Those however, to whom men are grateful, and in what they are grateful, or how they are affected when they are so, will be evident when we have defined what a favour or kindness is. Let a favour therefore, be that according to which he who possesses a thing, is said to confer a favour on him who is in want of it, not that he may receive any thing from him, nor that any advantage may accrue to the giver, but that he who is in want may be benefited. But a favour is great when it is conferred, either on one who is very much in want of it, or the favour itself consists of things which are great and difficult to obtain, or is bestowed opportunely, or when he who bestows it is the only one, or the first that bestows it, or who especially bestows it. Wants, however, are appetites or desires, and of these particularly such as are accompanied with pain when the desired object is not obtained. But of this kind, are such desires as love, and also those which take place in the maladies of the body, and in dangers; for he who is in danger desires, and likewise he who is in pain. Hence, those who relieve men that are in poverty or in exile, though the relief be but small, yet on account of the magnitude of the want, and the seasonableness of the relief, they confer a favour; as was the case with him who gave a mat in the Lyceum. It is necessary, therefore, that he who confers a favour must especially confer it in the above-mentioned circumstances; but if not in these, in such as are equal or greater. Hence, since it is evident when and in what things a favour is to be conferred, and how those are affected that bestow a favour, it is likewise manifest that from hence, arguments must be derived for the purpose of showing that others are or have been in such like pain and want, and that those who relieved them in such want, relieved them by supplying what was mentioned. It is likewise manifest whence it may be shown that a favour has not been conferred, and that no gratitude is due, either by evincing that it is or has been conferred for the sake of those that bestowed it; and that is not a favour. Or it may be shown that it was conferred casually, or by compulsion. Or that a kindness was returned, but not conferred, whether knowingly or not; for in both ways one thing is given for another; so that neither in this way will it be a favour. What we have said likewise must be considered in all the categories. For it is a favour, either because this particular thing is given, or so much, or a thing of such a quality, or at such a time, or in such a place. But the signs that a favour has not been conferred are if less has been done than at another time. And if the same, or equal, or greater things have been conferred on enemies; for it is evident in this case, that these things have not been bestowed for our sakes. Or if things of a vile nature have been bestowed knowingly; for no one will acknowledge that he is in want of vile things. And thus much concerning conferring and not conferring a favour.
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