Aristotle, Rhetoric. Book III, Chapter 12


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It is however requisite not to be ignorant that a different diction is adapted to each genus of orations. For graphic and agonistic diction, i.e. the diction employed in writing and at the bar are not the same; nor forensic, and that which is employed in popular harangues. But it is necessary to know both these kinds of diction. For to know the one is to know how to speak properly; and by a knowledge of the other, we are not compelled to be silent, when we wish to impart something to others, which those suffer who do not know how to write. But graphic diction, or the diction pertaining to writing; is indeed most accurate; but the agonistic, or that which belongs to the bar is most adapted to action. Of this latter, however, there are two species; one ethical; but the other pathetic. Hence, also, players choose dramas of this kind, and poets choose such like players to act their fables. Those poets, likewise, are most approved, whose fables delight, not only when acted, but also when read; such as those of Chæremon, whose diction is as accurate as that of any writer of orations; and among the dithyrambic poets, those of Licymnicus. When orations also are compared with each other, those which are written, will appear when recited in forensic contests to be jejune. On the other hand, those orations which when publicly delivered, are heard with applause, if they are perused when written, will appear to be unpolished and inaccurate; the reason of which is that they are merely adapted to forensic contests. Hence, those which are adapted to action, when deprived of action, in consequence of not accomplishing their proper work appear to be jejune. Thus for instance, disjointed sentences, and frequent repetition, are rightly rejected in the diction pertaining to writing; but rhetoricians use these in the diction which belongs to the bar; for both these are adapted to action. This repetition, however, ought to be delivered with a change of the voice; which as it were prepares the way for action; as, “He it is who robbed you; he it is who deceived you; he it is who at last endeavoured to betray you;” as Philemon the player also did, whilst he acted in the Gerontomaria of Anaxandrides, when Rhadamanthus and Palamedes speak; and also in the prologue of the play called the Pious, where I is frequently repeated. For if such repetitions are not accompanied with action, the actor, according to the proverb, will seem to carry a beam. The like also must be observed with respect to disjointed sentences; such as, I came, I met him, I requested him. For it is necessary that these should be accompanied with action, and not, as if only one thing was said, pronounced with the same manner, and the same tone of voice. Farther still, disjointed diction, possesses something peculiar; since in an equal time, many things appear to be said. For the conjunction or connective copula causes many things to be one; so that if it is taken away, it is evident that on the contrary one thing will be many. Hence, he amplifies who says, “I came, I spoke to him, I supplicated him much; but he seems to despise whatever I have said, whatever I do say.” Homer also intends to do this, when speaking of Nireus in the 2d book of the Iliad, he says, “Three ships with Nireus sought the Trojan shore, Nireus, whom Aglӓe to Charopus bore, Nireus, in faultless shape and blooming grace, The loveliest youth of all the Grecian race.” For he of whom many things are said, must necessarily be frequently mentioned. If, therefore, he is frequently mentioned, many things also appear to be said of him. Hence, Homer though he has only mentioned Nireus in one place, amplifies from paralogism, and mentions him here, though he did not intend to mention him in any other place afterwards. The diction therefore adapted to popular harangues perfectly resembles sciagraphy; for the greater the number of the spectators, the more remotely is such a picture to be seen. Hence, in both accuracy is superfluous, and both become worse through it. But judicial diction is more accurate; and it is requisite that the diction should be still more accurate, which is addressed to one judge; for this is the least thing in rhetorical diction. For that which is appropriate to, and that which is foreign from a thing, are more easily perceived. In this case, also, contention is absent; so that the judgement is pure. Hence, the same rhetoricians are not celebrated in all these kinds of diction; but where action is especially necessary, there accuracy is in the smallest degree requisite. And where voice, and especially a loud one is required, there action is necessary. Demonstrative diction, therefore, is most proper for writing; for demonstrative orations are composed in order that they may be read. But judicial diction is the next in order. It is however superfluous to divide diction into the pleasing and magnificent. For why may it not as well be divided into the temperate and liberal, or into any other ethical virtues. For it is evident that the particulars already mentioned will render it pleasing, if the virtue of diction has been rightly defined by us. For why ought it to be perspicuous, and not abject, but decorous; since it will not be perspicuous either if it be verbose, or concise; but it is evident that the medium between these is appropriate. The particulars, also, before-mentioned, render diction pleasing, if usual and foreign words are well mingled together, and likewise rythm, and that which is calculated to persuade from the decorous. And thus much concerning diction, as well in common about every, as in particular about each genus.


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