Let us now show what we mean by placing a thing before the eyes, and what is to be done in order to effect this. I say then, that those words place a thing before the eyes which signify things energizing. Thus for instance to say “That a good man is a square” is metaphorical; for both a good man and a square are perfect; but it does not signify energy. But to say, “Possessing a flourishing acme” signifies energy. Likewise to say, “But you as liberated,” indicates energy. And, “Then with impetuous feet forth rush’d the Greeks.”
Here the word impetuous is energy, and a metaphor. Thus too energy is every where exhibited by Homer, who speaks of inanimate things as animated, through a metaphor. But to produce energy in every thing as he does is very much applauded; as in the following instances,
“Back on the ground then roll’d the shameless stone.” And, “The arrow flew.” And, “Longing to strike.” And, “Trojan and Grecian darts in earth then stood, And long’d to gorge themselves with human blood.” And, “The furious pointed dart then pierc’d his breast.” For in all these instances, because the things are animated, they appear to energize. For to be shameless and furious, &c. are energies. But Homer has added these through metaphor from analogy. For as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is an impudent person to him whom he impudently torments. Homer, likewise, in his celebrated images attributes to inanimate things the proper energies of such as are animated, as, “Th’ afflicted deeps tumultuous mix and roar; The waves behind impel the waves before, Wide-rolling, foaming high, and tumbling to the shore.”
For he makes every thing moving and living; but energy is imitation. Metaphors, however, ought to be derived, as we have before observed, from things familiar and not obvious; just as in philosophy, it is the province of a sagacious man to survey the similar in things very different from each other, as Archytas says, “That an arbiter and an altar are the same thing; for he who is injured flies to both these.” Or if some one should say “That an anchor and cremastra are the same thing.” For both perform an office which is in a certain respect the same; but they differ in this, that the one is fixed above, and the other beneath. To say also that cities are anomalous is another instance of an appropriate metaphor taken from things very dissimilar. For as a superfices is said to be anomalous because one part rises above another, so a city may be said to be anomalous when some of the citizens in it surpass others in power. Polite diction, however, is for the most part effected through metaphor and previous deception. For the diction which not only causes us to learn something of which we were before ignorant, but also something about which we had been before deceived, is more polite and pleasant, since the mind passing from error to truth is delighted, and says to itself, “How true is this which I have learnt? I was in an error.” Of apothegms, likewise, those are polite, which imply something different from what the words at first seem to signify; as that apothegm of Stesichorus, “That the grasshoppers would sing to them on the ground.” Good enigmas, also, are for the same reason pleasing; for they cause us to learn something, and are metaphorical. And as Theodorus says, “It is pleasing to say something new.” But this is effected, when what is said is paradoxical, and (as he says) is not conformable to prior opinion; but as in ridiculous assertions is slightly transformed. This likewise is capable of being effected by jests, in which the letters of the words are somewhat changed; for these pleasantly deceive the hearer. And also in verse; for something is said different from what the hearer expected. “He walk’d along, with chilblains (χɩμετλɑ) on his feet.” But the hearer expected it would have been said that he had sandals (πεδɩλɑ) on his feet. This kind of jest, however, ought to be immediately manifest. Paragrams, or jests formed by the mutation of letters are produced, when that is not signified which the word at first sight seemed to signify, as that jest of Theodorus upon Nicon the harper. For Nicon having been vexed by a certain person, Theodorus deriding him said θραττη σε, which appears as if he had said, “He disturbs you,” θραττεɩ σε, and deceives the hearer. For in reality he said, “He makes you a Thracian.” Hence, this is pleasing to him who learns the true meaning of what is said. For unless the hearer apprehended that Nicon was a Thracian, the jest would not appear to be polite. Thus, also, to say Βουλει ɑυτον πεpσαɩ, seems at the first view to signify “Are you willing to vex him?” But the true meaning is, “are you willing to make him a favourer of the Persians, and a betrayer of the Greeks?” It is requisite, however, that each sense of the ambiguous word should be adapted to him of whom it is said. Another example is such as the following: “The arche of the sea was not to the Athenians the arche of evils; for they derived advantage from it.” And as Isocrates says, “The arche of the sea was to the city i.e. to the Athenians the arche of evils.” For in both these instances the real meaning is different from what at the first view it appears to be, and the hearer knows that what is asserted is true. For to say “that arche was arche, is to say nothing to the purpose; but this is not what is said in the above instances; nor is that denied which is asserted, but the word has another meaning. In all these instances, however, if the word is appropriately employed, whether it be an homonymous word, or a metaphor, then the diction is proper. As if the name of some one were Anaschetus (ανασχετος) and it should be said that Anaschetus is not anaschetus, i.e. importunate; for he who says this denies the homonymous signification of the word. And this is appropriately effected, if the word is always used twice. Again, “O hospes i.e. guest you will not become more hospes than is requisite.” And, it is not necessary that hopes should always be hopes.” For this also is foreign. The same thing also is effected in the celebrated saying of Anaxandrides. “It is a beautiful thing to die, prior to having done any thing deserving of death.” For this is the same thing as to say, “It is worth while to die, when not deserving to die,” Or, “It is worth while to die, when not deserving of death, or not doing things worthy of death.” The form of diction, therefore, is the same in these instances; but in proportion as they are shorter, and contain a greater opposition, in such proportion they are more elegant and pleasing. The cause, however, of this is, that we in a greater degree learn something from opposition; and that this is more rapidly effected by brevity. But it is always necessary that the person should be present on whom the thing is said, or that it should be rightly said, if the assertion is true, and not superficial; for these two things may exist separately. Thus for instance, to say, “It is necessary to die free from all faults;” and “It is requisite that a worthy man should marry a worthy woman,” is true, but is not politely said. But to say, ” It is worth while to die, when not deserving to die,” is both true, and politely said. The diction, also, will appear to be more polite, the more it contains of those things from which politeness is derived; as, if the words are metaphorical, and metaphors of such a kind, and if there is antithesis, adequation and energy. Images, likewise, as we have before observed, are always after a manner approved metaphors; for they are always derived from two things, in the same manner as an analogous metaphor. Thus we say that a shield is the cup of Mars, and that a bow is a stringless harp. When we thus speak, however, the assertion is not simple. But to say that a bow is a harp, or a shield a cup, is a simple assertion. They assimilate, however, as follows: as, a player on the flute to an ape; and a short-sighted man to a trickling lamp; for in both there is a contraction. But images are celebrated when they contain a metaphor. For it is to assimilate to say that a shield is the cup of Mars; that a ruinous building is a worn out garment; and that Niceratus, according to the assimilation of Thrasymachus, was Philoctetes bit by the poet Pratys. For Thrasymachus said this, in consequence of seeing Niceratus vanquished by Pratys in a poetical contest, and through this neglecting his person. In these similitudes, however; poets fail unless they are proper, even if they are celebrated. I mean for instance, when they say, “He carries legs like parsley bent.” And, “As Philammon with Corycus yok’d In contest.” And all such things are images. But that images are metaphors has been frequently observed by us. Proverbs likewise are metaphors from species to species, i.e. in which one species is predicated of another on account of agreement in the same genus. Thus of him who expects to derive advantage from a certain thing, if he should afterwards suffer a loss from it, it is said, as the Carpathian the hare. For both suffered the evil we have mentioned. And thus we have nearly assigned the cause whence and why diction is polite. Celebrated hyperboles also are metaphors; as of one who had contusions on his face, “You would have thought him to be a basket of mulberries;” for the part under the eyes is red; but this hyperbole is much too great. An hyperbole, however, may differ from an hyperbole in the diction; as, instead of saying Philammon yoked in contest with Corycus, it might be said, “You would have thought it was Philammon fighting with Corycus.” And instead of saying, “He carried legs as distorted as parsley,” it might be said, “I should have thought that he had not legs but parsley, they are so distorted.” Hyperboles, however, are puerile; for they indicate a vehement motion of the soul. Hence, they are especially used by those who are angry. Thus Achilles, in Iliad 9, speaks hyperbolically, when he says he is not to be appeased by the gifts of Agamemnon,
“Tho’ bribes were heap’d on bribes in number more, Than dust in fields, or sands along the shore.” And, “Atrides’ daughter never shall be led, An ill match’d consort to Achilles’ bed; Like golden Venus though she charm’d the heart, Or vied with Pallas in the works of art.”
The Attic rhetoricians, also, especially use hyperboles; on which account it is unbecoming in an old man to speak hyperbolically.
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