To pity, however, that passion is especially opposed which they call indignation. For to the pain arising from adverse circumstances in which some one is undeservedly involved, the pain is after a certain manner opposed, which arises from the same manners, on account of the prosperity which some one unworthily obtains. And both these passions are the offspring of worthy manners. For it is necessary to condole and compassionate those who are undeservedly unfortunate in their affairs; and to be indignant with those who are undeservedly prosperous. For that which happens to any one contrary to his desert is unjust. Hence, also, we attribute indignation to the gods. Envy, likewise, may appear to be after the same manner opposed to pity, as being proximate to and the same with indignation. It is however different from it. For envy also is a turbulent pain arising from the prosperity of another person but is not a pain arising from undeserved prosperity, but from the prosperity of one who is equal and similar to him who is envious. Both these passions, however, agree in this, that each is pained for the prosperity of another, because he is prosperous, and not because any evil arises from thence to the subject of these passions. For if this were not the case, one of these passions would no longer be envy, and the other indignation; but each would be fear, if pain and perturbation were produced, because some evil would befal the subject of these passions from the prosperity of another.
It is however evident that contrary passions are consequent to these perturbations. For he who is pained on account of the unmerited prosperity of others, will rejoice, or at least will be without pain, on account of the contraries to these, viz. those who are deservedly unfortunate. Thus for instance, no worthy person will be pained, when parricides and murderers are punished. For it is necessary to rejoice in the misfortunes of such persons. After the same manner, also, it is proper to rejoice in the prosperity of those who are deservedly fortunate. For both these are just, and cause a worthy man to rejoice; since it is necessary he should hope the same prosperity will also befal him which befel one who resembles him. And all these passions belong to the same manners. But the contraries to these belong to contrary manners. For it is the same person who rejoices in the evils of another, and who is envious; since he who is pained at that which befals and is present with some one, must necessarily rejoice at the privation, and destruction of that thing. Hence, all these passions are impediments to pity; but they differ from the above-mentioned causes; so that all of them are similarly useful for the prevention of pity. In the first place, therefore, let us speak concerning indignation, and show with what persons, and on account of what circumstances we are indignant, and how those who are indignant are affected; and afterwards, let us speak concerning the other passions. But from what has been said, it is evident with what persons men are, indignant. For if to be indignant is to be pained on account of some one who appears to be undeservedly prosperous, in the first place it is evident, that we cannot be indignant on account of every good. For if a man is just or brave, or has any virtue, no one can be indignant with him; nor are those the objects of pity who are contrary to these. But men are indignant at riches and power, and things of this kind, of which in short, good men are worthy. Nor are men indignant with those who possess any thing which is naturally good, such as nobility, beauty, and the like. Since, however, that which is ancient appears to be something proximate to what is naturally possessed, it necessarily follows that men are more indignant with those who possess the same good, if they have recently possessed it, and on account of this are in prosperous circumstances; for those who have recently become rich are the cause of greater molestation to others, than those whose wealth is ancient, and by descent. In a similar manner, also, rulers, powerful men, those who have numerous friends, and an excellent progeny, and whatever else is of the like kind, occasion greater molestation to others. And this is also the case if any other good befals them on account of these things. For we are more indignant with those who are recently rich when they become rulers through their riches, than with those who have been for a long time in possession of wealth; and in a similar manner in other things. The cause, however, of this is, that those who have for a long time possessed wealth, appear to possess what is their own; but this is not the case with those who have recently become rich. For that which appears to have always been possessed, appears to be truly possessed; so that persons of the latter description, do not seem to possess what is their own. Because, likewise, any casual person is not worthy of every good, but there is a certain analogy and fitness; (since for instance, the beauty of arms is not adapted to a just, but to a brave man, and illustrious marriages are not adapted to those who have recently become rich, but to those of noble birth)—hence, if a man is a worthy character, and does not obtain that which is adapted to him so far as he is worthy, we are indignant. We are likewise indignant when an inferior contends with his superior, and especially when he contends with him in that in which he is inferior. On this account it is said by Homer, Hence did Cebriones in combat shun, T’ engage the valiant son of Telamon; For his presuming pride offended Jove, That with a better man he durst his courage prove. And we are also indignant if he contends with him in any thing else, and not only in that in which he is inferior; as if for instance, a musician should contend with a just man; for justice is a thing more excellent than music. From these things, therefore, it is evident what are the objects of indignation, and why they are so; for they are these, and things of a like nature. But men are disposed to be indignant, if being worthy to obtain the greatest goods, they do not obtain them; for it is not just to think those persons worthy to obtain a similar good, who are not similarly worthy; and when men of this description become the possessors of similar good, worthy men are indignant. In the second place good and worthy men are prone to be indignant; for they judge well, and hate what is unjust. Those, likewise, are indignant who are ambitious, and who aspire after certain actions; and especially when they are ambitious about those things which others obtain, that are unworthy to obtain them. And in short, those who think themselves deserving of that good, which other persons think them not to deserve, are indignant with such persons, and especially when they obtain this good. Hence, men of a servile disposition, bad men, and those who are not ambitious, are not prone to indignation; for there is nothing of this kind of which they think themselves worthy. From these things, however, it is manifest what kind of persons those are for whose misfortunes and evils, or the frustration of their wishes, we ought to rejoice, or feel no pain; for from what has been said the opposites are apparent. Hence, unless the oration so prepares the judges when their compassion is sollicited, as to convince them that those who implore their pity are unworthy to receive it, and that those who do not implore it are worthy to receive it, it is impossible to excite pity in the judges.
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