Let, therefore, what we have written in the Poetic be surveyed; and let the virtue of diction be perspicuity; of which this is an indication, that speech does not effect its proper work unless it renders manifest the mind of the speaker. Another virtue of diction is, that it be neither low, nor above its dignity, but appropriate. For poetic diction perhaps is not low, and yet is not adapted to an oration. But of nouns and verbs, such as are proper render the diction perspicuous. Such other names, however, as are mentioned in the Poetic, cause the diction not to be low, but ornamented. For the introduction of unusual words, makes the diction appear more venerable; since men are affected in the same manner towards diction, as they are towards strangers, and their fellow-citizens. Hence it is necessary to render the dialect foreign. For we admire the language of foreigners; and that which is admirable is pleasant. In metre, therefore, the poet does this frequently, and there it is appropriate; for both the verse, and the subjects of the verse, are very remote from common occurrences; but in prose much fewer foreign words are to be used. For there, if either a slave, or a very young man, or one who speaks of very trifling things uses elegant language, it is more indecorous. But in the language of these persons, the becoming consists in an appropriate contraction and dilatation. Unusual words, however, should be introduced by the orator latently, and he should not seem to speak fictitiously, but naturally. For natural diction is adapted to persuade; but the fictitious has a contrary effect. For we avoid those who speak fictitiously as insidious persons, in the same manner as we avoid mixed wines. Thus, the voice of Theodorus was preferred to the voice of other actors; for his seemed to be the voice of the speaker, but the voice of the others appeared to be foreign. Unusual terms, however, will be well introduced latently, if he who frames a speech makes a selection from the accustomed dialect; which Euripides does, and was the first that showed the way to others. But since an oration consists from nouns and verbs, and nouns have as many species as are enumerated in the treatise On Poetry; of these species, nouns taken from various tongues, or dialects, and also such as are double and fictitious, are seldom, and but in few places to be used. Where, however, they are to be used, and why but seldom, we shall afterwards show. For they produce a greater change in the language than is becoming. But the proper, the appropriate, and metaphorical, are alone useful to prosaic diction; of which this is an indication, that all men in common conversation, use these alone; for all men speak in metaphors, and in appropriate and proper terms. Hence it is evident, that if any one does this well, his diction will be foreign, and it may be latent that it is so, and he will speak with perspicuity. But this was defined by us to be the virtue of a rhetorical discourse. Of names or nouns, however, the homonymous are useful to the sophist; for through these they deceive. But the synonymous are useful to the poet. I call, however, proper and synonymous terms, such as to go and to walk; for both these are proper, and synonymous to each other.
What, therefore, each of these is, how many species there are of metaphor, and that metaphors can do much both in poetry and prose, we have shown, as we have before observed, in the treatise On Poetry. But it is so much more necessary to labour about these, in prose, because it has fewer aids than verse. A metaphor also especially possesses the clear, the pleasant, and the foreign, and it is not to be taken from another person. It is necessary, however, to use epithets and metaphors that are appropriate; and this adaptation will be obtained from the analogous. But without this there will be an apparent indecorum, because contraries are especially conspicuous, when placed by each other. As a purple garment, therefore, becomes a young, but not an old man; for the same garment is not adapted to both; thus also certain metaphors and epithets are adapted to some things, but are not adapted to others. If likewise you are willing to praise, the metaphor must be derived from that which is better in the same genus; but if to blame, it must be derived from things which in the same genus are inferior. I say for instance, since contraries are in the same genus, to say, “That a beggar prays,” and “That he who prays begs,” because both are petitions, it is expedient to do as we have said. Thus Iphicrates called Callias, Metragurtes, or collector to the mother of the gods, and not Dadouchos, or torch-bearer. But Callias replied “That Iphicrates was not initiated, otherwise he would not have called him Metragurtes, but Dadouchos.” For both these offices pertained to the goddess, but that of torch-bearer was honourable, but that of collector ignoble. The flatterers of Dionysius also employed the same artifice; for they called themselves artists. Both these words, however, are metaphors. the one indeed, of things sordid, but the other the contrary. And robbers at present call themselves exactors. Hence, we may be allowed to say, “That he who acts unjustly errs; and that he who errs, acts unjustly; and also that he who steals, both takes, and robs.” There is, however, an indecorum in what Telephus in Euripides says of certain rowers “That they reigned over oars, and descended into Mysia.” For the word to reign is greater than the dignity of the matter i.e. of an oar. He does not therefore conceal his artifice. There is also an error in syllables, unless they cause the words to have a pleasing sound. And this error was committed by Dionysius surnamed Chalkous, in his elegies. For he calls poetry “The clangor of Calliope,” because both are vocal sounds, But the metaphor is bad, which is made from sounds that are not significant. Farther still, nouns are not to be far fetched, but things which are anonymous are to be denominated by words derived from things that are allied, and of the same species, and which show as soon as they are uttered that they are allied; as in that celebrated enigma, “I saw a man agglutinating brass to a man with fire.” For the passion is anonymous. But both are a certain addition. The enigma, therefore, calls the application of the cupping glass an agglutination. And in short, from enigmas that are well composed, good metaphors may be assumed. For metaphors have an obscure meaning; so that it is evident that an enigma if it is approved consists of metaphors that are well made. Metaphors also must be assumed from beautiful things. But the beauty of a name consists as Lycimnius says in sounds, or in the thing signified; and in a similar manner the deformity of a name. Farther still, there is a third thing, which solves a sophistical argument. For that which Bryson says is not true, “That no one speaks obscurely, since the same thing is signified by using this name instead of that.” For this is false; since one name is more proper and more assimilated than another, and is more adapted to place the thing before our eyes. Again, this name and that signify a thing not similarly subsisting; so that thus also, one name must be admitted to be more beautiful or more deformed than another. For both names indeed, signify the beautiful and the deformed; but not so far as beautiful, or so far as deformed. Or both signify the same things, but in a greater or less degree. Metaphors, however, are hence to be derived from things which are beautiful, either in the voice, or in the power of signification, or to the sight, or some other sense. But it makes a difference to say for instance “The rosy-finger’d morn,” rather than, “The purple fingered,” or which is still worse “The red-finger’d.” In epithets also, oppositions may be made from what is vile or base; as for instance, the matricide. But the opposition may be made from that which is better; as, the avenger of his father. And Simonides, when he who conquered with mules, offered him a small reward, was unwilling to compose verses on the occasion, as disdaining to celebrate in verse semi-asses. But when he had given him a sufficient reward, then he sung, Hail daughters of the steeds that fly With feet like whirlwinds swift. Though they were also the daughters of asses. Farther still, a thing may be praised or blamed by employing diminutives. But diminution is that which renders both evil and good less. Thus Aristophanes in his Babylonics calls in derision krusion (a golden thing) krusidarion, and imation (a garment) imatidarion. He also calls loidoria (slander) loidoremation, and nosema (disease) nosemation. In both appositions, however, and diminutives, it is requisite to be cautious, and to observe a mediocrity.
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