What kind of things, however, those are which are the objects of shame, and also those for which men are not ashamed, and towards what persons they are ashamed, and how they are disposed when under the influence of this passion, will be evident from what follows. But let shame be a certain pain and perturbation with respect to evils either present, or past, or future, which apparently lead to infamy. And let want of shame or impudence be a certain contempt and impassivity with respect to these very same things. If, therefore, shame is that which we have defined it to be, a man must necessarily be ashamed of evils of such a kind as appear to him to be base, or to those whom he regards. But things of this kind are such deeds as proceed from vice; such for instance as, for a soldier to throw away his shield in battle or fly; for this proceeds from timidity. It is likewise base to deny a deposit; for this is the effect of injustice. And also to lie with women with whom it is not lawful to lie, or where it is not proper, or when it is not proper; for this proceeds from intemperance. It is likewise base, to seek after gain from minute, or disgraceful, or impossible things; as from the poor or the dead; whence also the proverb, to take away from the dead; for this proceeds from a desire of base gain, and from illiberality. It is also base for a man not to assist others with money when he is able, or to assist in a less degree than he is able. Likewise for a man to receive pecuniary assistance from one less rich than himself, is base; and for him to take up money at interest, and yet seem to beg; to beg, and yet seem to demand; to demand, and yet seem to beg; to praise a thing, so as that he may appear to beg it; and though repulsed, to persist no less in begging it. For all these are indications of illiberality. It is likewise base to praise a man to his face; for this is a sign of flattery; also to praise above measure what is good, but extenuate what is evil; to condole immoderately with one who is afflicted; and every thing else of a similar kind; for these are indications of flattery. It is also base not to endure labours which more elderly or delicate men, or those that have greater authority, or in short those that are more imbecil endure; for all these are indications of effeminacy. To be benefited likewise by another, and that frequently is base; and also to reprobate the benefits conferred on another. For all these are indications of pusillanimity and an abject mind. It is also base for a man to speak of himself, and to promise great things of himself; and likewise to attribute to himself the deeds of others; for this is a sign of arrogance. In a similar manner in each of the other ethical vices, works, and indications, the like may be found; for they are base and shameful. In addition to these things also, it is shameful not to participate of those beautiful things of which all men, or all those that resemble each other, or most men participate. But by men that resemble each other I mean, those of the same nation, city, and age, and who are allied to each other; and in short, those that are of an equal condition. For it is now base not to partake of these things; as for instance, of such a portion of erudition, and of other things in a similar manner. But all these are more shameful when they are seen to happen to any one from himself; for thus they proceed in a greater degree from vice, when a man is the cause to himself, of past, present, or future evils. Men likewise are ashamed of such things as lead to infamy and disgrace if they suffer or have suffered, or are to suffer them; and these are such things as pertain to the ministrant services either of the body, or of base works, among the number of which is having the body abused. Things also are shameful which pertain to intemperance, whether voluntary or involuntary; but things which pertain to violence are involuntary. For the endurance of such things unattended with revenge proceeds from sloth and timidity. These, therefore, and the like are the things of which men are ashamed. Since, however, shame is an imagination with respect to ignominy, and shame, on account of ignominy itself, and not on account of the evils which attend it; but no one pays any attention to opinion except on account of those who form the opinion, men must necessarily feel shame in the presence of those whom they regard when they have acted wrong. But they regard those who admire them, and those whom they admire, those by whom they wish to be admired, and with whom they contend for honours, and whose opinion they do not despise. They wish, therefore, to be admired by, and they admire those, who are in possession of some good which is honourable, or from whom they very much wish to obtain something which it is in their power to give them; as for instance, is the case with lovers. Men, however, contend for honours with those that resemble themselves. But they pay attention to prudent men, as to persons of veracity; and men of this kind are such as are more elderly, and the erudite. Men also are ashamed of what is before their eyes, and is done openly; whence the proverb that shame is in the eyes. On this account they are more ashamed before those that are always present with them, and who pay attention to them, because both these are before their eyes. They are likewise ashamed before those who are not obnoxious to the same crimes as themselves; for it is evident that the opinions of the latter are contrary to those of the former. Before those also they are ashamed who are not disposed to pardon such as appear to act wrong; for that which a man does himself he is said not to be indignant with in his neighbours; so that it is evident he will be indignant with crimes which he does not commit himself. They are likewise ashamed before those who divulge to many persons any thing they have done amiss; for there is no difference between the not appearing to have done wrong, and the not divulging it. But those divulge the faults of others who have been injured by them, because they observe their conduct, and also those who are given to defamation (for if they defame those who have not acted wrong, much more will they defame those that have.) Those also divulge what they see or hear who are attentive to the faults of others, such as those that deride and comic poets; for in a certain respect they are given to defamation and are babblers. Men likewise are ashamed before those by whom they have never been repulsed, but have obtained what they wished; for they are disposed towards them, as towards persons whom they admire. Hence, also they feel shame before those who have for the first time asked any thing of them, as not having yet done any thing by which they might lose their good opinion. Of this kind likewise are such as recently wish to be friends; for they have perceived qualities of the most excellent nature in us. Hence, the answer of Euripides to the Syracusans was well, when they desired his friendship. Among those likewise who were formerly known to us we feel shame before such of them as are not conscious of any crime we may have committed. Men also are not only ashamed of disgraceful things, but of the indications of such things. Thus for instance they are not only ashamed of the act of venery, but likewise of the indications of it; and not only when they do base things, but when they speak of them. In a similar manner also, they are not only ashamed before the above-mentioned persons, but before those who may divulge their actions to them, such as the servants and friends of these. In short, men are not ashamed before those whose opinion with respect to veracity, is despised by many persons; for no one is ashamed before children and brutes. Nor are men ashamed of the same things before persons that they know, and those who are unknown to them; but before those whom they know, they are ashamed of such things as are base in reality, and before those that are unknown, of such things as are legally base. Men likewise when they are ashamed, are affected in the following manner. In the first place, when they are present with persons of such a description as we have shown those to be before whom they are ashamed; but these were such as are either admired by them, or who admire them, or by whom they wish to be admired, or from whom they are in want of something advantageous, which they will not obtain if they are without renown. Men also are ashamed when they are seen by such persons as these, as Cydias the orator said respecting the division of the lands in Samos; for he desired the Athenians to suppose that they were surrounded by the Greeks in a circle, not only as hearers, but as spectators of their decrees. And they are likewise ashamed, if such persons are near them, or are likely to be spectators of their actions. Hence, those that are unfortunate are unwilling to be seen by those that emulate them; for emulators are admirers. Men also are ashamed when they have any thing which disgraces the actions and affairs, either of themselves, or of their ancestors, or of certain other persons, with whom they have any alliance; and in short, they are ashamed before those of whom they are themselves ashamed. But these are such persons as the above mentioned, and those who are referred to them, of whom they have been the preceptors or counsellors. They are likewise ashamed if there are other persons resembling themselves with whom they contend for honorary distinctions; for from shame they both do and omit to do many things on account of men of this description. Men also feel more ashamed when they are about to be seen, and converse openly with those who are conscious of their actions. Hence, Antipho the poet when he was led to punishment by the command of Dionysius, on seeing those who were to be executed with him, having their faces covered as they passed through the gates of the prison, said, why do you cover your faces? ‘Will any one of these see you tomorrow? And thus much concerning shame. But with respect to impudence, it is evident that we shall abound with what is to be said about it from contraries.
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