate it. Shall we, therefore, now make this correction in the definition, that what all the gods hate is unholy, and what they all love is holy; but that what some of them love, and others hate, is neither, or both? Are you willing that at present we should thus define concerning the holy and unholy?

Euthyphro: What should hinder, Socrates?

Socrates: Nothing hinders me, Euthyphro; but do you, as to what relates to yourself, consider whether, admitting this, you can so easily teach me what you promised?

Euthyphro: But I say the holy is that which all the gods love; and its contrary, the unholy, that which all the gods hate.

Socrates: Shall we not therefore consider, Euthyphro, whether this is well said? Or shall we dismiss this consideration, and thus grant both to ourselves and others, that if any one only says that a certain thing is so, we shall admit that it is so? Or shall we consider what he who speaks says?

Euthyphro: Consider it certainly; though I think that this is now well said.

Socrates: Perhaps, O good man, we shall know this more clearly. For consider as follows: Is the holy, because it is holy, beloved by the gods; or because it is beloved by them, is it holy?

Euthyphro: I do not know what you say, Socrates.

Socrates: But I will endeavour to speak more clearly. We say that a thing may be carried, and that a thing carries; that a thing may be led, and that a thing leads; that a thing may be seen, and that a thing sees; and every thing else of this kind. Do you understand that these are different from each other, and in what they differ?

Euthyphro: I appear to myself to understand this.

Socrates: Is therefore that which is beloved a certain thing, and that which loves another different from this?

Euthyphro: Undoubtedly.

Socrates: Tell me, therefore, whether that which maybe earned, may be carried because it is carried, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro: For no other reason but for this.

Socrates: And is this the case with that which may be led, because it is led; and with that which may be seen, because it is seen?

Euthyphro: Entirely so .

Socrates: A thing therefore is not seen because it may be seen: but, on the contrary, because it is seen, on this account it may be seen. Nor because a thing may be led, on this account is it led; but because it is led, on this account it may be led. Nor because a thing may be carried, is it carried; but because it is carried, it may be carried. Is then what I wish to say evident, Euthyphro? But what I wish to say is this: If any thing is making, or suffers any thing, it is not making because it may be made; but because it is making it may be made. Nor because it may suffer does it suffer; but because it suffers it may suffer. Or do you not admit this to be the case?

Euthyphro: I do.

Socrates: Is not this therefore also the case with that which is beloved, or making:, or bussering; something; from some one?

Euthyphro: Entirely so.

Socrates: This therefore subsists in the same manner as the things before mentioned: it is not beloved by those by whom it is beloved, because it may be beloved; but because it is beloved, it may be beloved.

Euthyphro: It is necessary.

Socrates: What then do we say concerning holiness, O Euthyphro? Is it not this, that it is beloved by all the gods, according to your assertion?

Euthyphro: Yes.

Socrates: Is it therefore beloved on this account, because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro: For no other reason but on this account.

Socrates: Because it is holy, therefore, it is beloved; but not because it is beloved, on this account it is holy.

Euthyphro: It appears so.

Socrates: Because however it is beloved by the gods, it may be beloved, and be dear to divinity.

Euthyphro: Undoubtedly.

Socrates: That which is dear to divinity, therefore, is not holy, O Euthyphro, nor must holiness be defined to be that which is dear to divinity as you say, but it is something different from this.

Euthyphro: How is this, Socrates?

Socrates: Because we have acknowledged that holiness is on this account beloved because it is holy; and not that it is holy because it is beloved. Did we not?

Euthyphro: Yes.

Socrates: But that which is dear to divinity, because it is beloved by the gods, from this very circumstance that it is beloved, is dear to divinity; but not because it is dear to divinity, on this account is it beloved.

Euthyphro: True.

Socrates: But, my dear Euthyphro, is that which is dear to divinity were the same with that which is holy, is holiness were beloved through its being holiness, that also which is dear to divinity would be beloved through its being dear to divinity. But is that which is dear to divinity were dear to divinity through being beloved by the gods, that which is holy would also be holy through being beloved. Now, however, you see that they are contrarily asserted, as being perfectly different from each other. For the one, viz. what is dear to the gods because it is beloved, is a thing of that kind that it may be beloved; but the other, viz. holiness, because it is a thing which may be beloved, on this account is beloved. And you appear, O Euthyphro, when you were asked what holiness is, to have been unwilling to manifest the offence of it to me, but to have mentioned a certain assertion pertaining to it, which this same thing holiness suffers, viz. the being beloved by all the gods; but you have not yet told me what it is. If therefore it is agreeable to you, do not conceal this from me, but again say from the beginning what holiness is, whether it be beloved by the gods, or has any other property whatever pertaining to it. For we shall not differ about this. But tell me readily what the holy, and also what the unholy is?

Euthyphro: But, Socrates, I cannot tell you what I conceive. For whatever position we adopt, is always some how or other circumvented, and is not willing to remain where we have established it.

Socrates: The things which you have asserted, O Euthyphro, appear to be the offspring of our progenitor Daedalus. And if I indeed had laid and adopted these things, perhaps you would have derided me, as is my works also, which consist in discourse, through my alliance with him, privately escaped, and were unwilling to remain where they were placed. But now (for they are your hypotheses) the raillery of some other person is necessary. For they are unwilling to abide with you, as it also appears to you yourself.

Euthyphro: But it appears to me, Socrates, that what is laid ought to be exposed to nearly the same ridicule. For I am not the cause of the circuitous wandering of these assertions, and of their not abiding in the same place; but you appear to me to be the Daedalus. For so far as pertains to me, these things would have remained firm.

Socrates: I appear therefore, my friend, to have become so much more skilful than that man in this art, in as much as he only made his own productions unstable; but I, besides my own, as it seems, make those of others to be so. And moreover, this is the most elegant circumstance pertaining to my art, that I am unwillingly wise. For I had rather that my reasonings should abide, and be established immoveable, than that the riches of Tantalus, together with the wisdom of Daedalus, should become my possession. But enough of this. Since, however, you appear to be delicate, I, in conjunction with you, will endeavour to show how you may teach me concerning holiness, and not be weary till this is accomplished. For see whether it does not appear to you to be necessary that every thing holy should be just.

Euthyphro: To me it does.

Socrates: Is therefore every thing just also holy? Or, is every thing holy indeed just; but not every thing just holy, but partly holy, and partly something else?

Euthyphro: I do not comprehend, Socrates, what you say.

Socrates: And yet you are younger no less than you are wiser than I am; but, as I said, you are delicate through the riches of your wisdom. However, O blessed man, collect yourself; for it is not dissfficult to understand what I say. For I assert the contrary to the poet, who says,

*You Jove, the source of all, refuse to sing:
for fear perpetually resides with shame.*

I therefore differ from this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?

Euthyphro: By all means.

Socrates: It does not appear to me, that wherever there is fear, there also there is shame. For there are many, as it seems to me, who fear diseases, poverty, and many other things of this kind, but who by no means are ashamed of these things which they fear. Does not the same thing also appear to you?

Euthyphro: Certainly.

Socrates: But wherever shame is, there also is fear. For is there any one who is ashamed of and blushes at any thing, but who does not at the same time fear and dread the opinion of improbity?

Euthyphro: He will certainly dread this.

Socrates: It is not therefore right to say, that where there is fear, there also there is shame; but we should say that where there is shame, there also fear resides. For wherever there is fear, there is not also shame. For I think that fear extends further than shame; since shame is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number. So that it does not follow that wherever there is number, there also is the odd; but wherever there is the odd, there also there is number. Do you now apprehend me?

Euthyphro: Perfectly so.

Socrates: Respecting a thing of this kind, therefore, I inquired above, when I asked you whether where the just was, there also the holy was; or whether where the holy was, there also the just was, but the holy was not to be found every where in conjunction with the just. For the holy is a part of the just. Does it appear to you that we should thus speak, or otherwise?

Euthyphro: Not otherwise; but thus. For you appear to me to speak rightly.

Socrates: See then what follows: for, if the holy is a part of the just, it is necessary, as it seems, that we should discover what part of the just the holy will be. If therefore you should ask me some of the things just now mentioned, as, for instance, what part of number the even is, and

what number it is, I should say that it is not scalene, but isosceles. Or does it not appear so to you?

Euthyphro: It does.

Socrates: Do you therefore also endeavour in like manner to teach me what part of the just the holy is, that we may tell Melitus he must no longer act unjustly by us, nor accuse us of impiety, as having now sufficiently learnt from you what things are pious and holy, and what not.

Eutit. This part then, Socrates, of the just, appears to me to be pious and holy, viz. that which is conversant with the culture of the gods; but that which is conversant with the culture of mankind is the remaining part of the just.

Socrates: And you appear to me, Euthyphro, to speak well. However, I am still in want of a certain trifling particular. For I do not yet understand what culture you mean. For you certainly do not say that such as is the culture about other things, such also is that which pertains to the gods. For instance, we say not every one knows the culture of horses, but he who is skilled in equestrian affairs. Do we not?

Euthyphro: Certainly.

Socrates: For equestrian skill is the culture of horses.

Euthyphro: It is.

Socrates: Nor does every one know the culture of dogs, but this belongs to the huntsman.

Euthyphro: It does.

Socrates: For the art of hunting is the culture of dogs.

Euthyphro: It is.

Socrates: But the grazier's art is the culture of oxen.

Euthyphro: Certainly.

Socrates: But holiness and piety are the culture of the gods, O Euthyphro. Do you say so?

Euthyphro: I do.

Socrates: All culture, therefore, effects the same thing, viz. the good and advantage of that which is cultivated. Just as with respect to horses, you see that being cultivated by the equestrian art, they are advantaged by it and become better. Or does it not appear so to you?

Euthyphro: It does.

Socrates: Dogs also are benefited by the huntsman's art, and oxen by that of the grazier, and all other things in a similar manner. Or do you think that culture is the injury of that which is cultivated?

Euthyphro: Not I, by Jupiter,

Socrates: But the advantage therefore?

Euthyphro: How should it not?

Socrates: Is holiness, therefore, since it is a culture of the gods, an advantage to the gods, and does it make the gods better? And do you admit this, that when you perform any thing holy, you render some one of the gods better?

Euthyphro: Not I, by Jupiter.

Socrates: Nor do I, O Euthyphro, think that you say this: it certainly is far otherwise. And for this reason I asked you what this culture of the gods is, not thinking you would say a thing of this kind.

Euthyphro: And you thought rightly, Socrates: for I do not say any such thing.

Socrates: Be it so. But what culture of the gods will holiness be?

Euthyphro: That culture, Socrates, which slaves pay to their masters.

Socrates: I understand. It will be a certain subserviency as it seems to the god?.

Euthyphro: Entirely so.

Socrates: Can you then tell me, with respect to the art subservient to physicians, to the accomplishment of what work it is subservient? Do you not think it is subservient to health?

Euthyphro: I do.

Socrates: But what? With respect to the art subservient to shipwrights, to the accomplishment of what work is it subservient?

Euthyphro: Evidently, Socrates, to that of a ship.

Socrates: And is not the art subservient to architects, subservient to the building of houses?

Euthyphro: Yes.

Socrates: Tell me, then, O best of men: with respect to the art subservient to the gods, to the accomplishment of what work will it be subservient? for it is evident that you know, because you say that you have a knowledge of divine concerns beyond that of other men.

Euthyphro: And I say true, Socrates.

Socrates: Inform me then, by Jupiter, what that all-beautiful work is which the gods effect, employing our subserviency.

Euthyphro: They are many and beautiful, Socrates.

Socrates: The generals of an army too, my friend, accomplish many and beautiful things; but at the same time you can easily tell what that principal thing is which they effect, viz. victory in battle. Or can you not?

Euthyphro: How is it possible I should not?

Socrates: Husbandmen also, I think, accomplish many and beautiful things; but at the same time the principal thing which they produce is aliment from the earth.

Euthyphro: Entirely so.

Socrates: Of the many and beautiful things then which the gods accomplish, what is the principal?

Euthyphro: I told you a little before, Socrates, that to learn accurately how all these things subsist is an arduous undertaking; but I now tell you simply this, that if any one knows how to say and do things acceptable to the gods, praying and sacrificing to them, these things are holy. Things of

this kind also preserve both private houses and cities; but the contraries to things acceptable to the gods are impious, and these subvert and destroy all things.

Socrates: You might, if you had been willing, Euthyphro, have told me the sum of my inquiries in a much shorter manner. But it is evident that you are not readily disposed to instruct me. For now when you drew near for this purpose you receded; though if you had answered, I should before this perhaps have learnt from you what holiness is. But now (for it is necessary that he who interrogates should follow him who is interrogated wherever he may lead) what do you again say the holy, and holiness, is? Do you not say it is a certain science of sacrificing and praying?

Euthyphro: I do.

Socrates: Is not to sacrifice to offer gifts to the gods; but to pray to request something of the gods?

Euthyphro: Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates: From this it follows that holiness will be the science of requesting and giving to the gods.

Euthyphro: You have very well understood, Socrates, what I said.

Socrates: For I am very desirous, my friend, of your wisdom, and I pay attention to it; so that what you say does not fall to the ground. But tell me what this subserviency to the gods is? Do you say it is to request of them and to give to them?

Euthyphro: I do.

Socrates: Will it not follow, therefore, that to request rightly, will be to request of them those things of which we are in want?

Euthyphro: What else can it be?

Socrates: And again, will not to give rightly consist in giving to them in our turn such things as they are in want of from us? For it would not be conformable to act to bestow upon any one those things of which he is not in want.

Euthyphro: You say true, Socrates.

Socrates: Holiness, therefore, O Euthyphro, will be a certain mercantile art between gods and men.

Euthyphro: Let it be mercantile, if it pleases you so to call it.

Socrates: But it is not pleasing to me unless it be true. Tell me therefore what advantage the gods derive from the gifts which they receive from us? For the advantage arising from their gifts is evident to every one; since we have not any good which they do not impart. But in what respect are they benefited from what they receive from us? Or have we so much the advantage in this merchandise, that we receive every good from them, but they receive nothing from us?

Euthyphro: But do you think, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by what they receive from us?

Socrates: What is the use then, Euthyphro, of these our gifts to the gods?

Euthyphro: What other use do you think except honour and reverence, and, as I just now said, gratitude?

Socrates: Holiness then, Euthyphro, is that which is acceptable to the gods, but not that which is profitable to, or beloved by them.

Euthyphro: I think it is the most of all things beloved by them.

Socrates: This then again is as it seems holiness, viz. that which is dear to the gods.

Euthyphro: Especially so.

Socrates: Averting these things, can you wonder that your discourse does not appear to be fixed, but wandering? And can you accuse me as being the Daedalus that causes them to wander, when you yourself far surpass Daedalus in art, and make your assertions to revolve in a circle? Or do you not perceive that our discourse, revolving again, comes to the same? For you remember that in the former part of our discourse, the holy, and the dear to divinity, did not appear to us to be the same, but different from each other: or do you not remember?

Euthyphro: I do.

Socrates: Now, therefore, do you not perceive that you say the holy is that which is beloved by the gods? But is this any thing else than that which is dear to divinity?

Euthyphro: It is nothing else.

Socrates: Either therefore we did not then conclude well, or, if we did, our present position is not right.

Euthyphro: It seems so.

Socrates: From the beginning, therefore, we must again consider what the holy is. For I shall not willingly, before I have learnt this, run timidly away. Do not then despise me, but paying all

possible attention, tell me the truth in the most eminent degree. For you know it, if any man does; and you will not be dismissed like Proteus till you have told me. For if you had not clearly known what the holy, and also the unholy is, you never would have attempted, for the sake of a man who is a hireling, to accuse your father of murder, when he is now advanced in years; but you would have dreaded (lest you should not act rightly in this affair) the danger of incurring the anger of the gods, and the reproach of men. But now I well know that you clearly suspect, that you have a knowledge of what the holy and its contrary are. Tell me, therefore, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal from me what you think it to be?

Euthyphro: It must be at some other opportunity then, Socrates: for now I am in haste, and it is time for me to leave you.

Socrates: What do you do, my friend? By your departure you will throw me from the great hope I had entertained of learning from you what things are holy, and what are not so, and of liberating myself from the accusation of Melitus, by showing him that I was become wise through Euthyphro in divine concerns; that I shall no longer speak rashly, nor introduce any novelties respecting them through ignorance; and also that I shall act better during the remainder of my life.

THE END