This study covers the second paragraph of Chapter 2 of Aristotle’s Categories, from “Of spoken things, some are predicated of a subject,” to “but is not predicated of any subject.” It explains the text with the help of St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas.
I. Primary Source Text
Of spoken things, some are predicated of a subject, but are in no subject. Thus, “man” is predicated of a subject (viz. an individual man), but is in no other subject. Other things are in a subject, and are predicated of no other subjects. (By being in a subject, however, I do not mean that which is in a subject as a part is in a whole, but as that which cannot exist without it as a subject.) Thus, “grammar” is in a subject, that is, in “the soul”, and is predicated of no subject; and “this white thing” is in a subject (viz. in a body, for all color exists in a body) but it is predicated of no subject. Some things are both predicated of a subject, and are in a subject. Thus, “science” is in a subject, in “the soul”, and is predicated of a subject, of “grammar”. Some things are neither in a subject, nor are predicated of a subject. As for instance, an individual man, or an individual horse. For nothing of this kind either is in another subject, or is predicated of another subject. And, in short, individuals, and things which are singular in number, are indeed predicated of no other subject, yet nothing hinders but that some of them may be in another subject. For “grammar”, is among the things in a subject, but is not predicated of any subject.
— Aristotle, Categories, Chapter 2 (Taylor translation)
II. Exposition by St. Albert the Great
Some things are said with connection and some without. Only what is said without connection can be placed in a category. In this passage Aristotle divides the things said without connection into four kinds.
Why Aristotle Divides the Things Said Without Connection
A category is one of the ten most general genera. Aristotle is about to set out the ten categories and the things that belong in each, and he first divides the things said without connection into four kinds. St. Albert gives the reason. The division lets us know whether two things belong in the same category or in different categories. It also lets us know how, and in what order, each thing is to be placed in its category.
Substance and Accident, Universal and Particular
The division does this by settling two things about anything said without connection. The first is whether the thing is a substance or an accident. The answer tells whether it belongs in the category of substance or in one of the other nine categories, which are all categories of accidents. The second is whether the thing is universal or particular. The answer tells where it stands within its category. The universals, which are the genera and species, stand above. The particulars, which are the individuals, stand at the bottom and have nothing below them. The Tree of Porphyry shows this order, running from substance down to man, and below man to Socrates. Each of the ten categories has an order of this kind.
The Use of This Division in Definition
The division serves logic because a definition is made of a genus and differences. The genus of a thing cannot be given until one knows which category the thing is in and where it stands in that category. Man is defined as a rational mortal animal because man stands under animal in the category of substance.
III. How Words Relate to Things: St. Thomas on On Interpretation
Aristotle’s division sorts things that are said, so the relation of words to things must also be understood. St. Thomas explains this in his commentary on On Interpretation. Written words are signs of spoken words. Spoken words are signs of ideas in the mind. Ideas in the mind are likenesses of things. The mind knows a thing only through some likeness of it in the mind.
So spoken words signify things, but they signify them indirectly, through ideas.
Why Logic Is Chiefly Concerned With Spoken Words
Logic does seek knowledge of things. Its chief concern is what spoken words signify, because spoken words stand next to the ideas in the mind. Written words stand further from the ideas. What written words signify belongs to Grammar, not Logic.
IV. Does Aristotle Divide Things Said or Things That Exist?
The order of written words, spoken words, ideas, and things raises a question about the division. Aristotle is sorting things that are said, but what is said signifies things. Is Aristotle dividing what is said of ideas in the mind, or things that exist outside the mind? St. Albert asks this question. He answers that the division into four kinds is of things that exist, more than just of things that are said. His reason is that how a thing exists determines how it is said.
The Logician and the Natural Philosopher
St. Albert’s answer does not make logic a study of things in the world outside the mind. In logic, Aristotle still divides what is said of ideas. His division follows how things exist, for the reason St. Albert gives. The logician does not study what things are in themselves; natural philosophy does that. The logician takes what things are and uses it to put what is said in order. Truth in the mind must agree with reality as it exists outside the mind.
V. Aristotle’s Two Questions: “Said of a Subject” and “In a Subject”
Aristotle sorts the things said without connection into four kinds by asking two questions about each one:
- Is it said of a subject?
- Is it in a subject?
Both questions use the word subject. A subject is what something is said of, or what something is in.
What It Means to Be Said of a Subject
In the sentence Socrates is a man, Socrates is the subject, because the sentence is about him. Man is said of Socrates. It is also said of Plato, and of every other man. When we say Socrates is a man, the word man tells what Socrates is. Taylor’s translation says “predicated of a subject” where St. Albert says “said of a subject.” The two expressions mean the same thing.
What It Means to Be in a Subject
White is in a body. The body is the subject, because the white is in it. Aristotle defines what it is to be in a subject: a thing is in a subject when it cannot exist without that subject. It is not in the subject as a part is in a whole.
St. Albert explains this definition. What is in a subject needs that subject in order to exist, but it is not a part of what the subject is. Rational is a part of what a man is, but white is not. Nor is it a part of the subject’s body: a hand is a part of a body, but white is not. What is in a subject does not make the subject what it is. A body is a body whether it is white or not. Yet white cannot exist by itself, but only in some body.
How the Two Questions Yield Four Kinds
St. Albert says the four kinds come from two divisions. Everything in a category is either a substance or an accident, and everything in a category is either universal or particular. Put together, these two divisions give four kinds of things said without connection.
Aristotle’s two questions settle the same two things. What is said of a subject is universal, and what is said of no subject is particular. What is in a subject is an accident, and what is in no subject is a substance.
| Kind | Said of a subject? | In a subject? | Aristotle’s example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Universal substance | Yes | No | man |
| Particular accident | No | Yes | this grammar; this white |
| Universal accident | Yes | Yes | science |
| Particular substance | No | No | this man; this horse |
VI. The Four Kinds of Things Said Without Connection
1. Universal Substance: Said of a Subject, In No Subject
A universal substance is that which is said of a subject and is in no subject.
Man is a universal substance. Man is said of a subject: we say Socrates is a man, Plato is a man, and so of every man. Man is universal, because it is said of many.
Man is in no subject. Man is not in Socrates the way white is in a body. Socrates may be white or not white, and he is still Socrates. But man is what Socrates is. If Socrates were not a man, he would not be Socrates at all. So man is not in Socrates; man is said of him.
2. Particular Accident: In a Subject, Said of No Subject
A particular accident is that which is in a subject and is said of no subject.
Aristotle’s first example is grammar. The translation says only “grammar,” but Aristotle means one person’s grammar, and St. Albert’s words make this plain: this grammar. Grammar here does not mean a book or a school subject. It means the knowledge of grammar that one person has in his mind. St. Albert’s example is the grammar of Donatus, the knowledge of grammar that belongs to Donatus alone.
The grammar of Donatus is in a subject. It is in the soul of Donatus, because knowledge can exist only in a mind that knows it. It is not part of what Donatus is: Donatus would still be a man if he knew no grammar.
The grammar of Donatus is said of no subject. It is one particular thing. Man is said of Socrates and of Plato, but the grammar of Donatus is not said of anything else. It is only itself.
Aristotle’s second example is this white, the white color of one particular thing, such as this sheet of paper. That white is in a subject: it is in the paper and cannot exist apart from it. The paper is paper whether it is white or not. And that white is said of no subject, because it is the white of this one sheet of paper and of nothing else.
3. Universal Accident: Both In a Subject and Said of a Subject
A universal accident is that which is in a subject and is also said of a subject.
Aristotle’s example is science, which here means knowledge. Grammar is one science, and geometry is another.
Science is said of a subject. We say grammar is a science and geometry is a science. So science is said of grammar and of geometry, as animal is said of man and of ox. Science is universal, because it is said of many.
Science is also in a subject. Science is knowledge, and knowledge can exist only in a mind that knows. So science is in the soul. It is not part of what the soul is, because a soul is a soul whether it has knowledge or not. That is why St. Albert calls science an accident of the soul.
Universal Accident Compared With Particular Accident
The grammar of Donatus is one particular knowledge in one mind, and it is said of nothing. Science is said of many kinds of knowledge. Both are in a subject. Only science is also said of a subject.
4. Particular Substance: Neither Said of a Subject Nor In a Subject
A particular substance is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject.
Aristotle’s examples are this man and this horse. Socrates is such a man.
Socrates is said of no subject. Man can be said of Socrates, of Plato, and of every man, but Socrates cannot be said of anyone, because there is only one Socrates. St. Albert gives the reason: individuals are at the bottom of the Tree of Porphyry, and there is nothing below them for them to be said of.
Socrates is in no subject. White needs a body to exist in, and knowledge needs a mind. Socrates does not need anything else to exist in. Socrates exists by himself.
Aristotle’s Concluding Rule on Individuals
Aristotle ends with a rule drawn from the second and fourth kinds. Individuals are never said of anything, but some individuals are in something. Those individuals are particular accidents, such as the grammar of Donatus, which is in the soul of Donatus.
VII. Summary
- Purpose of the division: It shows whether two things belong in the same category, and where each thing stands in its category.
- Words and things: Written words are signs of spoken words, spoken words are signs of ideas, and ideas are likenesses of things. Words therefore signify things indirectly.
- What is divided: The division is of what is said, but it follows how things exist, because how a thing exists determines how it is said. The logician does not study what things are.
- Subject: A thing is said of a subject when it names what that subject is. A thing is in a subject when it cannot exist without that subject and is not a part of it. What is said of a subject is universal; what is in a subject is an accident.
- The four kinds: Universal substance is said of a subject and is in none. Particular accident is in a subject and is said of none. Universal accident is both. Particular substance is neither.
Key Concepts
- Said of a subject: To be said of a subject is to name what that subject is, as man is said of Socrates, and whatever is said of a subject is universal.
- In a subject: To be in a subject is to be unable to exist without that subject while not being a part of it, as white is in a body, and whatever is in a subject is an accident.
- Universal substance: A universal substance is that which is said of a subject and is in no subject, such as man.
- Particular accident: A particular accident is that which is in a subject and is said of no subject, such as the grammar of Donatus or the white of this sheet of paper.
- Particular substance: A particular substance is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, such as Socrates or this horse.
How to Cite This Reference:
Chicago: Classical Liberal Arts Academy. “Aristotle’s Categories: The Four Kinds of Things Said Without Connection (TRV-362 Lesson 04).” CLAA Library, 2026. https://classicalliberalarts.com/aristotles-categories-said-of-in-a-subject/.
MLA: Classical Liberal Arts Academy. “Aristotle’s Categories: The Four Kinds of Things Said Without Connection (TRV-362 Lesson 04).” CLAA Library, 2026, classicalliberalarts.com/aristotles-categories-said-of-in-a-subject/.
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