St. Albert the Great, “On the Categories of Aristotle”
A literal translation for students of the Classical Liberal Arts Academy
by Mr. William C. Michael, O.P., Headmaster
Note: The translation below maintains, as far as possible, the original Latin word order, and is intended to assist students reading the Latin text. It is not intended for general reading. -WCM
Treatise I. Concerning the things going before to the knowledge of the book of the Categories
Chapter 1. Concerning the intention of the book, and the order, and the manner and other things which are accustomed to be asked.
In things set before it has been said that logic is the science through which it is taught how through the known one may come to the knowledge of the unknown. And this in two ways is done, according as there are two things which, when they are unknown, we desire to know, namely the complex and the incomplex. And the incomplex unknown cannot be known except by definition, or by any notion. The complex, however, unknown cannot be known except by argumentation. It has also been said for this, that reason (which is the power embracing one with another) cannot come to the instrument by which it may draw forth the knowledge of the unknown from the known, except by three acts, which are to order one to another, to compose one with another, and to gather composed things according to the discourse which is made from one to another. Thus indeed and not otherwise will it receive the knowledge of the unknown through that which is known.
The first act therefore which is to order one thing able to be composed with another, is perfected in two ways: and the order itself is done in two ways. The first thing which is required for the act of reason ordering is the reason which is taken from the very form of things able to be ordered, and this reason is drawn from the universal and the particular: for by this that the universal is that which is in many, and of many, the reason of the order of the predicate to the subject is taken: and concerning this already as far as pertains to the present intention it has been determined. It follows therefore now to determine concerning those things which according to the aforesaid reason are to be ordered to one another according to genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents: for this alone is that in which the ordering of reason is perfected. And therefore here things able to be ordered to be subjected and to be predicated are to be ordered and determined according to all their diversity, which consists in the ten genera of things able to be predicated or categories.
Because however already in the preceding things to logic it has been proved, that to the knowledge of the unknown through the known one does not come, except through arranged speech for signifying, whether a man inquires with himself through inwardly arranged speech, or inquires with another through speech outwardly uttered, it follows of necessity, that the order of things able to be predicated cannot be determined, except according as under a word the thing able to be predicated is to be designated. For with things inquisitively unknown we are not able to use, because neither are they finished for us, nor present: and therefore with signs and words it is necessary to use. On account of which things able to be predicated it is necessary to consider according as by words they are signified: on account of which Boethius says that this science, namely the books of the categories, is concerning the ten first words the first genera of things signifying: for order is not in the things themselves, but it is necessary that reason place order, just as also it makes composition and collection of composed things.
And from these things it is clear what is the subject of this book: for it is the subject able to be ordered in the reason of being able to be predicated or able to be subjected, according as it stands under a word signifying such order. And thus it is clear how this science is one from one subject.
But the parts of this subject are things able to be ordered according to the different mode of predicating in substance, and in accident, and in accidents according to all nine genera of accidents. And thus infinite multitude is restricted into ten genera, as Boethius says: but the ten into two things able to be predicated, namely substance and accident: and the two into one thing able to be predicated, namely ordered to composition according to the reason of being able to be predicated, or determined from universal and particular, or able to be subjected and able to be predicated. From this also it is clear what is the cause of the undertaken work: for it is not possible for the thing able to be predicated to be composed with the thing able to be subjected, except through the order of one to the other, and therefore concerning those things able to be ordered in genus and species it was necessary to determine.
It is also clear what is the ultimate end and what is the proximate end. For the ultimate is that from things ordered reason may be taken of composition for enunciation, which alone among speeches signifies the true: and a further end still is, that from things composed may be drawn forth the collection of consequence of one from another, through which may be taken the knowledge of the complex which is unknown. But the proximate end is, which is the end of the work, that knowledge may be had of things able to be ordered according to every genus, according as there can be a different mode of predicating, or a different order of the thing able to be predicated to the subject about which it is predicated: which knowledge of the book of the Categories is the proper end.
But the mode of this science it is necessary that from the end be taken: for that mode is to be chosen, by which in the proposed matter one can come to the end of the intention. It is therefore (since it is about incomplex things) indeed definitive according as from things prior according to nature it proceeds: but divisive according as it makes known what is prior by its posterior things which are in it. And the first indeed, namely definitive, makes known the substance and being of the thing. But the second, namely divisive, makes known the power of the thing: because a thing is not perfectly known, unless it is known according to being and according to power. But the third mode, not for the knowable, but for him who seeks to know, will be added by us, and was added by the predecessors so that the teaching may be easier, and that is the positive of examples.
But there is a doubt of some, whether concerning the genera (which, as Porphyry says, are the first principles of things) knowledge can be had? because knowledge is a habit of the conclusion demonstrated through causes and principles. Since therefore these are the first principles of things, there are not other things prior to them through which passions may be demonstrated concerning them. And thus concerning these it does not seem that knowledge can be given, but in knowledge they ought to be supposed. But to solve this is not difficult: for these according to the thing, and according as they are certain natures and parts of being, are first principles: according as they are something able to be predicated or able to be ordered in a genus according to this or that mode of predicating or subjecting, thus they are not considered as principles, and they have many properties and passions which are able to be demonstrated concerning them: and in this way we will treat concerning them here. But as they are parts of being and principles of the diversity of things, thus concerning them the first Philosopher treats, as he can know, who in the Metaphysics places the intention of studying: which does not pertain to the present business which the logician has to consider.
Thus therefore treating of the thing able to be predicated according as it stands under a word designative of the thing able to be predicated according to the different mode of predicating in genus and species able to be ordered, we follow as in higher things the sect of the Philosophers who are called Peripatetics, and especially Aristotle who is said to have been the chief and first inventor of this sect, nevertheless adding whatever things well said by later ones we are able to find: for we will proceed both by the mode of science and by the mode of art. By the mode indeed of science in this, that we will consider the subject and the principal parts of the subject, showing which passions are in them, and properties from the principles proper to this science. But the way of art we will hold in this, that we will gather principles tending to one end of the work: which work indeed is the ordering of things able to be predicated to the end of composition and understanding of the syllogism, through which by the knowledge of the known one can come to the knowledge of the unknown, as we have often said. Now however let us approach the proposed matter, for it is enough also to have tasted many things beforehand.
Chapter 2. How is is set forth concerning Equivocal, Univocal, and Denominative things, and what are Equivocal things
Since therefore in this it is to be done concerning the thing able to be predicated how it is to be ordered in genus, and the thing able to be predicated is reduced into triple common, namely into being and one, into which according to one reason it cannot be reduced: and into the common which is common as genus which receives the predication of its universal according to name and reason, which indeed is univocal: and thirdly into that which is common as subject of which accident is predicated, which of the subject is not predicated, except according to denomination: it is necessary for us concerning these three to set forth beforehand, so that afterwards it may be more easily seen what in what as in genus is contained, or what to another as to subject is reduced, or what of name and of thing receives predication.
Because however the first of all that is predicated is being, which univocally of all is not predicated, as in the science of universals it has been said, therefore first concerning equivocal things it is necessary to speak. And again on account of this so that it may be known what of what as genus, or species, or difference, or property, or accident is not predicated, although univocal is before equivocal, just as one before many: nevertheless according to the intention of this doctrine equivocal is before univocal, because through equivocal the thing able to be predicated is reduced to being and one which is before every genus. Through univocal however it is reduced to everything which is common as genus. Through denominative however or through its reason all predicates of accident regard substance. And through these three commonalities, the universality of all things able to be predicated returns to the predication of one common in some way, and all things which regard one thing able to be subjected, it is necessary that they regard it according to some one of the three modes.
I say therefore, because it is true what in the science of universals has been said, that if anyone calls all beings equivocally, and not univocally will name, it is necessary concerning equivocal things to set forth beforehand. Equivocal therefore are called those of which only the name is common, but according to that name the notion of substance is different. They are therefore called equivocal as if the name (which according to the voice is) from equal as regards the one imposing they have. And therefore it is also added, that they are said and are not, because what is in the expression common is to them: in being however what is said through the name, there is not community according to equal participation: for although the equivocal by actual multiplicity says many things, nevertheless nothing of all those by equal participation is participated by those which in the name are signified: on account of which they are called equivocal, because equally having the name, the being of the name they do not receive by equal participation.
On account of which it is also added, of which only the name is common: for name although it is said as if notamen, because it makes some mark of the thing as regards the act of the one signifying and imposing the name, because the one imposing the name according to something of the property of the thing is affected when the name is imposed: because also the signification of the thing which is intended through the name gives form to the name. Nevertheless these are not of the intrinsic things to the name itself according as name is only, but rather intrinsic to the name are such lettering or composition of the name from letter and syllable and accent, which are intrinsic to the name as name is. Which things now being perfected as regards the substance of the name then first the name refers to that to which he is affected, or which he has conceived who imposed the name: and therefore in equivocal things only the name according as it consists in the sound of letters and syllables and accent is common, and without equal participation of any thing which is imported in the name: and therefore it is called equivocal.
And although perhaps principally in the equivocal one thing is imported, and others not principally, nevertheless, because not by equal reason many things said in the name participate in that name, there is also some species of equivocation: and this is what is added in the definition of equivocal things there, the notion of substance is different according to that name. For every name signifies something as to substance, and something as to quality, since every name signifies substance with quality: and that indeed to which the name is imposed is the signified substance of it: but the property of the same thing or substance which affects the one imposing when the name is imposed, is the quality signified through the name.
When therefore the same is the name as regards those things which are of the name in letter and accent: and that which is signified in the name, is not the same nor equally participated by those to whom the name is imposed, nor also is the property from which it is imposed altogether the same, although perhaps it is referred to one: then the name is equivocal, because the notion of substance to which the name is imposed (which is the substantial notion from which the name is imposed) thus in two ways is according to something or simply different: for some substance (as we have said) is according to something by the mode by which it underlies the notion, to which the name itself is imposed: and the notion of that is different when it is not altogether the same: and further from which the name is imposed which is the quality of the name, and the substantial notion which is given of the name according to that which the name is. When therefore that also is not altogether the same, again the notion of substance, that is, the substantial notion of the name is different: so that nothing of the thing to which the name is imposed, equally participates in the things signified by the name.
From which it is clear that of equivocal things there are many modes or species. For there are equivocal things indeed the same according to the thing, but not equally participating, that is, through the same notion given of all equally, but rather having a certain mode of that (of which the notion is given): just as being is said equivocally of all beings existing per se and in another, because per se being alone is being of nature, but others are certain modes of that being and not true and principal beings. In this way healthy in animal, and urine, and diet, and medicine is said equivocally: because healthy of nature is of the animal: others however say a certain mode of health, signifying and conserving of health, or as perfecting of health, or in some other way which in the animal is had. For if physician is said equivocally of him who by perfect medicine (which is in him) operates, and of the old woman imitating the physician, and of the clyster which as an instrument perfects the operation and act of the physician, and of certain others participating in some mode: so also being and one are said equivocally, because being and one first is that which per se is being and one: others however are called being and one, because to that as to subject in some way of entity they are referred, or as measure of that, or as disposition, or as relation, or in some other way, which are in that as in subject. And this indeed mode is called multiple said according to analogy, or proportion to one which principally in the name is signified.
But another mode is of equivocal things, which Boethius calls equivocal by chance and fortune, when namely the same name by chance and fortune is imposed on different things, of which the substance to which the name is imposed is not one nor of one referring to one, or even of different things referring to one: but nevertheless the quality by which that name is imposed on different things, through the likeness of transference is one, as dog which is imposed on the barking animal, and on the sea, and on the celestial: and the substance of those to which the name is imposed is not one, but different in proximate genus and species. And the property or quality from which the name is imposed, only through the likeness of transference is one. For example, being biting, which agrees with everything which bites with teeth: but through transference it agrees with that which bites by quality and harmful relation. Thus therefore it is clear how equivocal things are, of which only the name is common, and the notion of substance according to that name, namely the things signified, is different, that is, is not altogether the same and not equally nor according to more and less participated.
There are however those who against the things which have been said, sophistically object, saying, that signification is the perfection of the name giving to it species and being, as it seems. And therefore name is said as if notamen, because it makes a mark of the thing, and is defined by signifying, when it is said that a name signifies substance with quality. But if it is so, then with the signification changed it seems that that which gives to the name species and form is changed: but with the species and form changed, that which is specified and formed is changed, and thus with the signification changed, it seems that the same name cannot remain. And these things especially seem in those which are said relatively to one another, just as the sign and the proper signified is changed, it seems that the sign must be changed, because in vain and to no purpose will be its signification, when it is not referred to the signified. But this especially seems to be in voices and names: because voices are marks of passions and conceptions which are in the soul: but things are causes of passion and conception of the soul: therefore it seems that passions and conceptions of the soul are changed with things changed. But with concepts and passions of the soul changed, it seems that it is necessary that voices (which are signs of concepts) be changed. This and very many things of this kind can be objected, all of which are most easily solved by a solution, provided that the things which have been said are well understood.
It must therefore be said, that a name has as matter the voice in which it is formed: but it has as form the lettering which the act of the one imposing gives for signifying this or that. And this matter and this form always remain in the name as long as it is a voice and a name: and this remains in the equivocal according to the name and the matter of the name always the same in common. But the signified is sometimes called the signification, and this indeed in natural signs remains the same: but in those which are by convention, sometimes it is different, because convention is not fixed and having causes in one way: and on account of this, with the name remaining the same according to its own matter and its own form, it is not necessary that it have the same signified: and therefore it is not necessary that the relation of such a sign to the signified be the same, but it can be a different relation.
Because however everyone instituting a sign refers it to the act of signifying, although he does not refer it to this, that it signify the same, and a name is a voice referred to the act of signifying, but a voice does not have that relation: therefore it is not said in the definition of equivocal things, that equivocal are called those of which only the voice is common, but of which only the name is common, so that the act of signifying by institution may be imported by the name, which as making a mark is said: which by the voice would not be imported. And because the signified is the second perfection of the name, to which as a sign it is referred, therefore it can be changed with the name not changed: and when the signification is changed, it is necessary that the relation of the sign to the signified be changed: and thus the name will be equivocal with the name remaining one and the same according to the first and substantial matter, and according to the first and substantial form, and not the definitive of the substance named by the signified of the name. And the substantial notion given by the quality (by which the name is in such signified substance) is one and another according to that name which for signifying these two is referred to such things to be signified by one and the same name.
But an example suitable to the proposed intention is as man is called animal, and as is called image which is painted to the image of man or animal: for although Zeno says in his logic, that there are many modes of equivocation, nevertheless one and the first mode is nearer to the univocal, which is of things said in many ways through analogy or proportion to one and from one: as are all things equivocal in being, and as is animal man and that which is painted: for painted animal is called, whose likeness from one and the same is transformed, and when the painted is referred to the natural animal according to a certain mode of representation, as being truly is one, and others are beings from that said, and to that according to some mode of entity of the nature of being to that referred.
But that here we say that equivocal things are called, and we do not say that equivocal is said in the singular, although one name is by its own form: the reason is because here we intend concerning the thing able to be predicated or sayable incomplex according as it is able to be ordered in genus or common univocal, or by denomination predicated of one: and these are things not from voices or expressions absolutely, but by voices signified: and because many things are referred to the same name, therefore more and more fittingly we say in the plural, than in the singular: for equivocal things are things under one name equivocated. And when it is said, only the name is common, we intend to exclude the notion of substance designated by the name: which substantial notion is when it is given by those things which are of substance, which are genus and differences. From these things it can be clear, why equivocation on account of the actual plurality of things signified produces multiplicity: but about this it will be treated in the Elenchi.
Still moreover because in the equivocal the same form remains which is the act of signifying by the will of the institutor according to reference to something of the thing signified, which was the reason for instituting that sign, it is easily clear, that in every equivocal, as we have said, there is something of the univocal by which the equivocal must be reduced to the one: for one sign being set for different things to signify, it is necessary to refer to something one, which in some way is in those, which are different in substance and in the notion of substance.
These things therefore thus have been said about equivocal things, and concerning these what has been said is sufficient, as far as pertains to the present intention: but it will be treated about the others in the Elenchi. It is however to be noted, that although in the definition of equivocal things it has been said that the notion of substance is different, nevertheless it is not said that the notion of substance is the true definition given by genus and difference, but generally is said the notion any notification, which is of greater and better declaration than the name itself absolutely posited. And according to this way the notion being taken, individuals have a notion and equivocation in one name: although their notion taken from the collection of accidents is not one according to that name in which they communicate. These therefore are equivocal things, through which all things are reduced not to genus but to things transcending every genus, which are being and one, as Aristotle says.
Chapter 3. Concerning Univocal things
Univocal things however are those through whose notion the thing able to be predicated is ordered in one genus, which to its subjects gives its name and definition: and without this notion of the univocal there would not be a reduction of things able to be predicated to one genus predicated of all those which are of that genus: and therefore it is defined thus by Aristotle that univocal things are called those whose name is common, and according to that name the same is the notion of substance or definition. And they are called univocal by a mode opposite to equivocal, namely things univocally in one name, so that the thing itself may be referred to being said and to speech, because otherwise it would not be logical what is said: because the thing considered in itself, not according as it stands under expression, pertains not to the logician, but to the Philosopher. And therefore it is added, are called, and it is not said, univocal is. Still moreover because speeches are finite as regards us, but things are infinite, as Aristotle says, it is necessary that many things in genus and species and number one according to mode be signified. When therefore many things in one nature (which is the cause of the imposition of the name) agree in one name, those will be univocal. And because many things are named by one name, therefore they are more fittingly called in the plural univocal things than in the singular univocal.
But that which is added, whose name is common, name is said as if notamen, which is of the thing which is the cause of the imposition of the name in the many of that: for this nature in all those is one, and not by prior and posterior participated: on account of which such a name is simply common to all those, naming nothing in one which is not named in another.
But that which is said, and the notion of substance is the same, the notion indeed of substance says two things, as earlier in the definition of equivocal things: for the notion says not only the definition, but also any declaration which is given of that which is named by the name, as it also says the form from which the name is set, which it is necessary to be the same: and thus, both the name and the nature and the notion of the imposition of the name will be one in such as such: and the notion of substance is the substantial notion adding together in those things which are univocal: and that that nature in them is participated equally which not according to more and less, nor according to prior or posterior is in them, but in one way just as being is one.
But if it were to receive more and less, it would not be one at all, as in the things set before it has been determined in the book on universals. For although nothing is compared, except by some one thing which is in them, nevertheless that one thing which is in them, according to more and less, cannot be of their being. And therefore its notion is not the notion of their substance. For their substance consists in participation of genus and participation of difference, which are act and potency constituting substance, because the terms of substantial being are the being of all those things which are, just as man is called animal and ox is called animal: so that animal, the name of one nature, makes a mark which equally is in man and ox, which nature indeed is animated sensible substance: and therefore if the nature or substance which is said by the name as the common name is explained, thus explaining the name the notion or definition will be common equally to each: whence if anyone assigns the notion of each, of man namely and of ox, according to this that they are animals, that is, according to the nature of which the common name which is animal makes a mark, the same of necessity he will assign the definitive notion of man namely and of ox. And similarly it is of Socrates and Plato in this name man. And this is in all things which as genus or species are, or as difference, or as property, or as accident under the same name are predicated, as Avicenna and Algazel say: for if it is said, Socrates is white and Cicero is white, if the notion is taken according to the common name, the predicate of Socrates and Plato will be one and the same notion. The same if I say Socrates is risible, and the same it will be if I say Socrates is rational: and to say generally, everything which as universal of many and of its subjects is predicated, is said univocally.
There are however those who sophistically object against this, saying, that because truly a name is imposed from form, but of different things there are different forms, and therefore, as they say, different things cannot have one name. To which it is most easily answered, that of different things in that they are different, there are different forms, and different names with those forms imposed. But nothing prevents different things not in that in which they are different, but in that in which they are one, to have one name, just as they have one form: and therefore different individuals in the form of the species nothing prevents to have one name of the species: and those which are different in species, nothing prevents to have one form of the genus, and therefore to have one name of the genus: and so it is in others. And therefore it is necessary, that according to that form of which the name makes a mark, different things have one and the same definitive notion of that substance. For that definition does not say more explicitly than the name itself implicitly.
But if, however, someone still objects against this, saying, that it is impossible that there be one nature or form of the genus in many species, and thus it is impossible that there be one name of the genus, which is said of many things differing in species, this is proved by this which is said, one and the same does not at the same time in act have contraries. But the nature of the genus is one and the same: and therefore if it is in many things differing in species in act, and one and the same notion, one and the same in act at the same time has contraries: for it has rational in man and irrational in ox or ass, and since this cannot be, it cannot be that the name of the genus is one in man and ox. But these things seem to be confirmed by this which Aristotle says, that the notion of animal according to each animal is different and different: it is therefore false that there is one name and one notion.
But these and similar things are not difficult to solve. For we say that one nature of the genus is in different things differing in species and in number. And what is said, that the same does not at the same time have contraries, is understood of the same in number and not of the same in genus or species. And this indeed already in the things set before in the book on Predicables has been determined. And what Aristotle says that the notion of animal according to each is different, thus it must be thought: the notion of animal according to each, that is according to the being which it has in each one individually, is different: for this is true not only in species, but also in the individual: because thus animal is not taken as the essence of the genus, but as it has special or singular being in the species or in the individual: but thus it is not genus, because it is in that only, and not outside that in another, and therefore thus it is not in universal being, but particular: because although that which is in one, is in another universally, nevertheless not according as it is in one, is it in another, as in the treatise on Universals it has been determined. It remains therefore that univocal things are those of which both the name is common, and the notion of substance is the same.
However, it must be noted, that although multivocal or synonymous and diversivocal are not of those by which the thing able to be predicated is ordered in the line of genus, because synonyms regard one particular or special thing through diverse properties which are in that thing signified by many names: diversivocal things, however, just as the names are different, so they are attributed to different things; nevertheless, because Avicenna and Algazel and John Damascene in their categories place these, we also will place them here not for the necessity of science but for the perfection of teaching. Therefore, multivocal or synonymous things are, when many names are attributed to one thing, as sword, point, blade, gladius, or Marcus, Tullius, Cicero: for by these names the same thing is signified according to diverse properties which are in that thing. Diversivocal things, however, are, when different names are attributed to different things, as wood, man, stone and suchlike. But we do not need these for the necessity of this science, in which (as Euclid does in geometry) we do not set forth except the definitions of those things which are required for the ordering of the thing able to be predicated to the one which is in that order able to be predicated or able to be said first, as is the transcending principle which is in all principles, and as is the most general: for the first it is necessary to set forth the notion of equivocal things, for the second, however, the notion of univocal things is necessary.
More coming soon…
